1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, MessageRouter, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
82 use crate::prelude::*;
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
112 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
115 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
116 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
118 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
119 /// do with the HTLC.
120 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
121 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
123 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
124 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
125 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
126 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
127 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
128 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
130 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
132 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
133 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
135 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
136 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
137 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
138 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
139 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
141 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
142 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
143 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
144 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
145 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
147 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
148 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
149 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
150 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
152 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
153 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
158 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
159 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
160 requires_blinded_error: bool,
162 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
163 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
164 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
166 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
167 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
169 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
170 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
171 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
172 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
173 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
174 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
175 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
177 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
178 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
179 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
180 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
182 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
183 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
184 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
186 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
187 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
188 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
192 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
193 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
194 pub struct BlindedForward {
195 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
196 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
197 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
198 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
199 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
202 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
203 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
204 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
205 // TODO: needs update when we support forwarding blinded HTLCs as non-intro node
207 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
208 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
214 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
216 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
217 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
218 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
219 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
220 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
221 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
223 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
224 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
225 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
226 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
229 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
231 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
233 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
235 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
236 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
237 /// it along another path).
239 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
240 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
241 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
242 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
243 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
244 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
245 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
246 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
247 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
249 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
252 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
254 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
256 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
259 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
260 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
261 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
262 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
265 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
266 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
267 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
268 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
269 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
272 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
273 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
274 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
276 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
277 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
278 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
281 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
282 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
284 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
285 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
288 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
289 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
290 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
293 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
298 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
302 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
303 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
304 enum BlindedFailure {
305 FromIntroductionNode,
309 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
310 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
311 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
312 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
313 short_channel_id: u64,
314 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
316 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
317 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
318 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
320 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
321 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
326 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
328 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
329 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
330 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
332 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
333 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
336 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
337 struct ClaimableHTLC {
338 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
340 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
342 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
343 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
344 sender_intended_value: u64,
345 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
347 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
348 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
349 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
350 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
352 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
353 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
356 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
357 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
358 events::ClaimedHTLC {
359 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
360 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
361 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
362 value_msat: val.value,
363 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
368 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
369 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
371 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
372 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
373 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
376 /// Number of bytes in the id.
377 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
380 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
381 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
386 impl Readable for PaymentId {
387 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
388 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
393 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
394 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
395 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
399 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
401 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
402 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
403 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
405 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for InterceptId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
419 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
420 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
421 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
422 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
425 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
427 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
428 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
429 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
431 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
432 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
436 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
437 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
438 (0, short_channel_id, required),
439 (2, htlc_id, required),
441 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
442 (0, session_priv, required),
447 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
448 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
449 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
450 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
451 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
454 session_priv: SecretKey,
455 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
456 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
457 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
458 payment_id: PaymentId,
461 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
462 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
463 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
465 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
467 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
469 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
472 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
473 payment_id.hash(hasher);
474 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
480 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
482 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
483 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
484 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
485 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
486 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
487 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
491 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
492 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
493 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
494 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
495 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
496 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
498 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
504 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
505 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
507 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
508 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
509 pub enum FailureCode {
510 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
511 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
512 TemporaryNodeFailure,
513 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
514 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
515 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
516 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
517 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
518 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
519 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
520 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
521 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
522 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
524 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
525 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
526 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
529 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
530 fn into(self) -> u16 {
532 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
533 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
534 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
535 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
540 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
541 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
542 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
543 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
544 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
546 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
547 err: msgs::LightningError,
548 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
549 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
550 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
552 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
554 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
556 err: LightningError {
558 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
559 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
566 shutdown_finish: None,
567 channel_capacity: None,
571 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
572 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
575 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
576 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
577 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
578 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
579 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
580 // commitment upon reconnecting.
581 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
583 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
586 err: LightningError { err, action },
587 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
588 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
589 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
593 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
596 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
598 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
599 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
603 log_level: Level::Warn,
606 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
608 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
610 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
612 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
613 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
621 shutdown_finish: None,
622 channel_capacity: None,
626 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
627 self.chan_id.is_some()
631 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
632 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
633 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
634 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
635 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
637 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
638 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
639 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
640 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
641 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
642 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
643 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
645 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
649 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
650 struct ClaimingPayment {
652 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
653 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
654 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
655 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
657 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
658 (0, amount_msat, required),
659 (2, payment_purpose, required),
660 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
661 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
662 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
665 struct ClaimablePayment {
666 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
667 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
668 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
671 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
672 struct ClaimablePayments {
673 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
674 /// failed/claimed by the user.
676 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
677 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
679 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
680 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
681 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
683 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
684 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
685 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
686 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
689 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
690 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
691 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
692 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
694 enum BackgroundEvent {
695 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
696 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
697 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
698 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
700 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
701 /// are regenerated on startup.
702 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
703 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
704 /// channel to continue normal operation.
706 /// In general this should be used rather than
707 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
708 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
709 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
711 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
712 /// are regenerated on startup.
713 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
714 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
715 funding_txo: OutPoint,
716 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
718 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
719 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
721 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
722 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
723 channel_id: ChannelId,
728 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
729 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
730 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
731 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
732 /// event can be generated.
733 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
734 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
735 /// operation of another channel.
737 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
738 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
739 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
740 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
742 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
743 event: events::Event,
744 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
746 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
747 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
748 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
750 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
751 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
752 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
753 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
754 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
756 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
757 /// stored for later processing.
758 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
759 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
760 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
761 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
765 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
766 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
767 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
768 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
769 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
770 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
771 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
772 (4, blocking_action, required),
774 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
775 (0, event, upgradable_required),
776 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
777 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
778 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
779 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
780 // downgrades to prior versions.
781 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
785 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
786 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
787 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
788 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
789 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
792 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
793 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
794 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
799 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
800 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
801 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
802 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
803 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
804 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
806 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
807 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
808 channel_id: ChannelId,
809 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
814 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
815 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
816 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
817 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
818 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
823 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
824 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
828 /// State we hold per-peer.
829 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
830 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
832 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
833 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
834 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
836 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
837 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
838 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
839 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
840 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
841 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
842 latest_features: InitFeatures,
843 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
844 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
845 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
846 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
847 /// user but which have not yet completed.
849 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
850 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
851 /// for a missing channel.
852 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
853 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
854 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
856 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
857 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
858 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
859 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
861 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
862 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
863 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
864 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
865 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
866 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
867 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
868 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
869 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
870 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
871 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
872 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
873 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
874 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
875 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
879 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
880 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
881 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
882 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
883 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
884 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
887 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
888 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
889 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
892 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
893 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
894 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
897 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
898 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
899 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
900 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
904 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
905 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
906 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
907 /// The original OpenChannel message.
908 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
909 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
910 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
913 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
914 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
915 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
917 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
918 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
920 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
923 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
924 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
925 struct PendingInboundPayment {
926 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
927 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
928 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
929 /// this payment being removed.
931 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
932 user_payment_id: u64,
933 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
934 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
935 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
938 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
939 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
940 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
941 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
942 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
943 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
944 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
945 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
947 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
948 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
949 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
957 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
959 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
960 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
961 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
966 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
967 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
968 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
969 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
970 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
971 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
972 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
973 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
974 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
976 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
977 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
978 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
987 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
989 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
990 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
991 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
996 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
998 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1000 pub trait AChannelManager {
1001 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1002 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1003 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1004 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1005 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1006 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1007 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1008 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1009 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1010 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1011 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1012 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1013 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1014 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1015 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1016 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1017 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1018 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1019 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1020 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1021 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1022 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1023 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1024 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1025 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1026 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1027 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1028 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1029 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1030 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1031 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1032 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1033 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1034 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1035 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1036 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1039 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1040 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1042 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1043 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1044 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1045 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1046 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1047 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1051 type Watch = M::Target;
1053 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1055 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1057 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1059 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1060 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1062 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1064 type Router = R::Target;
1066 type Logger = L::Target;
1068 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1071 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1072 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1074 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1075 /// to individual Channels.
1077 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1078 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1079 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1080 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1082 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1083 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1084 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1085 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1086 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1087 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1088 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1089 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1090 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1092 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1093 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1094 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1096 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1097 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1098 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1099 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1100 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1102 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1103 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1104 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1105 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1107 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1108 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1109 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1111 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1112 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1113 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1114 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1115 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1117 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1118 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1119 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1120 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1121 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1122 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1123 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1124 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1127 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1128 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1129 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1130 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1131 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1135 // `pending_offers_messages`
1137 // `total_consistency_lock`
1139 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1141 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1143 // |__`per_peer_state`
1145 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1147 // |__`claimable_payments`
1149 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1153 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1155 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1157 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1161 // |__`pending_events`
1163 // |__`pending_background_events`
1165 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1167 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1168 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1169 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1170 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1171 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1172 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1176 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1177 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1178 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1184 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1186 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1188 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1189 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1191 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1192 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1193 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1194 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1196 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1197 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1199 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1200 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1201 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1202 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1203 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1204 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1205 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1206 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1208 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1210 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1211 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1213 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1215 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1216 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1217 /// and via the classic SCID.
1219 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1220 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1222 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1224 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1226 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1227 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1228 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1230 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1231 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1233 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1234 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1236 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1237 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1239 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1240 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1241 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1242 /// active channel list on load.
1244 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1245 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1247 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1249 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1250 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1251 /// the handling of the events.
1253 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1254 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1257 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1258 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1259 /// would break backwards compatability.
1260 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1261 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1262 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1264 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1266 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1268 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1270 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1272 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1273 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1274 /// confirmation depth.
1276 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1277 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1278 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1280 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1282 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1284 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1286 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1288 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1290 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1291 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1292 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1294 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1295 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1297 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1298 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1299 /// keeping additional state.
1300 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1302 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1303 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1304 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1305 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1307 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1308 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1310 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1311 /// are currently open with that peer.
1313 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1314 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1317 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1319 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1320 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1321 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1322 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1323 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1325 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1326 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1327 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1328 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1329 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1331 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1332 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1334 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1335 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1336 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1337 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1338 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1340 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1341 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1343 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1344 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1345 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1346 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1347 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1349 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1351 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1353 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1354 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1355 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1356 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1357 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1358 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1359 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1360 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1361 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1362 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1363 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1365 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1366 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1367 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1369 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1371 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1372 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1374 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1378 signer_provider: SP,
1383 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1385 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1386 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1387 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1388 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1389 pub struct ChainParameters {
1390 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1391 pub network: Network,
1393 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1395 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1396 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1399 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1403 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1404 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1407 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1408 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1409 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1410 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1411 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1412 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1414 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1415 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1416 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1417 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1418 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1419 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1421 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1422 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1425 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1426 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1427 /// events to handle.
1429 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1430 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1432 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1433 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1436 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1437 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1438 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1439 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1441 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1442 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1443 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1444 should_persist: move || {
1445 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1446 // processing and return that.
1447 let notify = persist_check();
1448 match (notify, force_notify) {
1449 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1450 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1451 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1452 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1453 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1456 _read_guard: read_guard,
1460 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1461 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1462 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1463 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1464 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1465 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1467 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1468 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1469 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1470 should_persist: persist_check,
1471 _read_guard: read_guard,
1476 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1477 fn drop(&mut self) {
1478 match (self.should_persist)() {
1479 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1480 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1481 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1483 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1484 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1485 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1490 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1491 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1493 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1495 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1496 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1497 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1498 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1499 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1501 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1502 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1504 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1506 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1507 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1508 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1509 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1510 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1511 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1512 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1513 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1514 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1515 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1516 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1517 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1518 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1520 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1521 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1523 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1524 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1525 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1526 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1528 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1529 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1530 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1531 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1532 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1533 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1535 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1537 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1538 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1540 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1542 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1543 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1545 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1546 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1547 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1549 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1550 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1551 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1553 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1554 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1555 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1556 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1558 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1559 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1560 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1562 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1563 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1564 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1566 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1567 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1568 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1569 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1570 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1571 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1572 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1573 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1574 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1575 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1576 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1579 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1580 /// to better separate parameters.
1581 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1582 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1583 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1584 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1585 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1586 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1587 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1588 pub features: InitFeatures,
1589 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1590 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1591 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1593 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1595 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1596 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1597 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1598 /// payments to us through this channel.
1599 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1600 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1601 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1602 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1603 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1604 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1605 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1608 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1609 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1610 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1611 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1612 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1613 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1614 /// lifetime of the channel.
1615 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1616 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1617 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1618 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1619 /// our counterparty already.
1621 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1622 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1623 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1624 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1626 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1627 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1628 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1629 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1631 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1632 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1634 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1635 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1637 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1638 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1639 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1640 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1641 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1642 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1643 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1644 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1645 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1648 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1650 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1651 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1652 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1653 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1654 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1655 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1656 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1658 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1659 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1661 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1662 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1663 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1664 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1665 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1666 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1667 /// this value on chain.
1669 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1671 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1673 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1674 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1675 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1676 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1677 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1678 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1679 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1681 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1682 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1683 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1684 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1685 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1686 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1688 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1689 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1690 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1691 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1692 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1694 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1695 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1696 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1697 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1699 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1700 pub balance_msat: u64,
1701 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1702 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1703 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1704 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1706 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1708 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1709 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1710 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1711 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1712 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1713 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1714 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1715 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1717 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1718 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1719 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1720 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1721 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1722 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1723 /// route which is valid.
1724 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1725 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1726 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1727 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1728 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1729 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1731 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1732 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1733 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1734 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1735 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1736 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1737 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1738 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1739 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1741 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1743 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1744 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1745 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1746 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1747 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1749 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1750 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1751 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1752 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1753 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1754 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1755 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1757 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1758 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1759 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1760 pub is_outbound: bool,
1761 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1762 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1763 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1764 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1765 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1767 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1768 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1769 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1770 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1771 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1772 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1773 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1775 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1776 pub is_usable: bool,
1777 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1778 pub is_public: bool,
1779 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1780 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1781 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1782 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1783 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1784 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1786 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1787 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1790 impl ChannelDetails {
1791 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1792 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1793 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1795 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1796 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1797 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1798 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1801 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1802 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1803 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1805 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1806 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1807 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1808 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1811 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1812 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1813 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1816 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1817 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1819 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1820 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1821 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1823 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1824 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1825 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1826 features: latest_features,
1827 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1828 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1829 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1830 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1831 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1832 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1833 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1834 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1835 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1836 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1838 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1839 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1840 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1841 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1842 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1843 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1844 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1845 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1846 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1847 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1848 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1849 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1850 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1851 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1852 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1853 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1854 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1855 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1856 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1857 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1858 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1859 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1860 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1861 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1862 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1863 config: Some(context.config()),
1864 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1869 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1870 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1871 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1872 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1873 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1874 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1875 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1876 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1877 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1879 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1881 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1882 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1884 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1885 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1886 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1887 /// to drop the channel.
1891 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1892 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1893 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1894 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1895 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1897 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1898 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1899 payment_id: PaymentId,
1901 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1903 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1904 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1905 payment_id: PaymentId,
1906 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1908 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1909 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1910 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1913 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1914 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1915 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1917 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1918 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1919 payment_id: PaymentId,
1920 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1921 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1922 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1924 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1925 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1926 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1928 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1929 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1930 payment_id: PaymentId,
1931 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1932 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1936 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1938 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1940 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1941 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1942 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1943 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1945 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1946 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1947 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1950 macro_rules! handle_error {
1951 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1952 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1953 // entering the macro.
1954 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1955 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1959 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1960 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1962 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1963 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1964 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1965 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1969 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1970 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1971 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1972 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1973 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1974 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1979 let logger = WithContext::from(
1980 &$self.logger, Some($counterparty_node_id), chan_id.map(|(chan_id, _)| chan_id)
1982 log_error!(logger, "{}", err.err);
1983 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1985 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1986 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1987 action: err.action.clone()
1991 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1992 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1993 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1994 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1995 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1999 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2006 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2007 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2008 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2009 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2011 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2012 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2013 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2015 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2016 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2017 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2018 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2019 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2021 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2022 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2024 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2028 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2029 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2030 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2032 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2033 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2035 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2036 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2038 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2039 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2040 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2041 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2042 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
2043 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
2044 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
2046 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
2047 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
2051 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2052 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2054 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2055 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2057 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2058 match $channel_phase {
2059 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2060 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2062 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2063 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2065 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2066 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2072 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2073 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2077 let key = *$entry.key();
2078 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2080 $entry.remove_entry();
2088 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2089 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2093 let key = *$entry.key();
2094 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2096 $entry.remove_entry();
2104 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2105 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2107 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2108 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2114 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2115 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2116 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2117 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2118 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2120 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2121 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2122 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2123 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2124 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2125 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2126 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2127 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2128 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2129 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2134 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2135 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2136 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2137 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2138 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2139 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2140 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2141 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2142 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2144 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2149 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2150 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2151 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2152 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2153 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2154 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2155 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2156 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2157 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2159 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2164 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2165 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2166 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2167 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2168 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2169 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2170 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2171 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2172 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2173 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2174 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2175 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2177 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2178 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2179 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2185 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2186 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2188 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2189 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2190 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2191 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2192 updates.announcement_sigs);
2193 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2194 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2197 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2198 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2199 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2200 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2202 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2203 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2204 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2205 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2206 let mut batch_completed = false;
2207 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2208 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2209 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2210 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2212 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2213 channel_state.2 = true;
2215 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2217 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2219 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2222 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2223 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2224 if batch_completed {
2225 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2226 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2227 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2228 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2229 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2230 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2231 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2232 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2233 chan.set_batch_ready();
2234 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2235 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2239 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2240 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2241 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2246 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2248 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2249 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2251 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2252 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2253 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2254 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2259 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2260 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2261 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2262 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2264 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2265 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2266 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2267 panic!("{}", err_str);
2269 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2270 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2271 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2274 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2280 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2281 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2282 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2284 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2285 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2286 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2287 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2288 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2289 // filter for uniqueness here.
2290 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2291 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2292 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2293 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2295 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2296 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2298 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2299 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2300 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2306 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2307 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2308 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2309 while !processed_all_events {
2310 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2317 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2318 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2319 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2321 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2322 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2323 result = $self.process_background_events();
2325 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2326 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2327 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2328 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2332 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2333 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2334 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2335 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2338 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2340 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2341 $event_to_handle = event;
2343 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2344 post_event_actions.push(action);
2349 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2350 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2351 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2352 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2353 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2354 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2357 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2358 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2359 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2360 processed_all_events = false;
2364 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2365 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2366 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2368 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2369 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2370 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2376 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2378 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2379 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2380 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2381 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2382 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2383 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2387 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2389 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2391 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2392 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2394 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2396 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2397 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2398 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2401 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2402 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2403 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2405 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2406 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2407 current_timestamp: u32,
2409 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2410 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2411 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2412 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2414 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2415 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2416 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2421 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2423 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2424 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2425 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2426 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2427 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2428 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2429 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2430 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2432 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2435 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2436 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2438 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2440 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2442 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2444 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2445 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2446 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2447 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2448 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2449 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2450 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2451 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2453 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2463 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2464 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2465 &self.default_configuration
2468 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2469 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2470 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2473 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2474 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2476 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2478 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2482 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2487 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2489 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2490 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2491 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2492 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2493 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2495 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2496 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2498 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2499 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2500 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2502 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2503 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2504 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2506 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2507 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2509 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2510 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2511 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2512 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2513 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2514 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2516 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2517 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2518 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2519 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2520 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2521 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2524 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2525 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2526 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2528 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2530 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2531 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2533 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2535 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2536 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2537 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2542 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2543 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2544 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2545 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2546 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2547 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2551 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2556 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2558 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2559 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2560 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2562 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2564 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2567 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2570 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2571 node_id: their_network_key,
2574 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2577 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2578 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2579 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2580 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2581 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2582 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2583 // the same channel.
2584 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2586 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2587 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2588 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2589 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2590 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2591 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2592 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2593 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2594 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2598 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2599 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2600 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2608 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2609 /// more information.
2610 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2611 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2612 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2613 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2614 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2615 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2616 // the same channel.
2617 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2619 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2620 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2621 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2622 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2623 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2624 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2625 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2626 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2634 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2635 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2637 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2638 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2640 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2641 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2642 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2643 // really wanted anyway.
2644 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2647 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2648 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2649 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2650 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2652 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2653 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2654 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2655 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2656 let context_to_details = |context| {
2657 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2659 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2661 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2662 .map(context_to_details)
2668 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2669 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2671 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2672 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2673 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2675 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2676 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2677 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2678 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2679 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2680 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2682 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2683 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2684 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2686 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2687 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2688 payment_id: *payment_id,
2689 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2690 total_msat: *total_msat,
2693 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2694 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2696 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2697 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2699 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2704 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2705 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2706 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2707 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2708 Some(transaction) => {
2709 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2710 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2715 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2716 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2717 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2718 reason: closure_reason,
2719 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2720 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2724 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2725 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2727 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2728 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2731 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2733 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2734 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2736 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2737 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2739 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2740 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2741 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2742 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2743 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2744 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2745 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2746 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2748 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2749 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2750 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2751 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2752 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2756 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2757 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2759 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2760 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2761 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2762 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2765 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan_phase_entry.get().context(), ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2766 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2767 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2770 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2771 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2773 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2774 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2781 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2782 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2783 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2784 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2787 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2788 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2794 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2795 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2796 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2798 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2799 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2801 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2802 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2803 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2804 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2806 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2808 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2809 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2810 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2813 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2814 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2815 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2816 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2817 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2818 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2821 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2822 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2823 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2825 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2826 /// the channel being closed or not:
2827 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2828 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2829 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2830 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2831 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2832 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2833 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2835 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2836 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2837 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2838 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2840 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2842 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2843 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2844 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2847 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2848 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2849 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2850 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2851 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2854 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2855 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2856 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2857 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2858 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2861 let logger = WithContext::from(
2862 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2864 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2865 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2866 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2867 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2868 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2869 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2871 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2872 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2873 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2874 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2875 // ignore the result here.
2876 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2878 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2879 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2880 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2881 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2883 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2884 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2885 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2886 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2887 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2888 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2889 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2890 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2893 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2896 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2897 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2900 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2901 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2905 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2906 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2907 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2908 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2909 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2910 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2911 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2912 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2913 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2914 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2915 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2917 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2919 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2920 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2921 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2922 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2923 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2924 mem::drop(peer_state);
2925 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2927 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2928 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2929 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2931 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2932 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2933 // Unfunded channel has no update
2934 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2937 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2938 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2939 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2940 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2942 (None, *peer_node_id)
2944 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2947 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2948 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2949 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2950 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2951 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2952 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2953 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2954 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2955 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2961 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2964 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2966 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2967 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2968 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2969 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2970 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2971 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2972 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2973 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2974 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2975 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2986 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2987 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2988 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2990 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2991 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2992 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2995 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2996 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2997 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2999 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
3000 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3001 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3002 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3003 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3006 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3007 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3008 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3009 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3010 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3014 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3015 /// local transaction(s).
3016 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3017 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3018 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3022 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3023 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3025 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3027 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3028 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3031 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3032 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3033 // TODO: update this when we support blinded forwarding as non-intro node
3034 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
3039 macro_rules! return_err {
3040 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3043 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3044 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3046 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3047 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3048 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3049 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3050 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3051 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3052 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3056 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3057 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3058 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3059 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3060 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3061 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3062 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3063 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3069 let NextPacketDetails {
3070 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3071 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3072 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3073 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3074 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3077 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3078 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3079 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3080 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3081 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3082 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3083 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3084 // phantom or an intercept.
3085 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3086 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3087 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3091 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3094 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3096 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3097 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3098 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3099 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3100 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3102 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3103 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3104 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3105 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3108 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3109 // have no consistency guarantees.
3110 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3114 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3115 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3116 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3117 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3118 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3120 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3121 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3122 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3123 // we don't have the channel here.
3124 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3126 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3128 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3129 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3130 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3131 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3132 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3133 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3134 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3135 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3136 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3137 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3138 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3140 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3143 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3144 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3146 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3147 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3154 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3156 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3157 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3159 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3160 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3161 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3162 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3163 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3165 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3166 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3172 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3173 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3174 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3175 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3177 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3178 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3180 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3181 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3182 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3184 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3185 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3186 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3187 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3188 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3189 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3190 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3194 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3196 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3199 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3200 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3201 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3202 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3203 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3204 macro_rules! return_err {
3205 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3207 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3208 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3209 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3210 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3211 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3212 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3213 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3214 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3215 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3219 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3220 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3221 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3222 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3223 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3229 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3231 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3232 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3233 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3234 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3237 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3238 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3239 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3240 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3241 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3243 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3246 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3247 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3248 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3249 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3250 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3256 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3257 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3258 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3260 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3261 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3262 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3264 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3265 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3266 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3267 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3268 return Err(LightningError {
3269 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3270 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3273 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3274 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3276 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3277 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3278 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3281 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3282 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3283 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3284 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3286 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3287 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3288 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3290 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3291 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3292 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3293 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3294 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3295 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3296 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3300 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3303 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3304 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3305 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3306 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3308 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3309 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3310 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3311 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3312 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3315 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3316 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3318 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3319 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3320 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3321 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3322 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3323 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3324 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3325 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3327 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3328 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3329 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3331 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3333 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3340 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3341 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3342 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3343 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3348 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3349 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3350 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3353 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3354 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3355 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3356 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3358 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3359 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3360 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3362 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3363 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3367 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3368 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3370 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3371 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3372 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3374 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3377 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3379 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3380 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3382 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3383 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3384 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3385 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3386 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3387 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3388 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3389 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3390 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3391 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3393 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3394 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3395 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3396 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3398 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3399 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3401 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3402 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3403 Some(monitor_update) => {
3404 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3406 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3407 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3408 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3409 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3410 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3411 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3412 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3420 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3423 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3424 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3425 // `channel_by_id` map.
3426 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3427 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3431 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3432 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3434 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3439 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3441 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3442 /// fields for more info.
3444 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3445 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3447 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3449 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3450 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3451 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3452 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3453 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3455 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3456 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3457 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3458 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3459 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3461 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3462 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3463 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3464 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3466 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3468 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3469 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3470 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3472 /// In general, a path may raise:
3473 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3474 /// node public key) is specified.
3475 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3476 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3477 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3478 /// relevant updates.
3480 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3481 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3482 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3484 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3485 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3486 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3487 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3488 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3489 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3490 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3491 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3492 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3493 self.pending_outbound_payments
3494 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3495 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3496 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3499 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3500 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3501 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3502 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3503 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3504 self.pending_outbound_payments
3505 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3506 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3507 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3508 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3512 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3513 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3515 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3516 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3517 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3521 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3522 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3523 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3527 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3528 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3531 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3532 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3533 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3534 self.pending_outbound_payments
3535 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3536 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3537 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3538 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3539 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3543 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3544 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3545 /// retries are exhausted.
3547 /// # Event Generation
3549 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3550 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3552 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3553 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3554 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3556 /// # Requested Invoices
3558 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3559 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3560 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3561 /// once the invoice has been received.
3563 /// # Restart Behavior
3565 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3566 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3567 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3569 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3570 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3571 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3572 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3575 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3576 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3577 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3578 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3579 /// never reach the recipient.
3581 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3582 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3584 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3585 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3587 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3588 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3589 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3590 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3591 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3592 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3593 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3596 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3597 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3599 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3602 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3603 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3604 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3606 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3607 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3608 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3609 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3612 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3613 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3614 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3615 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3616 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3617 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3618 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3619 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3620 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3623 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3626 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3627 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3630 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3631 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3633 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3634 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3635 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3636 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3637 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3638 let payment_params =
3639 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3641 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3643 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3646 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3647 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3649 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3650 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3651 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3652 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3654 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3655 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3656 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3657 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3658 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3659 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3660 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3661 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3662 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3663 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3665 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3666 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3667 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3668 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3672 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3674 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3675 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3678 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3680 let mut res = Vec::new();
3682 for mut path in route.paths {
3683 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3684 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3685 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3686 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3687 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3690 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3693 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3694 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3696 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3698 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3699 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3704 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3707 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3712 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3713 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3714 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3716 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3717 let used_liquidity =
3718 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3720 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3721 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3723 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3726 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3731 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3732 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3733 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3740 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3741 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3742 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3743 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3744 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3745 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3746 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3747 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3748 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3750 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3751 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3753 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3754 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3755 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3757 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3758 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3759 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3760 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3761 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3762 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3763 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3764 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3765 } else { unreachable!(); });
3767 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3768 Err((chan, err)) => {
3769 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3770 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3771 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3772 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3773 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3779 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3780 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3782 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3783 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3786 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3787 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3788 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3792 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3793 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3794 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3798 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3799 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3800 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3802 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3803 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3804 if outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3805 panic!("outpoint_to_peer map already contained funding outpoint, which shouldn't be possible");
3807 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3814 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3815 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3816 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3820 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3822 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3823 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3825 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3826 /// across the p2p network.
3828 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3829 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3831 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3832 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3833 /// keys per-channel).
3835 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3836 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3837 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3839 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3840 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3841 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3843 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3844 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3845 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3846 /// for more details.
3848 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3849 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3850 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3851 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3854 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3856 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3857 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3859 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3860 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3861 /// signature for each channel.
3863 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3864 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3865 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3866 let mut result = Ok(());
3868 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3869 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3870 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3871 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3872 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3877 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3878 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3879 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3883 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3884 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3885 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3886 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3887 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3888 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3889 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3890 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3892 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3893 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3898 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3899 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3900 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3901 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3905 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3906 match states.entry(txid) {
3907 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3908 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3909 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3913 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3916 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3917 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3918 temporary_channel_id,
3919 counterparty_node_id,
3920 funding_transaction.clone(),
3923 let mut output_index = None;
3924 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3925 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3926 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3927 if output_index.is_some() {
3928 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3929 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3932 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3935 if output_index.is_none() {
3936 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3937 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3940 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3941 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3942 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3948 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3949 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3950 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3951 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3952 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3953 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3954 .into_iter().flatten()
3955 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3957 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3958 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3960 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3962 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3963 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3964 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3965 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3966 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3968 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3969 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3970 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3974 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3975 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3981 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3983 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3984 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3985 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3986 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3988 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3989 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3991 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3992 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3994 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3996 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3997 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3998 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3999 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4000 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4001 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4002 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4003 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4004 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4005 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4006 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4007 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4008 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4012 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4013 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4014 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4015 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4016 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4017 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4018 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4019 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4020 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4021 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4025 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4026 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4027 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4028 config.apply(config_update);
4029 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4032 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4033 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4034 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4035 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4036 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4037 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4044 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4045 debug_assert!(false);
4046 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4048 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4049 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4056 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4058 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4059 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4060 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4061 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4063 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4064 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4066 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4067 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4069 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4071 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4072 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4073 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4074 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4075 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4076 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4077 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4078 pub fn update_channel_config(
4079 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4080 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4081 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4084 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4085 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4087 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4088 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4090 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4091 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4092 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4093 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4094 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4096 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4097 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4098 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4101 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4104 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4105 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4106 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4107 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4108 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4109 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4110 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4112 let next_hop_scid = {
4113 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4114 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4115 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4116 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4117 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4118 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4119 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4120 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4121 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4122 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4125 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4127 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4128 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4129 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4132 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4133 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4134 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4135 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4136 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4143 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4144 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4145 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4148 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4149 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4150 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4151 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4154 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4156 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4157 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4158 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4159 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4160 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4163 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4164 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4165 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4166 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4167 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4169 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4173 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4174 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4176 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4179 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4180 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4181 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4183 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4184 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4185 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4188 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4189 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4190 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4191 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4192 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4193 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4194 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4195 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4196 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4199 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4200 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4201 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4202 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4207 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4209 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4210 /// Will likely generate further events.
4211 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4212 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4214 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4215 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4216 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4218 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4219 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4221 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4222 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4223 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4224 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4226 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4227 match forward_info {
4228 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4229 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4230 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4231 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4232 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4235 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4236 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4237 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4238 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4240 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4241 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4242 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4243 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4244 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4245 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4246 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4247 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4250 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4251 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4253 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4256 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4257 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4263 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4264 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4266 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4270 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4271 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4273 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4277 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4278 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4279 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4280 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4281 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4282 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4283 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4286 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4287 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4288 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4289 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4290 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4292 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4294 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4295 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4299 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4300 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4301 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4302 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4303 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4304 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4306 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4307 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4313 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4316 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4319 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4320 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4321 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4322 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4323 // problem, not ours.
4329 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4330 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4331 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4333 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4337 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4338 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4339 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4340 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4341 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4344 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4345 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4346 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4347 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4348 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4349 match forward_info {
4350 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4351 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4352 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4353 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4354 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4355 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4356 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4359 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4360 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4361 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4362 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4363 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4364 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4365 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4366 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4367 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4368 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4370 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4371 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4372 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4373 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4374 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4375 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4378 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4379 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4380 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4383 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4384 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4386 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4388 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4389 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4390 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4391 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4396 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4397 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4399 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4400 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4401 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4402 htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger
4404 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4405 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4407 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4409 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4410 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4411 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4415 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4416 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4417 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &self.logger) {
4418 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4419 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4421 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_malformed_htlc() were not met");
4423 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4424 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4425 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4432 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4436 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4437 match forward_info {
4438 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4439 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4440 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4441 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4442 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4445 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4446 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4447 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4448 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4449 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4451 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4452 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4453 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4454 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4455 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4457 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4458 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4459 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4463 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4464 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4467 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4470 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4471 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4472 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4473 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4474 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4475 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4476 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4477 phantom_shared_secret,
4480 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4481 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4482 // if routing nodes overpay
4483 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4484 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4486 total_value_received: None,
4487 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4490 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4493 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4495 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4496 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4497 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4498 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4499 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4500 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4502 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4503 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4504 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4505 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4506 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4507 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4508 phantom_shared_secret,
4511 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4512 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4514 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4517 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4518 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4519 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4520 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4521 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4524 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4525 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4526 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4527 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4528 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4529 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4531 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4532 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4533 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4535 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4536 .entry(payment_hash)
4537 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4538 .or_insert_with(|| {
4539 committed_to_claimable = true;
4541 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4544 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4545 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4546 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4547 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4549 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4550 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4551 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4553 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4554 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4555 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4558 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4560 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4561 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4562 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4563 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4564 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4565 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4566 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4567 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4568 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4569 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4571 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4573 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4574 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4575 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4576 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4577 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4578 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4580 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4581 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4582 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4583 committed_to_claimable = true;
4585 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4586 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4587 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4588 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4589 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4590 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4591 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4592 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4593 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4594 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4598 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4599 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4600 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4601 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4602 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4604 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4606 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4607 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4609 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4610 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4611 committed_to_claimable = true;
4614 payment_claimable_generated
4618 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4619 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4620 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4621 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4622 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4623 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4624 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4625 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4626 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4627 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4628 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4629 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4630 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4631 Ok(result) => result,
4633 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4634 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4637 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4638 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4639 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4640 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4641 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4642 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4645 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4646 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4647 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4649 check_total_value!(purpose);
4651 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4652 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4653 check_total_value!(purpose);
4657 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4658 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4659 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4660 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4662 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4663 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4664 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4665 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4666 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4667 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4668 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4669 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4671 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4672 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4673 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4675 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4676 if payment_claimable_generated {
4677 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4683 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4684 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4692 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4693 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4694 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4695 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4697 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4698 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4700 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4702 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4703 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4704 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4706 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4708 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4709 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4710 events.append(&mut new_events);
4713 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4715 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4716 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4717 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4719 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4721 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4722 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4723 if background_events.is_empty() {
4724 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4727 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4729 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4730 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4731 // monitor updating completing.
4732 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4734 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4735 let mut updated_chan = false;
4737 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4738 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4739 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4740 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4741 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4742 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4743 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4744 updated_chan = true;
4745 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4746 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4748 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4751 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4756 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4757 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4760 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4761 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4762 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4763 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4764 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4765 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4766 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4768 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4769 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4770 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4771 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4772 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4778 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4781 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4782 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4783 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4784 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4785 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4788 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4789 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4791 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4793 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4794 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4795 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4796 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4797 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4799 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4801 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4802 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4803 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4804 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4806 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4807 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4809 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4810 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4814 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4815 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4816 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4817 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4818 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4819 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4820 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4822 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4823 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4825 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4826 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4827 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4828 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4829 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4830 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4832 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4837 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4838 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4846 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4848 /// This currently includes:
4849 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4850 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4851 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4853 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4854 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4855 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4856 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4857 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4858 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4859 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4860 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4862 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4863 /// estimate fetches.
4865 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4866 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4867 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4868 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4869 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4871 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4872 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4874 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4875 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4876 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4877 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4879 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4880 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4881 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4882 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4883 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4884 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4886 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4887 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4888 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4890 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4891 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4892 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4893 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4894 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4895 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4896 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4897 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4898 channel_id: *chan_id,
4899 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4910 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4911 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4912 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4913 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4914 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4915 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4916 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4918 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4919 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4924 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4925 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4927 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4928 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4929 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4930 if needs_close { return false; }
4933 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4934 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4935 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4936 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4937 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4938 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4939 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4940 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4942 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4943 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4944 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4945 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4949 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4951 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4954 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4956 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4957 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4958 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4959 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4963 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4965 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4971 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4973 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4974 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4975 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4976 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4977 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4978 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4979 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4980 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4981 channel_id: *chan_id,
4982 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4990 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4991 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4992 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4994 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4995 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4996 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5001 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5002 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5003 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5004 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5005 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5006 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5007 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5008 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5009 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5015 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5017 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5018 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5023 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5024 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5025 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5026 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5027 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5028 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5029 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5030 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5031 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5032 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5033 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5034 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5035 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5036 // have no channels to the peer.
5037 let remove_entry = {
5038 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5039 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5042 entry.remove_entry();
5045 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5050 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5051 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5052 // This should be unreachable
5053 debug_assert!(false);
5056 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5057 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5058 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5059 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5060 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5061 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5062 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5065 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5066 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5067 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5069 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5070 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5077 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5078 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5079 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5080 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5081 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5084 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5085 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5088 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5089 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5092 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5093 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5094 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5095 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5096 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5097 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5098 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5101 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5102 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5105 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5106 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5107 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5108 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5109 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5116 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5117 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5118 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5120 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5121 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5122 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5123 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5125 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5126 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5127 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5128 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5129 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5130 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5133 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5134 /// reason for the failure.
5136 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5137 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5138 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5140 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5141 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5142 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5143 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5144 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5145 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5146 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5151 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5152 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5153 match failure_code {
5154 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5155 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5156 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5157 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5158 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5159 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5161 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5162 let fail_data = match data {
5163 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5166 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5171 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5172 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5174 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5176 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5177 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5178 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5179 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5180 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5181 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5182 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5184 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5186 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5187 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5189 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5194 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5195 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5196 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5197 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5198 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5199 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5200 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5201 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5202 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5203 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5205 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5206 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5207 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5208 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5210 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5211 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5212 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5213 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5214 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5218 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5219 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5220 // be surfaced to the user.
5221 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5222 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5223 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5225 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5226 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5227 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5228 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5229 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5230 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5232 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5233 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5235 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5236 debug_assert!(false);
5237 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5240 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5242 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5245 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5246 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5247 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5248 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5252 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5253 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5254 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5255 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5256 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5257 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5258 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5259 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5260 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5261 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5264 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5265 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5266 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5269 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5270 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5271 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5273 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5274 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5275 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5276 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5277 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5279 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5280 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5281 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5284 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5285 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5286 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5288 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5289 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5290 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5291 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5292 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5294 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5296 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5297 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5299 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5300 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5304 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5305 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5307 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5311 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5312 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5313 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5314 push_forward_ev = true;
5316 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5318 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5321 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5324 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5325 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5326 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5327 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5328 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5329 failed_next_destination: destination,
5335 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5336 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5338 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5339 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5340 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5341 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5343 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5344 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5345 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5346 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5348 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5349 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5350 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5352 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5353 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5354 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5355 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5356 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5357 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5358 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5359 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5360 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5363 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5364 /// even type numbers.
5368 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5369 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5371 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5372 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5373 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5376 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5377 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5379 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5382 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5383 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5384 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5385 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5386 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5387 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5388 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5389 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5394 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5395 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5396 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5397 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5398 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5400 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5401 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5402 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5406 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5407 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5408 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5409 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5410 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5411 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5412 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5413 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5414 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5415 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5416 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5425 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5427 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5428 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5429 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5430 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5431 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5432 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5433 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5434 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5435 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5436 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5437 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5438 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5439 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5440 debug_assert!(false);
5444 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5446 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5447 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5448 debug_assert!(false);
5452 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5453 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5455 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5456 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5457 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5458 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5461 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5462 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5463 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5464 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5468 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5469 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5470 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5471 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5472 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5473 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5474 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5477 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5478 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5479 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5480 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5481 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5482 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5487 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5488 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5489 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5490 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5491 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5492 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5493 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5495 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5498 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5499 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5500 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5501 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5505 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5506 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5507 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5508 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5510 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5511 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5512 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5513 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5515 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5516 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5517 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5518 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5521 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5522 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5523 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5524 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5528 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5529 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5530 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5533 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5534 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5535 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5536 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5537 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5538 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5539 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5540 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5543 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5544 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5545 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5547 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5550 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5551 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5553 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5554 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5555 // monitor update as a background event.
5556 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5557 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5558 counterparty_node_id,
5559 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5560 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5564 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5565 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5570 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5572 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5574 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5575 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5576 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5577 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5578 blocking_action: blocker,
5580 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5582 debug_assert!(false,
5583 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5586 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5587 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5588 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5589 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5590 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5592 let mut found_blocker = false;
5593 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5594 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5595 // which case we need to only remove the one
5596 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5597 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5598 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5599 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5601 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5604 debug_assert!(false);
5613 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5614 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5615 counterparty_node_id: None,
5616 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5622 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5623 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5624 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5625 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5626 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5627 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5628 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5629 // again on restart.
5630 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5631 payment_preimage, update_res);
5634 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5635 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5637 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5638 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5639 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5640 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5641 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5642 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5643 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5644 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5645 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5646 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5649 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5650 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5651 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5652 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5653 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5654 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5658 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5659 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5662 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5663 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5664 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5667 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5668 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5669 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5670 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5671 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5673 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5674 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5675 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5677 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5678 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5681 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5682 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5683 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5684 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5685 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5686 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5687 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5688 let chan_to_release =
5689 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5690 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5692 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5693 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5694 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5695 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5700 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5701 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5702 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5703 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5704 // in the background.
5705 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5706 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5707 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5708 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5710 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5711 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5712 funding_txo, update, ..
5714 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5715 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5716 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5717 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5719 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5725 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5726 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5727 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5729 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5730 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5732 monitor_update.updates[0],
5733 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5738 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5739 // immediately once we get going.
5740 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5743 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5745 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5748 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5749 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5750 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5751 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5752 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5753 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5757 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5758 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5759 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5762 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5763 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5765 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5766 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5767 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5768 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5770 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5774 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5775 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5776 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5782 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5783 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5784 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5787 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5788 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5789 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5790 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5792 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5794 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5795 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5796 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5798 payment_purpose: purpose,
5801 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5803 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5807 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5809 sender_intended_total_msat,
5813 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5814 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5816 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5817 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5818 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5821 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5822 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5824 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5825 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5826 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5827 Some(blocking_action),
5834 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5835 /// update completion.
5836 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5837 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5838 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5839 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5840 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5841 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5842 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5843 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5844 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5845 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5846 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5847 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5848 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5849 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5851 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5853 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5854 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5855 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5856 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5859 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5860 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5862 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5863 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5864 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5869 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5870 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5871 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5872 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5877 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5878 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5879 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5880 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5881 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5886 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5890 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5896 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5897 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5898 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5902 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5903 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5904 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5910 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5911 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5913 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5914 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5916 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5917 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5918 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5919 match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
5920 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5925 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5926 let mut peer_state_lock;
5927 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5928 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5929 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5930 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5932 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5935 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5936 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5937 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5938 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5939 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5942 let remaining_in_flight =
5943 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5944 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5947 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5948 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5949 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5950 remaining_in_flight);
5951 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5954 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5957 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5959 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5960 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5963 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5964 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5965 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5967 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5968 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5969 /// used to accept such channels.
5971 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5972 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5973 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5974 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5977 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5978 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5980 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5981 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5982 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5984 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5985 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5987 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5988 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5990 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5991 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5993 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5994 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5995 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5996 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5999 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6000 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6002 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6003 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6004 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6005 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6006 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
6007 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6009 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6011 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6012 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6013 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6015 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6016 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6017 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6018 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6019 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6020 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6021 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
6023 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
6027 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6028 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6029 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6030 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6031 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6032 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6033 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6036 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6037 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
6039 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6040 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6041 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6042 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6043 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6044 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6045 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6046 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6049 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6050 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
6054 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6055 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6056 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6058 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6059 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6060 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6063 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6068 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6069 /// or 0-conf channels.
6071 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6072 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6073 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6074 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6075 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6076 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6078 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6079 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6080 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6081 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6082 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6083 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6084 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6088 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6091 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6092 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6094 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6095 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6097 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6098 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6099 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6100 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6101 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6103 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6106 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6107 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6108 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6111 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6112 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6117 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6120 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6121 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6122 // likely to be lost on restart!
6123 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6124 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6127 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6128 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6131 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6132 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6133 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6134 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6135 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6137 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6138 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6140 debug_assert!(false);
6141 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6143 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6144 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6146 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6147 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6148 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6149 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6150 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6151 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6153 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6154 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6155 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6158 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6159 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6160 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6161 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6162 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6165 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6166 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6168 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6171 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6172 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6173 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6174 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6175 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6176 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6177 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6178 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6179 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6181 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6182 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6183 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6188 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6189 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6190 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6191 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6192 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6193 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6194 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6197 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6202 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6203 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6204 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6206 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6207 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6210 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6211 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6213 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6214 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6215 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6217 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6221 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6222 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6223 // likely to be lost on restart!
6224 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6225 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6226 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6228 debug_assert!(false);
6229 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6231 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6232 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6233 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6234 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6235 match phase.get_mut() {
6236 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6237 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6238 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6241 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6245 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6248 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6249 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6250 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6251 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6252 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6254 user_channel_id: user_id,
6259 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6260 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6262 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6263 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6265 debug_assert!(false);
6266 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6269 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6270 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6271 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6272 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6273 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6274 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6275 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6277 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6278 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6279 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6280 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6281 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6282 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6283 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6284 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6285 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6289 Some(mut phase) => {
6290 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6291 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6292 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6294 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6297 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6299 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6300 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6301 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6302 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6303 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6304 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6306 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6307 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6308 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6311 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6312 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6313 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6316 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6317 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6319 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6321 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6322 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6323 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6324 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6325 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6327 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6328 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6329 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6330 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6331 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6332 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6333 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6338 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6339 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6340 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6342 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6346 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6347 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6348 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6356 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6357 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6358 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6359 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6361 debug_assert!(false);
6362 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6365 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6366 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6367 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6368 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6369 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6370 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6371 let logger = WithContext::from(
6373 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6374 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6377 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6379 Ok((chan, monitor)) => {
6380 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6381 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6382 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6383 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6384 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6385 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6386 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6387 } else { unreachable!(); }
6390 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6391 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6395 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6396 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6397 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6398 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6399 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6400 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6404 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6407 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6411 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6412 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6413 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6415 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6417 debug_assert!(false);
6418 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6420 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6421 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6422 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6423 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6424 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6425 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6426 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6427 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6428 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6429 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6430 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6431 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6432 msg: announcement_sigs,
6434 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6435 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6436 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6437 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6438 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6439 // announcement_signatures.
6440 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6441 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6442 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6443 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6450 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6451 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6456 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6457 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6460 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6461 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6466 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6467 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6468 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6470 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6471 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6473 debug_assert!(false);
6474 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6476 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6477 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6478 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6479 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6481 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6482 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6483 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6484 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6486 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6489 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6490 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6491 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6492 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6494 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6495 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6496 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6497 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6498 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6499 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6503 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6504 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6505 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6506 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6509 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6510 let context = phase.context_mut();
6511 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6512 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6513 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6514 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6515 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6519 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6522 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6523 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6524 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6525 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6527 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6528 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6534 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6535 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6536 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6538 debug_assert!(false);
6539 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6541 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6542 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6543 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6544 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6545 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6546 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6547 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6548 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6549 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6550 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6551 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6556 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6557 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6558 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6559 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6560 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6561 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6562 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6564 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6565 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6568 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6571 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6572 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6573 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6574 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6576 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6577 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6578 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6579 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6580 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6584 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6586 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6587 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6588 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6593 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6594 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6595 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6596 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6598 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6599 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6600 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6601 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6603 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6604 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6606 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6607 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6608 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6610 debug_assert!(false);
6611 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6613 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6614 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6615 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6616 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6617 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6618 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6619 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6620 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6621 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6622 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6624 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6626 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6627 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6628 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6629 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6630 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6631 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6632 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6633 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6637 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6638 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6639 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6640 match pending_forward_info {
6641 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6642 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6644 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6645 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6646 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6647 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6648 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6650 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6651 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6652 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6653 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6654 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6657 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6659 _ => pending_forward_info
6662 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6663 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6665 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6666 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6674 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6676 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6677 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6678 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6680 debug_assert!(false);
6681 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6683 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6684 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6685 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6686 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6687 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6688 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6689 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6690 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6692 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6694 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6695 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6696 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6698 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6699 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6700 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6701 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6702 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6703 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6704 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6707 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6708 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6714 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6718 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6719 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6720 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6721 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6722 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6724 debug_assert!(false);
6725 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6727 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6728 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6729 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6731 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6732 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6734 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6735 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6738 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6743 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6744 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6745 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6746 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6747 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6749 debug_assert!(false);
6750 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6752 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6753 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6754 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6755 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6756 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6757 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6758 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6760 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6761 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6763 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6764 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6768 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6772 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6773 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6774 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6776 debug_assert!(false);
6777 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6779 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6780 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6781 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6782 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6783 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6784 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6785 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6786 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6787 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6788 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6789 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6793 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6794 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6797 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6802 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6803 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6804 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6805 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6806 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6807 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6808 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6809 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6810 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6811 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6812 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6814 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6815 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6817 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6818 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6819 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6820 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6821 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6822 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6824 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6825 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6826 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6828 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6829 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6830 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6831 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6832 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6833 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6834 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6835 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6836 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6839 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6840 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6843 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6844 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6845 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6846 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6847 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6848 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6849 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6850 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6851 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6852 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6855 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6856 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6857 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6862 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6863 // payments are being processed.
6864 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6865 push_forward_event = true;
6867 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6868 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6875 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6876 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6879 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6880 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6881 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6883 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6887 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6888 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6889 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6890 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6891 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6893 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6894 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6895 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6896 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6897 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6898 // real by taking more time.
6899 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6900 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6901 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6906 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6907 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6908 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6909 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6910 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6911 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6912 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6914 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6915 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6916 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6917 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6918 channel_funding_outpoint,
6919 counterparty_node_id,
6924 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6925 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6926 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6928 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6929 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6930 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6931 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6933 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6934 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6935 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6941 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6942 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6943 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6944 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6946 debug_assert!(false);
6947 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6948 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6949 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6950 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6951 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6952 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6953 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6954 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6955 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6956 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6957 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6958 *counterparty_node_id)
6960 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6961 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6962 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6963 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6964 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6965 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6966 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6970 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6971 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6974 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6977 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6981 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6982 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6983 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6985 debug_assert!(false);
6986 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6988 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6989 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6990 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6991 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6992 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6993 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6994 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6996 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6997 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7005 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7006 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7007 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7009 debug_assert!(false);
7010 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7012 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7013 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7014 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7015 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7016 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7017 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7018 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7021 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7022 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7023 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7024 msg, &self.default_configuration
7025 ), chan_phase_entry),
7026 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7027 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7028 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7031 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7032 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7035 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7040 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7041 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7042 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7043 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7045 // It's not a local channel
7046 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7049 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7050 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7051 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7052 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7054 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7055 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7056 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7057 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7058 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7059 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7060 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7061 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7062 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7063 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7064 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7066 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7068 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7069 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7070 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7071 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7073 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7074 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7075 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7076 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7079 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7083 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7084 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7087 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7089 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7092 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7094 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7095 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7097 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7099 debug_assert!(false);
7100 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7101 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7105 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7106 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7107 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7108 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7109 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7110 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7111 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7112 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7113 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7114 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7115 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7116 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7117 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7118 let mut channel_update = None;
7119 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7120 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7121 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7124 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7125 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7126 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7127 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7128 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7129 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7130 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7135 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7136 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7137 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7138 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7139 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7140 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7144 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7145 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7148 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7149 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7151 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7152 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7153 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7154 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7155 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7156 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7158 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7159 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7160 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7161 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7162 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7163 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7164 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7165 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7166 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7167 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7168 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7169 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7170 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7171 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7172 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7173 next_funding_txid: None,
7176 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7177 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7178 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7184 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7185 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7186 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7187 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7190 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7191 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7196 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7197 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7198 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7200 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7201 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7202 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7203 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7204 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7205 match monitor_event {
7206 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7207 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7208 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7209 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7210 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7212 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7213 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7214 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7215 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7218 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7219 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7220 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7222 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7223 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7224 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7225 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7228 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7229 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7230 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7231 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7232 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7233 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7234 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7235 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7236 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7237 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7238 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7242 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7243 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7244 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7245 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7246 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7254 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7255 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7261 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7262 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7265 has_pending_monitor_events
7268 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7269 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7270 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7272 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7273 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7274 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7277 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7278 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7279 /// update was applied.
7280 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7281 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7282 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7284 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7285 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7286 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7287 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7289 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7290 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7292 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7293 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7294 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7295 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7297 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7298 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7299 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7300 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7301 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7302 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7304 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7305 has_monitor_update = true;
7307 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7308 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7309 continue 'peer_loop;
7318 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7319 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7320 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7326 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7327 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7329 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7330 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7332 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7333 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7334 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7337 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7338 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7340 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7341 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7342 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7343 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7348 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7349 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7354 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7355 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7358 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7359 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7360 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7366 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7370 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7371 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7372 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7373 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7374 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7375 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7376 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7380 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7381 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7382 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7383 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7384 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7390 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7391 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7392 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7393 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7394 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7395 let mut has_update = false;
7396 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7398 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7400 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7401 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7402 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7403 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7404 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7406 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7407 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7408 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7409 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7410 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7412 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7413 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7416 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7417 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7418 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7420 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7421 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7422 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7423 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7424 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7429 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7431 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7432 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7433 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7439 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7440 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7445 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7451 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7452 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7455 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7456 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7462 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7463 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7465 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7466 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7467 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7468 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7469 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7470 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7471 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7472 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7473 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7474 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7475 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7476 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7477 assert!(should_broadcast);
7478 } else { unreachable!(); }
7479 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7480 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7481 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7484 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7488 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7489 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7490 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7494 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7495 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7496 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7497 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7498 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7500 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7504 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7509 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7511 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7513 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7514 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7515 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7516 &self, description: String
7517 ) -> Result<OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7518 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7519 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7520 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7521 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7523 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7524 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7525 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7527 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7533 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7534 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7538 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7539 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7541 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7542 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7543 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7546 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7547 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7548 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7550 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7551 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7555 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7556 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7557 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7558 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7559 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7561 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7565 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7566 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7571 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7572 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7573 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7575 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7577 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7578 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7579 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7580 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7581 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7582 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7583 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7584 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7585 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7586 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7587 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7588 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7590 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7591 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7592 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7594 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7595 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7598 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7599 self.pending_outbound_payments
7600 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7601 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7603 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7608 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7609 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7610 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7612 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7613 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7614 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7615 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7616 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7617 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7618 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7620 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7621 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7625 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7626 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7629 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7630 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7631 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7635 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7636 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7637 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7638 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7642 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7643 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7644 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7649 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7650 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7651 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7654 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7655 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7656 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7657 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7658 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7659 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7660 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7661 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7662 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7663 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7664 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7665 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7666 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7667 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7668 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7671 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7672 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7673 let builder = match quantity {
7675 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7677 let builder = match amount_msats {
7679 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7681 let builder = match payer_note {
7683 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7685 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7686 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7688 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7689 self.pending_outbound_payments
7690 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7691 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7693 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7695 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7696 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7697 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7698 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7699 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7702 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7704 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7705 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7706 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7707 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7708 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7709 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7710 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7711 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7712 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7714 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7721 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7724 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7725 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7726 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7730 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7731 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7732 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7733 /// received and no retries will be made.
7737 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7738 /// path for the invoice.
7740 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7741 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7742 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7743 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7744 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7746 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7747 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7749 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7750 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7751 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7752 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7754 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7755 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7756 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7758 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7759 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7760 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7762 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7763 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7764 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7766 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7767 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7768 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7770 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7771 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7772 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7773 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7774 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7777 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7779 for path in refund.paths() {
7780 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7781 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7782 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7783 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7785 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7791 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7795 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7798 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7799 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7801 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7802 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7803 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7804 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7806 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7808 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7809 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7813 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7814 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7816 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7818 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7819 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7821 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7822 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7823 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7824 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7825 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7826 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7827 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7828 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7829 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7830 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7831 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7834 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7835 /// stored external to LDK.
7837 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7838 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7839 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7841 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7842 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7845 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7846 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7847 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7848 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7850 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7851 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7852 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7853 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7854 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7856 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7857 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7858 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7859 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7860 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7862 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7863 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7865 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7866 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7870 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7871 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7873 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7875 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7876 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7878 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7879 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7880 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7881 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7882 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7883 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7884 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7887 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7888 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7890 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7891 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7892 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7895 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7897 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7898 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7899 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7900 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7901 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7903 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
7905 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
7906 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
7907 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
7910 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, entropy_source, secp_ctx)
7911 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
7914 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
7915 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
7916 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
7917 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7918 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
7919 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7920 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7922 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
7923 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7924 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
7925 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7926 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7928 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7930 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7933 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
7934 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7938 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7939 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7941 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7942 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7943 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7944 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7946 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7947 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7948 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7949 Some(_) => continue,
7950 None => return scid_candidate
7955 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7957 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7958 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7960 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7961 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7962 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7966 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7967 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7968 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7970 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7971 /// times to get a unique scid.
7972 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7973 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7974 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7976 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7977 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7978 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7979 return scid_candidate
7983 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7984 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7985 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7986 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7988 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7989 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7990 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7991 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7992 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7993 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7995 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7996 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7997 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8006 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8007 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8008 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8009 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8010 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8014 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8015 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8016 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8017 events.push_back((event, None));
8021 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8022 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8023 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8027 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8028 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8032 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8033 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8036 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8037 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8038 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8039 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8040 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8041 let logger = WithContext::from(
8042 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8045 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8046 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8047 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8048 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8049 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8050 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8051 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8052 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8054 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8058 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8059 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
8060 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8061 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8062 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8063 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8064 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8068 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
8069 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8070 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8071 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8072 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8073 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8074 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8075 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8076 if further_update_exists {
8077 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8082 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8083 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8089 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8090 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8096 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8097 for action in actions {
8099 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8100 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
8102 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
8108 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8109 /// using the given event handler.
8111 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8112 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8116 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8120 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8122 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8123 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8124 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8125 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8126 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8127 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8131 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8132 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8133 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8134 /// is always placed next to each other.
8136 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8137 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8138 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8139 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8141 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8142 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8143 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8144 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8145 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8146 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8147 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8149 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8150 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8151 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8152 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8155 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8156 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8158 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8159 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8162 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8163 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8164 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8165 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8166 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8167 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8168 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8172 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8173 events.replace(pending_events);
8182 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8184 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8185 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8186 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8187 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8188 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8189 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8193 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8195 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8196 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8197 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8199 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8203 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8205 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8206 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8207 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8208 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8209 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8210 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8214 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8216 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8217 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8218 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8219 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8220 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8223 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8224 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8227 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8228 let _persistence_guard =
8229 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8230 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8231 let new_height = height - 1;
8233 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8234 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8235 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8236 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8237 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8238 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8241 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8245 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8247 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8248 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8249 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8250 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8251 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8252 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8256 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8257 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8258 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8259 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8261 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8262 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8264 let _persistence_guard =
8265 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8266 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8267 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8268 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8270 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8271 if height < last_best_block_height {
8272 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8273 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8277 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8278 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8279 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8280 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8282 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8283 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8285 let _persistence_guard =
8286 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8287 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8288 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8290 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8292 macro_rules! max_time {
8293 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8295 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8296 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8297 // having an explicit local time source.
8298 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8299 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8300 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8301 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8302 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8308 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8309 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8310 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8311 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8315 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8316 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8317 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8318 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8319 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8320 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8321 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8322 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8323 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8324 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8325 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8332 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8333 let _persistence_guard =
8334 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8335 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8336 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8337 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8338 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8339 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8340 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8341 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8346 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8348 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8349 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8350 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8351 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8352 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8353 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8357 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8358 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8360 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8361 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8362 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8363 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8364 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8366 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8367 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8369 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8370 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8371 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8372 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8373 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8374 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8376 // Retain unfunded channels.
8377 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8378 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8379 let res = f(channel);
8380 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8381 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8382 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8383 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8384 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8386 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8387 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8388 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8389 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8390 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8391 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8392 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8393 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8398 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8403 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8404 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8407 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8408 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8409 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8410 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8411 msg: announcement_sigs,
8413 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8414 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8415 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8417 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8418 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8419 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8424 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8425 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8426 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8427 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8428 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8429 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8430 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8431 // is always consistent.
8432 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8433 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8434 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8435 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8436 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8439 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8440 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8441 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8442 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8443 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8444 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8445 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8449 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8450 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8451 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8452 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8453 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8454 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8455 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8456 data: reason_message,
8469 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8470 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8471 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8472 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8473 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8474 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8475 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8476 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8477 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8478 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8480 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8481 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8482 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8486 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8489 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8490 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8491 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8492 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8493 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8494 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8495 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8496 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8497 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8498 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8499 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8502 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8503 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8504 _ => unreachable!(),
8506 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8507 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8508 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8509 let logger = WithContext::from(
8510 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8512 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8518 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8520 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8521 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8525 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8526 /// may have events that need processing.
8528 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8529 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8531 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8532 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8533 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8534 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8537 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8538 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8539 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8542 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8543 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8544 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8547 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8548 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8549 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8550 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8553 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8554 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8555 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8556 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8559 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8560 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8562 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8563 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8564 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8565 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8566 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8569 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8570 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8571 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8572 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8575 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8576 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8577 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8578 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8581 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8582 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8583 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8584 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8587 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8588 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8589 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8590 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8594 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8595 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8597 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8598 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8599 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8600 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8601 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8602 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8606 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8607 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8608 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8609 // change to the contents.
8610 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8611 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8612 let persist = match &res {
8613 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8614 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8615 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8617 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8619 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8624 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8625 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8626 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8627 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8630 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8631 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8632 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8633 // change to the contents.
8634 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8635 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8636 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8640 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8641 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8642 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8643 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8646 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8647 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8648 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8651 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8652 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8653 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8656 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8657 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8658 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8659 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8660 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8661 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8662 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8663 let persist = match &res {
8664 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8665 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8667 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8672 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8673 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8674 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8675 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8678 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8679 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8680 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8681 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8684 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8685 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8686 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8687 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8690 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8691 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8692 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8693 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8696 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8697 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8698 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8701 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8702 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8703 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8706 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8707 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8708 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8709 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8711 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8712 let persist = match &res {
8713 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8714 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8715 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8717 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8722 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8724 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8727 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8728 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8729 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8730 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8731 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8732 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8733 let persist = match &res {
8734 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8735 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8736 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8738 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8743 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8744 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8745 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8746 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8748 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8749 let persist = match &res {
8750 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8751 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8752 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8754 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8759 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8760 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8761 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8764 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8765 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8766 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8769 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8770 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8771 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8772 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8773 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8774 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8775 let persist = match &res {
8776 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8777 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8778 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8780 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8785 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8786 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8787 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8790 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8791 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8792 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8795 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8800 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8801 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8802 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8803 let persist = match &res {
8804 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8805 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8806 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8808 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8813 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8814 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8815 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8816 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8817 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8820 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8821 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8822 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8824 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8827 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8828 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8829 let context = match phase {
8830 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8831 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8832 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8833 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8838 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8839 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8842 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8846 // Clean up for removal.
8847 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8848 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8849 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8852 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8853 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8854 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8855 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8857 // V1 Channel Establishment
8858 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8859 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8860 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8861 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8862 // V2 Channel Establishment
8863 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8864 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8865 // Common Channel Establishment
8866 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8867 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8869 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8871 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8872 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8873 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8874 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8875 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8876 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8877 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8878 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8879 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8880 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8881 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8882 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8883 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8884 // Channel Operations
8885 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8886 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8887 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8888 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8889 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8890 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8892 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8893 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8894 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8895 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8896 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8897 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8898 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8899 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8900 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8903 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8904 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8905 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8906 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8909 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8911 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8913 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8914 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8918 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8919 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8920 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8921 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8925 let mut res = Ok(());
8927 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8928 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8929 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8930 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8931 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8932 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8933 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8936 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8937 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8939 if inbound_peer_limited {
8941 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8943 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8944 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8945 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8946 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8947 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8948 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8949 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8950 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8954 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8955 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8956 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8958 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8959 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8960 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8961 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8964 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8967 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8968 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8973 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8975 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8976 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8977 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8978 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8979 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8981 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8982 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8984 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8985 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8986 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8987 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
8992 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8993 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8998 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8999 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9001 match &msg.data as &str {
9002 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9003 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9005 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9006 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9007 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9008 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9009 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9010 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9011 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9012 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9013 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9014 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9015 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9016 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9017 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9018 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9019 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9020 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9024 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9025 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9026 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9027 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9028 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9029 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9031 log_level: Level::Trace,
9041 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9042 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9044 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9045 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9046 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9047 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9048 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9049 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9050 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9051 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9053 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9054 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9055 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9059 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9060 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9061 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9062 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9063 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9064 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9065 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9066 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9067 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9068 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9076 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9077 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9081 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9082 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9085 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9086 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9089 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9090 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9093 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9094 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9095 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9096 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9099 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9100 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9101 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9102 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9105 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9106 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9107 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9108 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9111 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9112 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9113 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9114 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9117 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9118 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9119 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9120 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9123 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9124 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9125 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9126 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9129 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9130 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9131 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9132 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9135 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9136 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9137 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9138 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9141 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9142 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9143 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9144 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9148 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9149 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9151 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9152 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9153 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9154 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9155 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9156 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9160 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9161 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9162 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9165 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9166 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9169 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9170 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9172 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9173 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9175 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9176 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9180 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9181 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9182 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9184 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9186 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9187 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9191 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9192 amount_msats, payment_secret
9194 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9196 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9197 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9201 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9202 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9203 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9206 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9207 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9208 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9209 payment_paths, payment_hash
9211 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9212 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9213 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9215 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9216 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9217 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9220 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9221 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9222 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9223 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9224 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9226 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9227 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9229 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9230 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9231 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9232 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9234 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9235 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9239 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9240 Err(error) => Some(error),
9244 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9245 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9247 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9249 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9250 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9253 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9254 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9255 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9262 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9263 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9269 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9270 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9274 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9275 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9276 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9277 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9278 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9282 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9283 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9285 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9286 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9287 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9288 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9289 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9292 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9293 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9294 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9295 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9298 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9299 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9300 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9301 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9304 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9305 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9306 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9307 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9310 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9311 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9312 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9313 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9314 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9315 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9316 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9317 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9318 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9319 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9320 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9321 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9322 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9323 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9324 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9325 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9326 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9327 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9328 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9329 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9334 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9335 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9337 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9338 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9339 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9340 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9343 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9344 (2, node_id, required),
9345 (4, features, required),
9346 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9347 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9348 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9349 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9352 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9353 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9354 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9355 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9356 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9357 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9358 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9359 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9360 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9361 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9362 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9363 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9364 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9365 (7, self.config, option),
9366 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9367 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9368 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9369 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9370 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9371 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9372 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9373 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9374 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9375 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9376 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9377 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9378 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9379 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9380 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9381 (32, self.is_public, required),
9382 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9383 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9384 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9385 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9386 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9392 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9393 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9394 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9395 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9396 (2, channel_id, required),
9397 (3, channel_type, option),
9398 (4, counterparty, required),
9399 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9400 (6, funding_txo, option),
9401 (7, config, option),
9402 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9403 (9, confirmations, option),
9404 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9405 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9406 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9407 (16, balance_msat, required),
9408 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9409 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9410 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9411 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9412 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9413 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9414 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9415 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9416 (26, is_outbound, required),
9417 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9418 (30, is_usable, required),
9419 (32, is_public, required),
9420 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9421 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9422 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9423 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9424 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9427 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9428 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9429 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9430 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9431 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9435 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9437 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9438 outbound_scid_alias,
9442 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9443 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9445 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9446 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9447 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9448 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9449 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9450 confirmations_required,
9452 force_close_spend_delay,
9453 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9454 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9455 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9456 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9457 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9458 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9459 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9460 channel_shutdown_state,
9465 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9466 (2, channels, required_vec),
9467 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9468 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9471 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9472 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9475 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9477 (0, onion_packet, required),
9478 (1, blinded, option),
9479 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9482 (0, payment_data, required),
9483 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9484 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9485 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9486 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9487 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9489 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9490 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9491 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9492 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9493 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9494 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9498 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9499 (0, routing, required),
9500 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9501 (4, payment_hash, required),
9502 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9503 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9504 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9505 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9509 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9510 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9512 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9514 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9515 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9516 reason.write(writer)?;
9518 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9519 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9522 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9523 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9524 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9525 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9532 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9533 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9534 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9537 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9538 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9539 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9540 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9544 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9545 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9546 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9547 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9548 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9551 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9552 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9553 // messages contained in the variants.
9554 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9555 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9556 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9558 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9559 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9560 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9561 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9562 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9565 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9566 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9567 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9568 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9569 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9571 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9576 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9581 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9582 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9583 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9586 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9587 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9588 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9589 (2, outpoint, required),
9590 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9591 (4, htlc_id, required),
9592 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9593 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9596 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9597 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9598 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9599 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9600 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9602 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9603 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9604 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9605 (2, self.value, required),
9606 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9607 (4, payment_data, option),
9608 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9609 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9610 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9611 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9617 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9618 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9619 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9620 (0, prev_hop, required),
9621 (1, total_msat, option),
9622 (2, value_ser, required),
9623 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9624 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9625 (5, total_value_received, option),
9626 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9627 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9628 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9630 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9631 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9632 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9634 if payment_data.is_some() {
9635 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9637 if total_msat.is_none() {
9638 total_msat = Some(value);
9640 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9643 if total_msat.is_none() {
9644 if payment_data.is_none() {
9645 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9647 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9649 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9653 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9656 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9657 total_value_received,
9658 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9660 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9661 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9666 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9667 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9668 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9671 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9672 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9673 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9674 let mut payment_id = None;
9675 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9676 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9677 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9678 (0, session_priv, required),
9679 (1, payment_id, option),
9680 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9681 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9682 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9683 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9685 if payment_id.is_none() {
9686 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9688 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9690 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9691 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9692 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9694 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9695 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9696 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9697 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9701 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9702 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9703 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9705 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9708 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9709 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9714 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9715 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9717 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9719 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9720 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9721 (0, session_priv, required),
9722 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9723 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9724 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9725 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9726 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9727 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9730 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9732 field.write(writer)?;
9739 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9740 (0, forward_info, required),
9741 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9742 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9743 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9744 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9747 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9748 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9749 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9751 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9755 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9756 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9757 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9758 (0, htlc_id, required),
9759 (2, err_packet, required),
9762 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9763 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9764 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9765 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9766 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9767 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9768 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9769 (0, htlc_id, required),
9770 (1, failure_code, required),
9771 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9772 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9780 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9781 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9782 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9784 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9786 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9787 (0, htlc_id, required),
9788 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9789 (2, err_packet, required),
9790 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9792 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9793 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9794 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9796 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9800 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9801 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9805 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9810 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9811 (0, payment_secret, required),
9812 (2, expiry_time, required),
9813 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9814 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9815 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9818 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9820 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9821 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9822 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9823 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9824 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9825 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9829 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9830 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9832 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9834 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9836 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9837 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9838 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9841 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9843 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9844 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9845 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9846 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9847 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9848 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9849 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9852 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9853 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9857 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9859 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9860 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9861 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9862 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9863 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9864 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9867 channel.write(writer)?;
9873 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9874 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9875 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9876 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9877 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9878 for forward in pending_forwards {
9879 forward.write(writer)?;
9884 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9886 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9887 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9888 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9890 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9891 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9892 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9893 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9894 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9895 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9896 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9897 htlc.write(writer)?;
9899 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9900 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9903 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9904 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9905 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9906 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9907 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9908 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9909 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9912 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9913 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9914 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9915 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9916 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9918 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9919 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9920 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9921 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9922 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9923 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9924 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9929 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9930 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9931 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9932 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9933 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9934 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9935 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9936 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9937 0u64.write(writer)?;
9939 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9940 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9941 event.write(writer)?;
9945 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9946 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9947 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9948 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9949 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9950 0u64.write(writer)?;
9952 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9953 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9954 // likely to be identical.
9955 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9956 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9958 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9959 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9960 hash.write(writer)?;
9961 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9964 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9965 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9966 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9967 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9968 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9971 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9972 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9974 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9975 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9976 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9977 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9980 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9981 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9982 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9983 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9987 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9988 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9989 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9991 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9992 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9993 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9999 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10000 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10001 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10002 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10005 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10006 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10007 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10008 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10009 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10012 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10013 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10014 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10015 if !updates.is_empty() {
10016 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
10017 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10022 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10023 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10024 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10025 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10026 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10027 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10028 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10029 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10030 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10031 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10032 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10033 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10034 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10041 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10042 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10043 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10044 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10047 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10048 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10049 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10050 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10051 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10052 // check that the event is sane here.
10053 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10054 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10055 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10056 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10062 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10063 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10064 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10065 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10066 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10067 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10070 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10071 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10072 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10073 events.push_back((ev, action));
10074 } else if action.is_some() {
10075 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10082 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10083 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10084 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10085 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10086 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10087 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10090 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10092 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10094 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10095 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10096 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10097 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10098 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10099 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10100 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10101 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10102 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10103 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10104 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10105 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10106 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10108 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10109 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10111 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10112 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10114 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10115 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10116 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10117 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10118 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10119 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10121 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10122 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10124 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10125 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10126 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10127 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10128 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10129 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10133 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10134 pub entropy_source: ES,
10136 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10137 pub node_signer: NS,
10139 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10140 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10142 pub signer_provider: SP,
10144 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10146 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10147 pub fee_estimator: F,
10148 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10150 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10151 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10152 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10153 pub chain_monitor: M,
10155 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10156 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10157 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10158 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10159 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10160 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10162 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10164 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10165 /// deserialization.
10167 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10168 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10169 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10171 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10172 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10174 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10175 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10176 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10177 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10179 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10182 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10183 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10186 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10187 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10189 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10190 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10191 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10192 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10193 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10194 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10198 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10199 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10200 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10201 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10202 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10204 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10205 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10210 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10211 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10212 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10213 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10215 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10216 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10217 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10218 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10219 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10220 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10224 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10225 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10226 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10230 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10231 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10233 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10234 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10235 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10236 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10237 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10238 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10242 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10243 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10245 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10246 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10247 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10249 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10251 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10252 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10253 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10254 let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10255 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10256 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10257 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10258 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10259 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10260 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10262 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10263 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10264 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10265 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10266 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10267 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10268 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10269 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10270 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10271 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10272 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10273 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10274 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10275 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10277 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10278 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10279 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10281 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10282 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10283 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10285 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10286 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10287 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10289 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10290 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10291 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10293 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10294 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10295 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10298 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10299 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10300 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10301 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10302 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10303 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10304 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10306 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10307 let mut found_htlc = false;
10308 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10309 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10312 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10313 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10314 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10315 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10316 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10317 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10318 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10320 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10321 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10322 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10326 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10327 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10328 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10329 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10330 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10332 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10333 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10335 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10337 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10338 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10340 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10341 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10342 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10343 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10347 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10348 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10349 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10350 // safely discard the channel.
10351 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10352 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10353 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10354 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10355 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10356 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10357 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10360 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10361 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10362 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10363 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10364 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10365 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10369 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10370 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10371 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10372 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10373 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10374 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10375 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10376 counterparty_node_id: None,
10377 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10379 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10383 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10384 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10385 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10386 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10387 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10388 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10389 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10390 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10391 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10393 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10396 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10397 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10398 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10399 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10400 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10401 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10402 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10403 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10405 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10408 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10411 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10412 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10413 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10414 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10415 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10416 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10417 is_connected: false,
10421 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10422 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10423 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10424 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10425 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10426 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10427 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10428 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10431 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10432 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10433 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10434 for _ in 0..event_count {
10435 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10436 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10441 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10442 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10443 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10445 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10446 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10447 // on-startup monitor updates.
10448 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10449 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10451 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10455 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10456 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10458 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10459 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10460 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10461 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10462 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10466 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10467 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10468 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10469 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10470 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10471 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10472 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10474 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10475 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10479 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10480 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10481 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10482 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10483 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10484 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10485 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10486 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10487 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10488 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10489 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10490 let mut events_override = None;
10491 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10492 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10493 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10494 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10495 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10496 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10497 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10498 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10499 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10500 (8, events_override, option),
10501 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10502 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10503 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10504 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10506 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10507 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10510 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10511 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10514 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10515 pending_events_read = events;
10518 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10519 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10522 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10523 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10524 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10525 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10526 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10527 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10529 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10531 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10532 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10533 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10536 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10537 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10538 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10539 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10540 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10542 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10543 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10544 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10546 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10547 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10548 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10549 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10550 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10552 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10553 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10554 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10555 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10556 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10557 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10558 pending_background_events.push(
10559 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10560 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10561 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10562 update: update.clone(),
10565 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10566 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10567 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10568 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10569 pending_background_events.push(
10570 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10571 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10572 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10575 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10576 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10577 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10579 max_in_flight_update_id
10583 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10584 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10585 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10586 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10587 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10588 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10590 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10592 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10593 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10594 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10595 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10596 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10597 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10598 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10599 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10600 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10603 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10604 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10605 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10606 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10607 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10608 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10609 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10610 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10611 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10612 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10613 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10616 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10617 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10618 debug_assert!(false);
10619 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10624 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10625 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10626 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10627 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10628 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10629 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10630 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10631 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10632 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10634 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10635 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10636 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10638 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10639 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10640 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10641 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10642 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10643 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10644 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10645 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10650 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10651 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10653 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10654 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10655 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10656 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10659 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10660 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10661 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10662 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10663 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10664 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10665 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10667 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10668 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10669 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10670 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10671 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10672 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10673 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10674 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10675 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10678 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10679 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10680 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10681 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10683 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10684 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10685 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10687 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10688 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10689 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10690 retry_strategy: None,
10691 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10692 payment_params: None,
10693 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10694 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10695 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10696 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10697 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10698 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10699 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10700 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10701 total_msat: path_amt,
10702 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10703 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10705 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10706 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10711 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10712 match htlc_source {
10713 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10714 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10715 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10716 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10718 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10719 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10720 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10721 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10722 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10723 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10724 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10725 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10726 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10727 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10728 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10733 !forwards.is_empty()
10735 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10736 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10737 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10738 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10739 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10740 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10741 intercepted_id != ev_id
10748 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10749 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10750 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10751 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10752 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10753 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10754 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10755 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10756 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10757 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10758 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10760 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10761 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10762 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10764 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10765 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10766 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10773 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10774 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10776 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10778 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10779 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10780 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10781 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10782 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10783 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10784 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10785 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10786 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10787 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10790 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10791 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10792 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10793 // channel still live case here.
10797 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10798 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10803 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10804 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10805 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10806 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10807 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10808 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10809 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10810 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10814 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10815 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10817 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10818 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10819 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10820 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10822 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10823 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10824 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10826 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10827 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10829 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10830 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10832 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10835 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10836 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10837 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10839 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10843 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10844 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10845 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10846 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10847 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10849 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10850 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10851 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10852 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10853 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10854 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10855 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10856 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10858 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10859 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10863 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10865 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10867 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10868 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10870 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10871 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10876 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10877 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10879 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10881 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10883 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10884 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10885 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10886 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10890 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10891 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10892 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10893 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10894 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10895 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10896 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10897 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10898 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10900 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10901 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10902 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10904 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10905 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10906 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10907 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10908 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10909 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10911 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10912 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10913 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10914 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10915 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10916 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10920 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10921 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10922 debug_assert!(false);
10923 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10928 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10930 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10931 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10932 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10933 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10934 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10935 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10936 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10937 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10938 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10939 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10940 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10942 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10943 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10945 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10946 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10947 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10948 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10950 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10951 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10952 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10953 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10955 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10956 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10957 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10958 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10960 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10961 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10962 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10963 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10964 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10965 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10966 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10967 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
10970 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10971 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10974 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10977 purpose: payment.purpose,
10978 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10979 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10980 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10986 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10987 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10988 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10989 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
10990 for action in actions.iter() {
10991 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10992 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10993 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10995 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10997 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10998 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10999 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11000 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
11001 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11003 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11004 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11005 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11006 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11010 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11011 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11015 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11017 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11018 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11022 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11024 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11025 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11026 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11027 router: args.router,
11029 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11031 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11032 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11033 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11034 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11036 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11037 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11038 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11039 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11040 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11041 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11043 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11045 our_network_pubkey,
11048 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11050 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11052 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11053 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11054 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11055 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11056 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11058 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11059 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11061 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11063 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11065 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11066 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11067 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11069 logger: args.logger,
11070 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11073 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11074 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11075 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11076 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11077 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11080 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11081 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11082 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11083 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11084 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11085 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11088 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11089 //connection or two.
11091 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11097 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11098 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11099 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11100 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11101 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11102 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11103 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11104 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11105 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11106 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11107 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11108 use crate::prelude::*;
11109 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11110 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11111 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11112 use crate::util::test_utils;
11113 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11114 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11117 fn test_notify_limits() {
11118 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11119 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11120 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11121 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11122 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11123 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11125 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11126 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11127 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11128 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11129 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11131 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11133 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11134 // to connect messages with new values
11135 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11136 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11137 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11138 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11139 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11140 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11142 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11143 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11144 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11145 // ... but the last node should not.
11146 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11147 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11148 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11149 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11151 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11152 // about the channel.
11153 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11154 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11155 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11157 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11159 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11160 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11161 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11162 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11163 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11164 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11166 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11167 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11168 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11170 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11171 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11172 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11173 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11174 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11175 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11177 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11178 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11179 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11180 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11181 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11182 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11183 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11184 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11186 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11187 // the channel info has updated.
11188 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11189 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11190 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11191 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11192 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11193 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11197 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11198 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11200 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11201 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11202 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11203 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11204 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11206 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11207 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11208 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11209 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11211 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11212 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11213 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11214 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11215 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11216 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11217 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11218 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11220 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11221 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11222 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11224 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11225 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11226 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11228 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11229 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11230 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11231 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11232 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11234 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11235 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11236 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11238 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11239 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11240 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11241 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11242 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11243 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11244 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11245 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11246 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11248 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11249 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11250 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11252 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11253 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11254 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11256 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11257 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11258 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11259 // lightning messages manually.
11260 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11261 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11264 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11265 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11266 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11267 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11269 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11270 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11272 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11273 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11275 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11276 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11277 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11279 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11280 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11281 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11283 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11285 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11287 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11288 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11291 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11292 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11293 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11294 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11296 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11297 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11298 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11299 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11301 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11304 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11305 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11306 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11307 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11309 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11314 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11315 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11316 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11319 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11320 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11321 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11322 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11323 // fails as expected.
11324 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11325 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11326 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11327 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11328 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11329 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11332 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11333 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11334 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11335 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11336 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11337 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11338 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11340 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11341 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11342 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11344 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11345 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11346 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11347 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11348 let route = find_route(
11349 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11350 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11352 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11353 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11355 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11356 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11357 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11358 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11359 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11361 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11362 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11363 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11364 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11365 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11367 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11368 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11369 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11370 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11371 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11372 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11373 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11374 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11375 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11377 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11378 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11380 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11381 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11382 let route = find_route(
11383 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11384 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11386 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11387 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11389 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11390 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11391 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11392 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11393 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11395 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11396 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11397 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11398 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11400 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11401 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11402 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11403 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11404 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11406 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11407 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11408 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11410 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11411 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11412 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11413 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11414 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11415 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11416 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11417 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11418 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11420 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11421 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11423 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11424 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11425 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11426 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11428 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11429 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11430 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11431 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11432 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11434 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11435 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11436 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11439 let route = find_route(
11440 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11441 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11443 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11444 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11445 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11447 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11448 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11449 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11450 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11453 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11454 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11455 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11457 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11458 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11459 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11460 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11461 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11462 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11463 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11464 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11465 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11467 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11468 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11472 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11473 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11474 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11475 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11476 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11477 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11478 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11480 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11481 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11483 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11484 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11485 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11486 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11487 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11488 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11489 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11490 let route = find_route(
11491 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11492 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11495 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11496 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11497 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11498 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11499 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11500 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11503 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11504 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11505 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11506 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11507 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11508 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11509 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11511 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11515 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11516 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11517 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11518 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11519 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11520 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11521 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11522 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11523 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11525 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11526 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11528 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11529 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11530 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11531 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11532 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11533 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11534 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11535 let route = find_route(
11536 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11537 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11540 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11541 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11542 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11543 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11544 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11545 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11546 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11547 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11550 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11551 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11552 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11553 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11554 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11555 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11556 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11558 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11562 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11563 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11564 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11565 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11566 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11568 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11569 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11570 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11571 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11573 // Marshall an MPP route.
11574 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11575 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11576 route.paths.push(path);
11577 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11578 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11579 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11580 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11581 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11582 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11584 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11585 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11587 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11588 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11590 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11595 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11596 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11597 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11598 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11599 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11601 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11603 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11604 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11606 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11607 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11609 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11612 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11613 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11614 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11615 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11616 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11617 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11620 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11623 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11624 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11629 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11630 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11631 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11632 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11633 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11634 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11636 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11637 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11639 total_msat: 100_000,
11642 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11643 // payment verification fails as expected.
11644 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11645 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11646 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11647 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11649 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11653 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11654 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11658 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11659 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11660 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11661 // the channel is successfully closed.
11662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11665 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11667 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11668 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11669 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11670 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11671 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11673 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11674 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11676 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11677 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11678 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11679 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11682 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11684 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11685 // as it has the funding transaction.
11686 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11687 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11688 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11691 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11693 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11695 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11697 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11698 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11699 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11701 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11704 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11705 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11706 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11707 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11708 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11711 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11712 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11714 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11715 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11716 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11717 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11719 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11720 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11721 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11722 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11724 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11725 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11727 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11728 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11729 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11730 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11731 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11732 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11733 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11737 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11738 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11739 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11740 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11741 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11742 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11743 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11746 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11748 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11749 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11750 // closing transaction).
11751 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11752 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11753 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11755 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11756 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11757 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11758 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11759 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11762 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11764 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11766 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11767 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11768 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11770 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11772 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11773 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11776 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11777 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11778 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11781 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11782 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11783 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11786 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11787 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11788 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11791 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11792 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11793 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11796 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11798 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11799 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11801 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11802 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11804 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11805 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11810 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11811 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11812 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11813 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11814 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11815 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11816 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11817 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11820 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11821 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11822 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11824 // Test the API functions.
11825 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11827 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11829 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11831 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11833 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11835 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11837 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11841 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11842 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11843 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11844 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11845 // the given `channel_id`.
11846 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11847 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11848 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11849 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11851 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11854 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11856 // Test the API functions.
11857 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11859 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11861 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11863 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11865 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11867 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11871 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11872 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11873 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11874 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11875 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11876 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11878 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11880 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11881 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11883 let mut funding_tx = None;
11884 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11885 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11886 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11889 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11890 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11891 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11892 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11893 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11895 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11897 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11899 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11901 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11903 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11905 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11908 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11909 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11910 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11911 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11912 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11914 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11915 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11917 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11918 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11919 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11920 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11921 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11922 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11923 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11926 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11927 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11928 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11929 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11930 }, true).unwrap_err();
11932 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11933 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11934 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11935 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11936 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11937 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11938 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11940 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11941 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11943 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11944 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11945 }, true).unwrap_err();
11947 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11948 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11949 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11950 }, false).unwrap();
11951 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11953 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11954 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11956 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11957 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11958 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11959 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11960 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11962 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11963 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11964 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11966 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11967 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11968 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11970 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11971 // "protected" and can connect again.
11972 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11973 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11974 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11976 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11978 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11980 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11981 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11985 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11986 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11987 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11988 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11989 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11990 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11992 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11994 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11995 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11997 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11998 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11999 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12000 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12003 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12005 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12006 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12007 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12009 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12010 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12011 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12013 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12014 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12015 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12016 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12020 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12021 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12022 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12023 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12024 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12025 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12026 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12027 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12028 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12030 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12032 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12033 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12035 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12036 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12037 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12038 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12039 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12040 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12043 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12044 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12046 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12047 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12049 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12051 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12052 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12055 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12056 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12057 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12058 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12059 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12061 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12062 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12064 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12065 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12066 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12067 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12071 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12073 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12074 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12076 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12077 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12078 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12080 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12081 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12083 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12085 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12089 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12090 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12091 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12092 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12093 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12094 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12095 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12096 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12098 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12099 payment_metadata: None,
12100 keysend_preimage: None,
12101 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12102 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12104 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12106 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12107 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12108 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12109 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
12110 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12111 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12112 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12114 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12115 } else { panic!(); }
12117 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12118 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12120 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12121 payment_metadata: None,
12122 keysend_preimage: None,
12123 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12124 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12126 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12128 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12129 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12130 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12131 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12135 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12136 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12137 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12138 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12139 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12141 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12142 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12144 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
12145 payment_metadata: None,
12146 keysend_preimage: None,
12147 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12148 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12150 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12151 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12152 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12154 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12155 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12156 // is not satisfied.
12157 assert!(result.is_ok());
12161 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12162 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12163 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12164 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12165 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12167 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12168 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12170 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12171 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12172 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12173 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12174 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12176 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12177 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12179 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12180 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12181 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12182 match &msg_events[0] {
12183 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12184 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12186 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12187 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12188 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12194 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12195 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12197 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12198 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12201 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12205 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12206 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12207 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12208 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12211 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12212 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12213 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12215 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12217 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12218 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12219 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12221 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12222 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12224 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12225 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12227 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12230 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12231 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12233 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12234 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12236 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12237 // not have generated any events.
12238 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12242 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12243 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12244 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12245 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12246 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12247 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12248 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12249 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12251 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12252 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12253 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12255 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12256 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12257 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12258 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12259 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12261 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12262 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12265 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12266 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12267 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12269 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12270 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12271 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12272 ..Default::default()
12274 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12275 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12276 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12278 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12279 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12282 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12283 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12284 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12285 ..Default::default()
12287 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12288 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12289 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12290 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12292 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12293 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12296 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12297 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12298 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12299 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12300 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12303 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12304 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12305 ..Default::default()
12307 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12310 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12311 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12312 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12313 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12317 fn test_payment_display() {
12318 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12319 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12320 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12321 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12322 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12323 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12327 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12328 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12329 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12330 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12331 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12332 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12334 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12335 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12336 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12337 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12338 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12339 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12340 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12341 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12343 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12344 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12345 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12348 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12349 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12351 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12352 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12354 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12355 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12356 }, false).unwrap();
12357 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12358 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12359 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12361 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12363 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12364 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12365 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12366 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12367 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12368 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12369 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12370 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12371 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12372 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12373 } else { panic!() };
12374 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12375 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12376 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12377 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12379 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12381 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12382 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12383 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12388 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12389 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12390 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12391 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12394 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12395 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12396 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12398 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12399 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12401 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12402 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12405 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12406 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12407 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12409 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12413 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12414 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12415 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12417 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12422 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12423 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
12424 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12425 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12427 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12428 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12429 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12431 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12433 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12434 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12435 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12436 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12438 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12439 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12441 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12447 use crate::chain::Listen;
12448 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12449 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12450 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12451 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12452 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12453 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12454 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12455 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12456 use crate::util::test_utils;
12457 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12459 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12460 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12461 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12462 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12464 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12466 use criterion::Criterion;
12468 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12469 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12470 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12471 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12472 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12473 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12474 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12476 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12477 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12479 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12480 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12482 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12484 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12487 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12488 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12491 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12492 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12493 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12495 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12496 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12498 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12499 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12500 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12501 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12502 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12504 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12505 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12506 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12508 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12509 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12510 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12511 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12513 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12514 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12515 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12517 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12518 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12519 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12520 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12521 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12523 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12524 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12525 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12527 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12528 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12530 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12531 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12532 }, false).unwrap();
12533 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12534 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12535 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12538 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12539 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12540 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12542 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12543 } else { panic!(); }
12545 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12546 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12547 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12548 match events_b[0] {
12549 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12550 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12555 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12556 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12557 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12558 match events_a[0] {
12559 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12560 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12562 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12565 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12567 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12568 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12569 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12571 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12572 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12573 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12574 match msg_events[0] {
12575 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12576 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12577 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12581 match msg_events[1] {
12582 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12586 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12587 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12588 match events_a[0] {
12589 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12590 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12592 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12595 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12596 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12597 match events_b[0] {
12598 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12599 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12601 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12604 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12605 macro_rules! send_payment {
12606 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12607 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12608 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12609 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12610 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12611 payment_count += 1;
12612 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12613 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12615 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12616 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12617 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12618 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12619 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12620 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12621 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12622 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12623 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12624 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12625 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12627 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12628 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12629 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12630 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12632 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12633 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12634 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12635 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12636 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12638 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12641 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12642 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12643 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12644 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12646 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12650 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12651 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12652 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);