1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
176 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
177 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
178 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
181 session_priv: SecretKey,
182 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
183 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
184 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
189 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
190 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
192 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
193 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
198 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
199 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
201 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
209 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
210 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
212 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
217 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
219 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
220 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
221 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
222 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
223 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
225 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
226 err: msgs::LightningError,
227 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
229 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
231 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
233 err: LightningError {
235 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
236 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
242 shutdown_finish: None,
246 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
248 err: LightningError {
250 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
252 shutdown_finish: None,
256 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
257 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
260 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
262 err: LightningError {
264 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
265 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
271 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
275 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
278 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
282 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
284 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
286 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
288 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
289 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
295 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
297 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
298 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
305 shutdown_finish: None,
310 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
311 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
312 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
313 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
314 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
316 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
317 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
318 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
319 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
320 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
321 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
322 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
324 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
328 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
329 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
330 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
331 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
332 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
333 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
334 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
335 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
336 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
337 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
338 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
339 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
341 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
342 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
343 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
344 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
347 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
348 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
349 /// quite some time lag.
350 enum BackgroundEvent {
351 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
352 /// commitment transaction.
353 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
356 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
357 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
359 latest_features: InitFeatures,
362 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
363 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
365 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
367 struct PendingInboundPayment {
368 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
369 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
370 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
371 /// this payment being removed.
373 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
374 user_payment_id: u64,
375 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
376 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
377 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
380 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
381 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
382 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
383 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
384 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
385 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
386 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
387 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
389 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
390 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
391 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
392 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
393 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
394 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
395 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
396 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
397 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
399 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
400 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
402 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
403 /// to individual Channels.
405 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
406 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
407 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
408 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
410 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
411 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
412 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
413 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
414 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
415 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
416 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
418 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
419 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
420 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
421 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
424 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
425 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
426 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
427 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
428 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
430 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
431 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
432 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
433 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
434 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
435 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
436 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
437 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
438 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
439 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
442 default_configuration: UserConfig,
443 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
449 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
451 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
452 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
454 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
455 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
456 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
457 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
459 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
460 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
461 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
462 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
463 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
464 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
466 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
467 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
468 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
469 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
470 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
471 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
472 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
473 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
475 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
476 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
478 our_network_key: SecretKey,
479 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
481 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
482 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
483 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
485 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
486 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
487 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
488 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
490 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
491 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
492 /// are currently open with that peer.
493 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
494 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
497 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
498 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
500 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
501 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
502 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
503 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
504 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
505 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
506 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
507 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
508 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
510 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
517 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
519 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
520 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
521 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
522 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
523 pub struct ChainParameters {
524 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
525 pub network: Network,
527 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
529 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
530 pub best_block: BestBlock,
533 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
539 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
540 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
541 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
542 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
543 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
544 /// updates are ready for persistence).
546 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
547 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
548 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
549 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
550 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
552 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
553 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
556 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
557 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
558 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
561 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
562 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
564 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
565 persistence_notifier: notifier,
566 should_persist: persist_check,
567 _read_guard: read_guard,
572 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
574 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
575 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
580 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
581 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
583 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
585 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
586 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
587 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
588 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
589 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
591 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
592 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
594 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
596 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
597 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
598 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
599 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
600 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
601 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
602 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
604 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
605 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
607 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
608 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
609 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
610 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
612 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
613 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
614 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
615 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
616 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
617 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
620 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
622 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
623 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
626 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
628 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
629 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
630 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
631 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
632 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
633 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
634 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
635 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
636 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
637 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
638 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
641 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
642 /// to better separate parameters.
643 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
644 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
645 /// The node_id of our counterparty
646 pub node_id: PublicKey,
647 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
648 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
649 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
650 pub features: InitFeatures,
651 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
652 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
653 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
655 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
657 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
658 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
659 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
660 /// payments to us through this channel.
661 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
664 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
665 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
666 pub struct ChannelDetails {
667 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
668 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
669 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
670 /// lifetime of the channel.
671 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
672 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
673 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
674 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
675 /// our counterparty already.
677 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
678 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
679 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
680 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
681 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
682 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
683 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
684 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
685 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
686 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
687 /// this value on chain.
689 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
691 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
693 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
694 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
695 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
697 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
698 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
699 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
700 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
702 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
703 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
704 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
705 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
706 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
707 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
708 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
709 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
710 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
712 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
713 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
714 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
715 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
716 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
717 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
718 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
719 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
720 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
722 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
724 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
725 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
726 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
727 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
728 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
729 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
730 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
731 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
732 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
734 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
735 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
736 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
737 pub is_outbound: bool,
738 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
739 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
740 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
741 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
742 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
744 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
745 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
746 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
747 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
749 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
751 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
755 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
756 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
758 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
759 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
760 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
761 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
762 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
763 ParameterError(APIError),
764 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
765 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
766 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
769 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
771 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
772 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
773 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
774 /// paths than the ones selected).
775 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
776 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
777 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
778 /// in over-/re-payment.
780 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
781 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
782 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
784 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
785 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
786 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
787 /// with the latest update_id.
788 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
791 macro_rules! handle_error {
792 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
795 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
796 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
798 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
799 // entering the macro.
800 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
803 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
805 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
806 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
807 if let Some(update) = update_option {
808 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
814 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
815 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
817 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
818 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
819 action: err.action.clone()
823 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
824 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
827 // Return error in case higher-API need one
834 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
835 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
836 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
838 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
839 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
841 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
843 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
844 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
846 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
847 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
848 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
849 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
851 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
852 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
854 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
855 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
856 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
857 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
859 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
860 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
866 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
867 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
871 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
873 $entry.remove_entry();
881 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
882 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
886 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
888 $entry.remove_entry();
896 macro_rules! remove_channel {
897 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
899 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
900 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
901 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
908 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
909 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
910 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
912 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
914 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
915 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
916 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
917 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
919 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
920 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
921 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
922 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
923 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
924 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
925 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
926 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
927 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
928 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
929 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
932 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
933 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
934 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
935 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
937 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
938 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
940 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
941 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
943 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
944 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
945 if !$resend_commitment {
946 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
949 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
951 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
952 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
956 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
957 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
959 $entry.remove_entry();
965 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
966 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
967 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
969 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
970 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
974 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
975 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
976 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
977 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
978 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
981 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
986 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
987 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
988 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
989 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
990 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
991 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
993 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
994 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
996 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
997 if !forwards.is_empty() {
998 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
999 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1002 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1003 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1004 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1005 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1006 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1007 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1008 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1009 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1010 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1011 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1012 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1013 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1016 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1017 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1018 // before it should be allowed to.
1019 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1020 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1021 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1024 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1025 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1026 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1027 msg: announcement_sigs,
1030 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1033 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1034 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1035 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1036 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1037 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1038 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1039 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1040 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1041 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1042 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1043 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1044 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1045 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1046 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1047 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1048 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1049 let mut order = $order;
1051 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1053 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1057 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1058 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1059 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1060 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1065 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1066 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1067 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1068 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1069 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1074 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1078 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1083 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1084 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1085 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1090 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1091 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1092 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1093 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1094 assert!(res.is_ok());
1097 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1101 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1102 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1103 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1105 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1107 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1108 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1113 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1114 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1115 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1116 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1117 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1120 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1122 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1123 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1125 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1127 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1129 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1130 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1131 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1132 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1133 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1134 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1137 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1138 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1139 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1143 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1145 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1146 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1147 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1148 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1149 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1150 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1152 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1153 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1155 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1156 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1159 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1160 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1162 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1164 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1165 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1166 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1167 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1175 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1176 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1177 &self.default_configuration
1180 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1182 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1183 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1184 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1185 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1186 /// otherwise ignored.
1188 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1189 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1191 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1192 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1194 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1195 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1196 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1197 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1198 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1199 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1203 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1204 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1205 Some(peer_state) => {
1206 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1207 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1208 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1209 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
1211 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1214 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1216 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1217 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1218 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1220 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1221 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1222 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1223 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1224 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1226 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1229 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1231 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1232 node_id: their_network_key,
1238 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1239 let mut res = Vec::new();
1241 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1242 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1243 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1244 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1245 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1246 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1247 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1248 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1249 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1250 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1251 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1252 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1253 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1255 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1256 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1257 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1258 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1259 inbound_capacity_msat,
1260 outbound_capacity_msat,
1261 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1262 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1263 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1264 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1265 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1266 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1267 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1271 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1272 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1273 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1274 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1280 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1281 /// more information.
1282 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1283 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1286 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1287 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1289 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1290 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1292 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1293 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1294 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1295 // really wanted anyway.
1296 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1299 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1300 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1302 let counterparty_node_id;
1303 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1304 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1305 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1306 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1307 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1309 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1310 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1311 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1312 Some(peer_state) => {
1313 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1314 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1315 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1317 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1319 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1321 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1322 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1323 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1324 let (result, is_permanent) =
1325 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1327 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1333 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1334 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1338 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1339 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1340 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1341 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1348 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1352 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1353 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1356 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1360 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1361 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1362 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1364 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1365 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1367 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1368 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1369 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1370 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1372 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1374 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1375 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1376 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1377 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1378 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1381 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1382 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1383 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1385 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1386 /// the channel being closed or not:
1387 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1388 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1389 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1390 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1391 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1392 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1393 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1395 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1397 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1398 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1399 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1400 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1401 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1405 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1406 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1407 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1408 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1409 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1411 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1412 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1413 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1414 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1415 // ignore the result here.
1416 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1420 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1422 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1423 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1424 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1425 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1426 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1427 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1430 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1431 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1433 chan.remove_entry().1
1435 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1438 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1439 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1440 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1441 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1442 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1447 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1450 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1451 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1452 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1453 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1454 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1455 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1456 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1457 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1458 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1459 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1460 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1470 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1471 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1472 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1473 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1474 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1478 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1479 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1480 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1482 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1483 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1484 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1485 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1486 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1487 failure_code: $err_code,
1488 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1493 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1494 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1497 let shared_secret = {
1498 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1499 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1502 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1504 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1505 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1506 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1507 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1508 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1509 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1510 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1511 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1514 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1515 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1516 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1517 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1518 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1521 let mut channel_state = None;
1522 macro_rules! return_err {
1523 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1525 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1526 if channel_state.is_none() {
1527 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1529 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1530 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1531 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1532 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1533 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1538 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1539 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1540 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1541 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1543 let error_code = match err {
1544 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1545 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1546 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1547 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1548 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1550 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1553 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1554 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1555 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1562 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1565 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1566 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1567 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1568 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1569 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1570 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1571 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1572 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1573 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1574 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1575 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1576 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1580 // final_expiry_too_soon
1581 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1582 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1583 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1584 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1585 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1586 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1587 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1589 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1590 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1591 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1593 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1594 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1595 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1598 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1599 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1600 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1601 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1602 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1603 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1604 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1605 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1607 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1609 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1610 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1611 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1612 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1613 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1614 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1615 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1616 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1617 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1620 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1622 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1625 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1630 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1631 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1632 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1633 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1635 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1637 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1638 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1639 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1640 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1643 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1644 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1645 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1647 // Check two things:
1648 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1649 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1650 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1652 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1654 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1655 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1656 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1658 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1660 let blinding_factor = {
1661 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1662 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1663 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1664 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1667 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1669 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1671 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1674 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1675 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1678 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1679 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1680 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1681 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1682 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1686 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1687 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1688 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1691 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1692 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1693 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1694 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1698 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1699 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1700 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1701 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1702 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1703 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1704 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1705 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1706 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1707 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1708 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1710 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1713 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1715 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1716 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1717 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1718 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1719 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1722 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1723 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1724 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1725 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1726 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1727 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1728 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1730 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1731 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1733 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1734 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1735 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1736 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1737 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1739 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1740 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1742 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1743 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1744 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1745 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1746 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1748 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1749 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1751 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1752 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1753 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1754 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1760 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1761 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1762 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1763 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1765 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1766 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1768 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1769 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1770 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1772 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1774 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1779 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1782 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1783 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1784 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1786 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1787 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1788 if !chan.should_announce() {
1789 return Err(LightningError {
1790 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1791 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1794 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1795 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1798 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1799 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1800 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1801 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1802 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1803 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1804 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1805 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1806 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1810 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1812 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1813 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1815 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1816 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1817 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1818 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1819 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1820 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1821 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1822 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1825 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1826 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1828 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1834 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1835 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1836 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1837 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1838 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1839 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1841 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1842 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1843 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1844 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1845 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1847 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1850 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1852 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1853 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1854 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1855 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1856 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1859 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1860 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1862 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1863 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1865 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1866 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1868 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1870 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1871 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1872 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1874 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1875 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1876 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1877 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1878 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1879 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1880 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1881 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1882 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1885 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1886 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1887 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1888 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1889 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1890 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1891 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1892 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1900 } else { unreachable!(); }
1904 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1905 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1907 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1912 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1914 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1915 /// fields for more info.
1917 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1918 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1919 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1920 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1921 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1922 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1924 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1926 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1927 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1928 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1930 /// In general, a path may raise:
1931 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1932 /// node public key) is specified.
1933 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1934 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1936 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1937 /// relevant updates.
1939 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1940 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1941 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1943 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1944 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1945 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1946 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1948 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1949 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1950 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1951 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1952 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1955 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1956 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1957 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1959 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1960 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1961 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1962 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1963 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1965 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
1966 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
1968 let mut total_value = 0;
1969 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1970 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1971 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1972 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1973 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1974 continue 'path_check;
1976 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1977 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1978 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1979 continue 'path_check;
1982 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1983 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1985 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1986 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1989 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1990 let mut results = Vec::new();
1991 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1992 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, &keysend_preimage));
1994 let mut has_ok = false;
1995 let mut has_err = false;
1996 for res in results.iter() {
1997 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1998 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1999 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2000 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2007 if has_err && has_ok {
2008 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2010 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2016 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2017 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2018 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2019 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2020 /// never reach the recipient.
2022 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2024 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2025 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2027 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2029 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2030 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2031 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2033 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2035 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2036 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
2037 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2042 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2043 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2044 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2045 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2047 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2049 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2051 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2052 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2053 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2054 } else { unreachable!(); })
2057 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2059 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2060 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2063 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2064 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2069 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2070 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2071 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2074 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2075 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2076 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2078 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2086 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2087 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2088 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2092 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2094 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2095 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2097 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2099 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2100 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2101 /// keys per-channel).
2103 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2104 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2105 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2107 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2108 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2109 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2111 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2112 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2113 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2115 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2116 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2117 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2118 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2122 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2123 let mut output_index = None;
2124 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2125 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2126 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2127 if output_index.is_some() {
2128 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2129 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2132 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2133 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2134 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2137 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2140 if output_index.is_none() {
2141 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2142 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2145 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2149 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2150 if !chan.should_announce() {
2151 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2155 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2157 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2159 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2160 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2162 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2163 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2164 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2165 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2166 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2171 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2172 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2173 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2175 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2178 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2179 // smaller than 500:
2180 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2182 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2183 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2184 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2185 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2186 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2187 /// our network addresses.
2189 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2190 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2192 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2193 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2194 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2195 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2197 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2199 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2200 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2201 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2203 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2204 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2207 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2208 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2209 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2211 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2212 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2213 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2214 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2215 rgb, alias, addresses,
2216 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2217 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2219 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2220 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2222 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2223 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2225 let mut announced_chans = false;
2226 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2227 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2228 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2230 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2235 announced_chans = true;
2237 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2238 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2239 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2243 if announced_chans {
2244 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2245 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2246 signature: node_announce_sig,
2247 contents: announcement
2253 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2255 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2256 /// Will likely generate further events.
2257 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2258 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2260 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2261 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2262 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2264 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2265 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2267 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2268 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2269 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2270 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2272 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2273 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2274 match forward_info {
2275 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2276 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2277 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2278 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2279 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2280 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2281 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2283 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2284 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2287 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2288 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2289 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2290 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2291 // problem, not ours.
2298 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2299 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2300 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2301 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2302 match forward_info {
2303 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2304 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2306 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2307 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2308 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2309 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2310 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2311 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2312 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2313 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2315 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2317 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2318 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2320 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2322 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2323 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2324 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2330 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2332 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2333 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2334 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2335 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2336 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2337 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2338 // this channel currently :/.
2344 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2345 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2347 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2349 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2351 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2352 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2354 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2356 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2357 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2358 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2361 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2363 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2364 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2365 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2366 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2367 // messages when we can.
2368 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2369 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2370 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2377 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2378 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2381 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2382 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2383 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2384 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2385 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2386 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2388 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2389 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2390 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2391 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2392 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2394 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2396 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2398 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2402 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2403 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2406 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2407 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2408 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2409 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2410 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2411 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2412 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2413 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2414 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2416 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2424 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2425 match forward_info {
2426 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2427 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2428 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2429 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2430 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2431 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2432 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2433 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2435 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2438 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2439 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2440 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2441 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2442 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2443 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2445 value: amt_to_forward,
2450 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2452 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2453 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2454 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2456 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2457 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2458 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2459 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2460 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2462 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2467 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2468 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2469 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2470 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2471 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2472 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2473 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2474 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2475 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2476 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2477 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2478 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2479 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2481 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2482 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2483 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2484 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2485 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2487 amt: amt_to_forward,
2488 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2491 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2492 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2493 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2501 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2504 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2505 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2508 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2509 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2510 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2511 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2512 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2513 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2514 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2516 let mut total_value = 0;
2517 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2518 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2519 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2520 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2521 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2522 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2526 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2527 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2528 total_value += htlc.value;
2529 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2530 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2531 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2532 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2533 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2534 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2536 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2538 _ => unreachable!(),
2541 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2542 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2543 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2544 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2547 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2548 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2550 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2551 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2552 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2553 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2557 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2558 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2560 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2562 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2563 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2570 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2571 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2579 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2580 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2583 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2584 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2587 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2588 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2589 events.append(&mut new_events);
2592 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2594 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2595 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2597 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2598 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2599 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2600 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2601 if background_events.is_empty() {
2605 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2607 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2608 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2609 // monitor updating completing.
2610 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2617 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2618 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2619 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2620 self.process_background_events();
2623 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2624 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2625 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2626 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2627 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2628 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2629 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2631 if !chan.is_live() {
2632 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2633 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2634 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2636 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2637 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2639 let mut retain_channel = true;
2640 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2643 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2644 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2648 let ret_err = match res {
2649 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2650 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2651 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2652 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2655 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2656 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2657 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2658 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2659 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2660 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2661 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2662 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2672 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2676 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2677 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2678 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2679 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2680 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2681 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2682 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2684 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2686 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2688 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2689 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2690 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2691 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2692 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2693 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2694 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2696 handle_errors.push(err);
2706 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2708 /// This currently includes:
2709 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2710 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2711 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2714 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2715 /// estimate fetches.
2716 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2717 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2718 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2719 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2721 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2723 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2725 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2726 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2727 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2728 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2729 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2730 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
2731 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2732 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2734 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
2736 if !retain_channel { return false; }
2738 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
2739 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2740 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
2741 if needs_close { return false; }
2744 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2745 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2746 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2747 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2748 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2749 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2750 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2751 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2755 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2756 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2758 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2759 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2760 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2764 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2765 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2774 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2775 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2781 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2782 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2783 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2784 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2785 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2786 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2787 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2789 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2790 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2791 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2792 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2793 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2794 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2795 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2796 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2797 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2798 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2799 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2805 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2806 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2807 // be surfaced to the user.
2808 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2809 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2811 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2812 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2813 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2814 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2815 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2816 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2818 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2821 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2823 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2824 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2825 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2827 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2829 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2830 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2831 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2833 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2834 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2836 rejected_by_dest: false,
2844 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2851 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2852 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2853 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2854 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2855 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2856 /// still-available channels.
2857 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2858 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2859 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2860 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2863 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2864 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2865 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2867 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2869 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2870 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2871 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2873 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2876 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2877 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2878 match &onion_error {
2879 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2881 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2883 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2884 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2885 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2886 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2887 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2888 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2889 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2894 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2895 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2896 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2897 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2899 error_code: onion_error_code,
2901 error_data: onion_error_data
2905 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2911 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2912 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2913 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2914 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2916 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2917 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2918 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2919 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2920 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2921 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2923 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2925 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2931 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2932 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2933 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2934 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2935 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2936 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2938 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2939 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2940 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2944 let mut forward_event = None;
2945 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2946 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2948 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2949 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2950 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2952 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2953 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2956 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2957 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2958 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2959 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2960 time_forwardable: time
2967 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2968 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2969 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2971 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2972 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2973 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2974 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2976 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2978 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2979 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2980 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2981 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2983 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2985 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2986 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2987 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2988 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2990 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2991 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2992 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2993 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2995 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2996 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2997 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2998 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2999 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3001 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3002 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3003 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3009 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3010 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3011 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3013 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3014 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3015 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3016 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3017 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3018 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3019 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3021 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3022 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3023 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3024 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3025 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3026 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3027 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3028 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3030 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3031 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3032 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3033 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3034 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3035 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3037 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3042 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3043 // which were generated.
3044 channel_state.take();
3046 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3047 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3048 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3055 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3056 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3057 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3058 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3059 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3061 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3065 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3066 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3067 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3068 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3069 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3070 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3071 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3072 payment_preimage, e);
3073 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3074 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3075 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3076 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3079 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3080 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3081 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3082 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3083 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3084 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3085 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3086 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3087 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3088 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3094 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3096 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3099 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3100 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3101 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3102 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3103 payment_preimage, e);
3105 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3106 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3108 chan.remove_entry();
3110 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3113 } else { unreachable!(); }
3116 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3118 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
3119 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3121 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3122 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3123 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
3125 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3126 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
3130 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3133 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3134 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3135 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3136 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3137 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3138 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3139 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3142 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3143 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3144 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3145 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3146 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3149 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3150 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3151 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3152 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3153 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3154 payment_preimage, e);
3156 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3157 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3158 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3159 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3162 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3163 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3164 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3165 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3169 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3170 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3171 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3174 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3175 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3177 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3185 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3186 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3187 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3190 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
3191 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
3194 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
3195 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
3197 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
3198 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
3199 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
3200 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
3202 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
3203 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
3204 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
3205 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
3206 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
3207 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
3208 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
3209 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
3210 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3211 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3213 let chan_restoration_res;
3214 let mut pending_failures = {
3215 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3216 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3217 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3218 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3219 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3221 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3225 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3226 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3227 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3228 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3229 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3230 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3231 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3232 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3233 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3236 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3237 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3238 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3242 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3243 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3244 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3248 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3249 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3250 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3253 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3254 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3255 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3256 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3257 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3258 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3259 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3260 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3261 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3262 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3264 entry.insert(channel);
3270 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3271 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3272 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3273 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3274 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3275 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3276 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3277 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3279 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3280 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3282 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3285 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3286 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3287 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3288 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3290 user_channel_id: user_id,
3295 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3296 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3297 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3298 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3299 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3300 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3301 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3302 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3303 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3305 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3310 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3311 // lock before watch_channel
3312 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3314 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3315 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3316 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3317 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3318 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3319 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3320 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3321 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3322 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3323 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3324 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3326 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3327 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3328 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3329 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3330 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3331 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3335 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3336 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3337 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3338 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3339 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3341 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3342 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3343 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3352 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3354 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3355 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3356 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3357 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3358 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3359 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3360 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3362 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3363 Ok(update) => update,
3364 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3366 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3367 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3371 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3374 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3375 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3379 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3380 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3381 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3382 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3383 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3384 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3385 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3387 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3388 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3389 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3390 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3391 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3392 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3393 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3394 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3395 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3396 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3397 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3398 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3399 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3400 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3401 msg: announcement_sigs,
3403 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3404 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3405 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3406 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3415 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3416 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3417 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3418 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3419 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3421 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3422 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3423 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3424 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3427 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3428 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3429 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3430 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3433 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3434 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3436 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3437 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3438 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3439 let (result, is_permanent) =
3440 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3442 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3448 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3449 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3450 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3457 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3460 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3461 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3464 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3468 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3469 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3470 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3471 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3472 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3473 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3474 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3475 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3477 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3478 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3479 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3480 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3485 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3486 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3487 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3488 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3489 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3490 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3491 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3493 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3494 } else { (tx, None) }
3496 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3499 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3500 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3501 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3503 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3504 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3505 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3506 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3514 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3515 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3516 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3517 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3519 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3520 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3521 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3522 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3524 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3525 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3527 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3529 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3530 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3533 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3534 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3535 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3536 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3537 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3538 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3539 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3540 match pending_forward_info {
3541 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3542 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3543 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3544 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3545 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3546 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3547 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3551 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3552 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3553 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3554 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3555 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3556 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3557 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3558 // no problem just calling this
3559 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3560 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3562 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3563 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3564 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3567 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3569 _ => pending_forward_info
3572 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3574 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3579 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3580 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3581 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3582 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3583 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3584 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3585 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3586 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3588 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3593 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3597 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3598 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3599 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3600 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3601 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3602 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3603 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3605 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3607 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3612 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3613 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3614 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3615 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3616 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3617 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3618 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3620 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3621 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3622 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3624 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3627 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3631 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3632 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3633 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3634 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3636 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3637 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3639 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3640 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3641 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3642 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3643 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3644 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3645 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3650 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3651 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3653 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3654 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3655 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3657 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3658 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3659 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3660 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3661 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3662 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3663 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3664 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3666 commitment_signed: msg,
3672 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3677 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3678 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3679 let mut forward_event = None;
3680 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3681 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3682 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3683 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3685 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3686 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3687 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3688 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3689 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3691 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3692 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3693 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3695 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3696 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3697 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3702 match forward_event {
3704 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3705 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3706 time_forwardable: time
3714 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3715 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3717 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3718 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3719 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3720 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3721 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3722 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3724 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3725 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3726 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3727 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3728 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3729 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3730 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3731 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3733 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3735 } else { unreachable!(); }
3738 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3739 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3740 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3744 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3746 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3749 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3751 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3752 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3753 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3755 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3762 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3763 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3764 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3765 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3766 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3767 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3768 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3770 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3772 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3777 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3778 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3779 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3781 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3782 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3783 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3784 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3786 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3787 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3790 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3791 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3792 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3793 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3794 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3797 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3802 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3803 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3804 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3805 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3806 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3807 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3809 // It's not a local channel
3810 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3813 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3814 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3815 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3816 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3817 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3818 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3819 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3820 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3822 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3824 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3825 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3826 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3827 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3829 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3832 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3834 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3837 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3838 let chan_restoration_res;
3839 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3840 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3841 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3843 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3844 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3845 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3846 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3848 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3849 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3850 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3851 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3852 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3853 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3854 let mut channel_update = None;
3855 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3856 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3857 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3860 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3861 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3862 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3863 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3864 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3865 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3866 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3869 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3870 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3871 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3872 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3874 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3879 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3880 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3882 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3883 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3888 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3889 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3890 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3891 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3892 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3893 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
3894 match monitor_event {
3895 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3896 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3897 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3898 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
3900 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3901 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3904 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3905 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3906 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3907 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3908 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3909 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3910 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3911 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3912 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3914 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3915 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3916 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3920 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3921 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3922 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3923 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3931 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3932 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3935 has_pending_monitor_events
3938 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3939 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3940 /// update was applied.
3942 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3943 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3944 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3945 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3946 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3947 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3948 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3949 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3951 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3952 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3953 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3954 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3955 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3957 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3958 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3959 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3960 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3961 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3963 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3964 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3965 has_monitor_update = true;
3966 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3967 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3968 if close_channel { return false; }
3970 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3971 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3972 updates: commitment_update,
3979 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3980 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3987 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
3988 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3989 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3992 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3993 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3999 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4000 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4001 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4002 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4003 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4004 let mut has_update = false;
4006 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4007 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4008 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4009 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4010 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4012 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4013 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4014 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4015 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4017 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4018 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4021 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4022 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4023 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4024 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4025 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4028 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4029 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4034 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4035 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4041 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4042 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4049 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4050 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4056 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4057 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4059 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4060 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4061 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4062 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4063 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4064 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4065 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4066 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4067 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4068 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4069 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4070 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4071 assert!(should_broadcast);
4072 } else { unreachable!(); }
4073 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4075 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4079 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4080 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4082 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4084 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4085 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4086 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4087 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4088 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4089 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4090 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4091 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4092 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4093 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4094 // never fail a payment too early.
4095 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4097 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4100 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4105 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4108 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4109 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4111 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4112 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4113 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4115 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4117 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4118 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4119 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4120 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4121 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4122 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4123 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4126 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4127 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4130 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4131 /// stored external to LDK.
4133 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4134 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4135 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4137 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4138 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4140 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4141 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4142 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4143 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4144 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4146 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4147 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4148 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4149 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4151 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4152 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4153 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4154 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4155 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4157 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4158 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4159 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4160 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4161 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4163 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4164 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4165 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4167 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4169 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4170 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4172 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4173 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4174 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4175 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4176 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4179 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4180 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4181 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4182 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
4183 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4188 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4189 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4190 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4191 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4192 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4195 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4196 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4197 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4198 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4200 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4201 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4202 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4203 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4206 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4207 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4209 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4210 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4213 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4214 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4215 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4217 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4218 events.replace(pending_events);
4227 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4229 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4230 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4231 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4232 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4235 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4237 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4238 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4240 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4241 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4242 /// restarting from an old state.
4243 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4244 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4245 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4247 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4248 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4249 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4250 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4253 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4254 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4255 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4258 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4259 handler.handle_event(event);
4267 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4269 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4270 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4271 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4272 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4275 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4277 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4278 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4279 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4280 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4281 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4284 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4285 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4286 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4289 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4290 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4291 let new_height = height - 1;
4293 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4294 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4295 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4296 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4297 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4298 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4301 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4305 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4307 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4308 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4309 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4310 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4313 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4314 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4315 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4316 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4318 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4319 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4321 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4322 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4325 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4326 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4327 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4328 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4330 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4331 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4333 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4335 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4337 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4339 macro_rules! max_time {
4340 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4342 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4343 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4344 // having an explicit local time source.
4345 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4346 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4347 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4348 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4349 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4355 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4356 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4357 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4358 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4359 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4363 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4364 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4365 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4366 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4367 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4368 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4374 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4375 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4376 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4377 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4378 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4379 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4380 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4381 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4386 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4388 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4389 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4390 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4391 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4394 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4395 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4397 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4398 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4399 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4400 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4401 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4403 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4404 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4406 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4407 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4408 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4409 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4410 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4411 let res = f(channel);
4412 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4413 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4414 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4415 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4416 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4420 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4421 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4422 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4423 msg: funding_locked,
4425 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4426 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4427 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4428 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4429 msg: announcement_sigs,
4431 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4432 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4433 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4434 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4435 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4438 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4440 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4442 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4443 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4444 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4446 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4447 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4448 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4449 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4450 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4454 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4455 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4456 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4463 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4464 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4465 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4466 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4467 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4468 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4469 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4470 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4471 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4472 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4473 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4474 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4475 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4480 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4485 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4487 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4488 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4492 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4493 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4494 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4496 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4497 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4498 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4499 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4502 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4503 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4505 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4506 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4509 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4510 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4511 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4512 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4513 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4517 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4518 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4519 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4520 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4524 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4525 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4526 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4527 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4528 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4529 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4532 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4533 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4534 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4537 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4539 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4542 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4543 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4544 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4547 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4548 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4549 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4552 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4553 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4554 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4557 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4558 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4559 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4562 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4564 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4567 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4568 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4569 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4572 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4573 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4574 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4577 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4579 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4582 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4583 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4584 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4587 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4588 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4589 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4592 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4593 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4594 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4597 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4599 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4602 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4603 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4604 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4607 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4608 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4609 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4612 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4617 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4618 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4619 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4622 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4624 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4625 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4627 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4628 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4629 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4630 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4631 if no_connection_possible {
4632 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4633 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4634 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4635 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4636 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4638 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4639 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4640 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4650 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4651 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4652 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4653 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4654 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4655 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4656 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4660 no_channels_remain = false;
4666 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4668 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4669 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4670 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4671 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4672 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4673 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4674 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4675 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4676 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4677 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4678 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4679 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4680 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4681 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4682 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4683 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4684 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4685 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4686 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4687 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4691 if no_channels_remain {
4692 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4695 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4696 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4700 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4701 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4703 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4706 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4707 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4708 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4709 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4710 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4713 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4714 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4719 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4720 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4721 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4722 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4723 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4724 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4725 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4726 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4727 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4731 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4732 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4733 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4739 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4742 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4743 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4745 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4746 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4747 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4748 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4749 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4753 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4754 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4759 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4760 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4761 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4762 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4763 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4764 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4767 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4770 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4776 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4777 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4782 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4783 let result = *guard;
4791 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4792 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4793 let current_time = Instant::now();
4795 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4796 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4801 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4802 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4803 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4804 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4805 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4807 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4808 let result = *guard;
4809 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4813 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4814 None => return result,
4820 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4822 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4823 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4824 *persistence_lock = true;
4825 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4830 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4831 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4833 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4835 (0, onion_packet, required),
4836 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4839 (0, payment_data, required),
4840 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4842 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4843 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4844 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4848 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4849 (0, routing, required),
4850 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4851 (4, payment_hash, required),
4852 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4853 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4856 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4860 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4865 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4866 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4867 (2, outpoint, required),
4868 (4, htlc_id, required),
4869 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4872 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4873 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4874 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4875 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4878 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4879 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4880 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4885 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4886 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4887 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4893 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4894 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4895 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4897 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4898 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4899 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4903 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4904 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4905 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4907 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4909 if payment_data.is_some() {
4910 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4912 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4915 if payment_data.is_none() {
4916 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4918 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4922 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4930 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4931 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4932 (0, session_priv, required),
4933 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4934 (4, path, vec_type),
4936 (1, PreviousHopData)
4939 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4940 (0, LightningError) => {
4944 (0, failure_code, required),
4945 (2, data, vec_type),
4949 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4951 (0, forward_info, required),
4952 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4953 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4954 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4957 (0, htlc_id, required),
4958 (2, err_packet, required),
4962 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4963 (0, payment_secret, required),
4964 (2, expiry_time, required),
4965 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4966 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4967 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4970 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4971 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4972 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4973 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4974 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4977 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4978 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4980 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4982 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4984 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4985 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4986 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4989 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4990 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4991 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4992 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4993 unfunded_channels += 1;
4996 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4997 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4998 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4999 channel.write(writer)?;
5003 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5004 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5005 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5006 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5007 for forward in pending_forwards {
5008 forward.write(writer)?;
5012 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5013 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5014 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5015 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5016 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5017 htlc.write(writer)?;
5021 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5022 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5023 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5024 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5025 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5026 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5029 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5030 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5031 for event in events.iter() {
5032 event.write(writer)?;
5035 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5036 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5037 for event in background_events.iter() {
5039 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5041 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5042 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5047 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5048 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5050 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5051 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5052 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5053 hash.write(writer)?;
5054 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5057 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5058 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5059 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5060 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5063 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
5069 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5071 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5073 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
5074 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
5075 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
5076 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
5077 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5078 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
5079 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
5080 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
5081 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
5082 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
5083 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
5085 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
5086 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
5088 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5089 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5090 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5091 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5092 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5093 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5094 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5095 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5096 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5097 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5098 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5101 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5102 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5104 pub keys_manager: K,
5106 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5108 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5109 pub fee_estimator: F,
5110 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5112 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5113 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5114 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5115 pub chain_monitor: M,
5117 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5118 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5119 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5120 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5121 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5122 /// deserialization.
5124 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5125 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5126 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5128 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5129 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5131 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5132 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5133 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5134 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5136 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5139 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5140 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5143 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5144 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5145 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5146 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5147 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5148 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5151 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5152 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5153 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5154 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5155 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5157 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5158 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5163 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5164 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5165 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5166 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5167 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5168 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5169 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5170 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5173 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5174 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5175 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5179 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5180 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5181 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5182 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5183 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5184 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5187 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5188 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5190 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5191 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5192 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5194 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5196 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5197 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5198 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5199 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5200 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5201 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5202 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5203 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5204 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5205 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5206 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5207 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5208 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5209 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5210 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5211 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5212 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5213 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5214 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5215 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5216 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5217 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5218 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5219 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5220 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5221 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5222 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5223 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5224 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5225 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5226 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5227 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5228 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5229 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5231 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5232 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5234 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5237 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5238 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5239 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5240 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5241 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5242 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5246 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5247 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5248 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5252 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5253 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5254 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5255 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5256 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5257 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5258 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5259 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5260 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5262 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5265 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5266 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5267 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5268 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5269 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5270 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5271 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5272 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5274 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5277 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5278 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5279 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5280 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5281 let peer_state = PeerState {
5282 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5284 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5287 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5288 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5289 for _ in 0..event_count {
5290 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5291 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5296 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5297 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5298 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5299 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5300 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5301 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5305 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5306 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5308 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5309 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5310 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5311 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5312 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5316 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5317 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5318 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
5319 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
5320 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5324 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
5326 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5327 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5329 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5331 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5332 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5333 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5335 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5337 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5342 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5344 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5345 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
5347 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5348 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5351 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5352 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5354 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5356 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5357 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5358 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5359 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5361 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5362 logger: args.logger,
5363 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5366 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5367 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5370 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5371 //connection or two.
5373 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5379 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5380 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5381 use core::time::Duration;
5382 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5383 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
5384 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5385 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5387 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5388 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5389 use util::errors::APIError;
5390 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5391 use util::test_utils;
5393 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5395 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5396 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5398 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5401 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5402 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5404 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5405 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5406 thread::spawn(move || {
5408 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5409 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5410 *persistence_lock = true;
5413 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5419 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5420 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5422 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5425 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5430 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5432 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5435 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5442 fn test_notify_limits() {
5443 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5444 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5445 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5446 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5447 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5448 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5450 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5451 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5452 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5453 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5454 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5456 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5458 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5459 // to connect messages with new values
5460 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5461 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5462 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5463 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5465 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5466 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5467 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5468 // ... but the last node should not.
5469 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5470 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5471 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5472 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5474 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5475 // about the channel.
5476 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5477 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5478 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5480 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5482 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5483 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5484 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5485 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5486 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5487 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5489 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5490 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5491 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5493 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5494 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5495 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5496 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5497 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5498 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5500 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5501 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5502 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5503 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5504 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5505 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5506 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5507 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5509 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5510 // the channel info has updated.
5511 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5512 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5513 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5514 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5515 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5516 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5520 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5521 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5526 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5527 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5528 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5530 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5531 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5532 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5533 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5534 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5535 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5536 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5537 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5539 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5540 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5541 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5543 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5544 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5546 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5547 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5548 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5549 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5550 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5552 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5553 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5554 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5556 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5557 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5558 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5559 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5560 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5561 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5562 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5563 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5564 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5566 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5567 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5569 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5570 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5571 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5573 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5574 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5575 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5576 // lightning messages manually.
5577 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5579 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5580 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5581 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5583 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5584 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5586 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5587 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5589 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5590 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5591 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5593 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5594 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5595 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5597 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5599 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5601 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5602 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5605 // There's an existing bug that generates a PaymentSent event for each MPP path, so handle that here.
5606 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5608 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5609 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5614 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5615 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5622 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5623 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5624 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5625 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5626 // fails as expected.
5627 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5628 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5630 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5631 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5632 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5634 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5635 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5636 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5638 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5639 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5640 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5642 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5643 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5644 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5645 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5646 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5648 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5649 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5650 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5652 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5653 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5654 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5655 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5656 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5657 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5658 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5659 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5660 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5662 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5663 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5665 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5666 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5667 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5668 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5670 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5671 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5672 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5673 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5674 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5676 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5677 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5678 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5680 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5681 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5682 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5683 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5684 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5686 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5687 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5688 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5690 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5691 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5692 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5693 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5694 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5695 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5696 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5697 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5698 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5700 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5701 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5705 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5706 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5707 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5708 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5709 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5710 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5711 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5713 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5714 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5715 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5716 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5718 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5719 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5720 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5721 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5722 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5723 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5725 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5726 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5727 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5730 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5731 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5732 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5733 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5734 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5735 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5736 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5738 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5742 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5743 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5747 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5749 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5750 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5751 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5752 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5754 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5755 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5756 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5757 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5758 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5759 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5761 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5762 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5763 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5764 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5767 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5768 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5769 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5770 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5771 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5772 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5773 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5775 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5779 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
5780 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5781 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5782 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
5783 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5785 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5786 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5787 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5788 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5789 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5791 // Marshall an MPP route.
5792 let (_, payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
5793 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5794 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5795 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
5796 route.paths.push(path);
5797 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5798 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
5799 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
5800 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
5801 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
5802 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
5804 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
5805 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
5806 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
5807 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
5812 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5815 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5816 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5817 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5818 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5819 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5820 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5821 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
5822 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5823 use routing::router::get_route;
5824 use util::test_utils;
5825 use util::config::UserConfig;
5826 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5828 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5829 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5830 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5832 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5836 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5837 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5838 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5839 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5840 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5841 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5842 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5847 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5848 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5851 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5852 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5853 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5855 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5856 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5858 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5859 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5861 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5862 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5864 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5865 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5866 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5867 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5868 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5870 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5872 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5874 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5875 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5876 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5877 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5878 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5880 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5882 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5884 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5885 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5886 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5887 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5888 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5891 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5892 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5893 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5895 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5896 } else { panic!(); }
5898 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5899 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5901 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5904 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5907 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5908 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5910 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5911 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5912 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5913 match msg_events[0] {
5914 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
5915 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
5916 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
5920 match msg_events[1] {
5921 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5925 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5927 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5928 macro_rules! send_payment {
5929 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5930 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5931 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5932 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5934 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5935 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5937 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5938 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5940 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5941 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5942 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5943 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5944 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5945 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5946 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5947 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5949 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5950 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5951 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5953 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5954 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5955 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5956 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5957 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5959 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5962 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5963 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5964 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5965 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5967 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5972 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5973 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);