1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
68 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
71 use crate::prelude::*;
73 use core::cell::RefCell;
75 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
76 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
77 use core::time::Duration;
80 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
81 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry};
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
121 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
122 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
123 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
126 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
131 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
132 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
135 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
138 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
139 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
142 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
143 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
145 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
146 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
147 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
150 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
151 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
153 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
154 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
157 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
158 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
161 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
167 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 short_channel_id: u64,
171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
172 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
175 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
182 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
183 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
184 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
187 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
190 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
191 struct ClaimableHTLC {
192 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
194 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
196 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
198 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
202 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
238 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
240 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
241 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
244 session_priv: SecretKey,
245 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
246 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
247 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
248 payment_id: PaymentId,
249 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
250 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
251 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
252 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
254 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
257 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
258 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
259 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
261 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
263 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
265 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
268 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
269 payment_id.hash(hasher);
270 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
271 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
272 payment_params.hash(hasher);
277 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
280 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
281 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
283 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
284 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
285 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
286 payment_secret: None,
287 payment_params: None,
292 struct ReceiveError {
298 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
299 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
301 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
302 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
303 pub enum FailureCode {
304 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
305 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
306 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
307 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
308 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
309 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
310 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
311 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
312 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
313 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
314 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
317 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
319 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
320 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
321 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
322 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
323 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
325 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
326 err: msgs::LightningError,
327 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
328 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
330 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
332 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
334 err: LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
344 shutdown_finish: None,
348 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
349 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
352 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
354 err: LightningError {
356 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
357 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
363 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
364 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
368 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
371 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
373 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
374 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
378 log_level: Level::Warn,
381 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
383 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
385 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
387 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
388 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
396 shutdown_finish: None,
401 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
402 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
403 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
404 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
405 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
407 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
408 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
409 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
410 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
411 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
412 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
413 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
415 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
419 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
420 struct ClaimingPayment {
422 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
423 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
425 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
426 (0, amount_msat, required),
427 (2, payment_purpose, required),
428 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
431 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
432 struct ClaimablePayments {
433 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
434 /// failed/claimed by the user.
436 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
437 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
439 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
440 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
441 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
443 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
444 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
445 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
446 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
449 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
450 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
451 /// quite some time lag.
452 enum BackgroundEvent {
453 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
454 /// commitment transaction.
455 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
459 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
460 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
461 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
462 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
463 /// event can be generated.
464 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
465 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
466 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
469 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
470 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
471 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, ignorable) },
474 /// State we hold per-peer.
475 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
476 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
478 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
479 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
481 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
482 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
483 latest_features: InitFeatures,
484 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
485 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
486 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
487 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
488 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
490 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
491 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
492 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
493 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
495 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
496 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
497 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
498 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
499 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
500 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
501 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
502 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
503 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
504 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
508 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
509 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
510 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
511 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
512 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
513 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
516 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
520 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
521 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
523 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
526 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
527 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
528 struct PendingInboundPayment {
529 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
530 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
531 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
532 /// this payment being removed.
534 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
535 user_payment_id: u64,
536 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
537 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
538 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
541 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
542 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
543 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
544 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
545 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
546 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
547 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
549 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
550 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
558 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
560 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
565 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
566 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
567 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
568 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
569 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
570 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
571 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
572 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
574 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
575 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
577 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
578 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
580 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
581 /// to individual Channels.
583 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
584 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
585 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
586 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
588 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
589 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
590 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
591 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
592 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
593 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
594 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
596 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
597 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
598 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
599 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
602 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
603 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
604 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
605 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
606 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
608 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, ChannelManager limits the number of inbound connections and
609 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
610 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
611 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
613 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
614 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
615 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
617 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
618 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
619 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
620 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
621 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
624 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
625 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
626 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
627 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
628 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
632 // `total_consistency_lock`
634 // |__`forward_htlcs`
636 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
638 // |__`per_peer_state`
640 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
642 // | |__`claimable_payments`
644 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
650 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
652 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
656 // | |__`pending_events`
658 // | |__`pending_background_events`
660 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
662 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
663 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
664 ES::Target: EntropySource,
665 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
666 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
667 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
671 default_configuration: UserConfig,
672 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
673 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
679 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
681 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
683 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
684 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
686 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
687 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
688 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
689 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
691 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
692 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
694 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
695 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
696 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
697 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
698 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
699 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
700 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
701 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
703 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
705 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
706 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
708 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
710 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
711 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
712 /// and via the classic SCID.
714 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
715 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
717 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
719 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
721 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
722 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
723 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
725 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
726 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
728 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
729 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
731 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
732 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
734 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
735 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
736 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
737 /// active channel list on load.
739 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
740 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
742 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
744 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
745 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
746 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
748 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
749 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
750 /// the handling of the events.
752 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
753 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
756 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
757 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
758 /// would break backwards compatability.
759 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
760 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
761 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
763 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
764 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
766 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
768 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
769 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
770 /// confirmation depth.
772 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
773 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
774 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
776 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
778 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
780 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
782 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
784 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
786 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
787 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
788 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
790 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
791 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
793 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
794 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
795 /// keeping additional state.
796 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
798 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
799 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
800 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
801 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
803 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
804 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
806 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
807 /// are currently open with that peer.
809 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
810 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
813 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
815 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
816 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
817 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
818 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
819 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
821 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
822 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
823 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
824 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
825 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
826 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
827 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
828 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
829 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
830 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
831 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
833 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
842 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
844 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
845 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
846 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
847 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
848 pub struct ChainParameters {
849 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
850 pub network: Network,
852 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
854 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
855 pub best_block: BestBlock,
858 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
864 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
865 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
866 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
867 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
868 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
869 /// updates are ready for persistence).
871 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
872 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
873 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
874 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
875 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
877 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
878 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
881 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
882 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
883 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
886 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
887 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
889 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
890 persistence_notifier: notifier,
891 should_persist: persist_check,
892 _read_guard: read_guard,
897 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
899 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
900 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
905 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
906 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
908 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
910 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
911 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
912 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
913 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
914 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
916 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
917 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
919 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
921 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
922 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
923 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
924 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
925 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
926 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
927 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
928 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
929 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
930 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
931 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
932 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
933 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
935 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
936 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
938 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
939 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
940 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
941 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
943 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
944 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
945 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
946 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
947 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
948 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
951 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
953 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
954 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
957 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
959 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
960 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
962 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
963 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
964 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
965 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
967 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
968 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
969 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
970 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
972 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
973 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
974 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
976 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
977 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
978 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
980 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
981 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
982 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
983 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
984 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
985 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
986 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
987 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
988 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
989 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
990 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
993 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
994 /// to better separate parameters.
995 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
996 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
997 /// The node_id of our counterparty
998 pub node_id: PublicKey,
999 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1000 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1001 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1002 pub features: InitFeatures,
1003 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1004 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1005 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1007 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1009 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1010 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1011 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1012 /// payments to us through this channel.
1013 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1014 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1015 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1016 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1017 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1018 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1019 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1022 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1023 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1024 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1025 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1026 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1027 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1028 /// lifetime of the channel.
1029 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1030 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1031 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1032 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1033 /// our counterparty already.
1035 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1036 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1037 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1038 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1040 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1041 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1042 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1043 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1045 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1046 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1048 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1049 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1051 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1052 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1053 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1054 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1055 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1056 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1057 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1058 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1059 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1062 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1064 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1065 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1066 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1067 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1068 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1069 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1070 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1072 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1073 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1075 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1076 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1077 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1078 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1079 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1080 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1081 /// this value on chain.
1083 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1085 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1087 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1088 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1089 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1090 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1092 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1093 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1094 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1095 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1097 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1098 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1099 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1100 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1102 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1103 pub balance_msat: u64,
1104 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1105 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1106 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1107 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1109 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1111 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1112 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1113 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1114 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1115 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1116 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1117 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1118 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1120 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1121 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1122 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1123 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1124 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1125 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1126 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1128 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1129 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1130 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1131 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1132 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1133 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1134 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1135 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1136 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1138 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1140 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1141 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1142 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1143 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1144 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1146 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1147 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1148 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1149 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1150 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1151 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1152 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1154 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1155 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1156 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1157 pub is_outbound: bool,
1158 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1159 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1160 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1161 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1162 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1164 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1165 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1166 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1167 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1169 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1170 pub is_usable: bool,
1171 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1172 pub is_public: bool,
1173 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1174 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1175 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1176 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1177 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1178 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1180 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1181 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1184 impl ChannelDetails {
1185 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1186 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1187 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1189 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1190 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1191 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1192 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1195 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1196 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1197 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1199 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1200 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1201 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1202 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1206 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1207 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1208 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1209 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1210 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1212 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1214 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1215 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1216 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1219 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1220 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1221 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1223 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1224 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1225 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1227 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1228 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1229 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1231 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1232 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1236 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1238 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1240 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1241 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1242 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1243 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1245 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1246 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1247 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1250 macro_rules! handle_error {
1251 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1254 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1255 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1256 // entering the macro.
1257 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1258 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1260 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1262 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1263 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1264 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1265 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1269 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1270 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1271 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1272 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1277 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1278 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1280 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1281 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1282 action: err.action.clone()
1286 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1287 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1288 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1289 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1290 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1294 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1301 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1302 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1303 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1304 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1305 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1306 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1308 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1309 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1310 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1311 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1312 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1314 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1315 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1317 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1321 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1322 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1323 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1325 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1326 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1328 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1329 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1331 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1332 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1333 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1334 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1335 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1336 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1342 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1343 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1347 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1349 $entry.remove_entry();
1357 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1358 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1362 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1364 $entry.remove_entry();
1372 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1373 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1375 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1376 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1382 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1383 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1384 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1385 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1386 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1388 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1389 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1390 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1391 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1392 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1393 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1394 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1395 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1396 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1397 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1402 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1403 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1404 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1406 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1407 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1408 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1409 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1410 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1411 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1414 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1419 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1420 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1421 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1422 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1423 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1424 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1425 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1426 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1427 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1428 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1429 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1431 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1432 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1433 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1439 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1440 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1442 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1443 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1444 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1445 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1446 updates.announcement_sigs);
1447 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1448 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1451 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1452 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1454 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1456 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1457 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1459 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1460 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1461 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1462 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1467 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1468 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1469 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1470 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1471 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1473 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1474 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1475 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1478 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1479 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1480 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1481 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1482 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1483 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1484 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1485 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1489 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1490 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1491 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1492 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1493 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1495 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $chan);
1501 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1502 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1506 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1508 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1509 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1510 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1511 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1512 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1513 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1517 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1519 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1520 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1522 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1524 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1525 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1526 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1527 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1528 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1529 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1530 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1531 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1533 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1534 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1535 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1540 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1542 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1543 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1544 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1545 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1546 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1547 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1548 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1549 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1551 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1554 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1555 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1557 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1559 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1561 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1563 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1564 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1565 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1566 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1576 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1577 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1578 &self.default_configuration
1581 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1582 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1583 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1586 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1587 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1589 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1591 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1595 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1600 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1602 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1603 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1604 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1605 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1606 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1608 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1609 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1611 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1612 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1613 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1615 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1616 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1617 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1618 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1619 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1620 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1622 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1623 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1624 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1625 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1626 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1627 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1630 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1631 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1632 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1634 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1636 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1637 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1639 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1641 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1642 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1643 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1644 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1645 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1646 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1650 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1655 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1657 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1658 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1659 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1661 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1663 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1666 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1669 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1670 node_id: their_network_key,
1673 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1676 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1677 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1678 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1679 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1680 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1681 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1682 // the same channel.
1683 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1685 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1686 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1687 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1688 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1689 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1690 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1691 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1692 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1693 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1694 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1695 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1696 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1697 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1698 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1699 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1700 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1701 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1702 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1703 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1704 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1705 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1706 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1707 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1708 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1710 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1711 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1712 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1713 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1714 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1715 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1716 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1717 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1718 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1719 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1720 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1721 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1722 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1723 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1724 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1725 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1726 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1727 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1728 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1729 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1730 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1731 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1732 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1733 config: Some(channel.config()),
1741 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1742 /// more information.
1743 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1744 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1747 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1748 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1750 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1751 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1754 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1755 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1756 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1757 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1758 // really wanted anyway.
1759 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1762 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1763 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1765 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1766 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1767 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1769 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1770 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1771 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1772 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1773 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1774 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1775 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1776 total_msat: *total_msat,
1779 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1780 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1782 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1783 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1785 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1790 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1791 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1792 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1793 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1794 Some(transaction) => {
1795 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1799 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1800 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1801 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1802 reason: closure_reason
1806 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1807 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1809 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1810 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1811 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1813 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1814 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1816 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1817 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1818 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1819 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1820 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1821 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1822 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1823 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1824 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1826 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1827 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1828 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1829 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1830 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1834 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1835 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1836 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1837 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1838 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan_entry);
1841 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1842 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1843 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1844 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1848 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1852 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1856 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1857 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1858 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1859 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1862 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1866 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1867 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1868 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1870 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1871 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1873 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1874 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1875 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1876 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1878 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1880 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1881 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1882 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1883 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1884 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1887 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1888 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1889 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1891 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1892 /// the channel being closed or not:
1893 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1894 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1895 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1896 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1897 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1898 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1899 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1901 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1903 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1904 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1905 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1906 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1907 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1911 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1912 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1913 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1914 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1915 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1916 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1917 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1918 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1920 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1921 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1922 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1923 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1924 // ignore the result here.
1925 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1929 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1930 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1931 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1932 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1933 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1934 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1935 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1937 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1938 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1939 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1940 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1941 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1943 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1945 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1947 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1950 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1951 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1952 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1953 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1954 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1959 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1962 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1963 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1964 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1965 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1966 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1967 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1968 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1969 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
1970 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1971 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1972 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1973 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1984 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1985 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1986 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1988 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1989 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1990 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1993 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1994 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1995 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1997 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1998 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1999 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2000 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2001 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2004 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2005 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2006 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2007 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2008 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2012 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2013 /// local transaction(s).
2014 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2015 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2016 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2020 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2021 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2023 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2024 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2025 return Err(ReceiveError {
2026 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2028 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2031 // final_expiry_too_soon
2032 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2033 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2035 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2036 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2037 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2038 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2039 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2040 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2041 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2042 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2043 return Err(ReceiveError {
2044 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2045 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2048 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2049 return Err(ReceiveError {
2051 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2052 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2056 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2057 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2058 return Err(ReceiveError {
2059 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2060 err_data: Vec::new(),
2061 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2064 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2065 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2066 return Err(ReceiveError {
2067 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2068 err_data: Vec::new(),
2069 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2071 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2072 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2074 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2075 phantom_shared_secret,
2077 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2078 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2079 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2080 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2081 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2082 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2083 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2084 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2085 return Err(ReceiveError {
2086 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2087 err_data: Vec::new(),
2088 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2092 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2094 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2097 return Err(ReceiveError {
2098 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2099 err_data: Vec::new(),
2100 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2105 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2108 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2109 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2110 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2111 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2115 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2116 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2117 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2119 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2120 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2121 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2122 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2123 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2124 failure_code: $err_code,
2130 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2131 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2134 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2135 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2136 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2138 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2139 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2140 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2141 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2142 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2143 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2144 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2145 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2147 macro_rules! return_err {
2148 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2150 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2151 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2152 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2153 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2154 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2155 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2161 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2163 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2164 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2166 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2167 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2171 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2172 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2174 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2176 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2177 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2178 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2179 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2180 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2182 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2185 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2186 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2187 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2189 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2190 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2191 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2194 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2195 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2196 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2197 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2201 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2202 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2203 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2206 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2207 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2208 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2209 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2210 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2215 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2216 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2217 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2218 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2219 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2220 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2221 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2222 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2223 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2224 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2225 // phantom or an intercept.
2226 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2227 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2228 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2232 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2235 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2237 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2238 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2239 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2240 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2241 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2243 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2244 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2245 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2247 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2248 // have no consistency guarantees.
2249 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2253 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2254 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2255 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2256 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2257 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2259 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2260 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2261 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2262 // we don't have the channel here.
2263 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2265 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2267 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2268 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2269 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2270 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2271 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2272 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2273 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2275 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2276 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2278 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2279 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2283 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2284 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2285 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2286 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2288 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2295 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2296 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2297 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2298 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2299 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2300 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2302 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2303 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2305 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2306 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2307 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2308 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2309 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2310 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2311 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2312 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2313 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2314 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2320 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2321 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2322 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2323 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2325 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2326 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2328 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2329 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2330 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2332 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2333 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2334 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2335 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2336 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2337 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2338 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2342 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2347 pending_forward_info
2350 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2351 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2352 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2354 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2355 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2356 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2357 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2358 if !chan.should_announce() {
2359 return Err(LightningError {
2360 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2364 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2365 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2368 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2371 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2372 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2373 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2374 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2376 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2377 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2378 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2379 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2380 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2381 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2382 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2386 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2388 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2389 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2390 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2392 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2393 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2395 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2396 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2397 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2398 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2399 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2400 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2401 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2402 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2404 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2405 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2406 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2408 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2410 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2416 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2417 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2418 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2419 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2420 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2422 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2423 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2424 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2425 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2426 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2428 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2430 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2432 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2433 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2434 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2435 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2438 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2439 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2440 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" })?;
2441 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2442 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2443 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2444 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2445 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2447 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2448 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2449 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2451 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2452 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2454 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2455 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2456 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2457 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2458 Some(monitor_update) => {
2459 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2460 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2461 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan) {
2464 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2465 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2466 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2467 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2468 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2469 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2470 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2471 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2477 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2478 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2479 // `channel_by_id` map.
2480 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2481 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2486 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2487 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2489 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2494 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2496 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2497 /// fields for more info.
2499 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2500 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2502 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2504 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2505 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2506 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2507 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2508 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2510 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2511 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2512 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2513 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2514 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2516 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2517 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2518 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2519 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2521 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2523 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2524 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2525 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2527 /// In general, a path may raise:
2528 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2529 /// node public key) is specified.
2530 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2531 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2533 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2534 /// relevant updates.
2536 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2537 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2538 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2540 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2542 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2543 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2544 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2545 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2546 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2548 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2549 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2550 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2552 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2553 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2554 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2555 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2556 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2557 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2558 self.pending_outbound_payments
2559 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2560 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2561 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2564 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2565 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2566 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2567 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2568 self.pending_outbound_payments
2569 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2570 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2571 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2572 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2573 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2577 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2578 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2579 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2580 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2581 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2585 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2586 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2587 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2591 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2592 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2593 /// retries are exhausted.
2595 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2596 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2598 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2599 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2600 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2602 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2603 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2605 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2606 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2607 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2609 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2612 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2613 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2614 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2615 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2616 /// never reach the recipient.
2618 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2619 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2621 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2622 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2624 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2626 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2627 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2628 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2629 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2630 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2632 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2633 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2636 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2637 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2639 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2642 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2643 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2644 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2645 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2646 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2647 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2649 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2650 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2653 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2654 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2655 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2656 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2657 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2658 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2659 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2660 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2663 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2666 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2667 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2670 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2671 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2672 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2673 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2674 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2675 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2676 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2677 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2679 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2680 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2683 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2685 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2687 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2688 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2689 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2690 } else { unreachable!(); })
2693 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2696 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2697 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2700 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2701 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2706 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2707 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2710 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2711 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2712 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2714 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2715 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2716 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2717 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2726 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2727 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2728 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2732 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2734 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2735 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2737 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2738 /// across the p2p network.
2740 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2741 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2743 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2744 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2745 /// keys per-channel).
2747 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2748 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2749 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2751 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2752 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2753 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2755 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2756 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2757 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2758 /// for more details.
2760 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2761 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2762 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2763 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2765 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2766 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2767 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2768 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2773 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2774 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2775 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2776 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2777 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2778 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2779 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2783 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2784 let mut output_index = None;
2785 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2786 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2787 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2788 if output_index.is_some() {
2789 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2790 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2793 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2794 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2795 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2798 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2801 if output_index.is_none() {
2802 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2803 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2806 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2810 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2812 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2813 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2814 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2815 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2817 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2818 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2820 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2821 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2823 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2825 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2826 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2827 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2828 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2829 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2830 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2831 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2832 pub fn update_channel_config(
2833 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2834 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2835 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2836 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2837 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2841 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2842 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2844 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2845 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2846 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2847 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2848 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2849 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2850 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2851 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2852 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2856 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2857 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2858 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2861 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2862 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2863 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2864 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2865 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2873 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2874 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2876 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2877 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2879 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2880 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2881 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2882 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2883 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2885 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2886 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2888 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2891 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2892 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2893 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2894 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2895 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2896 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2898 let next_hop_scid = {
2899 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2900 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2901 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2902 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2903 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2904 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2906 if !chan.is_usable() {
2907 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2908 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2911 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2913 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2914 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2919 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2920 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2921 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2924 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2925 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2926 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2928 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2930 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2931 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2934 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2935 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2936 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2937 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2938 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2940 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2944 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2945 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2947 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2950 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2951 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2952 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2954 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2955 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2956 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2959 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2960 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2961 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2962 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2963 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2964 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2965 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2968 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2969 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2970 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2971 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2976 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2978 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2979 /// Will likely generate further events.
2980 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2983 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2984 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2985 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2987 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2988 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2990 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2991 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2992 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2994 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2995 match forward_info {
2996 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2997 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2998 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2999 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3000 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3003 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3004 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3005 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3007 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3008 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3009 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3010 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3011 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3012 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3015 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3016 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3018 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3021 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3022 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3028 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3029 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3031 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3035 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3036 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3038 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3042 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3043 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3044 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3045 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3046 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3048 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3049 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3050 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3051 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3052 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3054 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3056 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3057 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3061 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3062 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3063 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3064 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3070 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3073 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3076 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3077 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3078 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3079 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3080 // problem, not ours.
3086 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3087 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3089 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3093 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3094 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3095 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3096 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3099 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3100 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3101 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3102 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3103 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3107 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3108 match forward_info {
3109 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3110 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3111 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3112 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3113 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3116 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3117 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3118 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3119 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3120 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3121 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3122 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3123 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3125 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3126 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3127 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3129 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3130 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3132 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3134 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3135 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3136 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3137 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3142 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3143 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3145 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3146 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3147 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3148 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3150 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3151 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3153 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3155 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3156 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3157 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3166 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3167 match forward_info {
3168 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3169 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3170 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3171 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3174 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3175 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3176 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3177 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3179 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3180 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3182 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3185 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3186 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3187 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3188 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3189 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3190 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3191 phantom_shared_secret,
3193 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3195 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3200 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3201 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3202 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3203 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3204 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3206 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3207 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3208 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3209 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3210 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3211 phantom_shared_secret,
3213 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3214 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3218 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3219 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3220 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3221 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3222 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3225 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3226 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3227 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3229 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3230 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3231 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3234 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3235 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3236 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3239 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3240 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3241 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3242 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3243 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3244 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3248 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3249 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3250 total_value += htlc.value;
3251 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3252 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3253 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3254 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3255 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3256 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3258 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3260 _ => unreachable!(),
3263 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3265 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3266 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3267 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3268 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3269 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3270 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3271 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3274 amount_msat: total_value,
3275 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3276 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3278 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3280 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3281 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3283 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3285 payment_claimable_generated
3289 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3290 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3291 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3292 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3293 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3294 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3295 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3296 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3297 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3298 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3299 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3300 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3301 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3302 Ok(result) => result,
3304 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3305 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3309 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3310 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3311 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3312 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3313 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3314 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3318 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3320 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3321 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3322 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3323 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3326 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3327 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3328 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3329 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3330 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3331 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3332 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3334 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3336 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3337 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3340 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3341 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3342 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3349 if payment_data.is_none() {
3350 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3351 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3354 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3355 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3356 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3357 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3358 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3359 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3360 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3361 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3363 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3364 if payment_claimable_generated {
3365 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3371 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3372 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3380 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3381 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3382 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3383 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3384 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3385 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3387 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3388 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3390 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3392 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3393 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3394 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3396 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3398 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3399 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3400 events.append(&mut new_events);
3403 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3405 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3406 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3408 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3409 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3410 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3411 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3412 if background_events.is_empty() {
3416 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3418 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3419 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3420 // monitor updating completing.
3421 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3428 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3429 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3430 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3431 self.process_background_events();
3434 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3435 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3436 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3437 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3438 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3439 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3440 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3442 if !chan.is_live() {
3443 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3444 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3445 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3447 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3448 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3450 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3451 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3455 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3456 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3457 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3458 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3459 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3460 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3461 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3463 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3466 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3469 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3470 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3471 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3479 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3481 /// This currently includes:
3482 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3483 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3484 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3486 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3487 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3488 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3490 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3491 /// estimate fetches.
3492 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3493 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3494 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3495 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3497 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3499 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3500 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3501 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3503 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3504 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3505 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3506 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3507 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3508 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3509 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3510 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3511 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3513 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3514 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3515 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3516 if needs_close { return false; }
3519 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3520 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3521 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3522 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3523 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3524 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3525 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3526 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3530 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3531 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3533 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3534 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3535 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3539 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3540 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3545 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3549 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3550 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3555 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3556 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3557 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3558 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3559 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3560 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3561 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3562 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3563 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3564 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3565 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3566 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3567 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3568 // have no channels to the peer.
3569 let remove_entry = {
3570 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3571 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3574 entry.remove_entry();
3577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3582 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3583 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3584 // This should be unreachable
3585 debug_assert!(false);
3588 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3589 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3590 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3591 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3593 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3594 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3595 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3597 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3604 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3605 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3606 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3607 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3608 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3611 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3612 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3615 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3617 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3618 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3619 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3620 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3621 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3628 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3629 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3630 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3632 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3633 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3634 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3635 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3637 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3638 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3639 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3640 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3641 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3642 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3645 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3646 /// reason for the failure.
3648 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3649 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
3650 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3652 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3653 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3654 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3655 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3656 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3657 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3658 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3663 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3664 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3665 match failure_code {
3666 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3667 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3668 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3669 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3670 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3671 HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3676 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3677 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3679 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3681 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3682 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3683 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3684 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3685 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3686 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3687 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3689 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3691 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3692 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3694 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3699 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3700 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3701 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3702 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3703 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3704 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3705 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3706 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3707 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3708 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3710 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3711 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3712 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3713 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3715 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3716 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3717 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3718 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3719 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3723 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3724 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3725 // be surfaced to the user.
3726 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3727 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3728 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3730 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3731 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3732 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3733 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3734 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3735 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3736 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3737 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3739 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3741 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3744 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3745 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3746 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3747 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3751 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3752 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3753 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3754 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3755 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3756 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3757 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3758 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3759 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3762 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3763 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3764 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3767 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3768 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3769 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3771 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3772 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3773 session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3774 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3775 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3777 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3778 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3779 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3781 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3782 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3783 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3784 push_forward_ev = true;
3786 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3787 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3788 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3790 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3791 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3794 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3795 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3796 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3797 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3798 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3799 failed_next_destination: destination,
3805 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3806 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3808 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3809 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3810 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3812 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3813 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3814 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3815 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3817 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3818 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3819 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3820 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3821 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3822 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3823 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3825 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3828 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3829 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3830 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3831 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3832 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3833 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3834 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3835 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3840 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3841 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3842 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3844 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3845 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3846 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3847 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3852 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3854 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3855 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3856 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3857 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3858 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3860 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3861 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3863 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3864 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3865 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3866 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3867 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3869 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3870 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3871 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3872 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3873 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3874 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3875 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3876 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3883 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3884 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3889 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3890 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3892 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3897 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3898 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3899 debug_assert!(false);
3904 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3905 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3906 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3907 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3908 if sources.len() != 1 {
3909 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3910 debug_assert!(false);
3916 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3918 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3919 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3920 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3921 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3924 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3925 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3926 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3927 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3931 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3932 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
3933 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3934 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3936 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3937 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3938 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3939 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3940 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3945 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3946 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3947 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3948 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3949 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3950 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3951 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3953 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3956 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3957 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3958 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3959 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3963 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3964 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3965 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3966 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3968 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3969 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3970 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3971 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3975 let mut peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
3976 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
3977 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
3981 if let Some(mut peer_state_lock) = peer_state_opt.take() {
3982 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3983 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3984 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3985 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
3987 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
3988 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
3989 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
3990 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
3991 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
3993 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3994 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
3995 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
3997 if let Err(e) = res {
3998 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
3999 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4000 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4001 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4002 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4008 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4009 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4010 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4014 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4015 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4016 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4017 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4018 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4019 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4020 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4021 // again on restart.
4022 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4023 payment_preimage, update_res);
4025 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4026 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4027 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4028 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4029 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4030 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4034 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4035 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4038 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4040 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4041 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4043 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4044 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4045 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4046 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4047 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4048 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4049 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4052 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4053 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4055 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4057 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4063 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4064 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4065 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4071 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4072 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4073 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4076 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4077 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4079 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4080 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4081 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4082 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4083 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4087 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4088 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4094 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4095 /// update completion.
4096 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4097 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4098 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4099 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4100 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4101 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4103 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4104 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4105 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4106 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4107 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4108 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4110 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4112 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4113 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4114 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4115 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4118 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4119 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4121 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4122 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4123 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4128 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4130 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4131 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4132 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4133 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4138 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4139 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4140 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4141 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4142 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4147 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4151 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4157 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4158 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4159 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4165 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4166 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4168 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4169 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4171 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4172 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4173 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4174 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4175 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4180 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4181 let mut peer_state_lock;
4182 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4183 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4184 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4185 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4187 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4188 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4189 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4192 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4193 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4194 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4197 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4200 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4202 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4203 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4206 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4207 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4208 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4210 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4211 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4212 /// used to accept such channels.
4214 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4215 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4216 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4217 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4220 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4221 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4223 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4224 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4225 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4227 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4228 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4230 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4231 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4233 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4234 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4236 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4237 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4238 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4239 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4242 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4243 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4245 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4246 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4247 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4248 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4249 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4250 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4251 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4252 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4253 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4254 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4255 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4258 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4259 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4260 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4261 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4262 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4263 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4266 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4267 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4268 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4270 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4271 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4272 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4273 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4274 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4275 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4277 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4280 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4281 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4282 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4286 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4287 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4288 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4292 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4298 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4299 /// or 0-conf channels.
4301 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4302 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4303 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4304 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4305 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4306 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4308 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4309 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4310 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4311 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4312 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4313 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4314 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4318 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4321 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4322 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4324 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4325 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4326 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4327 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4329 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4332 num_unfunded_channels
4335 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4336 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4337 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4340 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4341 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4344 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4345 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4346 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4347 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4349 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4350 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4351 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4352 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4354 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4355 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4357 debug_assert!(false);
4358 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4360 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4361 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4363 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4364 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4365 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4366 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4367 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4368 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4370 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4371 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4372 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4375 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4376 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4377 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4378 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4379 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4382 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4383 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4384 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4387 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4388 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4392 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4393 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4394 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4395 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4397 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4398 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4399 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4400 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4402 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4403 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4404 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4407 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4408 pending_events.push(
4409 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4410 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4411 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4412 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4413 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4414 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4419 entry.insert(channel);
4425 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4426 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4427 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4428 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4430 debug_assert!(false);
4431 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4433 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4434 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4435 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4437 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4438 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4443 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4444 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4445 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4446 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4447 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4449 user_channel_id: user_id,
4454 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4455 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4457 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4458 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4460 debug_assert!(false);
4461 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4464 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4465 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4466 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4467 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4468 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4469 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4471 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4474 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4476 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4478 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4479 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4480 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4481 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4482 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4483 funding_msg.channel_id))
4485 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4486 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4490 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4491 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4492 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4493 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4494 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4495 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4496 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4500 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4502 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4503 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4505 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4506 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4507 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4508 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4509 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4510 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4511 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4512 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4520 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4521 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4522 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4523 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4525 debug_assert!(false);
4526 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4529 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4530 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4531 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4532 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4533 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4534 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4535 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4536 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan);
4537 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4538 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4539 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4540 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4541 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4542 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4551 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4552 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4553 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4555 debug_assert!(false);
4556 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4560 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4561 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4562 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4563 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4564 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4565 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4566 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4567 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4568 msg: announcement_sigs,
4570 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4571 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4572 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4573 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4574 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4575 // announcement_signatures.
4576 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4577 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4578 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4579 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4585 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4589 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4593 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4594 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4595 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4596 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4597 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4599 debug_assert!(false);
4600 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4602 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4603 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4604 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4605 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4607 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4608 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4609 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4610 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4613 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4614 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4615 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4616 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4618 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4619 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4620 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4621 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4622 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4623 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4628 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4629 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4630 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4631 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4632 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan_entry);
4636 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4639 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4640 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4641 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4642 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4648 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4649 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4650 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4652 debug_assert!(false);
4653 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4655 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4656 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4657 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4658 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4659 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4660 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4661 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4662 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4663 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4668 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4669 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4670 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4671 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4672 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4673 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4674 } else { (tx, None) }
4676 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4679 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4680 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4681 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4683 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4684 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4685 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4686 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4687 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4691 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4696 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4697 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4698 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4699 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4701 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4702 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4703 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4704 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4706 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4707 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4708 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4710 debug_assert!(false);
4711 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4713 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4714 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4715 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4716 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4718 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4719 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4720 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4721 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4722 match pending_forward_info {
4723 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4724 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4725 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4726 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4728 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4729 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4730 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4731 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4732 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4735 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4737 _ => pending_forward_info
4740 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4747 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4748 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4749 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4750 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4752 debug_assert!(false);
4753 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4755 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4756 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4757 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4758 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4759 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4761 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4764 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4768 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4769 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4770 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4772 debug_assert!(false);
4773 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4775 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4776 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4777 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4778 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4779 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4786 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4788 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4790 debug_assert!(false);
4791 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4793 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4794 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4795 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4797 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4798 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4799 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4801 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4804 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4808 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4809 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4810 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4812 debug_assert!(false);
4813 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4815 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4816 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4817 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4819 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4820 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4821 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4822 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4823 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4831 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4832 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4833 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4834 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4835 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4836 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4837 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4838 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4839 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4840 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4841 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4843 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4844 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4846 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4847 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4848 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4850 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4851 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4853 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4854 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4855 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4857 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4858 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4859 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4860 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4861 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4862 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4863 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4864 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4865 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4868 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4869 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4871 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4872 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4873 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4874 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4875 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4876 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4877 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4878 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4881 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4882 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4883 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4888 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4889 // payments are being processed.
4890 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4891 push_forward_event = true;
4893 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4894 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4901 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4902 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4905 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4906 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4907 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4909 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
4913 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
4914 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
4915 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4916 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
4917 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
4919 if !forward_ev_exists {
4920 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4922 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
4927 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4928 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
4929 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4930 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4932 debug_assert!(false);
4933 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4935 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4936 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4937 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4939 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4940 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4941 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4942 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4943 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4945 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
4947 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4950 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4954 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4955 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4956 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4958 debug_assert!(false);
4959 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4961 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4962 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4963 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4964 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4965 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
4967 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4972 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4973 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4974 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4976 debug_assert!(false);
4977 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4979 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4980 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4981 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4982 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4983 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4984 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4987 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4988 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4989 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
4990 msg, &self.default_configuration
4992 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4993 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4994 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
4997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5002 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5003 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5004 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5005 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5007 // It's not a local channel
5008 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5011 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5012 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5013 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5014 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5016 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5017 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5018 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5019 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5020 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5021 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5022 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5023 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5024 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5025 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5027 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5029 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5030 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5031 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5032 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5034 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5035 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5038 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5040 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5043 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5045 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5046 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5048 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5050 debug_assert!(false);
5051 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5053 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5054 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5055 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5056 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5057 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5058 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5059 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5060 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5061 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5062 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5063 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5064 let mut channel_update = None;
5065 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5066 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5067 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5070 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5071 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5072 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5073 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5074 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5075 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5076 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5081 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5082 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5083 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5084 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5085 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5086 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5090 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5094 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5095 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5098 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5099 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5104 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5105 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5106 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5107 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5108 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5109 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5110 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5111 match monitor_event {
5112 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5113 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5114 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5115 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5117 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5118 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5119 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5120 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5123 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5124 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5125 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5126 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5128 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5129 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5130 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5131 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5134 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5135 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5136 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5137 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5138 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5139 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5140 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5141 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5142 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5143 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5144 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5148 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5149 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5151 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5153 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5154 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5155 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5156 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5157 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5164 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5165 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5171 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5172 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5175 has_pending_monitor_events
5178 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5179 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5180 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5182 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5183 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5186 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5187 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5188 /// update was applied.
5189 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5190 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5191 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5192 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5193 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5195 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5197 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5198 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5199 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5200 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5201 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5202 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5203 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5204 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5205 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5207 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5208 has_monitor_update = true;
5210 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5211 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5212 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5213 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5214 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5215 peer_state_lock, peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5216 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5218 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5220 continue 'chan_loop;
5227 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5228 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5229 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5232 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5233 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5239 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5240 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5241 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5242 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5243 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5244 let mut has_update = false;
5246 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5248 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5249 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5250 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5251 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5252 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5253 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5254 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5255 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5257 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5258 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5261 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5262 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5263 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5264 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5265 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5270 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5272 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5273 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5274 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5280 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5281 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5289 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5290 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5296 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5297 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5299 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5300 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5301 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5302 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5303 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5304 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5305 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5306 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5307 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5308 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5309 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5310 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5311 assert!(should_broadcast);
5312 } else { unreachable!(); }
5313 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5315 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5319 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5320 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5322 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5323 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5326 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5328 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5329 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5330 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5331 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5332 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5333 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5334 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5335 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5336 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5337 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5338 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5339 // never fail a payment too early.
5340 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5342 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5345 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5350 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5353 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5354 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5356 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5357 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5358 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5359 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5361 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5363 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5364 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5368 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5369 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5371 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5373 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5374 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5376 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5377 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5378 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5379 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5380 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5381 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5382 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5383 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5384 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5385 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5386 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5389 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5390 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5392 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5395 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5397 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5399 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5400 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5401 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5402 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5403 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5406 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5407 /// stored external to LDK.
5409 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5410 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5411 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5413 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5414 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5417 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5418 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5419 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5420 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5422 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5423 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5424 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5425 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5426 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5428 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5429 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5430 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5431 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5432 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5434 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5435 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5437 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5438 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5442 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5443 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5445 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5447 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5448 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5450 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5451 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5452 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5453 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5454 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5455 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5456 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5459 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5460 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5462 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5465 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5467 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5469 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5470 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5473 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5474 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5476 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5477 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5478 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5481 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5482 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5484 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5485 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5486 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5487 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5489 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5490 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5491 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5492 Some(_) => continue,
5493 None => return scid_candidate
5498 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5500 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5501 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5503 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5504 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5505 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5509 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5510 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5511 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5513 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5514 /// times to get a unique scid.
5515 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5516 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5517 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5519 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5520 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5521 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5522 return scid_candidate
5526 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5527 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5528 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5529 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5532 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5533 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5534 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5535 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5536 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5537 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5538 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5547 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5548 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5549 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5550 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5551 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5555 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5556 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5557 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5562 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5563 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5564 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5568 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5569 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5573 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5574 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5577 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5578 /// using the given event handler.
5580 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5581 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5584 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5585 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5586 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5588 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5590 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5591 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5592 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5593 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5596 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5597 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5598 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5601 for event in pending_events {
5602 handler(event).await;
5605 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5606 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5611 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5613 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5614 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5615 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5616 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5617 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5618 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5622 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5623 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5624 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5625 /// is always placed next to each other.
5627 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5628 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5629 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5630 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5632 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5633 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5634 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5635 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5636 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5637 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5638 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5640 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5641 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5642 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5643 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5646 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5647 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5649 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5650 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5653 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5654 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5655 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5656 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5657 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5658 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5659 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5663 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5664 events.replace(pending_events);
5673 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5675 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5676 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5677 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5678 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5679 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5680 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5684 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5686 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5687 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5688 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5689 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5690 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5692 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5693 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5694 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5695 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5698 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5699 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5700 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5703 for event in pending_events {
5704 handler.handle_event(event);
5712 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5714 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5715 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5716 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5717 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5718 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5719 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5723 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5725 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5726 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5727 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5728 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5729 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5732 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5733 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5736 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5737 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5738 let new_height = height - 1;
5740 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5741 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5742 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5743 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5744 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5745 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5748 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5752 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5754 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5755 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5756 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5757 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5758 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5759 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5763 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5764 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5765 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5766 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5768 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5769 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5771 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5772 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5773 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5775 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5776 if height < last_best_block_height {
5777 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5778 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5782 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5783 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5784 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5785 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5787 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5788 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5790 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5792 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5794 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5796 macro_rules! max_time {
5797 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5799 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5800 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5801 // having an explicit local time source.
5802 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5803 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5804 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5805 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5806 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5812 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5813 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5814 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5815 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5819 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5820 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5821 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5822 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5823 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5824 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5825 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5826 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5833 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5834 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5835 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5836 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5837 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5838 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5839 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5840 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5845 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5847 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5848 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5849 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5850 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5851 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5852 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5856 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5857 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5859 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5860 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5861 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5862 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5863 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5865 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5866 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5868 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5869 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5870 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5871 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5872 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5873 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5874 let res = f(channel);
5875 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5876 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5877 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5878 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5879 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5881 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5882 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5883 if channel.is_usable() {
5884 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5885 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5886 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5887 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5892 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5896 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5898 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5899 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5900 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5901 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5902 msg: announcement_sigs,
5904 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5905 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5906 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5908 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5909 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5910 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
5915 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5916 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5917 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5918 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5919 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5920 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5921 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5922 // is always consistent.
5923 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5924 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5925 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5926 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5927 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5930 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5931 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5932 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5933 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5934 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5935 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5936 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5940 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5941 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5942 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5943 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5944 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5945 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5946 data: reason_message,
5956 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5957 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5958 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5959 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5960 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5961 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5962 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5963 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5964 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5965 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
5967 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
5968 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5969 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5973 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5976 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5977 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
5978 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5979 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5980 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
5981 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
5982 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5983 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5984 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
5987 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
5988 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5989 _ => unreachable!(),
5991 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
5992 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
5993 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
5994 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6000 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6002 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6003 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6007 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6008 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6009 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6010 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6012 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6014 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6015 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6016 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6017 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6018 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6019 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6022 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6023 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6024 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6026 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6027 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6028 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6029 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6032 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6033 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6034 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6035 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6036 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6039 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6040 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6041 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6044 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6045 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6046 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6047 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6050 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6051 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6052 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6053 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6056 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6057 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6059 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6060 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6061 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6062 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6063 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6066 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6067 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6068 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6069 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6072 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6073 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6074 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6075 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6078 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6079 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6080 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6081 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6085 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6086 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6088 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6089 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6090 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6091 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6092 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6093 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6097 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6098 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6099 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6102 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6103 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6104 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6107 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6108 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6109 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6112 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6113 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6114 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6117 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6118 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6119 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6122 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6123 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6124 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6127 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6128 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6129 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6132 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6133 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6134 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6137 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6138 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6139 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6142 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6143 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6144 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6147 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6148 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6149 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6152 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6153 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6154 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6157 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6158 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6159 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6162 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6164 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6167 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6168 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6169 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6172 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6173 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6174 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6177 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6182 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6183 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6184 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6187 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6188 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6189 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6190 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6192 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6193 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6194 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6195 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6196 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6197 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6198 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6199 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6200 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6201 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6202 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6207 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6209 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6210 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6211 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6212 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6213 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6214 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6215 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6216 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6217 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6218 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6219 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6220 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6221 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6222 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6223 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6224 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6225 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6226 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6227 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6228 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6229 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6232 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6233 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6234 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6235 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6238 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6240 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6242 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6243 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6247 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6248 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6249 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6253 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6255 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6256 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6257 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6258 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6259 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6260 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6263 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6264 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6265 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6266 if inbound_peer_limited {
6269 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6270 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6271 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6272 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6273 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6277 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6278 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6279 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6281 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6282 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6283 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6284 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6289 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6290 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6295 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6297 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6298 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6299 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6300 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6301 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6302 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6303 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6304 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6305 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6306 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6307 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6311 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6312 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6313 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6318 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6319 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6320 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6321 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6322 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6331 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6335 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6336 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6338 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6339 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6340 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6341 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6342 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6343 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6345 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6347 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6348 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6349 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6353 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6354 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6355 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6356 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6357 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6358 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6359 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6360 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6361 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6362 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6370 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6371 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6375 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6376 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6379 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6380 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6384 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6385 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6386 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6387 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6390 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6391 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6393 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6394 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6395 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6396 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6397 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6400 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6401 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6402 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6403 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6406 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6407 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6408 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6409 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6412 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6413 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6414 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6415 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6416 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6417 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6418 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6419 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6420 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6421 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6422 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6423 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6424 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6425 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6426 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6427 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6428 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6429 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6431 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6432 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6433 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6439 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6440 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6442 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6443 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6444 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6445 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6448 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6449 (2, node_id, required),
6450 (4, features, required),
6451 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6452 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6453 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6454 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6457 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6458 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6459 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6460 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6461 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6462 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6463 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6464 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6465 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6466 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6467 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6468 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6469 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6470 (7, self.config, option),
6471 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6472 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6473 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6474 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6475 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6476 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6477 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6478 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6479 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6480 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6481 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6482 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6483 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6484 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6485 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6486 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6487 (32, self.is_public, required),
6488 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6489 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6490 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6496 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6497 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6498 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6499 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6500 (2, channel_id, required),
6501 (3, channel_type, option),
6502 (4, counterparty, required),
6503 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6504 (6, funding_txo, option),
6505 (7, config, option),
6506 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6507 (9, confirmations, option),
6508 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6509 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6510 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6511 (16, balance_msat, required),
6512 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6513 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6514 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6515 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6516 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6517 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6518 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6519 (26, is_outbound, required),
6520 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6521 (30, is_usable, required),
6522 (32, is_public, required),
6523 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6524 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6525 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6528 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6529 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6530 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6531 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6532 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6536 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6538 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6539 outbound_scid_alias,
6543 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6544 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6546 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6547 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6548 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6549 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6550 confirmations_required,
6552 force_close_spend_delay,
6553 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6554 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6555 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6556 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6557 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6558 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6563 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6564 (2, channels, vec_type),
6565 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6566 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6569 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6571 (0, onion_packet, required),
6572 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6575 (0, payment_data, required),
6576 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6577 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6579 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6580 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6581 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6585 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6586 (0, routing, required),
6587 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6588 (4, payment_hash, required),
6589 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6590 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6591 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6595 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6596 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6598 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6600 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6601 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6602 reason.write(writer)?;
6604 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6605 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6608 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6609 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6610 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6611 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6618 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6619 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6620 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6623 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6624 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6625 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6626 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6630 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6631 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6632 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6633 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6634 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6637 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6638 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6639 // messages contained in the variants.
6640 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6641 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6642 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6644 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6645 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6646 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6647 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6648 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6651 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6652 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6653 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6654 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6655 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6657 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6662 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6667 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6668 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6669 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6670 (2, outpoint, required),
6671 (4, htlc_id, required),
6672 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6675 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6676 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6677 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6678 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6679 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6681 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6682 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6683 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6684 (2, self.value, required),
6685 (4, payment_data, option),
6686 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6687 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6693 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6694 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6695 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6697 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6698 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6699 let mut total_msat = None;
6700 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6701 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6702 (0, prev_hop, required),
6703 (1, total_msat, option),
6704 (2, value, required),
6705 (4, payment_data, option),
6706 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6707 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6709 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6711 if payment_data.is_some() {
6712 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6714 if total_msat.is_none() {
6715 total_msat = Some(value);
6717 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6720 if total_msat.is_none() {
6721 if payment_data.is_none() {
6722 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6724 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6726 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6730 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6733 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6740 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6741 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6742 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6745 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6746 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6747 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6748 let mut payment_id = None;
6749 let mut payment_secret = None;
6750 let mut payment_params = None;
6751 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6752 (0, session_priv, required),
6753 (1, payment_id, option),
6754 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6755 (3, payment_secret, option),
6756 (4, path, vec_type),
6757 (5, payment_params, option),
6759 if payment_id.is_none() {
6760 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6762 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6764 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6765 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6766 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6767 path: path.unwrap(),
6768 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6773 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6774 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6779 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6780 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6782 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6784 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6785 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6786 (0, session_priv, required),
6787 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6788 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6789 (3, payment_secret, option),
6790 (4, *path, vec_type),
6791 (5, payment_params, option),
6794 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6796 field.write(writer)?;
6803 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6804 (0, forward_info, required),
6805 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6806 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6807 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6808 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6811 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6813 (0, htlc_id, required),
6814 (2, err_packet, required),
6819 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6820 (0, payment_secret, required),
6821 (2, expiry_time, required),
6822 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6823 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6824 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6827 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6829 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6830 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6831 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6832 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6833 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6834 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6838 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6839 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6841 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6843 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6845 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6846 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6847 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6850 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6853 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6854 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6855 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6856 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6857 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6858 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6859 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6861 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6862 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6863 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6864 unfunded_channels += 1;
6869 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6871 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6872 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6873 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6874 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6875 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6876 channel.write(writer)?;
6883 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6884 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6885 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6886 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6887 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6888 for forward in pending_forwards {
6889 forward.write(writer)?;
6894 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6896 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6897 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6898 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6900 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6901 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6902 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6903 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6904 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6905 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6906 htlc.write(writer)?;
6908 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6911 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
6912 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
6913 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6914 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap());
6917 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
6918 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
6919 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
6920 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
6921 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
6923 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6924 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6925 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6926 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
6927 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
6928 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6929 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
6934 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6935 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6936 for event in events.iter() {
6937 event.write(writer)?;
6940 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6941 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6942 for event in background_events.iter() {
6944 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6946 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6947 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6952 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6953 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6954 // likely to be identical.
6955 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6956 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6958 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6959 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6960 hash.write(writer)?;
6961 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6964 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6965 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6966 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6967 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6968 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6971 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6972 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6974 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6975 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6976 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6977 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6980 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6981 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6985 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6986 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6987 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6989 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6990 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6991 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6997 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
6998 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6999 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7000 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7003 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7004 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7005 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7006 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7007 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7010 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7011 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7012 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7013 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7014 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7015 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7016 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7017 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7018 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7019 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7026 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7028 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7030 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7031 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7032 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7033 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7034 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7035 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7036 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7037 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7038 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7039 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7040 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7041 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7042 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7044 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7045 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7047 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7048 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7050 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7051 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7052 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7053 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7054 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7055 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7057 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7058 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7060 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7061 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7062 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7063 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7064 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7065 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7069 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7070 pub entropy_source: ES,
7072 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7073 pub node_signer: NS,
7075 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7076 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7078 pub signer_provider: SP,
7080 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7082 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7083 pub fee_estimator: F,
7084 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7086 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7087 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7088 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7089 pub chain_monitor: M,
7091 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7092 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7093 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7094 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7095 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7096 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7098 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7100 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7101 /// deserialization.
7103 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7104 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7105 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7107 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7108 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7110 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7111 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7112 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7113 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7115 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7118 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7119 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7122 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7123 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7125 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7126 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7127 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7128 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7129 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7130 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7134 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7135 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7136 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7137 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7138 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7140 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7141 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7146 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7147 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7148 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7149 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7151 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7152 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7153 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7154 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7155 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7156 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7160 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7161 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7162 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7166 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7167 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7169 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7170 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7171 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7172 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7173 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7174 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7178 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7179 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7181 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7182 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7183 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7185 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7187 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7188 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7189 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7190 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7191 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7192 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7193 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7194 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7195 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7197 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7198 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7199 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7200 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7201 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7202 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7203 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7204 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7205 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7206 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7207 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7208 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7209 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7210 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7211 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7212 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7213 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7214 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7215 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7216 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7217 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7218 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7219 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7220 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7221 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7222 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7223 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7224 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7225 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7226 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7227 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7228 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7230 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7231 let mut found_htlc = false;
7232 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7233 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7236 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7237 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7238 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7239 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7240 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7241 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7242 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7243 log_info!(args.logger,
7244 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7245 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7246 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7250 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7251 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7252 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7254 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7255 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7257 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7258 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7259 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7260 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7262 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7263 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7264 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7265 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7269 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7270 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7271 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7272 // safely discard the channel.
7273 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7274 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7275 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7276 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7277 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7280 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7281 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7282 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7283 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7284 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7285 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7289 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7290 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7291 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7292 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7296 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7297 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7298 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7299 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7300 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7301 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7302 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7303 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7304 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7306 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7309 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7310 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7311 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7312 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7313 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7314 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7315 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7316 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7318 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7321 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7322 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7323 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7324 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7325 let peer_state = PeerState {
7326 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7327 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7328 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7329 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7330 is_connected: false,
7332 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7335 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7336 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7337 for _ in 0..event_count {
7338 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7339 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7344 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7345 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7346 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7347 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7348 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7349 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7353 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7354 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7356 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7357 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7358 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7359 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7360 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7364 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7365 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7366 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7367 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7368 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7369 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7370 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7372 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7373 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7377 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7378 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7379 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7380 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7381 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7382 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7383 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7384 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7385 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7386 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7387 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7388 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7389 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7390 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7391 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7392 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7393 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7394 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7395 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7396 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7398 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7399 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7402 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7403 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7406 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7407 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7408 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7409 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7410 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7411 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7413 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7415 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7416 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7417 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7418 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7419 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7420 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7421 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7423 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7424 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7425 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7426 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7427 if path.is_empty() {
7428 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7429 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7431 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7432 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7433 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7434 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7436 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7437 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7438 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7441 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7442 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7443 retry_strategy: None,
7444 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7445 payment_params: None,
7446 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7447 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7449 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7450 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7451 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7452 total_msat: path_amt,
7453 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7455 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7456 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7461 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7462 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7463 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7464 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7465 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7467 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7468 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7469 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7470 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7471 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7472 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7473 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7474 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7475 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7476 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7477 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7482 !forwards.is_empty()
7484 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7485 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7486 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7487 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7488 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7489 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7490 intercepted_id != ev_id
7502 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), retry_lock: Mutex::new(()) };
7503 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7504 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7505 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7506 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7507 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7508 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7509 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7510 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7514 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7515 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7517 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7518 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7519 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7520 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7522 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7523 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7526 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7527 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7528 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7529 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7530 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7532 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7533 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7534 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7535 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7536 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7537 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7538 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7539 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7541 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7542 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7546 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7548 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7550 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7551 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7553 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7557 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7558 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7560 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7561 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7564 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7566 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7568 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7569 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7570 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7571 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7575 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7576 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7577 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7578 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7579 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7580 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7581 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7583 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7584 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7585 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7587 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7588 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7589 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7590 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7591 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7592 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7594 if chan.is_usable() {
7595 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7596 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7597 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7598 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7599 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7605 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7607 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7608 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7609 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7610 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7611 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7612 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7613 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7614 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7615 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7616 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7617 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7619 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7620 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7622 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7623 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7624 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7625 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7627 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7628 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7629 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7630 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7632 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7633 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7634 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7635 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7637 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7638 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7639 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7640 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7641 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7642 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7643 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7646 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7647 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7650 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7653 purpose: payment_purpose,
7654 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7660 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7661 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7662 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7664 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7665 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7669 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7671 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7672 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7673 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7674 router: args.router,
7676 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7678 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7679 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7680 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7681 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7683 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7684 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7685 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7686 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7687 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7688 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7690 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7695 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7697 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7699 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7700 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7701 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7702 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7704 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7705 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7706 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7708 logger: args.logger,
7709 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7712 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7713 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7714 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7715 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7716 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7719 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7720 //connection or two.
7722 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7728 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7729 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7730 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7731 use core::time::Duration;
7732 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7733 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7734 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7735 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7736 use crate::ln::msgs;
7737 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7738 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7739 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7740 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7741 use crate::util::test_utils;
7742 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7743 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7746 fn test_notify_limits() {
7747 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7748 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7749 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7750 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7751 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7752 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7754 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7755 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7756 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7757 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7758 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7760 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7762 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7763 // to connect messages with new values
7764 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7765 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7766 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7767 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7769 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7770 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7771 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7772 // ... but the last node should not.
7773 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7774 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7775 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7776 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7778 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7779 // about the channel.
7780 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7781 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7782 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7784 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7786 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7787 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7788 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7789 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7790 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7791 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7793 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7794 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7795 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7797 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7798 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7799 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7800 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7801 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7802 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7804 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7805 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7806 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7807 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7808 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7809 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7810 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7811 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7813 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7814 // the channel info has updated.
7815 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7816 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7817 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7818 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7819 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7820 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7824 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7825 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7827 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7828 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7829 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7830 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7831 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7833 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7834 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7835 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7836 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7838 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7839 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7840 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7841 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7842 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7843 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7845 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7846 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7847 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7849 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7850 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7852 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7853 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7854 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7855 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7856 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7858 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7859 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7860 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7862 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7863 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7864 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7865 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7866 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7867 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7868 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7869 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7870 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7872 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7873 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7875 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7876 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7877 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7879 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7880 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7881 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7882 // lightning messages manually.
7883 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7884 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7887 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7888 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7889 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7891 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7892 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7894 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7895 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7897 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7898 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7899 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7901 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7902 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7903 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7905 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7907 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7909 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7910 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7913 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7914 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7915 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7916 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7918 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7919 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7920 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7921 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7926 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7927 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7928 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7929 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7934 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7935 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7936 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7937 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7939 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7944 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7945 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7946 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7947 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7948 // fails as expected.
7949 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7950 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7951 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7952 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7953 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7954 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7955 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7957 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7958 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7959 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7961 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7962 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7963 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
7964 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7965 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7967 let route = find_route(
7968 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7969 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7971 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7973 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7974 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7975 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7976 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7977 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7979 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7980 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7981 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7982 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7983 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7985 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7986 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7987 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7988 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7989 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7990 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7991 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7992 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7993 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7995 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7996 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7998 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7999 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8000 let route = find_route(
8001 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8002 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8004 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8006 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8007 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8008 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8009 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8010 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8012 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8013 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8014 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8016 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8017 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8018 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8019 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8020 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8022 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8023 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8024 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8026 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8027 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8028 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8029 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8030 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8031 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8032 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8033 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8034 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8036 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8037 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8041 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8042 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8043 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8044 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8045 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8046 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8047 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8049 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8050 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8052 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8053 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8054 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8055 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8056 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8058 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8059 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8060 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8061 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8062 let route = find_route(
8063 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8064 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8067 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8068 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8069 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8070 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8073 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8074 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8075 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8076 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8077 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8078 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8079 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8081 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8085 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8086 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8087 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8088 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8089 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8090 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8092 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8093 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8095 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8096 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8097 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8098 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8099 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8101 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8102 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8103 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8104 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8105 let route = find_route(
8106 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8107 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8110 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8111 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8112 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8113 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8114 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8117 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8118 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8119 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8120 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8121 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8122 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8123 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8125 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8129 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8131 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8132 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8133 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8135 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8136 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8137 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8138 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8140 // Marshall an MPP route.
8141 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8142 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8143 route.paths.push(path);
8144 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8145 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8146 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8147 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8148 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8149 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8151 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8152 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8153 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8154 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8159 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8160 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8161 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8162 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8163 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8165 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8167 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8168 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8170 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8171 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8173 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8176 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8177 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8178 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8179 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8180 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8181 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8184 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8187 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8188 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8193 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8194 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8195 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8196 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8197 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8198 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8200 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8201 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8203 total_msat: 100_000,
8206 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8207 // payment verification fails as expected.
8208 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8209 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8210 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8211 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8213 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8217 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8218 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8222 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8223 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8224 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8225 // the channel is successfully closed.
8226 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8227 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8229 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8231 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8232 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8233 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8234 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8235 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8237 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8238 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8240 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8241 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8242 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8243 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8246 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8248 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8249 // as it has the funding transaction.
8250 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8251 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8252 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8254 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8257 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8259 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8261 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8262 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8263 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8265 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8266 // as it has the funding transaction.
8267 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8268 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8269 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8272 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8273 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8275 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8276 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8277 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8279 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8280 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8281 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8282 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8284 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8285 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8287 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8288 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8289 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8290 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8291 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8292 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8293 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8295 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8296 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8297 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8298 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8299 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8300 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8301 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8304 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8306 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8307 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8308 // closing transaction).
8309 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8310 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8311 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8313 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8314 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8315 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8316 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8317 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8320 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8322 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8324 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8325 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8326 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8328 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8330 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8331 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8334 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8335 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8336 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8339 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8340 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8341 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8344 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8346 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8347 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8349 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8350 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8352 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8353 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8358 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8359 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8360 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8361 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8362 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8363 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8364 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8365 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8368 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8369 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8370 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8372 // Test the API functions.
8373 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8375 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8377 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8379 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8381 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8383 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8385 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8389 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8390 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8391 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8392 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8393 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8394 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8396 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8398 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8399 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8401 let mut funding_tx = None;
8402 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8403 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8404 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8407 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8408 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8409 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8410 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8411 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8413 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8415 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8417 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8420 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8423 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8424 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8425 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8426 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8427 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8429 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8430 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8432 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8433 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8434 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8435 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8436 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8437 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8438 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8440 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8441 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8442 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8443 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8445 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8446 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8447 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8448 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8449 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8450 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8451 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8453 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8454 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8455 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8456 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8458 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8459 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8460 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8461 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8463 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8464 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8466 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8467 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8468 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8469 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8470 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8472 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8473 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], last_random_pk).channel_id,
8474 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8476 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8477 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8478 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8480 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8481 // "protected" and can connect again.
8482 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8483 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8484 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8485 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8487 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8489 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8490 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8494 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8495 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8496 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8497 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8498 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8499 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8501 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8503 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8504 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8506 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8507 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8508 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8509 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8512 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8514 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8515 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8516 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8518 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8519 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8520 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8522 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8523 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8524 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8525 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8529 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8530 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8531 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8532 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8533 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8534 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8535 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8536 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8537 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8539 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8541 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8542 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8544 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8545 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8546 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8547 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8548 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8549 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8551 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8552 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8554 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8555 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8557 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8559 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8560 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8563 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8564 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8565 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8566 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8567 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8568 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8569 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8571 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8572 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8573 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8574 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8578 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8580 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], last_random_pk).channel_id,
8581 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8583 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8584 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8585 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8587 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8588 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8590 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8592 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8597 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8598 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8599 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8600 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8601 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8602 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8603 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8604 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8605 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8607 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8609 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8610 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8611 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8613 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8614 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8616 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8617 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8619 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8622 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8623 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8625 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8626 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8628 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8632 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8634 use crate::chain::Listen;
8635 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8636 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8637 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8638 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8639 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8640 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8641 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8642 use crate::util::test_utils;
8643 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8644 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8646 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8647 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8648 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8650 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8654 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8655 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8656 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8657 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8658 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8659 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8660 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8661 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8666 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8667 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8670 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8671 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8672 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8674 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8676 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8677 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8678 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8679 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8680 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8682 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8683 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8685 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8686 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8687 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8688 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8690 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8692 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8694 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8695 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8696 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8697 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8698 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8700 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8702 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8704 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8705 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8706 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8707 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8708 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8711 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8712 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8713 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8715 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8716 } else { panic!(); }
8718 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8719 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8721 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8724 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8727 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8728 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8730 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8731 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8732 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8733 match msg_events[0] {
8734 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8735 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8736 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8740 match msg_events[1] {
8741 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8745 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8746 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8748 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8749 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8754 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8755 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8757 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8758 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8760 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8763 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8765 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8766 macro_rules! send_payment {
8767 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8768 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8769 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8770 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8771 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8772 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8773 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8774 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8775 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8776 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8778 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8779 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8781 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8782 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8784 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8785 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8786 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8787 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8788 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8789 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8790 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8791 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8793 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8794 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8795 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8796 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8798 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8799 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8800 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8801 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8802 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8804 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8807 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8808 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8809 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8810 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8812 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8817 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8818 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);