1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
55 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use util::errors::APIError;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
96 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
116 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
121 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
122 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
125 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
126 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
127 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
128 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
129 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
132 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
134 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
148 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
152 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
153 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
154 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 short_channel_id: u64,
158 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
159 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
161 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
162 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
167 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
169 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
170 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
171 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
173 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
174 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
177 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
178 struct ClaimableHTLC {
179 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
181 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
183 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
185 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
189 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
190 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
191 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
192 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
194 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
195 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
200 impl Readable for PaymentId {
201 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
202 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
206 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
207 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
208 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
209 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
210 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
213 session_priv: SecretKey,
214 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
215 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
216 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
217 payment_id: PaymentId,
218 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
219 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
222 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
223 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
224 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
226 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
228 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
230 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
233 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
234 payment_id.hash(hasher);
235 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
236 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
237 payment_params.hash(hasher);
242 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
245 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
246 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
248 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
249 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
250 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
251 payment_secret: None,
252 payment_params: None,
257 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
258 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
260 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
268 struct ReceiveError {
274 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
275 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
277 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
282 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
284 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
285 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
286 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
287 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
288 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
290 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
291 err: msgs::LightningError,
292 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
293 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
295 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
297 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
299 err: LightningError {
301 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
302 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
309 shutdown_finish: None,
313 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
315 err: LightningError {
317 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
320 shutdown_finish: None,
324 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
325 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
328 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
330 err: LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
333 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
339 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
340 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
344 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
347 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
349 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
350 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
354 log_level: Level::Warn,
357 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
359 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
361 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
363 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
364 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 shutdown_finish: None,
377 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
378 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
379 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
380 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
381 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
383 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
384 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
385 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
386 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
387 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
388 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
389 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
391 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
395 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
396 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
397 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
398 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
400 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
401 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
402 /// confirmation depth.
403 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>,
404 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
406 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
407 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
408 /// and via the classic SCID.
410 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
411 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
412 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
413 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
414 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
415 /// failed/claimed by the user.
417 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
418 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
420 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
421 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
422 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
423 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
426 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
427 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
428 /// quite some time lag.
429 enum BackgroundEvent {
430 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
431 /// commitment transaction.
432 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
435 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
436 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
438 latest_features: InitFeatures,
441 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
442 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
444 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
447 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
448 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
449 struct PendingInboundPayment {
450 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
451 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
452 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
453 /// this payment being removed.
455 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
456 user_payment_id: u64,
457 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
458 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
459 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
462 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
463 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
464 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
466 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
469 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
470 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
471 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
472 pending_amt_msat: u64,
473 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
474 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
475 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
477 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
478 starting_block_height: u32,
480 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
481 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
482 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
484 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
485 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
487 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
488 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
489 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
490 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
491 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
493 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
495 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
496 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
500 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
501 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
507 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
513 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
519 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
521 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
526 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
535 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
536 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
537 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
544 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
545 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
548 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
549 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
550 let our_payment_hash;
551 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
552 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
553 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
555 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
556 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
557 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
561 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
565 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
566 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
567 let remove_res = match self {
568 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
571 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
572 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
576 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
577 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
578 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
579 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
580 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
581 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
588 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
589 let insert_res = match self {
590 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
591 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
592 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
594 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
595 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
598 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
599 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
600 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
601 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
602 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
609 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
611 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
612 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
613 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
614 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
621 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
622 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
623 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
624 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
625 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
626 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
627 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
629 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
630 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
632 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
633 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
634 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
635 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
636 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
637 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
638 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
639 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
641 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
642 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
644 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
645 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
647 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
648 /// to individual Channels.
650 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
651 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
652 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
653 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
655 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
656 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
657 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
658 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
659 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
660 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
661 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
663 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
664 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
665 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
666 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
669 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
670 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
671 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
672 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
673 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
675 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
676 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
677 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
678 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
679 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
680 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
681 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
682 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
683 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
684 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
687 default_configuration: UserConfig,
688 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
689 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
694 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
696 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
697 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
699 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
700 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
701 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
702 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
704 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
705 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
706 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
707 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
708 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
709 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
711 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
712 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
713 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
714 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
715 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
716 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
717 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
718 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
720 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
722 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
723 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
725 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
726 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
727 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
728 /// active channel list on load.
729 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
731 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
733 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
734 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
735 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
737 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
738 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
739 /// the handling of the events.
742 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
743 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
744 /// would break backwards compatability.
745 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
746 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
747 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
748 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
750 our_network_key: SecretKey,
751 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
753 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
755 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
756 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
757 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
759 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
760 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
762 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
763 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
764 /// keeping additional state.
765 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
767 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
768 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
769 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
770 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
772 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
773 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
774 /// are currently open with that peer.
775 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
776 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
779 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
780 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
782 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
783 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
784 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
785 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
786 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
787 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
788 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
789 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
790 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
792 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
799 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
801 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
802 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
803 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
804 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
805 pub struct ChainParameters {
806 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
807 pub network: Network,
809 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
811 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
812 pub best_block: BestBlock,
815 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
821 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
822 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
823 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
824 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
825 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
826 /// updates are ready for persistence).
828 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
829 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
830 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
831 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
832 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
834 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
835 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
838 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
839 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
840 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
843 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
844 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
846 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
847 persistence_notifier: notifier,
848 should_persist: persist_check,
849 _read_guard: read_guard,
854 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
856 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
857 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
862 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
863 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
865 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
867 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
868 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
869 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
870 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
871 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
873 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
874 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
876 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
878 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
879 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
880 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
881 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
882 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
883 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
884 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
885 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
886 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
887 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
888 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
889 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
890 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
892 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
893 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
895 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
896 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
897 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
898 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
900 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
901 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
902 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
903 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
904 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
905 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
908 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
910 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
911 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
914 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
916 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
917 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
918 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
920 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
921 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
923 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
924 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
925 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
926 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
927 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
928 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
929 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
930 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
931 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
932 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
933 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
936 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
937 /// to better separate parameters.
938 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
939 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
940 /// The node_id of our counterparty
941 pub node_id: PublicKey,
942 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
943 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
944 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
945 pub features: InitFeatures,
946 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
947 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
948 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
950 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
952 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
953 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
954 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
955 /// payments to us through this channel.
956 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
957 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
958 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
959 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
960 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
961 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
962 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
965 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
966 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
967 pub struct ChannelDetails {
968 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
969 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
970 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
971 /// lifetime of the channel.
972 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
973 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
974 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
975 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
976 /// our counterparty already.
978 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
979 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
980 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
981 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
983 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
984 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
985 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
986 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
988 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
989 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
991 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
992 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
994 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
995 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
996 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
997 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
998 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
999 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1000 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1001 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1002 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1005 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1007 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1008 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1009 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1010 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1011 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1012 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1013 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1015 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1016 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1018 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1019 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1020 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1021 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1022 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1023 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1024 /// this value on chain.
1026 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1028 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1030 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1031 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1032 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1033 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1034 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1035 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1036 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1038 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1039 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1040 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1041 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1043 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1044 pub balance_msat: u64,
1045 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1046 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1047 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1048 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1050 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1052 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1053 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1054 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1055 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1056 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1057 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1058 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1059 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1061 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1062 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1063 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1064 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1065 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1066 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1067 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1069 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1070 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1071 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1072 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1073 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1074 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1075 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1076 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1077 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1079 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1081 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1082 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1083 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1084 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1085 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1086 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1087 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1088 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1089 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1091 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1092 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1093 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1094 pub is_outbound: bool,
1095 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1096 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1097 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1098 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1099 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1101 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1102 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1103 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1104 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1106 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1107 pub is_usable: bool,
1108 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1109 pub is_public: bool,
1110 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1111 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1112 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1113 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1114 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1115 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1117 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1118 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1121 impl ChannelDetails {
1122 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1123 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1124 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1126 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1127 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1128 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1129 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1132 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1133 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1134 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1136 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1137 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1138 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1139 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1143 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1144 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1145 /// states for more.
1146 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1147 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1148 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1149 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1150 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1151 ParameterError(APIError),
1152 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1153 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1154 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1155 /// payment in full.
1157 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1159 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1160 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1161 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1162 /// paths than the ones selected).
1163 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1164 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1165 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1166 /// in over-/re-payment.
1168 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1169 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1170 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1172 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1173 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1174 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1175 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1177 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1178 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1179 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1180 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1181 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1182 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1183 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1184 payment_id: PaymentId,
1188 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1190 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1192 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1193 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1194 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1195 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1197 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1198 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1199 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1202 macro_rules! handle_error {
1203 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1206 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1207 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1209 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1210 // entering the macro.
1211 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1212 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1215 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1217 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1218 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1219 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1220 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1224 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1225 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1226 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1227 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1232 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1233 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1235 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1236 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1237 action: err.action.clone()
1241 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1242 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1245 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1252 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1253 ($self: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1254 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1255 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1257 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1258 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1259 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1260 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1261 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1263 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1264 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1266 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1267 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1271 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1272 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1273 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1275 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1276 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1278 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1279 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1281 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1282 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1283 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $channel);
1284 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1285 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1286 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1292 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1293 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1297 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1299 $entry.remove_entry();
1307 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1308 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1312 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1314 $entry.remove_entry();
1322 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1323 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1325 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1326 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel);
1332 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1333 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1335 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1336 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1337 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $chan);
1338 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1339 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1340 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1341 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1342 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1343 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1344 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1345 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1346 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1347 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1348 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1351 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1352 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1353 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1354 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1355 match $action_type {
1356 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1357 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1359 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1360 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1362 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1363 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1364 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1365 if !$resend_commitment {
1366 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1369 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1371 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1372 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1374 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1379 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1380 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1382 $entry.remove_entry();
1386 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1387 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1388 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1390 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1391 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1393 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1394 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1396 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1397 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1399 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1400 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1404 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1405 ($short_to_chan_info: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1406 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1407 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1408 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1410 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1411 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1412 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1413 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1414 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1415 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1416 let scid_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1417 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1418 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1423 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1424 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1425 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1426 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1427 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1429 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1430 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1431 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1433 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1434 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1435 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1436 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1439 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1440 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1441 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1442 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1443 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1444 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1445 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1446 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1447 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1448 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1449 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1450 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1453 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1454 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1455 // before it should be allowed to.
1456 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1457 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1459 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1460 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1461 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1466 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1467 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1468 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1469 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1470 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1471 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1472 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1473 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1474 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1475 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1476 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1477 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1478 match $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1479 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
1481 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1482 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1483 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1484 let mut order = $order;
1486 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1488 break handle_monitor_update_res!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1493 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1494 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1495 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1496 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1501 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1502 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1503 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1504 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1505 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1510 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1514 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1519 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1520 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1521 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1526 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1527 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1528 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1529 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1530 assert!(res.is_ok());
1533 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1537 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1538 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1539 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1541 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1543 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1544 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1549 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1550 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1551 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1552 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1553 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1556 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1558 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1559 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1561 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1563 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1564 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1565 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1566 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1567 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1568 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1569 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1570 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1572 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1573 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1574 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1578 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1580 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1581 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1582 short_to_chan_info: HashMap::new(),
1583 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1584 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1585 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1587 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1588 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1589 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1590 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1592 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1593 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1596 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1597 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1599 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1601 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1603 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1605 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1606 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1607 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1608 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1616 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1617 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1618 &self.default_configuration
1621 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1622 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1623 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1626 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1627 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1629 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1631 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1635 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1640 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1642 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1643 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1644 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1645 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1646 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1649 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1650 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1652 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1653 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1654 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1656 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1657 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1658 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1659 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1660 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1661 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1663 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1664 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1665 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1666 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1667 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1668 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1672 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1673 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1674 Some(peer_state) => {
1675 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1676 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1677 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1678 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1679 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1680 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1681 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1685 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1690 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1693 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1695 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1696 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1697 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1699 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1700 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1701 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1702 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1704 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1706 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1709 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1711 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1712 node_id: their_network_key,
1715 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1718 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1719 let mut res = Vec::new();
1721 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1722 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1723 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1724 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1725 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1726 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1727 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1728 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1729 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1730 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1731 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1732 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1733 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1734 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1735 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1736 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1737 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1738 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1739 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1740 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1741 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1743 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1744 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1745 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1746 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1747 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1748 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1749 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1750 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1751 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1752 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1753 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1754 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1755 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1756 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1757 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1758 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1759 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1760 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1761 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1762 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1763 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1764 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1765 config: Some(channel.config()),
1769 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1770 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1771 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1772 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1778 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1779 /// more information.
1780 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1781 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1784 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1785 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1787 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1788 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1791 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1792 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1793 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1794 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1795 // really wanted anyway.
1796 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1799 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1800 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1801 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1802 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1803 Some(transaction) => {
1804 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1808 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1809 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1810 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1811 reason: closure_reason
1815 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1816 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1818 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1819 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1820 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1821 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1822 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1823 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1824 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1825 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1827 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1828 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1829 Some(peer_state) => {
1830 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1831 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1832 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1834 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1836 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1838 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1839 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1840 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1841 let (result, is_permanent) =
1842 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1844 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1849 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1850 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1854 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1855 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1856 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1857 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1861 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1865 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1869 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1870 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1871 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1874 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1878 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1879 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1880 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1882 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1883 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1885 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1886 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1887 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1888 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1890 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1892 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1893 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1894 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1895 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1896 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1899 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1900 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1901 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1903 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1904 /// the channel being closed or not:
1905 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1906 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1907 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1908 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1909 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1910 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1911 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1913 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1915 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1916 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1917 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1918 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1919 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1923 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1924 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1925 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1926 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1927 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1928 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_id };
1929 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1931 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1932 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1933 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1934 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1935 // ignore the result here.
1936 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1940 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1941 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1942 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1943 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1945 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1946 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1947 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1948 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1949 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1951 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1952 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1954 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1956 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1958 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1961 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1962 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1963 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1964 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1965 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1970 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1973 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1974 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1975 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1976 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1977 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1978 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1979 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1980 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1981 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1991 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1992 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1993 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1995 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1996 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1997 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2000 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2001 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2002 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2004 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2005 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2006 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2007 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2008 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2011 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2012 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2013 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2014 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2015 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2019 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2020 /// local transaction(s).
2021 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2022 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2023 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2027 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2028 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2030 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2031 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2032 return Err(ReceiveError {
2033 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2035 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2038 // final_expiry_too_soon
2039 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2040 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2041 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2042 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2043 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2044 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2045 return Err(ReceiveError {
2047 err_data: Vec::new(),
2048 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2051 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2052 return Err(ReceiveError {
2054 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2055 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2059 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2060 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2061 return Err(ReceiveError {
2062 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2063 err_data: Vec::new(),
2064 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2067 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2068 return Err(ReceiveError {
2069 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2070 err_data: Vec::new(),
2071 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2074 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2075 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2076 return Err(ReceiveError {
2077 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2078 err_data: Vec::new(),
2079 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2081 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2082 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2084 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2085 phantom_shared_secret,
2087 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2088 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2089 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2090 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2091 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2092 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2093 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2094 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2095 return Err(ReceiveError {
2096 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2097 err_data: Vec::new(),
2098 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2102 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2104 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2107 return Err(ReceiveError {
2108 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2109 err_data: Vec::new(),
2110 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2115 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2118 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2119 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2120 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2124 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2125 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2126 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2128 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2129 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2130 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2131 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2132 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2133 failure_code: $err_code,
2139 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2140 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2143 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2145 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2146 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2147 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2148 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2149 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2150 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2151 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2152 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2154 macro_rules! return_err {
2155 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2157 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2158 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2159 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2160 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2161 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2167 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2169 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2170 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2172 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2173 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2177 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2178 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2180 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2182 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2183 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2184 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2185 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2186 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2188 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2191 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2192 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2193 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2195 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2196 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2197 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2200 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2201 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2202 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2203 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2204 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2208 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2209 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2210 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2213 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2214 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2215 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2216 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2221 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2222 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2223 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2224 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2225 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2226 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2227 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2228 let id_option = channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2229 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2230 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2231 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2233 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2236 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2239 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2241 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2242 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2243 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2244 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2245 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2246 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2247 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2249 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2250 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2251 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2252 // we don't have the channel here.
2253 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2255 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2257 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2258 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2259 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2260 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2261 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2262 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2263 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2265 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2266 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2268 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2269 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2273 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2275 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2282 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2283 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2284 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2285 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2286 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2287 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2289 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2290 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2292 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2293 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2294 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2295 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2296 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2297 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2298 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2299 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2300 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2301 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2307 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2308 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2309 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2310 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2312 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2313 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2315 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2316 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2317 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2319 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2320 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2321 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2323 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2328 pending_forward_info
2331 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2332 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2333 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2335 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2336 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2337 if !chan.should_announce() {
2338 return Err(LightningError {
2339 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2340 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2343 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2344 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2346 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2347 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2350 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2351 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2352 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2353 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2354 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2355 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2356 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2357 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2358 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2362 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2364 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2365 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2366 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2368 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2369 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2371 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2372 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2373 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2374 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2375 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2376 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2377 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2378 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2381 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2382 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2384 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2390 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2391 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2392 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2393 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2394 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2395 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2397 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2398 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2399 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2400 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2401 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2403 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2405 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2407 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2408 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2410 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2411 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2412 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2413 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2414 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2415 err: "Payment already completed"
2420 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_chan_info.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2421 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2422 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2425 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2427 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2428 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2429 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2430 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2431 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2432 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2433 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2434 total_msat: total_value,
2436 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2440 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2441 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2443 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2444 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2446 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2447 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2449 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2450 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2452 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2453 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2455 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2456 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2457 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2458 channel_state, chan)
2460 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2461 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2462 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2464 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, channel_state, chan,
2465 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2467 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2468 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {
2469 insert_outbound_payment!();
2471 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2472 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2473 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2474 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2475 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2476 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2477 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2478 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2479 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2481 _ => unreachable!(),
2484 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2485 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2486 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2487 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2488 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2489 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2490 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2491 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2497 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2499 } else { unreachable!(); }
2503 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2504 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2506 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2511 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2513 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2514 /// fields for more info.
2516 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2517 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2518 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2519 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2520 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2521 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2523 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2525 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2526 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2527 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2529 /// In general, a path may raise:
2530 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2531 /// node public key) is specified.
2532 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2533 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2535 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2536 /// relevant updates.
2538 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2539 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2540 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2542 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2543 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2544 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2545 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2547 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2548 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2549 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2550 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2551 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2554 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2555 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2556 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2558 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2559 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2561 let mut total_value = 0;
2562 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2563 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2564 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2565 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2566 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2567 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2568 continue 'path_check;
2570 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2571 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2572 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2573 continue 'path_check;
2576 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2577 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2579 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2580 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2582 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2583 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2584 total_value = amt_msat;
2587 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2588 let mut results = Vec::new();
2589 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2590 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2592 let mut has_ok = false;
2593 let mut has_err = false;
2594 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2595 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2596 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2597 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2598 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2599 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2600 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2604 } else if res.is_err() {
2605 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2606 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2609 if has_err && has_ok {
2610 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2613 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2614 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2615 Some(RouteParameters {
2616 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2617 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2618 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2624 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2625 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2626 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2627 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2633 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2635 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2636 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2637 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2638 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2639 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2641 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2642 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2643 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2644 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2645 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2646 if path.len() == 0 {
2647 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2648 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2653 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2654 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2655 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2657 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2658 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2660 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2661 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2662 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2663 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2666 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2668 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2669 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2670 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2673 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2674 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2675 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2678 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2679 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2680 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2685 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2686 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2690 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2693 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2695 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2696 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2697 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2698 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2700 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2701 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2702 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2704 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2705 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2706 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2707 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2708 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2710 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2711 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2712 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2713 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2714 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2716 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2724 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2725 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2726 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2727 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2728 /// never reach the recipient.
2730 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2732 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2733 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2735 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2737 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2738 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2739 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2741 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2743 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2744 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2745 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2750 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2751 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2752 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2753 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2754 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2756 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2759 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2760 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2764 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2766 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, Some(payment_id), None) {
2767 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2772 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2774 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2775 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2776 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2779 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2780 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2781 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2782 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2783 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2784 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2787 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2788 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2789 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2790 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2791 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2793 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2795 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2797 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2798 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2799 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2800 } else { unreachable!(); })
2803 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2805 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2806 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2809 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2810 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2815 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2817 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2820 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2821 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2822 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2824 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2825 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2826 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2827 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2836 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2837 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2838 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2842 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2844 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2845 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2847 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2848 /// across the p2p network.
2850 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2851 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2853 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2854 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2855 /// keys per-channel).
2857 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2858 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2859 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2861 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2862 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2863 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2865 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2866 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2867 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2868 /// for more details.
2870 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2871 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2872 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2873 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2875 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2876 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2877 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2878 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2883 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2884 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2885 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2886 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2887 // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped.
2888 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2889 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2890 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2894 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2895 let mut output_index = None;
2896 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2897 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2898 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2899 if output_index.is_some() {
2900 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2901 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2904 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2905 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2906 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2909 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2912 if output_index.is_none() {
2913 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2914 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2917 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2921 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2923 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2924 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2925 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2926 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2928 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2929 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2931 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2932 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2934 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2936 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2937 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2938 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2939 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2940 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2941 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2942 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2943 pub fn update_channel_config(
2944 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2945 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2946 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2947 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2948 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2952 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2953 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2956 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2957 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2958 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2959 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
2960 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2961 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
2963 .get_counterparty_node_id();
2964 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
2965 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2966 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
2970 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2971 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2972 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2975 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2976 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2977 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2978 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2979 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2988 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2990 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2991 /// Will likely generate further events.
2992 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2993 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2995 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2996 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2997 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2998 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3000 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3001 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3003 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3004 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3005 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_chan_id) {
3006 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3008 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3009 match forward_info {
3010 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3011 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3012 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3013 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3014 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3015 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3017 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3018 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3019 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3020 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3021 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3022 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3025 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3026 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3028 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3031 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3032 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3038 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3039 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3041 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3045 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3046 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3048 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3052 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3053 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3054 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3055 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3056 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3058 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3059 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3060 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3061 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3062 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3064 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3066 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3067 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3071 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3072 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3073 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3074 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3080 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3083 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3086 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3087 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3088 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3089 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3090 // problem, not ours.
3097 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3098 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3099 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3100 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3101 match forward_info {
3102 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3103 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3105 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3106 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3107 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3108 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3109 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3110 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3111 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3112 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3113 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3114 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3116 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3118 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3119 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3121 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3123 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3124 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3125 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3126 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3132 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3134 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3135 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3136 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3137 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3138 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3139 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3140 // this channel currently :/.
3146 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3147 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3149 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3150 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3151 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3153 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3154 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3156 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3158 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3159 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3160 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3163 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3165 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3166 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3167 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3168 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3169 // messages when we can.
3170 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3171 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3172 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3179 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3180 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3183 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3184 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3185 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3186 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3187 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3188 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3190 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3191 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3192 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3193 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3194 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3197 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3201 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3202 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3204 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3208 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3209 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3210 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3211 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3212 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3213 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3214 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3215 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3216 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3218 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3226 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3227 match forward_info {
3228 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3229 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3230 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3231 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3232 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3233 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3234 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3236 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3237 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3239 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3242 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3243 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3244 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3245 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3246 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3247 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3248 phantom_shared_secret,
3250 value: amt_to_forward,
3252 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3257 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3258 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3259 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3260 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3261 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3263 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3264 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3265 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3266 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3267 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3268 phantom_shared_secret,
3270 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3271 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3276 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3277 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3278 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3280 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3281 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3282 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3285 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3286 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3287 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3288 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3289 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3290 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3294 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3295 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3296 total_value += htlc.value;
3297 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3298 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3299 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3300 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3301 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3302 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3304 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3306 _ => unreachable!(),
3309 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3310 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3311 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3312 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3313 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3314 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3315 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3318 amount_msat: total_value,
3320 payment_received_generated = true;
3322 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3323 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3325 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3327 payment_received_generated
3331 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3332 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3333 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3334 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3335 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3336 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3337 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3338 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3339 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3340 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3341 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3342 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3343 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3344 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3346 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3350 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3352 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3353 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3355 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3356 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3357 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3359 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3363 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3365 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3371 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3372 if payment_data.is_none() {
3373 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3374 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3377 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3378 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3379 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3380 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3381 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3383 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3384 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3386 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3387 if payment_received_generated {
3388 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3394 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3395 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3403 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3404 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3406 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3408 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3409 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3412 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3413 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3414 events.append(&mut new_events);
3417 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3419 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3420 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3422 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3423 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3424 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3425 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3426 if background_events.is_empty() {
3430 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3432 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3433 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3434 // monitor updating completing.
3435 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3442 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3443 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3444 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3445 self.process_background_events();
3448 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_chan_info: &mut HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3449 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3450 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3451 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3453 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3454 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3456 if !chan.is_live() {
3457 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3458 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3459 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3461 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3462 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3464 let mut retain_channel = true;
3465 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3468 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3469 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3473 let ret_err = match res {
3474 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3475 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3476 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3477 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3478 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3479 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3480 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3481 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3482 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3483 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3484 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3491 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3492 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3500 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3504 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3505 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3506 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3507 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3508 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3509 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3510 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3512 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3514 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3516 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3517 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3518 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3519 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3520 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3521 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3522 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3524 handle_errors.push(err);
3534 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3536 /// This currently includes:
3537 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3538 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3539 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3541 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3542 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3544 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3545 /// estimate fetches.
3546 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3547 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3548 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3549 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3551 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3553 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3554 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3556 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3557 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3558 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3559 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3560 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3561 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3562 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3563 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3565 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3567 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3569 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3570 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3571 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3572 if needs_close { return false; }
3575 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3576 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3577 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3578 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3579 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3580 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3581 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3582 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3586 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3587 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3589 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3590 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3591 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3595 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3596 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3601 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3606 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3607 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3608 // This should be unreachable
3609 debug_assert!(false);
3612 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3613 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3614 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3615 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3617 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3618 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3619 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3621 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3629 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3630 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3631 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3634 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3635 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3641 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3642 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3643 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3645 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3646 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3647 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3648 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3650 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3651 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3652 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3653 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3654 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3655 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3657 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3658 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3659 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3660 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3661 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3662 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3663 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3664 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3665 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3666 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3667 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3668 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3673 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3674 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3676 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3678 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3679 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3680 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3681 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3682 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3683 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3684 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3686 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3688 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3689 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3691 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3696 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3697 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3698 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3699 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3700 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3701 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3702 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3703 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3704 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3705 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3707 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3708 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3709 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3710 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3712 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3713 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3714 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3715 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3716 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3720 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3721 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3722 // be surfaced to the user.
3723 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3724 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3725 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3727 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3728 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3729 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3730 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3731 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3732 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3737 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3738 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3742 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3743 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3744 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3745 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3746 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3747 /// still-available channels.
3748 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3749 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3750 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3751 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3754 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3755 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3756 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3758 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3759 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3760 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3761 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3762 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3763 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3764 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3765 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3766 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3769 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3770 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3773 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3774 all_paths_failed = true;
3775 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3776 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3778 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3784 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3787 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3788 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3789 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3790 Some(RouteParameters {
3791 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3792 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3793 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3796 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3798 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3799 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3801 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3803 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3805 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3806 if !payment_retryable {
3807 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3809 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3813 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3814 payment_id: payment_id,
3815 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3821 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3822 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3823 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3824 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3825 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3827 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3828 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3829 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3830 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
3837 error_code: onion_error_code,
3839 error_data: onion_error_data
3843 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3849 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3850 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3851 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3852 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3854 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3855 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3856 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
3857 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3859 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3860 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3861 payment_id: payment_id,
3862 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3864 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3867 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3868 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3869 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3870 payment_failed_permanently: false,
3871 network_update: None,
3874 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3877 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3879 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3884 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3885 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3886 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3888 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
3889 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3890 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3891 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3892 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3893 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3894 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3895 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3897 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3898 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3901 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3902 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3903 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3907 let mut forward_event = None;
3908 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3909 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3911 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3912 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3913 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3916 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3919 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3920 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3921 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3922 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3923 time_forwardable: time
3926 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3927 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3928 failed_next_destination: destination
3934 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3935 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3937 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3938 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3939 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3941 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3942 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3943 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3944 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3946 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3947 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3948 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3949 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3950 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3951 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3952 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3953 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3955 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3957 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3958 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3959 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3960 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3962 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3963 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3964 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3965 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3967 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3968 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3969 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3970 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3971 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3973 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3974 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3975 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3976 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3977 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_chan_info.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3981 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3982 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3983 debug_assert!(false);
3987 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3988 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3989 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3990 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3991 if sources.len() != 1 {
3992 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3993 debug_assert!(false);
3999 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4001 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4002 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4005 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4006 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4007 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4011 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4012 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4013 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4015 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4016 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4017 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4018 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4019 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4020 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4021 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4022 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4024 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4025 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4026 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4027 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4028 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4029 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4030 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4031 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4033 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4034 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4035 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4036 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4037 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4038 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4040 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4045 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4046 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4048 purpose: payment_purpose,
4049 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4053 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4054 // which were generated.
4055 channel_state.take();
4057 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4058 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4059 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4064 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4065 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4066 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4067 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4068 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4070 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4074 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4075 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4076 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4077 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4078 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4079 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4081 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4082 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4083 payment_preimage, e);
4084 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4085 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4086 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4087 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4091 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4092 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4093 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4094 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4095 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4096 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4097 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4098 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4099 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4100 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4106 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4108 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4111 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4112 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4113 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4115 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4116 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4117 payment_preimage, e);
4120 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4121 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4123 chan.remove_entry();
4125 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4128 } else { unreachable!(); }
4131 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4132 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4133 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4134 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4135 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4136 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4137 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4138 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4139 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4140 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4141 pending_events.push(
4142 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4144 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4149 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4157 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4159 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4160 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4161 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4162 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4163 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4164 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4165 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4166 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4167 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4168 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4169 pending_events.push(
4170 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4171 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4177 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4181 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4182 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4183 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4185 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4186 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4187 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4188 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4189 pending_events.push(
4190 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4198 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4203 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4206 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4207 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4208 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4209 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4210 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4211 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4212 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4215 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4216 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4217 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4218 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4219 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4222 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4223 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4224 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4225 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4226 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4227 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4228 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4229 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4230 // again on restart.
4231 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4232 payment_preimage, update_res);
4234 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4235 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4236 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4237 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4240 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4241 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4242 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4243 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4247 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4248 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4249 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4252 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4253 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4254 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4256 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4258 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4268 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4269 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4270 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4273 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4274 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4276 let chan_restoration_res;
4277 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4278 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4279 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4280 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4282 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4284 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4288 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4289 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4290 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4291 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4292 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4293 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4294 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4296 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4297 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4298 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4303 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4304 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4305 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4308 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4310 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4311 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4312 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4313 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4314 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4318 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4320 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4321 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4324 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4325 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4326 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4328 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4329 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4330 /// used to accept such channels.
4332 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4333 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4334 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4335 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4338 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4339 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4341 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4342 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4343 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4345 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4346 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4348 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4349 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4351 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4352 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4354 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4355 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4356 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4357 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4360 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4361 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4363 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4364 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4365 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4366 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4367 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4368 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4370 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4371 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4374 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4375 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4376 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4377 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4378 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4379 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4382 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4383 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4384 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4387 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4388 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4389 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4392 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4393 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4399 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4400 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4401 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4404 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4405 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4408 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4409 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4410 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4411 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4414 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4415 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4419 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4420 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4421 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4422 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4423 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4424 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4427 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4428 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4429 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4431 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4432 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4433 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4436 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4437 pending_events.push(
4438 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4439 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4440 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4441 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4442 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4443 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4448 entry.insert(channel);
4454 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4455 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4456 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4457 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4458 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4459 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4460 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4461 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4463 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4464 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4466 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4469 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4470 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4471 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4472 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4473 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4475 user_channel_id: user_id,
4480 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4481 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4482 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4483 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4484 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4485 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4486 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4487 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4488 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4490 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4492 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4495 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4496 // lock before watch_channel
4497 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4498 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4499 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4500 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4501 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4502 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4503 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4504 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4505 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4506 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4507 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4508 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4509 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4511 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4512 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4513 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4514 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4515 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4516 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4517 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4520 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4521 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4522 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4523 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4524 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4526 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4527 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4528 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4529 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4530 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4531 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4532 funding_msg.channel_id))
4534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4535 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4538 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4539 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4542 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4543 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4551 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4553 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4554 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4555 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4556 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4557 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4558 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4559 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4561 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4562 Ok(update) => update,
4563 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4565 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4566 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4568 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4569 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4570 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4571 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4572 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4573 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4574 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4580 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4581 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4585 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4588 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4589 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4593 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4594 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4595 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4596 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4597 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4598 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4599 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4601 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4602 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4603 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4604 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4605 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4606 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4607 msg: announcement_sigs,
4609 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4610 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4611 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4612 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4613 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4614 // announcement_signatures.
4615 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4616 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4617 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4618 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4625 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4629 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4630 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4631 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4632 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4633 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4635 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4636 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4637 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4638 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4641 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4642 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4643 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4644 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4647 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4648 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4650 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4651 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4652 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4653 let (result, is_permanent) =
4654 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4656 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4661 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4662 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4663 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4670 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4673 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4674 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4675 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4678 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4682 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4683 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4684 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4685 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4686 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4688 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4689 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4691 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4692 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4693 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4694 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4699 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4700 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4701 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4702 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4703 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4704 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4705 } else { (tx, None) }
4707 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4710 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4711 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4712 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4714 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4715 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4716 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4717 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4721 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4726 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4727 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4728 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4729 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4731 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4732 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4733 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4734 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4736 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4737 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4738 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4740 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4741 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4742 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4743 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4746 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4747 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4748 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4749 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4750 match pending_forward_info {
4751 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4752 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4753 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4754 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4756 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4758 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4759 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4760 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4763 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4765 _ => pending_forward_info
4768 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4770 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4775 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4776 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4777 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4778 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4779 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4781 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4782 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4784 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4786 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4789 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4793 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4794 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4795 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4796 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4798 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4799 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4801 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4803 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4808 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4809 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4810 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4811 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4812 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4813 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4814 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4816 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4817 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4818 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4820 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4827 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4828 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4829 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4830 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4832 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4833 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4835 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4836 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4837 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4838 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4839 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4840 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4841 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4846 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4847 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4851 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4852 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4853 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4855 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4856 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4857 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4858 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4859 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4860 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4861 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4862 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4864 commitment_signed: msg,
4870 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4875 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4876 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4877 let mut forward_event = None;
4878 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4879 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4880 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4881 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4883 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4884 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4885 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4886 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4887 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4889 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4890 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4891 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4893 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4894 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4895 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4900 match forward_event {
4902 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4903 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4904 time_forwardable: time
4912 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4913 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4915 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4916 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4917 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4918 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4919 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4920 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4922 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4923 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4924 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4925 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4926 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
4927 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4928 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4929 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4930 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4931 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4932 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4933 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4935 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4936 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, channel_state, chan,
4937 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4938 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4939 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4940 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4942 } else { unreachable!(); }
4944 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4945 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4946 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4950 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4951 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4952 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4953 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4954 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4956 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4959 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4961 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4962 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4964 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4965 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4966 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4968 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4969 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4976 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4977 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4978 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4979 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4980 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4981 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4982 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4984 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4986 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4991 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4992 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4993 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4995 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4997 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4998 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5000 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5001 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5004 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5005 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5006 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
5007 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5008 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5009 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5017 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5018 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5019 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5020 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5021 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5022 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5024 // It's not a local channel
5025 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5028 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5029 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5030 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5031 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5032 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5033 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5034 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5035 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5037 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5039 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5040 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5041 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5042 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5044 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5045 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
5048 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
5050 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5053 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5054 let chan_restoration_res;
5055 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5056 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5057 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5059 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5060 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5061 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5062 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5064 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5065 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5066 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5067 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5068 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5069 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5070 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5071 let mut channel_update = None;
5072 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5073 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5074 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5077 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5078 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5079 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5080 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5081 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5082 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5083 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5088 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5089 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5090 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5091 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5092 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5093 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5095 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5097 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5100 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5101 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5103 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5104 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5109 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5110 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5111 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5112 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5113 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5114 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5115 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5116 match monitor_event {
5117 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5118 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5119 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5120 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5122 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5123 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5124 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5127 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5128 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5129 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5130 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5131 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5132 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5133 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5134 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5135 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5136 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5137 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5141 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5142 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5144 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5146 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5147 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5148 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5149 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5150 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5155 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5156 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5162 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5163 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5166 has_pending_monitor_events
5169 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5170 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5171 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5173 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5174 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5177 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5178 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5179 /// update was applied.
5181 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5182 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5183 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5184 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5185 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5186 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5187 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5188 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5190 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5191 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5192 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5193 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5194 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5196 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5197 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5198 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5199 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5201 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5203 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5206 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5207 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5208 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5209 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5210 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5211 updates: commitment_update,
5215 has_monitor_update = true;
5216 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5217 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5218 if close_channel { return false; }
5225 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5226 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5227 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5234 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5235 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5236 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5239 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5240 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5246 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5247 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5248 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5249 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5250 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5251 let mut has_update = false;
5253 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5254 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5255 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5256 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5257 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5259 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5260 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5261 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5262 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5264 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5265 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5268 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5269 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5270 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5271 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5272 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5277 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5279 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5280 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5281 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
5287 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5288 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5295 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5296 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5302 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5303 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5305 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5306 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5307 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5308 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5309 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5310 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5311 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5312 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5313 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5314 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5315 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5316 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5317 assert!(should_broadcast);
5318 } else { unreachable!(); }
5319 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5321 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5325 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5326 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5328 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5329 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5332 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5334 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5335 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5336 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5337 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5338 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5339 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5340 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5341 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5342 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5343 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5344 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5345 // never fail a payment too early.
5346 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5348 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5351 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5356 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5359 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5360 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5362 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5363 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5364 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5366 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5368 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5369 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5373 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5374 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5376 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5378 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5379 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5380 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5381 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5382 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5383 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5386 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5387 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5389 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5392 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5394 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5396 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5397 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5398 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5399 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5400 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5403 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5404 /// stored external to LDK.
5406 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5407 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5408 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5410 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5411 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5414 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5415 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5416 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5417 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5419 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5420 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5421 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5422 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5423 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5425 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5426 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5427 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5428 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5429 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5431 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5432 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5434 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5435 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5439 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5440 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5442 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5444 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5445 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5446 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5447 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5450 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5451 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5453 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5456 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5458 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5460 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5461 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5464 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5465 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5467 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5468 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5469 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5472 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5473 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5475 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5476 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5477 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5478 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5480 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5481 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5482 match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.entry(scid_candidate) {
5483 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5484 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5489 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5491 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5492 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5494 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5495 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5496 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5500 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5501 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5502 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5503 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5504 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5509 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5510 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5514 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5515 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5519 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5520 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5521 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5522 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5523 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5526 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5527 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5528 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5529 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5531 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5532 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5533 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5534 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5537 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5538 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5540 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5541 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5544 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5545 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5546 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5548 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5549 events.replace(pending_events);
5558 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5560 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5561 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5562 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5563 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5566 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5568 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5569 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5570 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5571 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5572 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5574 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5575 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5576 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5577 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5580 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5581 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5582 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5585 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5586 handler.handle_event(&event);
5594 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5596 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5597 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5598 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5599 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5602 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5604 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5605 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5606 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5607 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5608 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5611 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5612 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5615 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5617 let new_height = height - 1;
5619 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5620 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5621 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5622 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5623 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5624 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5627 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5631 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5633 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5634 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5635 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5636 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5639 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5640 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5641 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5642 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5644 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5645 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5647 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5648 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5649 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5651 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5652 if height < last_best_block_height {
5653 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5654 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5658 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5659 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5660 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5661 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5663 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5664 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5666 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5668 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5670 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5672 macro_rules! max_time {
5673 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5675 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5676 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5677 // having an explicit local time source.
5678 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5679 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5680 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5681 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5682 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5688 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5689 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5690 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5691 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5694 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5695 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5696 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5697 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5698 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5699 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5700 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5701 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5702 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5710 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5711 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5712 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_chan_info.len());
5713 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5714 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5715 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5721 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5723 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5724 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5725 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5726 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5727 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5728 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5733 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5735 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5736 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5737 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5738 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5741 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5742 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5744 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5745 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5746 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5747 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5748 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5750 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5751 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5753 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5754 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5755 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5756 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5757 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5758 let res = f(channel);
5759 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5760 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5761 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5762 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5764 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5766 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5767 send_channel_ready!(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5768 if channel.is_usable() {
5769 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5770 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5771 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5772 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5777 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5780 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5781 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5782 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5783 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5784 msg: announcement_sigs,
5786 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5787 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5788 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5790 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5791 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5792 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5797 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5798 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5799 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5800 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5801 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5802 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5803 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5804 // is always consistent.
5805 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5806 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5807 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5808 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5811 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5812 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, channel);
5813 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5814 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5815 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5816 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5817 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5821 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5822 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5823 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5824 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5825 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5826 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5827 data: reason_message,
5835 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5836 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5837 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5838 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5839 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5840 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5841 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5842 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5843 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5844 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5846 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5847 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5848 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5849 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5853 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5858 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5860 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5861 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
5865 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5866 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5867 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5870 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5871 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5872 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5873 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5876 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5877 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5879 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5880 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5883 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5884 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5885 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5886 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5887 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5890 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5891 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5892 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5895 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5896 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5897 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5898 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5902 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5903 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5904 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5905 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5906 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5907 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5910 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5911 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5912 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5915 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5917 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5920 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5921 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5922 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5925 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5926 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5927 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5930 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5932 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5935 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5936 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5937 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5940 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5942 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5945 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5946 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5947 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5950 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5951 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5952 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5955 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5957 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5960 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5961 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5962 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5965 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5966 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5967 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5970 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5972 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5975 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5976 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5977 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5980 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5982 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5985 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5986 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5987 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5990 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5995 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5997 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6000 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6001 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6002 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6003 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6005 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6006 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6007 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6008 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
6009 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6010 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6011 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6012 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6013 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6014 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6015 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
6016 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6019 no_channels_remain = false;
6024 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6026 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6027 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6028 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6029 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6030 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6031 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6032 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6033 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6034 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6035 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6036 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6037 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6038 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6039 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6040 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6041 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6042 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6043 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6044 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6045 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6049 if no_channels_remain {
6050 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6053 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6054 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6058 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6059 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6060 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6064 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6069 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6070 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6071 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6072 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6073 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6076 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6077 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6082 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6083 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6084 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6085 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6086 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6087 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6088 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6089 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6090 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6094 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6095 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6096 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6101 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6102 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6103 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6104 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6105 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6113 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6117 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6118 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6120 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6121 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6122 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6123 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6124 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6129 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6130 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6131 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6132 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6135 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6136 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6137 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6145 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6146 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6150 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6151 provided_node_features()
6154 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6155 provided_init_features()
6159 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6160 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6161 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6162 provided_init_features().to_context()
6165 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6166 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6168 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6169 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6170 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6171 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6172 provided_init_features().to_context()
6175 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6176 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6177 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6178 provided_init_features().to_context()
6181 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6182 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6183 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6184 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6185 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6186 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6187 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6188 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6189 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6190 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6191 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6192 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6193 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6194 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6195 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6196 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6197 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6198 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6202 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6203 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6205 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6206 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6207 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6208 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6211 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6212 (2, node_id, required),
6213 (4, features, required),
6214 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6215 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6216 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6217 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6220 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6221 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6222 (2, channel_id, required),
6223 (3, channel_type, option),
6224 (4, counterparty, required),
6225 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6226 (6, funding_txo, option),
6227 (7, config, option),
6228 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6229 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6230 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6231 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6232 (16, balance_msat, required),
6233 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6234 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6235 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6236 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6237 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6238 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6239 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6240 (26, is_outbound, required),
6241 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6242 (30, is_usable, required),
6243 (32, is_public, required),
6244 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6245 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6248 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6249 (2, channels, vec_type),
6250 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6251 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6254 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6256 (0, onion_packet, required),
6257 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6260 (0, payment_data, required),
6261 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6262 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6264 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6265 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6266 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6270 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6271 (0, routing, required),
6272 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6273 (4, payment_hash, required),
6274 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6275 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6279 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6280 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6282 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6284 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6285 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6286 reason.write(writer)?;
6288 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6289 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6292 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6293 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6294 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6295 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6302 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6303 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6304 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6307 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6308 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6309 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6310 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6314 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6315 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6316 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6317 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6318 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6321 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6322 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6323 // messages contained in the variants.
6324 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6325 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6326 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6328 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6329 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6330 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6331 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6332 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6335 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6336 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6337 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6338 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6339 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6341 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6346 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6351 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6352 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6353 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6354 (2, outpoint, required),
6355 (4, htlc_id, required),
6356 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6359 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6360 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6361 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6362 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6363 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6365 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6366 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6367 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6368 (2, self.value, required),
6369 (4, payment_data, option),
6370 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6371 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6377 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6378 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6379 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6381 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6382 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6383 let mut total_msat = None;
6384 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6385 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6386 (0, prev_hop, required),
6387 (1, total_msat, option),
6388 (2, value, required),
6389 (4, payment_data, option),
6390 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6391 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6393 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6395 if payment_data.is_some() {
6396 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6398 if total_msat.is_none() {
6399 total_msat = Some(value);
6401 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6404 if total_msat.is_none() {
6405 if payment_data.is_none() {
6406 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6408 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6410 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6414 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6417 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6424 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6425 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6426 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6429 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6430 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6431 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6432 let mut payment_id = None;
6433 let mut payment_secret = None;
6434 let mut payment_params = None;
6435 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6436 (0, session_priv, required),
6437 (1, payment_id, option),
6438 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6439 (3, payment_secret, option),
6440 (4, path, vec_type),
6441 (5, payment_params, option),
6443 if payment_id.is_none() {
6444 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6446 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6448 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6449 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6450 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6451 path: path.unwrap(),
6452 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6457 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6458 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6463 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6464 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6466 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6468 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6469 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6470 (0, session_priv, required),
6471 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6472 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6473 (3, payment_secret, option),
6474 (4, path, vec_type),
6475 (5, payment_params, option),
6478 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6480 field.write(writer)?;
6487 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6488 (0, LightningError) => {
6492 (0, failure_code, required),
6493 (2, data, vec_type),
6497 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6499 (0, forward_info, required),
6500 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6501 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6502 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6505 (0, htlc_id, required),
6506 (2, err_packet, required),
6510 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6511 (0, payment_secret, required),
6512 (2, expiry_time, required),
6513 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6514 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6515 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6518 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6520 (0, session_privs, required),
6523 (0, session_privs, required),
6524 (1, payment_hash, option),
6527 (0, session_privs, required),
6528 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6529 (2, payment_hash, required),
6530 (4, payment_secret, option),
6531 (6, total_msat, required),
6532 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6533 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6536 (0, session_privs, required),
6537 (2, payment_hash, required),
6541 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6542 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6543 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6544 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6545 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6548 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6549 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6551 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6553 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6555 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6556 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6557 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6560 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6561 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6562 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6563 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6564 unfunded_channels += 1;
6567 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6568 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6569 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6570 channel.write(writer)?;
6574 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6575 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6576 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6577 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6578 for forward in pending_forwards {
6579 forward.write(writer)?;
6583 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6584 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6585 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6586 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6587 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6588 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6589 htlc.write(writer)?;
6591 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6594 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6595 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6596 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6597 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6598 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6599 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6602 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6603 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6604 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6605 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6606 for event in events.iter() {
6607 event.write(writer)?;
6610 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6611 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6612 for event in background_events.iter() {
6614 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6616 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6617 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6622 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6623 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6624 // likely to be identical.
6625 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6626 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6628 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6629 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6630 hash.write(writer)?;
6631 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6634 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6635 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6636 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6637 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6638 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6641 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6642 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6644 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6645 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6646 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6647 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6650 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6651 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6655 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6656 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6657 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6659 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6660 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6661 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6666 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6667 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6668 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6669 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6670 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6671 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6672 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6679 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6681 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6683 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6684 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6685 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6686 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6687 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6688 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6689 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6690 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6691 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6692 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6693 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6694 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6695 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6697 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6698 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6700 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6701 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6703 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6704 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6705 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6706 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6707 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6708 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6710 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6711 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6712 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6713 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6714 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6715 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6718 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6719 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6721 pub keys_manager: K,
6723 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6725 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6726 pub fee_estimator: F,
6727 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6729 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6730 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6731 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6732 pub chain_monitor: M,
6734 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6735 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6736 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6737 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6738 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6739 /// deserialization.
6741 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6742 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6743 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6745 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6746 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6748 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6749 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6750 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6751 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6753 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6756 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6757 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6760 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6761 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6762 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6763 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6764 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6765 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6768 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6769 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6770 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6771 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6772 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6774 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6775 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6780 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6781 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6782 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6783 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6784 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6785 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6786 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6787 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6790 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6791 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6792 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6796 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6797 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6798 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6799 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6800 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6801 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6804 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6805 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6807 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6808 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6809 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6811 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6813 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6814 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6815 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6816 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6817 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6818 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6819 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6820 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6821 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6822 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6823 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6824 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6825 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6826 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6827 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6828 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6829 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6830 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6831 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6832 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6833 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6834 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6835 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6836 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6837 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6838 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6839 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6840 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6841 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6842 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6843 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6844 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6845 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6846 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6847 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6848 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6849 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6850 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6851 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6852 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6855 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6856 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6857 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6859 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6860 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
6862 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6865 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6866 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6867 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6868 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6869 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6870 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6874 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6875 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6876 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6877 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6881 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6882 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6883 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6884 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6885 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6886 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6887 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6888 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6889 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6891 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6894 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6895 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6896 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6897 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6898 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6899 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6900 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6901 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6903 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6906 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6907 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6908 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6909 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6910 let peer_state = PeerState {
6911 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6913 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6916 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6917 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6918 for _ in 0..event_count {
6919 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6920 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6924 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6925 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6926 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6927 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6928 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6929 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6930 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6931 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6935 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6936 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6937 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6938 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6939 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6940 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6944 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
6945 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6947 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6948 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6949 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6950 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6951 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6955 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6956 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6957 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6958 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6959 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6960 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6961 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6963 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6964 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6968 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6969 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6970 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6971 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6972 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6973 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6974 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
6975 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6976 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6977 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6978 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6979 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6980 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6981 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
6983 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6984 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6987 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
6988 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6991 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6992 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6993 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6994 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6995 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6996 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6998 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7000 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7001 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7002 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7003 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7004 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7005 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7006 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7008 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7009 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7010 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7011 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7012 if path.is_empty() {
7013 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7014 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7016 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7017 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7018 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7019 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7020 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7021 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7022 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7023 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7025 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7026 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7027 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7028 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7029 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7031 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7032 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7033 total_msat: path_amt,
7034 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7036 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7037 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7046 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7047 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7049 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7050 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7051 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7052 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7054 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7055 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7058 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7059 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7060 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7061 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7062 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7064 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7065 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7066 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7067 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7068 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7069 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7070 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7071 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7073 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7074 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7078 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7080 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7082 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7083 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7085 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7089 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7090 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7092 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7093 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7096 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7098 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7100 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7101 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7102 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7103 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7104 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7108 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7109 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7110 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7111 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7113 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7114 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7115 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7117 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7118 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7119 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7120 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7121 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7122 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7124 if chan.is_usable() {
7125 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7126 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7127 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7128 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7129 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7134 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7136 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7137 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7138 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7139 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7140 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7141 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7142 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7144 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7145 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7146 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7147 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7149 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7150 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7151 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7152 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7154 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7155 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7156 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7157 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7159 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7160 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7161 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7163 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7164 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7167 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7169 purpose: payment_purpose,
7170 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7176 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7178 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7179 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7180 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7182 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7184 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7189 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7191 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7192 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7193 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7195 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7196 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7197 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7199 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7205 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7207 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7209 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7210 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7211 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7212 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7214 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7215 logger: args.logger,
7216 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7219 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7220 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7221 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7222 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7225 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7226 //connection or two.
7228 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7234 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7235 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7236 use core::time::Duration;
7237 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7238 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7239 use ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7240 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7242 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7243 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7244 use util::errors::APIError;
7245 use util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7246 use util::test_utils;
7247 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7250 fn test_notify_limits() {
7251 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7252 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7253 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7254 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7255 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7256 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7258 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7259 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7260 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7261 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7262 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7264 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7266 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7267 // to connect messages with new values
7268 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7269 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7270 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7271 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7273 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7274 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7275 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7276 // ... but the last node should not.
7277 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7278 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7279 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7280 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7282 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7283 // about the channel.
7284 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7285 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7286 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7288 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7290 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7291 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7292 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7293 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7294 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7295 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7297 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7298 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7299 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7301 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7302 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7303 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7304 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7305 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7306 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7308 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7309 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7310 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7311 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7312 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7313 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7314 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7315 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7317 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7318 // the channel info has updated.
7319 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7320 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7321 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7322 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7323 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7324 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7328 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7329 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7331 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7332 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7333 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7334 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7335 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7337 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7338 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7339 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7340 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7341 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7342 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7343 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7345 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7346 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7347 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7349 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7350 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7352 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7353 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7354 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7355 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7356 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7358 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7359 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7360 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7362 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7363 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7364 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7365 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7366 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7367 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7368 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7369 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7370 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7372 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7373 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7375 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7376 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7377 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7379 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7380 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7381 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7382 // lightning messages manually.
7383 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7384 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7387 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7388 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7389 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7391 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7392 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7394 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7395 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7397 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7398 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7399 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7401 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7402 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7403 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7405 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7407 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7409 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7410 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7413 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7414 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7415 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7416 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7418 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7419 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7420 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7421 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7423 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7426 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7427 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7428 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7429 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7431 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7434 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7435 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7436 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7437 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7444 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7445 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7446 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7447 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7448 // fails as expected.
7449 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7450 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7451 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7452 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7453 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7454 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7455 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7457 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7458 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7459 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7461 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7462 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7463 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7464 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7465 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7467 let route = find_route(
7468 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7469 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7471 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7473 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7474 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7475 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7476 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7477 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7479 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7480 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7481 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7482 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7483 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7485 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7486 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7487 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7488 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7489 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7490 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7491 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7492 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7493 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7495 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7496 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7498 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7499 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7500 let route = find_route(
7501 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7502 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7504 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7506 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7507 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7508 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7509 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7510 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7512 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7513 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7514 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7516 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7517 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7518 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7519 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7520 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7522 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7523 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7524 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7526 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7527 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7528 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7529 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7530 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7531 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7532 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7533 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7534 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7536 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7537 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7541 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7542 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7543 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7544 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7546 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7547 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7549 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7550 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7551 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7552 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7554 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7555 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7556 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7557 final_value_msat: 10000,
7558 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7560 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7561 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7562 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7563 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7564 let route = find_route(
7565 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7566 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7569 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7570 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7571 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7574 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7575 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7576 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7577 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7578 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7579 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7580 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7582 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7586 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7587 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7588 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7591 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7593 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7594 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7595 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7596 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7598 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7599 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7600 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7601 final_value_msat: 10000,
7602 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7604 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7605 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7606 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7607 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7608 let route = find_route(
7609 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7610 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7613 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7614 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7615 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7616 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7619 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7620 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7621 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7622 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7623 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7624 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7625 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7627 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7631 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7632 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7633 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7634 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7635 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7637 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7638 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7639 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7640 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7642 // Marshall an MPP route.
7643 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7644 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7645 route.paths.push(path);
7646 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7647 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7648 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7649 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7650 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7651 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7653 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7654 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7655 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7656 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7661 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7662 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7663 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7664 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7665 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7666 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7668 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7669 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7671 total_msat: 100_000,
7674 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7675 // payment verification fails as expected.
7676 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7677 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7678 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7679 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7681 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7685 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7686 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7690 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7691 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7692 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7693 // the channel is successfully closed.
7694 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7695 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7696 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7697 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7699 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7700 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7701 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
7702 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7703 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7705 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7706 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7708 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7709 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7710 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7711 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7714 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7716 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7717 // as it has the funding transaction.
7718 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7719 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7720 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7722 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7725 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7727 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7729 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7730 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7731 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7733 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7734 // as it has the funding transaction.
7735 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7736 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7737 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7740 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7741 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7743 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7744 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7745 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7747 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7748 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7749 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7750 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
7752 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7753 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
7755 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
7756 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
7757 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
7758 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
7759 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7760 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7761 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7763 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
7764 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
7765 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
7766 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
7767 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7768 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7769 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7772 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
7774 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
7775 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
7776 // closing transaction).
7777 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
7778 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
7779 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7781 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
7782 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
7783 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7784 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7785 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7788 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7790 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
7792 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
7793 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
7794 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7796 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7798 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7799 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7803 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7806 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7807 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7808 use ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7809 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7810 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7811 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7812 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7813 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7814 use util::test_utils;
7815 use util::config::UserConfig;
7816 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7818 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7819 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7820 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
7822 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7826 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7827 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7828 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7829 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7830 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7831 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7832 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7837 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7838 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7841 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7842 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7843 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7845 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7846 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7848 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7849 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7851 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7852 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7854 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7855 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7856 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7857 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7858 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7860 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7862 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7864 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7865 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7866 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7867 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7868 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7870 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7872 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7874 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7875 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7876 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7877 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7878 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7881 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7882 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7883 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7885 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7886 } else { panic!(); }
7888 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7889 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7891 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7894 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7897 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7898 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7900 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7901 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7902 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7903 match msg_events[0] {
7904 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7905 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7906 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7910 match msg_events[1] {
7911 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7915 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7917 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7918 macro_rules! send_payment {
7919 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7920 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7921 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7922 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7923 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7924 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7925 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7926 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7927 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7928 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7930 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7931 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7933 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7934 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7936 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7937 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7938 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7939 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7940 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7941 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7942 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7943 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7945 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7946 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7947 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7948 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7950 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7951 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7952 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7953 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7954 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7956 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7959 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7960 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7961 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7962 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7964 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7969 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7970 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);