1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
237 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
239 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
240 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
241 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
244 /// Number of bytes in the id.
245 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
248 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
249 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
254 impl Readable for PaymentId {
255 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
256 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
261 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
262 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
263 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
267 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
269 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
270 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
271 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
273 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
279 impl Readable for InterceptId {
280 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
286 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
287 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
288 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
289 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
290 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
293 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
296 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
297 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
300 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
304 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
305 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
306 (0, short_channel_id, required),
307 (2, htlc_id, required),
309 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
310 (0, session_priv, required),
315 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
316 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
317 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
318 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
319 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
322 session_priv: SecretKey,
323 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
324 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
325 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
326 payment_id: PaymentId,
329 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
330 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
331 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
333 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
335 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
337 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
340 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
341 payment_id.hash(hasher);
342 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
348 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
350 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
351 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
352 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
353 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
354 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
355 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
361 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
362 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
363 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
364 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
366 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
372 struct InboundOnionErr {
378 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
379 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
381 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
382 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
383 pub enum FailureCode {
384 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
385 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
386 TemporaryNodeFailure,
387 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
388 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
389 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
390 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
391 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
392 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
393 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
394 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
395 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
396 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
398 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
399 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
400 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
403 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
404 fn into(self) -> u16 {
406 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
407 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
408 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
409 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
414 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
415 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
416 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
417 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
418 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
420 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
421 err: msgs::LightningError,
422 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
423 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
424 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
426 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
428 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
430 err: LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
440 shutdown_finish: None,
441 channel_capacity: None,
445 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
446 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
449 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
451 err: LightningError {
453 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
454 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
460 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
461 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
462 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
466 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
469 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
471 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
472 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
476 log_level: Level::Warn,
479 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
483 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
485 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
486 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
494 shutdown_finish: None,
495 channel_capacity: None,
500 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
501 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
502 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
503 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
504 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
506 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
507 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
508 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
509 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
510 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
511 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
512 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
514 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
518 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
519 struct ClaimingPayment {
521 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
522 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
523 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
524 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
526 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
527 (0, amount_msat, required),
528 (2, payment_purpose, required),
529 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
530 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
531 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
534 struct ClaimablePayment {
535 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
536 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
537 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
540 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
541 struct ClaimablePayments {
542 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
543 /// failed/claimed by the user.
545 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
546 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
548 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
549 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
550 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
552 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
553 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
554 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
555 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
558 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
559 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
560 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
561 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
562 enum BackgroundEvent {
563 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
564 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
565 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
566 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
568 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
569 /// are regenerated on startup.
570 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
571 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
572 /// channel to continue normal operation.
574 /// In general this should be used rather than
575 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
576 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
577 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
579 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
580 /// are regenerated on startup.
581 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
582 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
583 funding_txo: OutPoint,
584 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
586 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
587 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
589 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
590 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
591 channel_id: ChannelId,
596 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
597 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
598 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
599 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
600 /// event can be generated.
601 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
602 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
603 /// operation of another channel.
605 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
606 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
607 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
608 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
610 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
611 event: events::Event,
612 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
616 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
617 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
618 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
619 (0, event, upgradable_required),
620 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
621 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
622 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
623 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
624 // downgrades to prior versions.
625 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
629 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
630 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
631 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
632 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
633 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
636 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
637 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
638 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
639 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
643 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
644 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
645 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
646 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
647 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
648 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
650 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
651 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
652 channel_id: ChannelId,
653 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
658 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
659 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
660 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
661 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
662 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
667 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
668 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
672 /// State we hold per-peer.
673 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
674 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
676 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
677 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
678 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
680 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
681 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
682 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
683 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
684 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
685 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
686 latest_features: InitFeatures,
687 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
688 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
689 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
690 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
691 /// user but which have not yet completed.
693 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
694 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
695 /// for a missing channel.
696 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
697 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
698 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
700 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
701 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
702 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
703 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
705 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
706 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
707 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
708 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
709 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
710 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
711 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
712 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
713 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
714 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
715 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
716 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
717 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
718 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
719 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
723 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
724 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
725 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
726 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
727 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
728 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
731 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
732 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
733 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
736 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
737 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
738 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
741 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
742 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
743 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
744 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
748 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
749 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
750 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
751 /// The original OpenChannel message.
752 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
753 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
754 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
757 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
758 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
759 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
761 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
762 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
764 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
767 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
768 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
769 struct PendingInboundPayment {
770 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
771 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
772 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
773 /// this payment being removed.
775 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
776 user_payment_id: u64,
777 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
778 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
779 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
782 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
783 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
784 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
785 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
786 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
787 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
788 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
789 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
791 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
792 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
800 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
802 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
803 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
804 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
809 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
810 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
811 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
812 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
813 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
814 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
815 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
816 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
817 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
819 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
820 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
829 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
831 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
832 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
833 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
838 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
839 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
840 $vis trait AChannelManager {
841 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
842 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
843 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
844 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
845 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
846 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
847 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
848 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
849 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
850 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
851 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
852 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
853 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
854 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
855 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
856 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
857 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
858 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
861 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
862 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
863 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
864 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
865 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
866 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
868 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
869 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
870 ES::Target: EntropySource,
871 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
872 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
873 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
877 type Watch = M::Target;
879 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
881 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
883 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
885 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
886 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
888 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
890 type Router = R::Target;
892 type Logger = L::Target;
894 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
897 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
898 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
900 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
901 /// to individual Channels.
903 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
904 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
905 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
906 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
908 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
909 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
910 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
911 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
912 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
913 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
914 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
916 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
917 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
918 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
920 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
921 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
922 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
923 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
924 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
926 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
927 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
928 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
929 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
931 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
932 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
933 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
935 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
936 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
937 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
938 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
939 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
941 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
942 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
943 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
944 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
945 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
946 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
947 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
948 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
951 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
952 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
953 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
954 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
955 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
959 // `total_consistency_lock`
961 // |__`forward_htlcs`
963 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
965 // |__`per_peer_state`
967 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
969 // | |__`claimable_payments`
971 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
977 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
979 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
983 // | |__`pending_events`
985 // | |__`pending_background_events`
987 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
989 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
990 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
991 ES::Target: EntropySource,
992 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
993 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
994 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
998 default_configuration: UserConfig,
999 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1000 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1006 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1008 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1010 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1011 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1013 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1014 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1015 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1016 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1018 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1019 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1021 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1022 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1023 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1024 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1025 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1026 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1027 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1028 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1030 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1032 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1033 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1035 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1037 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1038 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1039 /// and via the classic SCID.
1041 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1042 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1044 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1046 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1048 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1049 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1050 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1052 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1053 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1055 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1056 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1058 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1059 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1061 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1062 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1063 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1064 /// active channel list on load.
1066 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1067 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1069 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1071 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1072 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1073 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1075 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1076 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1077 /// the handling of the events.
1079 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1080 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1083 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1084 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1085 /// would break backwards compatability.
1086 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1087 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1088 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1090 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1091 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1093 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1095 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1096 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1097 /// confirmation depth.
1099 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1100 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1101 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1103 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1105 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1107 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1109 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1111 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1113 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1114 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1115 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1117 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1118 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1120 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1121 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1122 /// keeping additional state.
1123 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1125 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1126 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1127 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1128 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1130 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1131 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1133 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1134 /// are currently open with that peer.
1136 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1137 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1140 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1142 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1143 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1144 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1145 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1146 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1148 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1149 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1150 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1151 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1152 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1154 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1155 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1157 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1158 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1159 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1160 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1161 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1163 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1164 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1166 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1167 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1168 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1169 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1170 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1172 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1174 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1176 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1177 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1178 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1179 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1180 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1181 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1182 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1183 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1184 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1186 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1188 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1192 signer_provider: SP,
1197 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1199 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1200 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1201 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1202 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1203 pub struct ChainParameters {
1204 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1205 pub network: Network,
1207 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1209 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1210 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1213 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1220 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1221 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1222 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1223 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1224 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1225 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1227 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1228 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1229 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1230 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1231 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1233 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1234 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1237 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1238 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1239 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1240 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1242 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1243 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1244 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1245 _read_guard: read_guard,
1250 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1251 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1252 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1253 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1255 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1256 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1257 should_persist: persist_check,
1258 _read_guard: read_guard,
1263 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1264 fn drop(&mut self) {
1265 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1266 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1271 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1272 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1274 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1276 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1277 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1278 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1279 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1280 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1282 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1283 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1285 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1287 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1288 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1289 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1290 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1291 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1292 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1293 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1294 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1295 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1296 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1297 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1298 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1299 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1301 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1302 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1304 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1305 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1306 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1307 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1309 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1310 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1311 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1312 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1313 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1314 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1317 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1319 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1320 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1323 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1325 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1326 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1328 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1329 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1330 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1332 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1333 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1334 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1336 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1337 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1338 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1339 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1341 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1342 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1343 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1345 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1346 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1347 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1349 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1350 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1351 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1352 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1353 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1354 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1355 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1356 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1357 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1358 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1359 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1362 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1363 /// to better separate parameters.
1364 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1365 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1366 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1367 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1368 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1369 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1370 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1371 pub features: InitFeatures,
1372 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1373 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1374 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1376 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1378 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1379 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1380 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1381 /// payments to us through this channel.
1382 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1383 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1384 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1385 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1386 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1387 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1388 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1391 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1393 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1394 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1397 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1398 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1399 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1400 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1401 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1402 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1403 /// lifetime of the channel.
1404 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1405 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1406 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1407 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1408 /// our counterparty already.
1410 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1411 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1412 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1413 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1415 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1416 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1417 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1418 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1420 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1421 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1423 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1424 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1426 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1427 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1428 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1429 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1430 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1431 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1432 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1433 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1434 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1437 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1439 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1440 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1441 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1442 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1443 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1444 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1445 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1447 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1448 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1450 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1451 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1452 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1453 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1454 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1455 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1456 /// this value on chain.
1458 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1460 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1462 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1463 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1464 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1465 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1466 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1467 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1468 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1470 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1471 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1472 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1473 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1474 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1475 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1477 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1478 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1479 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1480 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1481 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1482 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1484 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1485 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1486 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1487 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1488 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1489 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1490 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1491 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1493 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1494 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1495 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1496 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1497 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1498 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1499 /// route which is valid.
1500 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1501 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1502 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1503 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1504 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1505 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1507 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1508 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1509 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1510 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1511 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1512 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1513 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1514 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1515 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1517 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1519 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1520 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1521 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1522 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1523 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1525 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1526 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1527 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1528 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1529 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1530 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1531 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1533 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1534 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1535 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1536 pub is_outbound: bool,
1537 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1538 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1539 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1540 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1541 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1543 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1544 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1545 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1546 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1547 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1548 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1549 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1551 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1552 pub is_usable: bool,
1553 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1554 pub is_public: bool,
1555 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1556 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1557 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1558 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1559 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1560 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1562 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1563 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1566 impl ChannelDetails {
1567 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1568 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1569 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1571 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1572 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1573 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1574 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1577 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1578 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1579 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1581 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1582 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1583 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1584 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1587 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1588 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1589 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1592 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1593 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1595 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1596 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1597 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1599 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1600 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1601 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1602 features: latest_features,
1603 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1604 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1605 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1606 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1607 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1608 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1609 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1610 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1611 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1612 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1614 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1615 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1616 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1617 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1618 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1619 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1620 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1621 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1622 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1623 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1624 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1625 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1626 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1627 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1628 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1629 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1630 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1631 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1632 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1633 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1634 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1635 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1636 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1637 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1638 config: Some(context.config()),
1639 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1644 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1645 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1646 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1647 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1648 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1649 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1650 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1651 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1652 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1654 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1656 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1657 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1659 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1660 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1661 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1662 /// to drop the channel.
1666 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1667 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1668 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1669 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1670 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1672 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1673 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1674 payment_id: PaymentId,
1676 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1678 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1679 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1680 payment_id: PaymentId,
1681 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1683 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1684 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1685 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1688 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1689 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1690 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1692 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1693 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1694 payment_id: PaymentId,
1695 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1696 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1697 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1699 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1700 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1701 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1703 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1704 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1705 payment_id: PaymentId,
1706 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1707 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1711 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1713 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1715 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1716 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1717 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1718 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1720 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1721 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1722 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1725 macro_rules! handle_error {
1726 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1727 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1728 // entering the macro.
1729 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1730 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1734 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1735 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1737 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1738 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1739 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1740 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1744 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1745 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1746 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1747 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1748 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1749 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1754 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1755 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1757 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1758 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1759 action: err.action.clone()
1763 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1764 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1765 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1766 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1767 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1771 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1776 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1779 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1780 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1781 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1787 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1788 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1789 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1790 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1791 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1792 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1794 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1795 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1796 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1797 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1798 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1800 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1801 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1803 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1807 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1808 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1809 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1811 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1812 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1814 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1815 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1817 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1818 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1819 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1820 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1821 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1822 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1824 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1825 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1829 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1830 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1832 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1833 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1835 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1836 match $channel_phase {
1837 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1838 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1840 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1841 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1843 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1844 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1850 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1851 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1855 let key = *$entry.key();
1856 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1858 $entry.remove_entry();
1866 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1867 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1871 let key = *$entry.key();
1872 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1874 $entry.remove_entry();
1882 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1883 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1885 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1886 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1892 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1893 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1894 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1895 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1896 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1898 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1899 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1900 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1901 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1902 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1903 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1904 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1905 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1906 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1907 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1912 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1913 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1914 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1915 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1916 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1917 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1918 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1919 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1920 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1922 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1927 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1928 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1929 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1930 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1931 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1932 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1933 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1934 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1935 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1937 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1942 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1943 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1944 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1945 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1946 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1947 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1948 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1949 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1950 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1951 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1952 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1954 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1955 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1956 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1962 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1963 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1965 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1966 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1967 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1968 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1969 updates.announcement_sigs);
1970 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1971 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1974 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1975 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1976 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1978 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1980 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1981 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1983 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1984 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1985 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1986 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1991 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1992 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1993 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1994 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1995 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1996 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1998 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1999 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2000 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2003 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
2004 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
2005 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2006 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
2007 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
2008 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
2009 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
2010 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
2014 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2020 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2021 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2022 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2023 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2025 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2026 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2027 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2028 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2030 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2032 debug_assert!(false);
2033 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2034 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2035 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2036 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2037 $chan_entry.remove();
2041 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2042 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2043 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2044 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2045 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2046 // filter for uniqueness here.
2047 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2048 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2049 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2050 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2052 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2053 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2054 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2056 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2057 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2058 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2062 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2063 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2064 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2065 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2067 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2069 debug_assert!(false);
2070 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2071 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2072 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2073 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2074 $chan_entry.remove();
2080 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2081 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2082 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2083 while !processed_all_events {
2084 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2088 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2091 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2092 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2093 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2095 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2096 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2097 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2099 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2100 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2101 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2102 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2106 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2107 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2108 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2109 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2112 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2114 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2115 $event_to_handle = event;
2117 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2118 post_event_actions.push(action);
2123 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2124 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2125 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2126 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2127 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2128 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2131 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2132 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2133 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2134 processed_all_events = false;
2137 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2138 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2144 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2146 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2147 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2148 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2149 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2150 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2151 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2155 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2157 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2159 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2160 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2162 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2164 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2165 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2166 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2169 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2170 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2171 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2173 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2174 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2175 current_timestamp: u32,
2177 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2178 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2179 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2180 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2182 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2183 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2184 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2189 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2191 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2192 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2193 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2194 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2195 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2196 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2197 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2198 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2200 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2203 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2204 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2206 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2208 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2210 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2212 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2213 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2214 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2215 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2216 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2217 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2227 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2228 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2229 &self.default_configuration
2232 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2233 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2234 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2237 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2238 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2240 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2242 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2246 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2251 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2253 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2254 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2255 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2256 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2257 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2259 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2260 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2262 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2263 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2264 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2266 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2267 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2268 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2270 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2271 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2272 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2273 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2274 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2275 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2277 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2278 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2279 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2280 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2281 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2282 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2286 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2287 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2289 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2291 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2292 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2294 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2296 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2297 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2298 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2299 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2300 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2301 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2305 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2310 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2312 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2313 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2314 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2316 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2318 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2321 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2324 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2325 node_id: their_network_key,
2328 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2331 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2332 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2333 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2334 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2335 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2336 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2337 // the same channel.
2338 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2340 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2341 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2342 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2343 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2345 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2346 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2347 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2348 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2352 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2353 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2354 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2362 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2363 /// more information.
2364 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2365 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2366 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2367 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2368 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2369 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2370 // the same channel.
2371 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2373 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2374 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2375 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2376 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2377 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2378 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2379 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2380 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2388 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2389 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2391 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2392 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2394 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2395 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2396 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2397 // really wanted anyway.
2398 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2401 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2402 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2403 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2404 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2406 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2407 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2408 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2409 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2410 let context_to_details = |context| {
2411 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2413 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2415 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2416 .map(context_to_details)
2422 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2423 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2425 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2426 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2427 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2429 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2430 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2431 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2432 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2433 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2434 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2436 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2437 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2438 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2440 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2441 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2442 payment_id: *payment_id,
2443 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2444 total_msat: *total_msat,
2447 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2448 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2450 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2451 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2453 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2458 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2459 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2460 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2461 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2462 Some(transaction) => {
2463 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2464 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2469 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2470 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2471 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2472 reason: closure_reason,
2473 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2474 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2478 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2479 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2481 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2482 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2484 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2486 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2487 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2489 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2490 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2492 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2493 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2494 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2495 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2496 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2497 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2498 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2499 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2501 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2502 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2503 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2504 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2505 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2509 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2510 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2511 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2512 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
2515 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2516 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2517 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2518 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2522 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2528 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2531 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2532 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2534 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2535 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2538 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2539 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2540 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2541 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2544 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2548 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2549 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2550 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2552 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2553 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2555 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2556 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2557 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2558 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2560 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2562 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2563 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2564 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2567 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2568 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2569 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2570 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2571 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2572 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2575 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2576 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2577 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2579 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2580 /// the channel being closed or not:
2581 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2582 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2583 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2584 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2585 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2586 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2587 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2589 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2590 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2591 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2592 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2594 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2596 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2597 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2598 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2601 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2602 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2603 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2604 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2605 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2606 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2610 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2611 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2612 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2613 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2614 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2615 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2616 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2617 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2619 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2620 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2621 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2622 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2623 // ignore the result here.
2624 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2628 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2629 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2630 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2631 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2632 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2633 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2634 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2635 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2636 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2637 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2638 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2639 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2641 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2643 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2644 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2645 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2646 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2648 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2649 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2650 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2653 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2654 // Unfunded channel has no update
2655 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2658 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2659 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2660 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2661 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2663 (None, *peer_node_id)
2665 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2668 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2669 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2670 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2675 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2678 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2680 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2681 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2682 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2683 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2684 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2685 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2686 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2687 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2688 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2689 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2700 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2701 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2702 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2704 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2705 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2706 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2709 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2710 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2711 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2713 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2714 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2715 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2716 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2717 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2720 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2721 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2722 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2723 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2724 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2728 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2729 /// local transaction(s).
2730 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2731 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2732 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2736 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2737 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2738 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2739 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2740 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2741 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2742 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2744 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2745 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2749 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2750 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2751 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2752 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2753 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2754 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2755 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2756 err_data: Vec::new(),
2760 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2761 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2762 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2765 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2766 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2767 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2768 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2769 outgoing_cltv_value,
2770 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2774 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2775 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2776 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2777 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2778 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2779 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2780 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2781 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2783 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2785 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2786 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2787 err_data: Vec::new(),
2788 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2791 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2792 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2793 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2794 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2796 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2799 // final_expiry_too_soon
2800 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2801 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2803 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2804 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2805 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2806 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2807 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2808 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2809 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2810 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2811 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2812 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2813 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2816 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2817 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2818 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2820 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2822 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2823 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2827 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2828 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2829 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2830 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2831 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2832 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2833 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2834 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2835 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2836 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2837 err_data: Vec::new(),
2838 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2841 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2842 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2843 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2844 err_data: Vec::new(),
2845 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2848 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2852 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2855 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2856 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2859 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2860 phantom_shared_secret,
2864 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2865 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2866 err_data: Vec::new(),
2867 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2870 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2873 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2874 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2875 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2876 outgoing_cltv_value,
2877 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2881 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2882 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2883 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2884 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2885 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2887 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2888 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2889 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2890 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2891 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2892 failure_code: $err_code,
2898 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2899 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2902 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2903 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2904 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2906 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2907 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2908 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2909 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2910 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2911 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2912 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2913 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2915 macro_rules! return_err {
2916 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2918 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2919 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2920 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2921 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2922 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2923 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2929 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2931 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2932 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2934 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2935 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2938 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2939 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2940 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2941 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2944 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2945 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2946 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
2948 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2949 // inbound channel's state.
2950 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2951 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2952 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2956 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2957 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2958 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2959 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2960 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2961 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2962 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2963 // phantom or an intercept.
2964 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2965 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2966 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2970 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2973 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2975 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2976 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2977 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2978 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2979 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2981 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2982 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2983 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
2984 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
2987 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2988 // have no consistency guarantees.
2989 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2993 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2994 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2995 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2996 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2997 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2999 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3000 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3001 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3002 // we don't have the channel here.
3003 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3005 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3007 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3008 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3009 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3010 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3011 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3012 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3013 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3014 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3015 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3016 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3017 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3019 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3022 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3023 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3025 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3026 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3030 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3031 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3032 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3033 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3035 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3042 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3043 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3044 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3045 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3046 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3047 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3049 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3050 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3052 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3053 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3054 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3055 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3056 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3057 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3058 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3059 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3060 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3061 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3067 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3068 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3069 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3070 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3072 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3073 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3075 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3076 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3077 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3079 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3080 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3081 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3082 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3083 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3084 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3085 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3089 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3091 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3094 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3095 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3096 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3097 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3098 macro_rules! return_err {
3099 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3101 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3102 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3103 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3104 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3105 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3106 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3112 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3114 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3115 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3118 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3119 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3120 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3121 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3122 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3124 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3127 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3128 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3129 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3130 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3131 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3137 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3138 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3139 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3141 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3142 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3143 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3145 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3146 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3147 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3148 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3149 return Err(LightningError {
3150 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3151 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3154 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3155 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3157 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3158 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3161 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3162 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3163 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3164 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3166 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3167 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3168 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3170 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3171 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3172 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3173 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3174 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3175 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3179 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3182 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3183 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3184 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3186 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3187 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3188 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3189 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3190 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3193 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3194 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3196 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3197 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3198 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3199 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3200 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3201 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3202 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3203 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3205 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3206 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3207 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3209 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3211 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3218 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3219 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3220 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3221 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3226 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3227 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3228 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3231 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3232 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3234 log_trace!(self.logger,
3235 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3236 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3237 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3238 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3240 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3241 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3242 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3244 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3245 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3247 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3248 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3249 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3250 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3253 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3254 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3255 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3256 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3257 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3258 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3259 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3260 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3261 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3262 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3264 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3265 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3266 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3268 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3269 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3271 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3272 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3273 Some(monitor_update) => {
3274 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry) {
3275 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3277 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3278 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3279 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3280 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3281 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3282 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3283 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3291 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3294 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3295 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3296 // `channel_by_id` map.
3297 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3298 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3303 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3304 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3306 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3311 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3313 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3314 /// fields for more info.
3316 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3317 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3319 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3321 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3322 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3323 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3324 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3325 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3327 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3328 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3329 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3330 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3331 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3333 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3334 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3335 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3336 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3338 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3340 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3341 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3342 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3344 /// In general, a path may raise:
3345 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3346 /// node public key) is specified.
3347 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3348 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3350 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3351 /// relevant updates.
3353 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3354 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3355 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3357 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3358 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3359 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3360 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3361 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3362 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3363 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3364 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3365 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3366 self.pending_outbound_payments
3367 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3368 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3369 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3372 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3373 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3374 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3375 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3376 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3377 self.pending_outbound_payments
3378 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3379 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3380 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3381 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3385 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3386 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3387 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3388 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3389 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3390 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3394 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3395 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3396 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3400 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3401 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3405 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3406 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3407 /// retries are exhausted.
3409 /// # Event Generation
3411 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3412 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3414 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3415 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3416 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3418 /// # Requested Invoices
3420 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`], abandoning the payment prior to receiving the
3421 /// invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] and prevent any attempts at paying
3422 /// it once received. The other events may only be generated once the invoice has been received.
3424 /// # Restart Behavior
3426 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3427 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3428 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3430 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3431 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3432 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3433 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3436 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3437 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3438 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3439 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3440 /// never reach the recipient.
3442 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3443 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3445 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3446 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3448 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3449 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3450 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3451 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3452 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3453 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3454 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3457 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3458 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3460 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3463 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3464 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3465 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3466 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3467 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3468 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3469 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3470 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3473 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3474 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3475 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3476 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3477 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3479 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3480 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3481 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3484 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3487 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3488 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3491 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3492 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3493 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3494 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3495 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3496 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3497 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3498 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3500 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3501 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3502 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3503 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3504 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3506 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3507 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3508 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3509 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3510 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3511 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3512 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3513 } else { unreachable!(); });
3515 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3516 Err((chan, err)) => {
3517 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3518 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3520 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3521 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3522 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3528 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3529 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3531 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3532 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3535 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3536 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3537 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3541 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3542 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3545 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3547 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3549 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3550 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3551 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3552 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3554 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3561 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3562 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3563 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3567 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3569 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3570 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3572 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3573 /// across the p2p network.
3575 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3576 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3578 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3579 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3580 /// keys per-channel).
3582 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3583 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3584 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3586 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3587 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3588 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3590 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3591 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3592 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3593 /// for more details.
3595 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3596 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3597 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3600 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3601 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3602 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3603 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3604 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3610 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3611 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3612 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3613 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3614 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3615 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3616 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3617 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3621 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3622 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3623 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3624 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3628 let mut output_index = None;
3629 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3630 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3631 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3632 if output_index.is_some() {
3633 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3634 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3637 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3640 if output_index.is_none() {
3641 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3642 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3645 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3649 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3651 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3652 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3653 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3654 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3656 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3657 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3659 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3660 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3662 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3664 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3665 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3666 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3667 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3668 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3669 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3670 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3671 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3672 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3673 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3674 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3675 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3676 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3680 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3681 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3682 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3683 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3684 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3685 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3686 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3687 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3688 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3689 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3693 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3694 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3695 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3696 config.apply(config_update);
3697 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3700 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3701 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3702 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3703 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3704 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3705 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3712 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3713 debug_assert!(false);
3714 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3716 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3717 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3724 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3726 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3727 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3728 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3729 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3731 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3732 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3734 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3735 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3737 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3739 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3740 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3741 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3742 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3743 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3744 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3745 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3746 pub fn update_channel_config(
3747 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3748 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3749 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3752 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3753 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3755 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3756 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3758 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3759 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3760 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3761 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3762 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3764 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3765 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3766 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3769 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3772 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3773 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3774 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3775 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3776 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3777 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3778 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3780 let next_hop_scid = {
3781 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3782 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3783 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3784 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3785 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3786 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3787 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
3788 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3789 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3790 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3793 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3795 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3796 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
3797 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3799 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3800 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}.",
3801 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3806 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3807 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3808 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3811 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3812 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3813 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3815 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3817 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3818 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3819 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3820 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3821 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3824 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3825 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3826 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3827 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3828 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3830 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3834 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3835 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3837 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3840 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3841 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3842 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3844 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3845 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3846 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3849 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3850 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3851 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3852 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
3853 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3854 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3855 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3856 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3859 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3860 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3861 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3862 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3867 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3869 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3870 /// Will likely generate further events.
3871 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3874 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3875 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3876 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3878 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3879 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3881 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3882 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3883 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3885 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3886 match forward_info {
3887 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3888 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3889 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3890 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3891 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3894 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3895 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3896 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3898 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3899 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3900 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3901 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3902 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3903 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3904 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3907 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3908 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3910 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3913 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3914 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3920 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3921 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3923 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3927 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3928 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3930 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3934 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3935 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3936 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3937 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3938 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3940 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3941 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3942 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3943 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3944 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3946 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3948 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3949 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3953 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3954 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3955 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3956 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3958 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3959 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3965 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3968 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3971 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3972 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3973 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3974 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3975 // problem, not ours.
3981 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3982 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3984 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3988 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3989 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3990 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3991 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3994 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3995 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3996 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
3997 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3998 match forward_info {
3999 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4000 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4001 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4002 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4003 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4006 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4007 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4008 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4009 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4010 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4011 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4012 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4013 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4014 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4016 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4017 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4018 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4021 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4022 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4024 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4026 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4027 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4028 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4029 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4034 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4035 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4037 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4038 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4039 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4040 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4042 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4043 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4045 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4047 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4048 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4049 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4056 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4060 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4061 match forward_info {
4062 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4063 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4064 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4065 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4066 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4069 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4070 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4071 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4072 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4073 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4074 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4075 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4077 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4078 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4079 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4083 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4084 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4087 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4090 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4091 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4092 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4093 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4094 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4095 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4096 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4097 phantom_shared_secret,
4099 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4100 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4101 // if routing nodes overpay
4102 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4103 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4105 total_value_received: None,
4106 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4109 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4112 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4114 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4115 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4116 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4117 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4118 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4119 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4121 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4122 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4123 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4124 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4125 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4126 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4127 phantom_shared_secret,
4129 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4130 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4132 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4135 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4136 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4137 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4138 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4139 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4142 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4143 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4144 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4145 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4146 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4147 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4149 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4150 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4151 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4153 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4154 .entry(payment_hash)
4155 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4156 .or_insert_with(|| {
4157 committed_to_claimable = true;
4159 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4162 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4163 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4164 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4165 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4167 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4168 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4169 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4171 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4172 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4173 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4176 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4178 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4179 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4180 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4181 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4182 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4183 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4184 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4185 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4186 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4187 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4189 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4191 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4192 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4193 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4194 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4195 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4198 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4199 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4200 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4201 committed_to_claimable = true;
4203 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4204 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4205 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4206 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4207 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4208 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4209 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4210 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4211 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4212 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4216 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4217 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4218 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4219 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4220 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4222 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4224 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4225 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4227 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4228 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4229 committed_to_claimable = true;
4232 payment_claimable_generated
4236 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4237 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4238 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4239 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4240 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4241 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4242 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4243 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4245 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4246 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4247 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4248 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4249 Ok(result) => result,
4251 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4252 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4255 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4256 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4257 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4258 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4259 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4260 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4263 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4264 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4265 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4267 check_total_value!(purpose);
4269 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4270 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4271 check_total_value!(purpose);
4275 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4276 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4277 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4278 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4280 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4281 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4282 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4283 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4284 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4285 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4286 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4287 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4289 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4290 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4291 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4293 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4294 if payment_claimable_generated {
4295 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4301 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4302 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4310 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4311 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4312 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4313 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4315 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4316 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4318 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4320 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4321 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4322 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4324 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4326 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4327 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4328 events.append(&mut new_events);
4331 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4333 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4334 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4335 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4337 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4339 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4340 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4341 if background_events.is_empty() {
4342 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4345 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4347 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4348 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4349 // monitor updating completing.
4350 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4352 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4353 let mut updated_chan = false;
4355 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4356 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4357 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4358 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4359 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4360 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4361 updated_chan = true;
4362 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4363 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase).map(|_| ())
4365 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4370 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4371 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4373 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4374 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4375 // however, ensure that.
4377 log_error!(self.logger,
4378 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4380 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4382 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4383 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4384 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4385 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4386 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4387 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4388 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4390 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4391 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4392 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4393 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4394 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4400 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4403 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4404 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4405 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4406 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4407 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4410 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4411 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4412 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4413 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4414 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4415 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4416 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4418 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4419 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4420 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4421 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4423 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4424 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4426 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4427 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4431 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4432 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4433 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4434 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4435 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4436 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4437 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4439 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4440 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4442 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4443 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4444 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4445 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4446 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4447 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4449 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4454 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4455 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4463 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4465 /// This currently includes:
4466 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4467 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4468 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4470 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4471 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4472 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4473 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4475 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4476 /// estimate fetches.
4478 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4479 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4480 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4481 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4482 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4484 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4485 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4487 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4488 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4489 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4491 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4492 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4493 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4494 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4495 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4496 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4498 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4499 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4500 log_error!(self.logger,
4501 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4502 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4503 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4504 self.finish_force_close_channel(context.force_shutdown(false));
4505 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4506 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4507 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4508 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4509 channel_id: *chan_id,
4510 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4521 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4522 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4523 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4524 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4525 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4526 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4527 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4529 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4530 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4535 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4536 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4538 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4539 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4540 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4541 if needs_close { return false; }
4544 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4545 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4546 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4547 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4548 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4549 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4550 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4551 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4553 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4554 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4555 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4556 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4560 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4562 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4565 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4567 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4568 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4569 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4570 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4574 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4576 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4582 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4584 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4585 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4586 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4587 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4588 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4589 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4590 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4591 channel_id: *chan_id,
4592 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4600 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4601 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4602 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4604 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4605 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4606 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4611 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4612 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4613 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4614 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4615 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4616 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4617 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4618 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4624 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4626 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4627 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4632 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4633 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4634 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4635 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4636 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4637 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4638 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4639 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4640 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4641 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4642 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4644 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4645 // have no channels to the peer.
4646 let remove_entry = {
4647 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4648 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4651 entry.remove_entry();
4654 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4659 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4660 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4661 // This should be unreachable
4662 debug_assert!(false);
4665 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4666 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4667 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4668 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4669 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4670 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4671 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4674 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4675 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4676 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4678 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4679 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4686 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4687 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4688 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4689 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4690 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4693 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4694 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4697 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
4699 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4700 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4701 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4702 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4703 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4710 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4711 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4712 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4714 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4715 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4716 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4717 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4719 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4720 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4721 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4722 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4723 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4724 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4727 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4728 /// reason for the failure.
4730 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4731 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4732 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4734 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4735 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4736 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4737 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4738 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4739 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4740 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4745 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4746 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4747 match failure_code {
4748 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4749 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4750 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4751 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4752 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4753 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4755 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4756 let fail_data = match data {
4757 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4760 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4765 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4766 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4768 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4770 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4771 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4772 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4773 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4774 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4775 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4776 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4778 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4780 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4781 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4783 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4788 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4789 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4790 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4791 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4792 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4793 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4794 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4795 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4796 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4797 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4799 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4800 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4801 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4802 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4804 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4805 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4806 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4807 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4808 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4812 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4813 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4814 // be surfaced to the user.
4815 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4816 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
4817 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4819 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4820 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4821 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4822 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4823 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4824 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4825 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
4826 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
4827 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
4829 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
4830 debug_assert!(false);
4831 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4836 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4839 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4840 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4841 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4842 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4846 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4847 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4848 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4849 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4850 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4851 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4852 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4853 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4854 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4857 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4858 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4859 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4862 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4863 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4864 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4866 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4867 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4868 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4869 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4870 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4872 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
4873 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
4874 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4876 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4877 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4878 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4879 push_forward_ev = true;
4881 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4882 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4883 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4885 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4886 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4889 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4890 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4891 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4892 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4893 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4894 failed_next_destination: destination,
4900 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4901 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4903 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4904 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4905 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4906 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4908 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4909 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4910 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4911 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4913 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4914 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4915 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4917 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4918 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4919 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4920 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4921 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4922 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4923 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4924 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4925 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4928 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4929 /// even type numbers.
4933 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4934 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4936 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4937 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4938 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4941 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4942 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4944 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4947 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4948 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4949 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4950 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4951 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4952 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4953 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4954 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4959 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
4960 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
4961 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4962 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4963 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
4965 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4966 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4967 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4971 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4972 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4973 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4974 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4975 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4976 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4977 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4978 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4979 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4980 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4981 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4990 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4992 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4993 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4994 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4995 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4996 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4997 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4998 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4999 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5000 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5001 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5002 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5003 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5004 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5005 debug_assert!(false);
5009 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5011 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5012 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5013 debug_assert!(false);
5017 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5018 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5020 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5021 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5022 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5023 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5026 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5027 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5028 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5029 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5033 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5034 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5035 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5036 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5038 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5039 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5040 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5041 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5042 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5047 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5048 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5049 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5050 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5051 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5052 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5053 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5055 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5058 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5059 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5060 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5061 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5065 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5066 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5067 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5068 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5070 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5071 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5072 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5073 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5076 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5077 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5078 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5079 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5083 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5084 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5085 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5088 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5091 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5092 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5093 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5094 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5096 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5097 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5098 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5100 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5103 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5104 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry);
5105 if let Err(e) = res {
5106 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5107 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5108 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5109 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5110 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5113 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5114 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5115 // monitor update as a background event.
5116 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5117 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5118 counterparty_node_id,
5119 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5120 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5129 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5130 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5131 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5137 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5138 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5139 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5140 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5141 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5142 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5143 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5144 // again on restart.
5145 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5146 payment_preimage, update_res);
5149 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5150 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5152 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5153 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5154 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5155 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5156 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5157 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5158 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5159 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5160 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5161 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5164 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5165 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5166 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5167 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5168 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5169 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5173 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5174 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5177 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5178 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5179 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5182 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5183 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5184 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5185 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5186 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5188 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5189 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5190 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5192 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5193 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5196 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5197 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5198 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5199 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5200 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5201 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5202 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5203 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5206 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5207 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5209 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5210 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5211 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5212 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5214 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
5215 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5216 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5218 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5219 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5220 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5221 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5228 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5229 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5230 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5236 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5237 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5238 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5241 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5242 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5244 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5245 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5246 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5248 payment_purpose: purpose,
5251 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5253 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5257 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5259 sender_intended_total_msat,
5263 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5264 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5266 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5267 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5268 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5275 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5276 /// update completion.
5277 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5278 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5279 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5280 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5281 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5282 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5283 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5284 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5285 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5286 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5287 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5288 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5289 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5291 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5293 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5294 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5295 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5296 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5299 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5300 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5302 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5303 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5304 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5309 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5310 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5311 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5312 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5317 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5318 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5319 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5320 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5321 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5326 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5330 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5336 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5337 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5338 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5342 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5343 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5344 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5350 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5351 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5353 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5354 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5356 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5357 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5358 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5359 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5360 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5365 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5366 let mut peer_state_lock;
5367 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5368 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5369 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5370 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5372 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5375 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5376 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5377 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5378 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5379 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5382 let remaining_in_flight =
5383 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5384 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5387 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5388 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5389 remaining_in_flight);
5390 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5393 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5396 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5398 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5399 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5402 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5403 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5404 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5406 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5407 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5408 /// used to accept such channels.
5410 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5411 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5412 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5413 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5416 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5417 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5419 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5420 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5421 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5423 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5424 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5426 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5427 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5429 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5430 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5432 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5433 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5434 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5435 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5438 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5439 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5441 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5442 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5443 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5444 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5445 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5446 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5447 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5448 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5450 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5451 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5452 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5454 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5455 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5456 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5457 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5458 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5459 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5460 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5462 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5466 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5467 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5468 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5469 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5470 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5471 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5472 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5475 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5476 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5478 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5479 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5480 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5481 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5482 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5483 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5484 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5485 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5488 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5489 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5493 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5494 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5495 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5497 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5498 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5499 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5502 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5507 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5508 /// or 0-conf channels.
5510 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5511 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5512 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5513 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5514 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5515 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5517 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5518 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5519 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5520 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5521 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5522 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5523 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5527 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5530 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5531 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5533 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5534 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5536 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5537 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5538 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5539 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5540 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5542 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5545 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5546 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5547 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5550 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5551 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5556 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5559 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5560 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5561 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5564 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5565 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5568 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5569 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5570 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5571 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5572 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5574 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5575 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5577 debug_assert!(false);
5578 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5580 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5581 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5583 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5584 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5585 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5586 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5587 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5588 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5590 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5591 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5592 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5595 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5596 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5597 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5598 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5599 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5602 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5603 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5605 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5608 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5609 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5610 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5611 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5612 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5613 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5614 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5615 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5616 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5618 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5619 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5620 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5625 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5626 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5627 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5628 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5629 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5630 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5631 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5634 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5639 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5640 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5641 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5643 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5644 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5647 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5648 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5650 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5651 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5652 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5654 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5658 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5659 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5660 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5661 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5663 debug_assert!(false);
5664 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5666 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5667 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5668 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
5670 match phase.get_mut() {
5671 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5672 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
5673 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
5676 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5680 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5683 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5684 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5685 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5686 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5687 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5689 user_channel_id: user_id,
5694 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5695 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5697 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5698 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5700 debug_assert!(false);
5701 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5704 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5705 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5706 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5707 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5708 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
5709 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5711 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5712 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5713 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5714 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5715 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5716 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5717 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5718 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5719 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5723 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
5724 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5726 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5729 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5731 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5733 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5734 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5735 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5736 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5737 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5738 funding_msg.channel_id))
5740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5741 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5745 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5746 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5747 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5748 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5749 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5750 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5751 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5755 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5757 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
5758 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5759 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5760 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5762 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5763 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5764 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5765 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5766 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5767 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5768 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5769 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5774 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
5780 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5781 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5782 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5783 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5785 debug_assert!(false);
5786 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5789 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5790 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5791 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5793 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5794 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
5795 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5796 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5797 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5798 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5799 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5800 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5801 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5802 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5803 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5804 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5810 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5814 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5818 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5820 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5822 debug_assert!(false);
5823 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5827 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5829 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5830 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5831 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5832 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5833 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5834 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5835 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5836 msg: announcement_sigs,
5838 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
5839 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5840 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5841 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5842 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5843 // announcement_signatures.
5844 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5845 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
5846 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5847 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5854 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5855 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
5860 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
5861 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
5864 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5865 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5870 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5871 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5872 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5873 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5874 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5876 debug_assert!(false);
5877 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5879 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5880 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5881 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5882 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
5884 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5885 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
5886 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5888 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5891 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
5892 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5893 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
5894 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5896 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5897 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5898 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5899 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5900 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5901 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5905 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5906 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5907 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5908 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
5912 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5913 let context = phase.context_mut();
5914 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
5915 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5916 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
5917 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
5922 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5925 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5926 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5927 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5928 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5934 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5935 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5936 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5938 debug_assert!(false);
5939 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5941 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5942 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5943 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5944 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5945 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5946 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5947 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
5948 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5949 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5950 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5955 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5956 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5957 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5958 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5959 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5960 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
5961 } else { (tx, None) }
5963 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
5964 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
5967 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5970 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5971 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5972 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5974 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
5975 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5976 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5977 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5978 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5982 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5987 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5988 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5989 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5990 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5992 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5993 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5994 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5995 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5997 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5998 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5999 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6001 debug_assert!(false);
6002 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6004 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6005 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6006 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6007 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6008 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6009 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6010 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6011 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6012 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6013 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6015 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6016 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6017 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6018 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6019 match pending_forward_info {
6020 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6021 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6022 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6023 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6025 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6026 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6027 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6028 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6029 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6032 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6034 _ => pending_forward_info
6037 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6039 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6040 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6043 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6048 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6050 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6051 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6052 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6054 debug_assert!(false);
6055 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6057 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6058 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6059 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6060 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6061 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6062 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6063 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6064 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6065 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6066 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6068 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6069 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6070 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6071 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6072 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6073 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6074 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6077 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6078 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6081 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6084 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6088 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6089 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6090 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6092 debug_assert!(false);
6093 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6095 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6096 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6097 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6098 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6099 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6100 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6102 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6103 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6106 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6111 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6112 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6113 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6115 debug_assert!(false);
6116 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6118 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6119 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6120 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6121 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6122 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6123 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6124 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6126 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6127 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6129 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6130 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6134 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6138 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6139 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6140 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6142 debug_assert!(false);
6143 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6145 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6146 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6147 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6148 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6149 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6150 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6151 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6152 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6153 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6154 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6157 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6158 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6161 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6166 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6167 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6168 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6169 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6170 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6171 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6172 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6173 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6174 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6175 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6176 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6178 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6179 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6181 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6182 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6183 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6184 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6185 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6186 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6188 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6189 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6190 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6192 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6193 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6194 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6195 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6196 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6197 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6198 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6199 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6200 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6203 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6204 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6206 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6207 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6208 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6209 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6210 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6211 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6212 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6213 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6214 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6217 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6218 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6219 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6224 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6225 // payments are being processed.
6226 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6227 push_forward_event = true;
6229 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6230 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6237 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6238 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6241 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6242 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6243 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6245 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6249 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6250 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6251 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6252 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6253 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6255 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6256 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6257 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6258 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6259 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6260 // real by taking more time.
6261 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6262 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6263 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6268 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6269 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6270 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6271 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6272 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6273 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6274 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6276 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6277 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6278 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6279 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6280 channel_funding_outpoint,
6281 counterparty_node_id,
6286 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6287 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6288 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6290 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6291 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6292 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6293 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6295 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6296 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6297 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6303 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6304 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6305 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6306 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6308 debug_assert!(false);
6309 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6310 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6311 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6312 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6313 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6314 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6315 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6316 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6317 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6318 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6319 *counterparty_node_id)
6321 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6322 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6323 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6324 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6325 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6326 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6327 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6329 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6331 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6332 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6335 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6338 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6342 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6343 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6344 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6346 debug_assert!(false);
6347 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6349 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6350 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6351 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6353 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6354 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6356 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6357 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6360 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6365 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6366 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6367 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6369 debug_assert!(false);
6370 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6372 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6373 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6374 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6375 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6376 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6377 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6378 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6381 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6382 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6383 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6384 msg, &self.default_configuration
6385 ), chan_phase_entry),
6386 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6387 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6388 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6391 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6392 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6395 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6400 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6401 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6402 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6403 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6405 // It's not a local channel
6406 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6409 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6410 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6411 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6412 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6414 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6415 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6416 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6417 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6418 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6419 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6420 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6421 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6422 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6423 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6424 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6426 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6428 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6429 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6430 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6431 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6433 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", chan_id);
6434 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6437 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6438 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6441 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6443 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6446 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6448 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6449 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6451 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6453 debug_assert!(false);
6454 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6456 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6457 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6458 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6459 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6460 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6461 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6462 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6463 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6464 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6465 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6466 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6467 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6468 let mut channel_update = None;
6469 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6470 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6471 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6474 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6475 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6476 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6477 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6478 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6479 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6480 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6485 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6486 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6487 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6488 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6489 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6490 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6494 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6495 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6498 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6502 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6503 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6506 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6507 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6512 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6513 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6514 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6516 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6517 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6518 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6519 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6520 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6521 match monitor_event {
6522 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6523 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6524 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6525 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6527 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6528 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6529 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6530 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6533 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6534 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6535 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6536 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6538 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6539 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6540 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6541 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6544 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6545 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6546 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6547 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6548 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6549 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6550 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6551 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6552 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6553 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6554 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6558 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6559 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6561 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6563 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6564 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6565 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6566 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6567 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6575 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6576 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6582 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6583 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6586 has_pending_monitor_events
6589 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6590 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6591 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6593 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6594 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6595 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6598 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6599 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6600 /// update was applied.
6601 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6602 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6603 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6604 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6606 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6607 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6608 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6609 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6611 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6612 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6614 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6615 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6616 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6617 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6619 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6620 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6621 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6622 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6623 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6624 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6626 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6627 has_monitor_update = true;
6629 let channel_id: ChannelId = *channel_id;
6630 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6631 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6632 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6634 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6636 continue 'peer_loop;
6645 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6646 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6647 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6650 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6651 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6657 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6658 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6659 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6660 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6661 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6662 let mut has_update = false;
6664 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6666 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6667 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6668 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6669 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6670 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
6672 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6673 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6674 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6675 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6677 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6678 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6681 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6682 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6683 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6684 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6685 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6690 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6692 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6693 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6694 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6700 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
6701 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6706 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
6712 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6713 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6719 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6720 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6722 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6723 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6724 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6725 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6726 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6727 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6728 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6729 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6730 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6731 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6732 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6733 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6734 assert!(should_broadcast);
6735 } else { unreachable!(); }
6736 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6737 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6738 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6741 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6745 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6748 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6749 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6751 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6752 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6753 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6754 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6756 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6758 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6759 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6763 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6764 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6766 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6768 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6769 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6771 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6772 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6773 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6774 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6775 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6776 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6777 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6778 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6779 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6780 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6781 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6784 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6785 /// stored external to LDK.
6787 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6788 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6789 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6791 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6792 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6795 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6796 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6797 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6798 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6800 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6801 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6802 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6803 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6804 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6806 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6807 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6808 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6809 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6810 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6812 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6813 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6815 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6816 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6820 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6821 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6823 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6825 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6826 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6828 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6829 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6830 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6831 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6832 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6833 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6834 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6837 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6838 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6840 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6841 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6842 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6845 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6846 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6848 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6849 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6850 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6851 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6853 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6854 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6855 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6856 Some(_) => continue,
6857 None => return scid_candidate
6862 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6864 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6865 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6867 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6868 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6869 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6873 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6874 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6875 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6877 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6878 /// times to get a unique scid.
6879 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6880 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6881 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6883 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6884 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6885 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6886 return scid_candidate
6890 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6891 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6892 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6893 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6895 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6896 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6897 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6898 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6899 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
6900 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
6902 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6903 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6904 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6913 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6914 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6915 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6916 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6917 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6921 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6922 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6923 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6924 events.push_back((event, None));
6928 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6929 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6930 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6934 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6935 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6939 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6940 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6943 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6944 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6945 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6946 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6947 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6948 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6950 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6951 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6952 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6953 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6955 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6956 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6957 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6958 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6960 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6964 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6965 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6966 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6967 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6968 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6969 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6970 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6974 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6975 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6976 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6977 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6978 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6979 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6980 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6981 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry)
6983 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6985 if further_update_exists {
6986 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6991 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6992 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6997 log_debug!(self.logger,
6998 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6999 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7003 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
7004 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
7005 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
7009 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7010 for action in actions {
7012 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7013 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7015 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7021 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7022 /// using the given event handler.
7024 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7025 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7029 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7033 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7035 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7036 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7037 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7038 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7039 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7040 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7044 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7045 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7046 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7047 /// is always placed next to each other.
7049 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7050 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7051 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7052 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7054 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7055 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7056 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7057 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7058 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7059 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7060 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
7062 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7063 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7064 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7065 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7068 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7069 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7071 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7072 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7075 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7076 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7077 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7078 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7079 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7080 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7081 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7085 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7086 events.replace(pending_events);
7095 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7097 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7098 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7099 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7100 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7101 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7102 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7106 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7108 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7109 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7110 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7112 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7116 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7118 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7119 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7120 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7121 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7122 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7123 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7127 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7129 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7130 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7131 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7132 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7133 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7136 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7137 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7140 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7141 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7142 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7143 let new_height = height - 1;
7145 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7146 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7147 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7148 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7149 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7150 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7153 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7157 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7159 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7160 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7161 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7162 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7163 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7164 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7168 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7169 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7170 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7171 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7173 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7174 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7176 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7177 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7178 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7179 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7181 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7182 if height < last_best_block_height {
7183 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7184 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7188 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7189 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7190 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7191 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7193 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7194 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7196 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7197 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7198 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7200 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7202 macro_rules! max_time {
7203 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7205 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7206 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7207 // having an explicit local time source.
7208 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7209 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7210 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7211 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7212 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7218 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7219 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7220 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7221 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7225 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7226 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7227 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7228 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7229 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7230 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7231 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7232 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7239 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7240 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7241 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7242 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7243 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7244 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7245 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7246 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7247 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7252 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7254 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7255 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7256 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7257 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7258 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7259 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7263 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7264 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7266 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7267 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7268 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7269 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7270 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7272 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7273 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7275 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7276 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7277 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7278 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7279 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7280 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7282 // Retain unfunded channels.
7283 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7284 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7285 let res = f(channel);
7286 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7287 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7288 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7289 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7290 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7292 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7293 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7294 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7295 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7296 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7297 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7298 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7303 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7308 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7309 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7312 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7313 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7314 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7315 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7316 msg: announcement_sigs,
7318 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7319 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7320 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7322 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7323 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7324 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7329 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7330 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7331 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7332 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7333 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7334 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7335 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7336 // is always consistent.
7337 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7338 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7339 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7340 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7341 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7344 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7345 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7346 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7347 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7348 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7349 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7350 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7354 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7355 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7356 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7357 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7358 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7359 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7360 data: reason_message,
7372 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7373 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7374 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7375 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7376 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7377 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7378 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7379 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7380 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7381 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7383 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7384 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7385 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7389 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7392 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7393 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7394 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7395 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7396 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7397 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7398 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7399 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7400 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7401 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7404 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7405 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7406 _ => unreachable!(),
7408 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7409 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7410 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7417 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7419 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7420 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7424 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7426 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7427 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7429 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7430 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7433 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7434 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7435 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7438 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7439 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7440 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7441 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7444 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7445 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7446 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7447 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7450 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7451 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7453 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7454 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7455 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7456 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7457 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7460 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7461 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7462 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7463 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7466 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7467 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7468 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7469 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7472 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7473 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7474 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7475 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7479 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7480 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7482 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7483 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7484 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7485 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7486 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7487 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7491 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7492 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7493 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7496 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7497 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7498 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7499 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7502 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7503 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7504 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7507 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7508 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7509 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7510 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7513 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7515 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7518 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7519 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7520 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7523 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7524 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7525 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7528 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7529 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7530 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7533 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7534 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7535 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7538 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7539 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7540 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7543 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7544 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7545 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7548 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7550 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7553 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7554 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7555 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7558 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7559 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7560 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7563 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7564 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7565 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7568 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7570 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7573 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7574 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7575 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7578 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7579 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7580 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7581 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7582 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7584 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7589 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7590 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7591 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7594 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7596 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7597 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7599 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7600 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7601 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7602 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7603 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7604 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7605 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7606 let context = match phase {
7607 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7608 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7609 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
7610 if !chan.is_shutdown() {
7615 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
7616 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7619 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7623 // Clean up for removal.
7624 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
7625 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7628 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7629 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7630 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7631 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7633 // V1 Channel Establishment
7634 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7635 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7636 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7637 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7638 // V2 Channel Establishment
7639 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7640 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7641 // Common Channel Establishment
7642 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7643 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7644 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7645 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7646 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7647 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7648 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7649 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7650 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7651 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7652 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7653 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7654 // Channel Operations
7655 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7656 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7657 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7658 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7659 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7660 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7662 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7663 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7664 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7665 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7666 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7667 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7668 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7669 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7670 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7673 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7674 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7675 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7676 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7679 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7681 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7683 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7684 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7688 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7689 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7690 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7694 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7696 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7697 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7698 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7699 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7700 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7701 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7704 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7705 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7706 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7707 if inbound_peer_limited {
7710 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7711 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7712 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7713 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7714 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7715 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7716 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7717 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7721 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7722 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7723 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7725 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7726 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7727 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7728 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7733 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7734 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7739 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7741 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7742 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7743 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7744 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7745 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7747 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
7748 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
7749 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7750 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
7751 // worry about closing and removing them.
7752 debug_assert!(false);
7756 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7757 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7758 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7762 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7766 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7767 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7769 match &msg.data as &str {
7770 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
7771 "link failed to shutdown" =>
7773 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
7774 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
7775 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
7776 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
7777 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
7778 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
7779 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
7780 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7781 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7782 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7783 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7784 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7785 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
7786 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
7787 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7788 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7792 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7793 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7794 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
7795 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
7796 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7797 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
7799 log_level: Level::Trace,
7809 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7810 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
7811 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7812 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7813 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7814 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7815 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7816 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7817 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7818 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7819 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
7821 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7822 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7823 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7827 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7828 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7829 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7830 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7831 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7832 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7833 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7834 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7835 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7836 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7844 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7845 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7849 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7850 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7853 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7854 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7857 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7858 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7861 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7862 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7863 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7864 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7867 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7868 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7869 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7870 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7873 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7874 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7875 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7876 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7879 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7880 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7881 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7882 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7885 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7886 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7887 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7888 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7891 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7892 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7893 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7894 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7897 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7898 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7899 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7900 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7903 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7904 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7905 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7906 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7909 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7910 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7911 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7912 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7916 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7917 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7918 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7919 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7920 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7924 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7925 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7927 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7928 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7929 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7930 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7931 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7934 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7935 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7936 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7937 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7940 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7941 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7942 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7943 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7946 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7947 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7948 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7949 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7950 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7951 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7952 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7953 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7954 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7955 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7956 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7957 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7958 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7959 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7960 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7961 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7962 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7963 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7964 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7965 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7970 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7971 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7973 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7974 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7975 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7976 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7979 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7980 (2, node_id, required),
7981 (4, features, required),
7982 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7983 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7984 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7985 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7988 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7989 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7990 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7991 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7992 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7993 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7994 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7995 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7996 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7997 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7998 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7999 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8000 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8001 (7, self.config, option),
8002 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8003 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8004 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8005 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8006 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8007 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8008 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8009 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8010 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8011 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8012 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8013 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8014 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8015 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8016 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8017 (32, self.is_public, required),
8018 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8019 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8020 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8021 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8022 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8028 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8029 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8030 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8031 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8032 (2, channel_id, required),
8033 (3, channel_type, option),
8034 (4, counterparty, required),
8035 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8036 (6, funding_txo, option),
8037 (7, config, option),
8038 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8039 (9, confirmations, option),
8040 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8041 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8042 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8043 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8044 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8045 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8046 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8047 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8048 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8049 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8050 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8051 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8052 (26, is_outbound, required),
8053 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8054 (30, is_usable, required),
8055 (32, is_public, required),
8056 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8057 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8058 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8059 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8060 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8063 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8064 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8065 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8066 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8067 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8069 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
8073 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8075 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8076 outbound_scid_alias,
8080 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8081 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8083 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8084 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8085 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8086 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8087 confirmations_required,
8089 force_close_spend_delay,
8090 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8091 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8092 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8093 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8094 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8095 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8096 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8097 channel_shutdown_state,
8102 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8103 (2, channels, required_vec),
8104 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8105 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8108 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8110 (0, onion_packet, required),
8111 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8114 (0, payment_data, required),
8115 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8116 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8117 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8118 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8120 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8121 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8122 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8123 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8124 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8125 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8129 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8130 (0, routing, required),
8131 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8132 (4, payment_hash, required),
8133 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8134 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8135 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8136 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8140 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8141 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8143 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8145 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8146 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8147 reason.write(writer)?;
8149 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8150 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8153 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8154 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8155 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8156 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8163 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8164 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8165 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8168 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8169 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8170 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8171 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8175 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8176 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8177 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8178 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8179 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8182 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8183 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8184 // messages contained in the variants.
8185 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8186 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8187 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8189 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8190 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8191 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8192 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8193 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8196 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8197 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8198 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8199 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8200 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8202 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8207 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8212 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8213 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8214 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8215 (2, outpoint, required),
8216 (4, htlc_id, required),
8217 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8218 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8221 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8222 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8223 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8224 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8225 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8227 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8228 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8229 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8230 (2, self.value, required),
8231 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8232 (4, payment_data, option),
8233 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8234 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8235 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8236 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8242 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8243 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8244 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8245 (0, prev_hop, required),
8246 (1, total_msat, option),
8247 (2, value_ser, required),
8248 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8249 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8250 (5, total_value_received, option),
8251 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8252 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8253 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8255 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8256 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8257 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8259 if payment_data.is_some() {
8260 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8262 if total_msat.is_none() {
8263 total_msat = Some(value);
8265 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8268 if total_msat.is_none() {
8269 if payment_data.is_none() {
8270 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8272 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8274 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8278 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8281 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8282 total_value_received,
8283 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8285 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8286 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8291 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8292 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8293 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8296 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8297 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8298 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8299 let mut payment_id = None;
8300 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8301 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8302 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8303 (0, session_priv, required),
8304 (1, payment_id, option),
8305 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8306 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8307 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8308 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8310 if payment_id.is_none() {
8311 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8313 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8315 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8316 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8317 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8319 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8320 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8321 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8322 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8326 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8327 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8328 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8330 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8333 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8334 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8339 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8340 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8342 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8344 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8345 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8346 (0, session_priv, required),
8347 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8348 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8349 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8350 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8351 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8352 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8355 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8357 field.write(writer)?;
8364 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8365 (0, forward_info, required),
8366 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8367 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8368 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8369 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8372 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8374 (0, htlc_id, required),
8375 (2, err_packet, required),
8380 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8381 (0, payment_secret, required),
8382 (2, expiry_time, required),
8383 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8384 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8385 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8388 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8390 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8391 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8392 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8393 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8394 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8395 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8399 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8400 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8402 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8404 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8406 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8407 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8408 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8411 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8413 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8414 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8415 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8416 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8417 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8418 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8419 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8422 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8423 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_initiated() } else { false }
8427 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8429 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8430 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8431 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8432 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8433 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8434 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8437 channel.write(writer)?;
8443 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8444 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8445 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8446 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8447 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8448 for forward in pending_forwards {
8449 forward.write(writer)?;
8454 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8456 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8457 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8458 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8460 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8461 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8462 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8463 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8464 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8465 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8466 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8467 htlc.write(writer)?;
8469 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8470 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8473 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8474 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8475 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8476 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8477 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8478 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8479 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8482 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8483 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8484 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8485 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8486 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8488 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8489 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8490 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8491 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8492 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8493 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8494 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8499 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8500 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8501 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8502 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8503 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8504 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8505 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8506 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8507 0u64.write(writer)?;
8509 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8510 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8511 event.write(writer)?;
8515 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8516 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8517 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8518 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8519 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8520 0u64.write(writer)?;
8522 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8523 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8524 // likely to be identical.
8525 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8526 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8528 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8529 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8530 hash.write(writer)?;
8531 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8534 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8535 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8536 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8537 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8538 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8541 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8542 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8544 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8545 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8546 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8547 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8550 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
8551 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
8552 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8553 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8557 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8558 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8559 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8561 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8562 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8563 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8569 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8570 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8571 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8572 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8575 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8576 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8577 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8578 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8579 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8582 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8583 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8584 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8585 if !updates.is_empty() {
8586 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8587 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8592 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8593 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8594 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8595 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8596 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8597 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8598 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8599 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8600 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8601 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8602 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8603 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8604 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8611 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8612 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8613 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8614 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8617 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8618 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8619 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8620 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8621 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8622 // check that the event is sane here.
8623 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8624 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8625 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8626 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8632 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8633 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8634 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8635 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8636 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8637 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8640 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8641 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8642 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8643 events.push_back((ev, action));
8644 } else if action.is_some() {
8645 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8652 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8653 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8654 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8655 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8656 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8657 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8660 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8662 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8664 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8665 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8666 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8667 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8668 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8669 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8670 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8671 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8672 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8673 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8674 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8675 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8676 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8678 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8679 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8681 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8682 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8684 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8685 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8686 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8687 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8688 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8689 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8691 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8692 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8694 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8695 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8696 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8697 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8698 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8699 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8703 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8704 pub entropy_source: ES,
8706 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8707 pub node_signer: NS,
8709 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8710 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8712 pub signer_provider: SP,
8714 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8716 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8717 pub fee_estimator: F,
8718 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8720 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8721 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8722 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8723 pub chain_monitor: M,
8725 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8726 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8727 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8728 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8729 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8730 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8732 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8734 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8735 /// deserialization.
8737 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8738 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8739 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8741 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8742 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8744 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8745 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8746 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8747 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8749 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8752 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8753 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8756 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8757 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8759 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8760 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8761 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8762 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8763 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8764 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8768 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8769 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8770 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8771 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8772 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8774 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8775 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8780 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8781 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8782 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8783 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8785 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8786 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8787 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8788 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8789 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8790 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8794 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8795 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8796 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8800 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8801 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8803 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8804 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8805 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8806 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8807 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8808 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8812 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8813 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8815 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8816 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8817 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8819 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8821 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8822 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8823 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8824 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8825 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8826 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8827 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8828 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8829 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
8830 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8832 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8833 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8834 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8835 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8836 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8837 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8838 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8839 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8840 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8841 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8842 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8843 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8844 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8846 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
8847 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
8848 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
8850 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
8851 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
8852 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
8854 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
8855 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
8856 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
8858 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8859 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8860 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8861 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8864 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8865 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8866 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8867 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8868 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8869 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8870 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8872 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8873 let mut found_htlc = false;
8874 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8875 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8878 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8879 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8880 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8881 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8882 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8883 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8884 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8885 log_info!(args.logger,
8886 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8887 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
8888 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8892 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8893 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8894 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8895 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8896 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8898 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8899 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8901 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8902 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8903 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8904 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
8906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8907 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8908 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
8909 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8913 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8914 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8915 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8916 // safely discard the channel.
8917 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8918 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8919 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8920 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8921 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8922 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8923 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8926 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
8927 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8928 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8929 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8930 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8931 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8935 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8936 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8937 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8938 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
8939 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8940 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8941 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8943 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8947 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8948 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8949 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8950 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8951 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8952 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8953 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8954 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8955 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8957 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8960 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8961 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8962 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8963 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8964 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8965 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8966 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8967 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8969 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8972 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8975 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8976 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8977 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8978 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8979 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8980 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8981 is_connected: false,
8985 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8986 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
8987 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8988 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8989 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8990 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8991 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8992 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8995 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8996 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8997 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8998 for _ in 0..event_count {
8999 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9000 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9005 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9006 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9007 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9009 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9010 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9011 // on-startup monitor updates.
9012 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9013 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9015 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9019 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9020 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9022 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9023 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9024 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9025 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9026 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9030 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9031 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9032 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9033 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9034 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9035 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9036 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9038 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9039 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9043 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9044 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9045 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9046 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9047 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9048 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9049 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9050 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9051 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9052 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9053 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9054 let mut events_override = None;
9055 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9056 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9057 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9058 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9059 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9060 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9061 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9062 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9063 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9064 (8, events_override, option),
9065 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9066 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9067 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9068 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9070 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9071 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9074 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9075 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9078 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9079 pending_events_read = events;
9082 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9083 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9086 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9087 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9088 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9089 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9090 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9091 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9093 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9095 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9096 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9097 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9100 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9101 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9102 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9103 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9104 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9106 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9107 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9108 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9110 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9111 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9112 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9113 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9114 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9116 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9117 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9118 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9119 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9120 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9121 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9122 pending_background_events.push(
9123 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9124 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9125 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9126 update: update.clone(),
9129 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9130 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9131 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9132 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9133 pending_background_events.push(
9134 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9135 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9136 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9139 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9140 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9141 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9143 max_in_flight_update_id
9147 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9148 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9149 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9150 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9151 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9152 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9154 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9155 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9156 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9157 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9158 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9159 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9160 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9161 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9162 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9165 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9166 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9167 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9168 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9169 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9170 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9171 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9172 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9173 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9174 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9175 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9178 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9179 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9180 debug_assert!(false);
9181 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9186 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9187 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9188 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9189 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9190 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9191 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9192 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9193 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9195 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9196 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9197 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9199 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9200 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9201 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9202 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9203 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9204 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9205 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9206 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9211 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9212 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9214 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9215 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9216 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9217 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9220 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9221 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9222 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9223 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9224 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9225 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9226 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9228 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9229 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9230 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9231 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9232 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9233 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9234 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9235 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9238 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9239 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9240 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9241 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9243 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9244 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9245 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9247 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9248 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9249 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9250 retry_strategy: None,
9251 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9252 payment_params: None,
9253 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9254 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9255 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9256 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9257 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9258 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9259 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9260 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9261 total_msat: path_amt,
9262 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9264 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9265 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9270 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9272 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9273 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9274 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9275 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9277 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9278 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9279 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9280 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9281 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9282 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9283 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9284 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9285 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9286 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9287 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9292 !forwards.is_empty()
9294 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9295 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9296 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9297 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9298 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9299 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9300 intercepted_id != ev_id
9307 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9308 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9309 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9310 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9311 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9312 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9313 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9314 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9315 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9316 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9317 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9319 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9320 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9321 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9323 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9324 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9325 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9332 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9333 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9335 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9337 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9338 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9339 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9340 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9341 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9342 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9343 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9344 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9345 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9346 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9349 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9350 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9351 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9352 // channel still live case here.
9356 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9357 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9362 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9363 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9364 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9365 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9366 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9367 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9368 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9369 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9373 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9374 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9376 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9377 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9378 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9379 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9381 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9382 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9383 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9385 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9386 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9388 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9389 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9391 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9394 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9395 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9396 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9398 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9402 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9403 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9404 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9405 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9406 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9408 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9409 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9410 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9411 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9412 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9413 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9414 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9415 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9417 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9418 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9422 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9424 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9426 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9427 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9429 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9430 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9435 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9436 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9438 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9440 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9442 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9443 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9444 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9445 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9449 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9450 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9451 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9452 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9453 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9454 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9455 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9456 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9458 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9459 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9460 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9462 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9463 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9464 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9465 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9466 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9467 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9469 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9470 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9471 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9472 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9473 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9474 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9478 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9479 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9480 debug_assert!(false);
9481 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9486 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9488 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9489 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9490 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9491 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9492 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9493 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9494 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9495 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9496 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9497 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9498 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9500 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9501 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9503 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9504 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9505 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9506 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9508 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9509 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9510 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9511 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9513 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9514 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9515 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9516 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9518 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9519 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9520 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9521 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9522 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9523 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9524 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9527 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9528 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9531 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9534 purpose: payment.purpose,
9535 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9536 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9537 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9543 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9544 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9545 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9546 for action in actions.iter() {
9547 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9548 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9549 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9551 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9552 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9553 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9554 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9556 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9557 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9558 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9559 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9565 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9567 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9568 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9572 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9574 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9575 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9576 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9577 router: args.router,
9579 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9581 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9582 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9583 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9584 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9586 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9587 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9588 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9589 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9590 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9591 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9593 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9598 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9600 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9602 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9603 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9604 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9605 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9606 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9607 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9609 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9610 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9611 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9613 logger: args.logger,
9614 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9617 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9618 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9619 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9620 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9621 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9624 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9625 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9626 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9627 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9628 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9629 downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
9632 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9633 //connection or two.
9635 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9641 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9642 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9643 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9644 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9645 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9646 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9647 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
9648 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9649 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9650 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9651 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9652 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9653 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9654 use crate::util::test_utils;
9655 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9656 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9659 fn test_notify_limits() {
9660 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9661 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9665 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9667 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9668 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9669 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9670 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9671 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9673 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9675 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9676 // to connect messages with new values
9677 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9678 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9679 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9680 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9681 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9682 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9684 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9685 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9686 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9687 // ... but the last node should not.
9688 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9689 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9690 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9691 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9693 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9694 // about the channel.
9695 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9696 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9697 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9699 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9701 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9702 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9703 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9704 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9705 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9706 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9708 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9709 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9710 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9712 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9713 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9714 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9715 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9716 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9717 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9719 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9720 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9721 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9722 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9723 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9724 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9725 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9726 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9728 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9729 // the channel info has updated.
9730 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9731 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9732 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9733 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9734 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9735 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9739 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9740 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9742 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9743 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9744 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9745 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9746 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9748 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9749 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9750 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9751 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9753 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9754 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9755 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9756 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9757 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9758 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9759 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9760 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9762 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9763 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9764 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9766 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9767 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9768 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9770 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9771 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9772 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9773 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9774 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9776 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9777 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9778 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9780 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9781 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9782 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9783 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9784 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9785 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9786 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9787 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9788 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9790 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9791 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9792 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9794 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9795 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9796 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9798 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9799 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9800 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9801 // lightning messages manually.
9802 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9803 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9806 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9807 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9808 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
9809 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9811 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9812 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9814 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9815 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9817 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9818 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9819 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9821 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9822 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9823 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9825 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9827 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9829 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9830 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9833 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9834 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9835 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9836 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9838 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9839 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9840 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9841 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9846 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9847 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9848 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9849 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9851 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9856 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9857 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9858 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9861 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9862 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9863 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9864 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9865 // fails as expected.
9866 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9867 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9868 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9869 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9870 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9871 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9872 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9873 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9874 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9875 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9876 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9877 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9878 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9879 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9880 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9882 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9883 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9884 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9886 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9887 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
9888 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
9889 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
9890 let route = find_route(
9891 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9892 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9894 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9895 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9897 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9898 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9899 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9900 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9901 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9903 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9904 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9905 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9906 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9907 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9909 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9910 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9911 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9912 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9913 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9914 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9915 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9916 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9917 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9919 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9920 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9922 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9923 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9924 let route = find_route(
9925 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9926 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9928 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9929 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9931 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9932 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9933 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9934 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9935 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9937 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9938 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9939 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9940 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9942 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9943 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9944 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9945 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9946 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9948 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9949 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9950 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9952 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9953 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9954 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9955 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9956 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9957 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9958 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9959 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9960 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9962 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9963 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9965 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9966 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9967 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9968 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9970 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9971 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9972 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9973 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9974 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9976 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9977 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
9978 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9981 let route = find_route(
9982 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9983 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9985 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9986 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9987 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9989 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9990 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9991 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9992 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9993 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9995 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9996 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9997 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9999 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10000 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10001 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10002 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10003 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10004 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10005 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10006 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10007 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10009 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10010 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10014 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10015 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10016 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10017 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10018 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10019 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10020 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10022 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10023 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10025 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10026 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10027 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10028 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10029 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10030 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10031 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10032 let route = find_route(
10033 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10034 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10037 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10038 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10039 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10040 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10041 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10042 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10045 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10046 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10047 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10048 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10049 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10050 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10051 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10053 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10057 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10058 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10059 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10060 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10061 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10062 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10063 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10064 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10065 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10067 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10068 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10070 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10071 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10072 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10073 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10074 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10075 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10076 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10077 let route = find_route(
10078 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10079 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10082 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10083 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10084 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10085 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10086 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10087 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10088 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10089 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10092 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10093 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10094 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10095 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10096 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10097 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10098 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10100 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10104 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10108 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10110 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10111 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10112 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10113 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10115 // Marshall an MPP route.
10116 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10117 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10118 route.paths.push(path);
10119 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10120 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10121 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10122 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10123 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10124 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10126 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10127 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10129 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10130 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10132 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10137 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10138 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10139 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10140 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10141 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10143 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10145 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10146 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10148 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10149 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10151 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10154 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10155 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10156 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10157 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10158 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10159 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10162 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10165 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10166 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10171 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10172 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10173 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10174 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10175 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10176 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10178 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10179 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10181 total_msat: 100_000,
10184 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10185 // payment verification fails as expected.
10186 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10187 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10188 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10189 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10191 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10195 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10196 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10200 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10201 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10202 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10203 // the channel is successfully closed.
10204 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10205 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10206 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10207 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10209 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10210 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10211 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10212 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10213 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10215 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10216 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10218 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10219 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10220 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10221 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10224 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10226 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10227 // as it has the funding transaction.
10228 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10229 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10230 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10233 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10235 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10237 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10239 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10240 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10241 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10243 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10246 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10247 // as it has the funding transaction.
10248 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10249 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10250 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10253 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10254 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10256 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10257 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10258 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10259 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10261 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10262 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10263 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10264 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10266 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10267 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10269 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10270 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10271 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10272 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10273 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10274 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10275 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10279 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10280 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10281 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10282 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10283 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10284 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10285 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10288 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10290 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10291 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10292 // closing transaction).
10293 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10294 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10295 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10297 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10298 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10299 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10300 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10301 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10304 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10306 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10308 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10309 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10310 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10312 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10314 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10315 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10318 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10319 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10320 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10323 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10324 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10325 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10328 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10330 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10331 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10333 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10334 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10336 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10337 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10342 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10343 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10344 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10345 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10346 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10347 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10348 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10349 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10352 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10353 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10354 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10356 // Test the API functions.
10357 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10359 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10361 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10363 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10365 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10367 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10369 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10373 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10374 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10375 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10376 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10377 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10378 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10380 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10382 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10383 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10385 let mut funding_tx = None;
10386 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10387 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10388 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10391 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10392 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10393 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10394 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10395 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10397 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10399 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10401 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10403 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10405 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10407 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10410 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10411 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10412 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10413 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10414 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10416 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10417 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10419 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10420 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10421 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10422 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10423 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10424 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10425 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10428 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10429 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10430 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10431 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10432 }, true).unwrap_err();
10434 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10435 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10436 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10437 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10438 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10439 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10440 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10442 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10443 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10445 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10446 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10447 }, true).unwrap_err();
10449 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10450 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10451 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10452 }, false).unwrap();
10453 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10455 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10456 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10458 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10459 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10460 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10461 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10462 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10464 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10465 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10466 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10468 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10469 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10470 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10472 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10473 // "protected" and can connect again.
10474 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10475 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10476 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10478 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10480 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10482 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10483 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10487 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10488 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10489 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10490 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10491 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10492 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10494 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10496 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10497 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10499 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10500 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10501 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10502 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10505 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10507 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10508 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10509 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10511 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10512 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10513 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10515 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10516 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10517 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10518 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10522 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10523 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10524 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10525 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10527 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10528 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10529 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10530 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10532 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10534 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10535 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10537 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10538 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10539 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10540 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10541 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10542 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10545 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10546 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10548 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10549 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10551 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10553 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10554 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10557 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10558 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10559 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10560 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10561 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10563 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10564 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10566 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10567 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10568 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10569 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10573 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10575 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10576 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10578 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10579 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10580 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10582 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10583 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10585 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10587 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10591 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10592 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10593 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10594 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10595 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10596 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10597 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10598 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10600 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10601 payment_metadata: None,
10602 keysend_preimage: None,
10603 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10604 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10606 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10608 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10609 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10610 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10611 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10612 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10614 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10615 } else { panic!(); }
10617 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10618 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10620 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10621 payment_metadata: None,
10622 keysend_preimage: None,
10623 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10624 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10626 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10628 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10629 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10633 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10634 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10635 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10636 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10637 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10639 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10640 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10645 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10646 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10648 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10649 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10651 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10652 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10653 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10654 match &msg_events[0] {
10655 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10656 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10658 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10659 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10660 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10663 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10666 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10667 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10669 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10670 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10671 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10673 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10677 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10678 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10679 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10680 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10681 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10682 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10683 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10684 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10685 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10686 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10687 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10689 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10690 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10691 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10693 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10694 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10696 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10697 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10702 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10703 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10705 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10706 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10708 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10709 // not have generated any events.
10710 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10714 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10715 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10716 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10717 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10718 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10719 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10720 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10721 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10723 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10724 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10725 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10727 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10728 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10729 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10730 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10731 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10733 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10734 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10737 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10738 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10739 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10741 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10742 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10743 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10744 ..Default::default()
10746 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10747 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10748 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10750 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10751 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10754 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10755 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10756 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10757 ..Default::default()
10759 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10760 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10761 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10762 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10764 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10765 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10768 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10769 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10770 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
10771 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10772 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10775 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10776 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10777 ..Default::default()
10779 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10782 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10783 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10784 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10785 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10789 fn test_payment_display() {
10790 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10791 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10792 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
10793 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10794 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10795 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10801 use crate::chain::Listen;
10802 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10803 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10804 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10805 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10806 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10807 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10808 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10809 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10810 use crate::util::test_utils;
10811 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10813 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10814 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10815 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10817 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
10819 use criterion::Criterion;
10821 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10822 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10823 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10824 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10825 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10826 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10827 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10829 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10830 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
10832 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
10833 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
10835 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
10837 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10840 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10841 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10844 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10845 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10846 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10848 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10849 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10851 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10852 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10853 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10854 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10855 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10857 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10858 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10859 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10861 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10862 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10863 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10864 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10866 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10867 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10868 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10870 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10871 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10872 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10873 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10874 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10876 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10877 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10878 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10880 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10881 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10883 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10884 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10885 }, false).unwrap();
10886 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10887 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10888 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10891 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10892 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10893 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10895 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10896 } else { panic!(); }
10898 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10899 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10900 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10901 match events_b[0] {
10902 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10903 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10905 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10908 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10909 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10910 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10911 match events_a[0] {
10912 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10913 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10918 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10920 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10921 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10922 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10924 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10925 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10926 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10927 match msg_events[0] {
10928 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10929 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10930 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10934 match msg_events[1] {
10935 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10939 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10940 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10941 match events_a[0] {
10942 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10943 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10948 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10949 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10950 match events_b[0] {
10951 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10952 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10954 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10957 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10958 macro_rules! send_payment {
10959 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10960 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10961 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10962 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10963 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10964 payment_count += 1;
10965 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10966 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10968 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10969 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
10970 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
10971 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10972 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10973 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10974 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10975 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10976 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10977 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10978 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10980 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10981 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10982 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10983 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10985 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10986 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10987 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10988 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10989 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10991 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10994 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10995 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10996 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10997 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10999 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11003 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11004 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11005 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);