1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
26 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
43 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
44 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
46 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
48 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
49 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
50 use util::config::UserConfig;
51 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
52 use util::{byte_utils, events};
53 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
54 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
55 use util::logger::Logger;
56 use util::errors::APIError;
59 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
60 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
61 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
62 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
63 use std::time::Duration;
64 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
65 use std::time::Instant;
66 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
68 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
70 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
72 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
73 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
74 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
76 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
77 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
78 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
79 // before we forward it.
81 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
82 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
83 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
84 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
85 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
90 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
91 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
94 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
95 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
101 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
102 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
103 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
104 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
105 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
110 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
111 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
114 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
115 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
116 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
117 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
118 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
121 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
123 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
125 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
126 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
127 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
129 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
131 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
135 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
139 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
140 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
141 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
142 short_channel_id: u64,
144 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
146 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
147 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
151 struct ClaimableHTLC {
152 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
154 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
155 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
156 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
157 /// are part of the same payment.
158 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
162 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
163 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
164 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
165 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
168 session_priv: SecretKey,
169 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
170 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
171 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
176 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
177 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
179 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
180 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
185 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
186 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
188 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
196 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
197 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
198 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
199 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
200 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
204 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
205 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
206 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
207 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
209 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
211 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
212 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
213 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
214 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
215 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
217 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
218 err: msgs::LightningError,
219 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
221 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
223 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
225 err: LightningError {
227 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
228 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
234 shutdown_finish: None,
238 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
240 err: LightningError {
242 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
244 shutdown_finish: None,
248 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
249 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
252 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
254 err: LightningError {
256 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
257 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
263 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
267 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
270 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
272 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
274 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
277 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
283 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
286 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
293 shutdown_finish: None,
298 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
299 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
300 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
301 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
302 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
304 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
305 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
306 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
307 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
308 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
309 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
310 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
312 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
316 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
317 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
318 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
319 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
320 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
321 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
322 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
323 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
324 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
325 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
326 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
327 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
328 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
330 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
331 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
332 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
333 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
336 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
337 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_chan_freshness_every_min, so may be processed with
338 /// quite some time lag.
339 enum BackgroundEvent {
340 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
341 /// commitment transaction.
342 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
345 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
346 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
348 latest_features: InitFeatures,
351 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
352 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
354 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
355 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
356 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
357 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
358 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
359 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
360 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
361 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
363 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
364 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
365 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
366 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
367 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
368 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
369 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
370 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
371 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
373 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
374 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
376 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
377 /// to individual Channels.
379 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
380 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
381 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
382 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
384 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
385 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
386 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
387 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
388 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
389 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
390 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
392 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
393 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
394 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
395 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
398 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
399 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
400 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
401 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
402 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
404 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
405 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
406 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
407 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
408 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
409 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
410 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
411 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
412 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
413 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
416 default_configuration: UserConfig,
417 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
423 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
425 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
426 last_block_hash: RwLock<BlockHash>,
427 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
429 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
430 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
431 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
432 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
433 our_network_key: SecretKey,
435 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
436 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
437 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
439 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
440 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
441 /// are currently open with that peer.
442 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
443 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
445 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
447 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
448 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
449 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
450 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
451 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
452 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
453 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
454 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
455 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
457 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
464 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
466 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
467 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
468 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
469 pub struct ChainParameters {
470 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
471 pub network: Network,
473 /// The hash of the latest block successfully connected.
474 pub latest_hash: BlockHash,
476 /// The height of the latest block successfully connected.
478 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
479 pub latest_height: usize,
482 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
483 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
484 /// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
485 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
486 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
487 /// updates are ready for persistence).
488 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
489 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
490 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
491 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
494 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
495 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
496 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
499 persistence_notifier: notifier,
500 _read_guard: read_guard,
505 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
507 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
511 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
512 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
513 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
514 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
515 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
517 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
518 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
519 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
520 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
521 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
522 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
523 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
525 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
526 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
527 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
528 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
529 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
530 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
533 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
535 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
536 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
539 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
541 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
543 pub struct ChannelDetails {
544 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
545 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
546 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
547 /// lifetime of the channel.
548 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
549 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
550 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
551 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
552 /// The node_id of our counterparty
553 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
554 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
555 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
556 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
557 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
558 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
559 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
560 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
562 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
563 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
564 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
565 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
566 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
567 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
568 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
569 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
570 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
571 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
572 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
573 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
574 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
578 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
579 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
581 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
582 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
583 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
584 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
585 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
586 ParameterError(APIError),
587 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
588 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
589 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
592 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
594 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
595 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
596 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
597 /// paths than the ones selected).
598 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
599 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
600 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
601 /// in over-/re-payment.
603 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
604 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
605 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
607 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
608 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
609 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
610 /// with the latest update_id.
611 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
614 macro_rules! handle_error {
615 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
618 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
619 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
621 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
622 // entering the macro.
623 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
626 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
628 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
629 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
630 if let Some(update) = update_option {
631 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
637 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
638 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
640 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
641 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
642 action: err.action.clone()
646 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
647 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
650 // Return error in case higher-API need one
657 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
658 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
661 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
662 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
664 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
665 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
666 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
667 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
668 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
670 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
672 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
677 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
678 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
681 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
682 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
684 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
685 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
686 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
687 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
688 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
690 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
692 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
693 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
694 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
695 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
696 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
698 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
699 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
705 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
706 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
707 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
709 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
711 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
712 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
713 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
714 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
715 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
717 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
718 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
719 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
720 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
721 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
722 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
723 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
724 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
725 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
726 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
729 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
730 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
731 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
732 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
734 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
735 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
737 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
738 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
740 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
741 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
742 if !$resend_commitment {
743 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
746 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
748 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
749 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
755 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
756 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
757 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
759 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
760 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
764 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
765 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
766 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
767 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
768 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
771 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
776 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
777 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
778 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
779 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
780 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
783 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
785 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
786 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
788 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
790 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
792 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
793 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
794 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
795 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
796 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
797 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
800 default_configuration: config.clone(),
801 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
802 fee_estimator: fee_est,
806 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(params.latest_height),
807 last_block_hash: RwLock::new(params.latest_hash),
810 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
811 by_id: HashMap::new(),
812 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
813 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
814 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
815 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
817 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
819 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
821 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
823 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
824 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
825 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
826 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
834 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
836 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
837 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
838 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
839 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
841 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
842 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
844 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
845 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
846 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
847 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
848 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
851 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
852 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
853 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
855 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
856 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
857 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
859 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
860 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
861 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
862 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
863 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
865 panic!("RNG is bad???");
868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
870 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
871 node_id: their_network_key,
877 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
878 let mut res = Vec::new();
880 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
881 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
882 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
883 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
884 res.push(ChannelDetails {
885 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
886 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
887 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
888 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
889 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
890 inbound_capacity_msat,
891 outbound_capacity_msat,
892 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
893 is_live: channel.is_live(),
897 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
898 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
899 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
900 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
906 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
907 /// more information.
908 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
909 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
912 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
913 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
915 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
916 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
917 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
918 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
919 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
920 // really wanted anyway.
921 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
924 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
925 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
926 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
928 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
929 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
932 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
933 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
934 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
935 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
936 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
937 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
938 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
939 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
942 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
943 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
944 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
946 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
947 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
952 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
953 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
955 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
956 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
961 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
962 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
963 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
972 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
973 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
974 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
975 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
976 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
978 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
979 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
980 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
981 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
982 // ignore the result here.
983 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
987 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
989 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
990 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
991 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
992 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
993 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
994 // Error or Ok here doesn't matter - the result is only exposed publicly
995 // when peer_node_id is None anyway.
999 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1000 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1002 chan.remove_entry().1
1004 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1007 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1008 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1009 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1010 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1011 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1019 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1020 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1021 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1023 self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None)
1026 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1027 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1028 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1029 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1030 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1034 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1035 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1036 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1038 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1039 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1040 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1041 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1042 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1043 failure_code: $err_code,
1044 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1049 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1050 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1053 let shared_secret = {
1054 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1055 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1058 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1060 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1061 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1062 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1063 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1064 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1065 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1066 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1067 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1070 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1071 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1072 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1073 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1074 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1077 let mut channel_state = None;
1078 macro_rules! return_err {
1079 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1081 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1082 if channel_state.is_none() {
1083 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1085 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1086 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1087 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1088 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1089 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1094 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1095 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1096 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1097 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1099 let error_code = match err {
1100 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1101 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1102 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1103 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1104 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1106 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1109 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1110 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1111 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1118 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1121 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1122 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1123 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1124 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1125 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1126 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1127 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1128 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1129 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1130 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1131 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1132 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1136 // final_expiry_too_soon
1137 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1138 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1139 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1140 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1141 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1142 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1144 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1145 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1146 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1148 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1149 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1150 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1153 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1154 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1155 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1156 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1159 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1160 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1161 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1162 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1164 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1165 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1167 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1169 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1170 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1171 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1172 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1175 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1176 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1177 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1179 // Check two things:
1180 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1181 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1182 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1184 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1186 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1187 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1188 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1190 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1192 let blinding_factor = {
1193 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1194 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1195 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1196 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1199 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1201 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1203 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1206 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1207 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1210 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1211 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1212 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1213 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1214 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1218 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1219 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1220 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1223 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1224 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1225 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1226 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1230 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1231 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1232 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1233 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1234 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1235 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1236 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1237 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1238 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1239 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1241 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1243 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1244 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1246 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1247 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1248 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1249 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1250 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1251 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1252 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1254 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1255 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1257 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1258 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1259 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1261 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1262 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1264 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1265 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1266 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1267 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1268 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1270 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1271 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1273 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1274 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1275 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1276 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1282 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1283 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1284 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1285 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1287 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1288 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1290 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1291 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1292 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1294 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1296 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1301 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1304 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1305 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1306 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1307 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1308 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1312 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1314 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1315 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1317 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1318 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1319 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1320 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1321 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1322 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1323 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1324 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1327 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1328 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1330 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1336 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1337 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1338 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1339 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1340 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1342 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1343 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1344 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1345 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1346 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1348 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1350 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1352 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1353 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1354 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1355 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1356 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1359 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1360 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1362 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1363 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1365 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1366 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1368 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1370 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1371 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1372 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1374 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1375 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1376 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1377 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1378 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1379 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1380 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1381 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1382 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1385 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1386 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1387 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1388 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1389 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1390 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1391 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1399 } else { unreachable!(); }
1403 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1404 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1406 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1411 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1413 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1414 /// fields for more info.
1416 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1417 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1418 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1419 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1420 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1421 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1423 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1425 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1426 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1427 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1429 /// In general, a path may raise:
1430 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1431 /// node public key) is specified.
1432 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1433 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1435 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1436 /// relevant updates.
1438 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1439 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1440 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1442 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1443 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1444 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1445 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1447 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1448 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1449 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1450 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1451 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1452 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1454 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1455 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1456 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1457 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1458 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1460 let mut total_value = 0;
1461 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1462 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1463 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1464 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1465 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1466 continue 'path_check;
1468 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1469 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1470 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1471 continue 'path_check;
1474 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1475 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1477 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1478 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1481 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1482 let mut results = Vec::new();
1483 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1484 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1486 let mut has_ok = false;
1487 let mut has_err = false;
1488 for res in results.iter() {
1489 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1490 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1491 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1492 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1499 if has_err && has_ok {
1500 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1502 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1508 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1510 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1511 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1513 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1515 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1516 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1517 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1518 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1521 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1523 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1524 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1525 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1526 } else { unreachable!(); })
1531 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1532 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1535 Err(_) => { return; }
1539 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1540 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1541 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1544 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1545 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1546 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1548 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1554 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1555 if !chan.should_announce() {
1556 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1560 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1562 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1564 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1565 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1567 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1568 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1569 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1570 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1571 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1576 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1577 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1578 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1580 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1583 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1584 // smaller than 500:
1585 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1587 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1588 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1589 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1591 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1592 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1594 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1595 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1596 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1597 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1599 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1600 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1601 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1603 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1604 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1607 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1608 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1609 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1610 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1611 rgb, alias, addresses,
1612 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1613 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1615 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1617 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1618 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1619 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1620 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1621 contents: announcement
1626 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1628 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1629 /// Will likely generate further events.
1630 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1631 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1633 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1634 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1635 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1637 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1638 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1640 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1641 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1642 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1643 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1645 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1646 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1647 match forward_info {
1648 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1649 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1650 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1651 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1652 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1653 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1654 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1656 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1657 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1660 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1661 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1662 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1663 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1664 // problem, not ours.
1671 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1672 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1673 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1674 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1675 match forward_info {
1676 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1677 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1679 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1680 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1681 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1682 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1683 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1684 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1685 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1686 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1688 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1690 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1691 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1693 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1695 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1696 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1697 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1703 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1705 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1706 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1707 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1708 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1709 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1710 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1711 // this channel currently :/.
1717 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1718 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1720 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1721 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1722 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1724 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1725 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1727 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1729 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1730 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1731 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1734 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1736 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1737 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1738 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1739 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1740 // messages when we can.
1741 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1742 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1743 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1750 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1751 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1754 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1755 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1756 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1757 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1758 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1759 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1761 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1762 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1763 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1764 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1765 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1767 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1769 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1771 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1775 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1776 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1779 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1780 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1781 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1782 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1783 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1784 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1785 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1787 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1795 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1796 match forward_info {
1797 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1798 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1799 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1800 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1801 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1802 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1803 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1804 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1805 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1808 let mut total_value = 0;
1809 let payment_secret_opt =
1810 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1811 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1812 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1813 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1815 value: amt_to_forward,
1816 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1817 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1819 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1820 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1821 total_value += htlc.value;
1822 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1823 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1825 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1827 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1828 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1829 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1830 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1831 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1832 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1836 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1837 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1838 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1839 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1840 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1842 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1845 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1846 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1848 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1853 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1855 payment_secret: None,
1856 amt: amt_to_forward,
1860 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1861 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1863 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1864 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1872 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1873 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1876 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1877 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1880 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1881 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1882 events.append(&mut new_events);
1885 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
1887 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
1888 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
1890 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
1891 fn process_background_events(&self) {
1892 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
1893 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
1894 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
1896 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
1897 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
1898 // monitor updating completing.
1899 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
1905 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1906 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
1907 self.process_background_events();
1910 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1911 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1912 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1914 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1916 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
1917 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1918 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1919 self.process_background_events();
1921 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1922 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1923 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1924 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1925 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1926 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1931 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1933 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1934 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1939 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1940 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1941 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1942 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1943 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1944 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1945 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1947 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1948 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1949 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1950 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1951 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1952 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1953 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1954 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1956 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1957 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1958 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1964 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
1965 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
1966 // be surfaced to the user.
1967 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
1968 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
1970 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
1971 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
1972 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
1973 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
1974 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
1975 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
1977 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1980 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1982 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1983 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
1984 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
1986 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1987 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1988 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1990 rejected_by_dest: false,
2002 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2003 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2004 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2005 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2006 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2007 /// still-available channels.
2008 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2009 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2010 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2011 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2014 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2015 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2016 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2018 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2019 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2020 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2021 match &onion_error {
2022 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2024 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2026 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2027 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2028 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2029 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2030 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2031 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2032 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2037 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2038 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2039 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2040 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2042 error_code: onion_error_code,
2044 error_data: onion_error_data
2048 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2054 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2055 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2056 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2057 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2059 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2060 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2061 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2062 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2063 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2064 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2066 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2068 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2074 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2075 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2076 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2077 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2078 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2079 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2081 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2082 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2083 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2087 let mut forward_event = None;
2088 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2089 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2091 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2092 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2093 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2095 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2096 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2099 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2100 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2101 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2102 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2103 time_forwardable: time
2110 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2111 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2112 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2114 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2115 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2116 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2117 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2118 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2119 /// motivated attackers.
2121 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2122 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2124 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2125 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2126 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2128 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2130 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2131 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2132 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2133 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2135 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2136 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2137 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2138 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2140 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2141 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2142 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2143 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2144 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2147 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2148 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2149 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2151 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2155 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2156 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2157 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2162 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2163 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2164 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2165 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2166 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2167 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2168 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2169 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2171 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2172 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2173 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2175 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2177 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2178 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2179 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2180 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2181 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2182 } else { errs.push(e); }
2184 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2186 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2188 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2193 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2194 // which were generated.
2195 channel_state.take();
2197 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2198 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2199 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2206 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2207 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2208 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2209 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2210 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2216 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2217 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2218 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2219 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2220 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2221 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2222 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2223 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2225 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2229 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2230 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2231 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2232 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2233 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2234 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2235 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2236 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2245 // TODO: Do something with e?
2246 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2247 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2248 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2249 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2250 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2251 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2252 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2256 } else { unreachable!(); }
2259 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2262 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2263 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2264 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2268 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2269 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2270 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2273 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2274 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2275 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2276 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2279 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2280 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2281 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2282 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2283 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2284 payment_preimage, e);
2288 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2290 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2291 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2292 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2298 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2299 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2300 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2303 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2304 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2307 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2308 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2310 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2311 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2312 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2313 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2315 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2316 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2317 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2318 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2319 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2320 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2321 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2322 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2323 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2324 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2326 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2327 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2328 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2329 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2332 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2333 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2334 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2335 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2336 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2340 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2344 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2345 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2346 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2348 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2350 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2351 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2352 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2353 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2358 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2359 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2360 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2361 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2362 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2367 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2371 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2376 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2377 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2378 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2379 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2382 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2383 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2384 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2387 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2388 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2389 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2390 msg: announcement_sigs,
2393 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2397 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2399 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2400 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2402 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2404 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2405 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2409 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2410 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2411 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2414 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2415 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2416 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2417 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2418 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2420 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2421 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2422 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2423 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2425 entry.insert(channel);
2431 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2432 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2433 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2434 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2435 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2437 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2438 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2440 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2441 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2443 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2446 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2447 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2448 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2449 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2451 user_channel_id: user_id,
2456 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2457 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2458 let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
2459 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2460 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2461 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2462 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2463 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2464 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2466 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2468 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2471 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2472 // lock before watch_channel
2473 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2475 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2476 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2477 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2478 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2479 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2480 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2481 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2482 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2483 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2484 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2485 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2487 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2488 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2489 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2490 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2491 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2492 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2496 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2497 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2498 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2500 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2502 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2503 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2504 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2513 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2514 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2515 let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
2516 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2517 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2518 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2519 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2520 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2521 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2523 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger) {
2524 Ok(update) => update,
2525 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2527 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2528 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2530 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2532 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2535 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2536 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2538 user_channel_id: user_id,
2543 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2544 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2545 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2546 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2547 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2548 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2549 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2551 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2552 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2553 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2554 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2555 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2556 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2557 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2558 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2559 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2560 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2561 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2562 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2563 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2564 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2565 msg: announcement_sigs,
2570 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2574 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2575 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2576 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2577 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2579 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2580 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2581 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2582 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2584 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2585 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2586 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2587 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2591 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2592 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2593 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2597 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2598 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2599 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2601 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2602 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2604 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2607 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2608 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2610 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2611 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2612 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2613 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2621 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2622 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2623 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2624 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2625 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2626 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2627 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2628 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2630 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2631 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2632 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2633 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2638 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2639 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2640 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2641 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2642 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2643 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2644 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2646 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2647 } else { (tx, None) }
2649 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2652 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2653 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2654 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2656 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2657 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2658 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2659 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2667 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2668 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2669 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2670 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2672 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2673 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2674 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2675 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2677 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2678 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2680 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2681 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2682 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2683 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2686 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2687 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2688 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2689 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2690 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2691 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2692 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2693 match pending_forward_info {
2694 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2695 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2696 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2697 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2698 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2699 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2700 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2704 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2705 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2706 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2707 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2708 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2709 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2710 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2711 // no problem just calling this
2712 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2713 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2715 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2716 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2717 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2720 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2722 _ => pending_forward_info
2725 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2727 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2732 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2733 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2735 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2736 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2737 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2738 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2739 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2741 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2743 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2746 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2750 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2751 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2752 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2753 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2754 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2755 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2756 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2758 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2760 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2765 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2766 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2767 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2768 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2770 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2771 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2773 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2774 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2775 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2777 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2784 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2785 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2786 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2787 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2788 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2789 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2790 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2792 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2793 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2794 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2795 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2796 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2797 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2798 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2803 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2804 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2805 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2807 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2808 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2809 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2811 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2812 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2813 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2814 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2815 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2816 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2817 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2818 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2820 commitment_signed: msg,
2824 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2825 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2826 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2832 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2837 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2838 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2839 let mut forward_event = None;
2840 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2841 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2842 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2843 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2845 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2846 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2847 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2848 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2850 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2851 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2852 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2855 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2856 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2861 match forward_event {
2863 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2864 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2865 time_forwardable: time
2873 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2874 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2876 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2877 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2878 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2880 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2881 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2883 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2884 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2885 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2886 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2887 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2888 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2889 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2890 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2892 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2894 } else { unreachable!(); }
2897 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2898 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2899 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2903 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2904 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2905 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2909 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
2911 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2914 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
2916 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
2917 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2918 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2920 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
2927 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2928 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2929 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2930 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2932 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2933 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2935 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2937 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2942 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2943 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2944 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2946 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2947 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2948 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2949 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2951 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2952 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2955 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2956 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2957 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2959 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2960 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2962 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
2963 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
2964 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
2965 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
2967 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
2968 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2971 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
2972 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2978 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2980 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2981 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2982 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2983 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2984 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2985 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2986 contents: announcement,
2988 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2991 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2996 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2997 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2998 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3000 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3001 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3002 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3003 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3005 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3006 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3007 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3008 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3009 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3010 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3011 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3012 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3013 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3014 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3015 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3016 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3017 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3019 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3020 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3022 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3023 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3026 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3027 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3028 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3032 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3033 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3034 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3035 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3040 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3041 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3042 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3043 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3049 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3053 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3058 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3059 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3060 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3066 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3070 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3071 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3072 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3073 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3074 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3076 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3077 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3078 let counterparty_node_id;
3079 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3080 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3081 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3083 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3085 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3086 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3087 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3089 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3090 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3092 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3093 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3095 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3096 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3097 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3099 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3102 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3103 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3104 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3105 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3106 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3107 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3108 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3109 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3119 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3120 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3121 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3125 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3126 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3127 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3129 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3130 match monitor_event {
3131 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3132 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3133 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3134 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3136 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3137 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3140 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3141 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3142 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3143 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3144 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3145 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3146 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3147 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3148 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3150 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3151 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3152 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3162 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3163 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3167 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3168 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3170 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3171 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3172 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3173 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3174 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3175 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3176 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3177 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3178 // timer_chan_freshness_every_min, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3179 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3180 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3181 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3182 assert!(should_broadcast);
3183 } else { unreachable!(); }
3184 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3186 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3191 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3192 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3193 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3194 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3195 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3198 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3199 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3200 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3201 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3203 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3204 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3205 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3210 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3211 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3212 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3213 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3214 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3217 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3218 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3219 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3220 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3222 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3223 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3224 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3229 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3231 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3232 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3233 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3234 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3237 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3238 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3239 ChannelManager::block_connected(self, &block.header, &txdata, height);
3242 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _height: u32) {
3243 ChannelManager::block_disconnected(self, header);
3247 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3248 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3249 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3250 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3251 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3254 /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block.
3255 pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3256 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3257 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3258 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3259 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3260 log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", block_hash, height);
3262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3264 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3265 *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = block_hash;
3267 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3268 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3270 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3271 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3272 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3273 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3274 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3275 let res = channel.block_connected(header, txdata, height);
3276 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3277 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3278 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3279 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3280 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3284 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3285 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3286 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3287 msg: funding_locked,
3289 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3290 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3291 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3292 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3293 msg: announcement_sigs,
3296 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3298 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3300 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3301 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3302 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3303 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3307 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3308 for &(_, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3309 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3310 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3311 log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3312 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3313 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3315 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. Close the channel.
3316 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3317 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3318 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3330 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3331 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3332 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3333 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3334 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3335 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3336 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3337 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3338 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3339 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3340 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3341 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3346 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3350 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3352 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3353 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3357 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3358 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3359 // having an explicit local time source.
3360 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3361 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3362 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3363 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3364 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3370 /// Updates channel state based on a disconnected block.
3372 /// If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate
3373 /// in the shutdown.
3374 pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
3375 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3376 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3377 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3378 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3380 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3381 *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = header.prev_blockhash;
3383 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3385 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3386 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3387 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3388 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3389 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3390 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3391 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3392 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3394 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3395 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3396 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3407 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3410 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3411 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3412 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3414 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3415 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3416 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3417 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3420 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3421 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3423 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3424 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3427 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3428 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3429 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3430 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3431 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3436 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3437 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3438 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3439 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3440 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3441 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3444 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3445 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3446 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3449 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3450 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3451 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3454 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3455 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3456 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3459 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3461 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3464 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3465 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3466 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3469 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3470 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3471 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3474 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3475 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3476 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3479 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3481 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3484 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3485 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3486 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3489 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3490 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3491 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3494 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3495 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3496 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3499 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3500 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3501 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3504 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3505 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3506 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3509 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3511 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3514 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3515 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3516 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3519 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3520 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3521 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3524 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3526 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3527 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3528 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3530 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3531 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3532 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3533 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3534 if no_connection_possible {
3535 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3536 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3537 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3538 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3539 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3541 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3542 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3543 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3553 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3554 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3555 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3556 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3557 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3558 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3559 // reestablish logic.
3560 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3561 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3562 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3563 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3564 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3566 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3567 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3568 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3572 no_channels_remain = false;
3578 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3580 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3581 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3582 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3583 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3584 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3585 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3586 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3587 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3588 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3589 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3590 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3591 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3592 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3593 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3594 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3595 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3596 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3597 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3601 if no_channels_remain {
3602 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3605 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3606 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3608 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3609 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3610 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3615 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3616 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3618 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3621 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3622 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3623 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3624 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3625 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3628 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3629 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3634 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3635 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3636 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3637 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3638 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3639 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3640 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3641 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3642 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3646 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3647 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3648 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3654 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3657 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3658 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3660 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3661 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3662 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3663 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3664 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3668 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3669 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3674 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
3675 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
3676 struct PersistenceNotifier {
3677 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
3678 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
3679 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
3682 impl PersistenceNotifier {
3685 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
3691 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3692 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3693 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
3694 let result = *guard;
3702 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3703 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3704 let current_time = Instant::now();
3706 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3707 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3708 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
3709 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
3710 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
3711 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
3712 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
3714 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
3715 let result = *guard;
3716 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
3720 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
3721 None => return result,
3727 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
3729 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
3730 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
3731 *persistence_lock = true;
3732 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
3737 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3738 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3740 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3741 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3742 match &self.routing {
3743 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3745 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3746 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3748 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3750 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3751 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3754 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3755 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3756 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3757 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3762 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3763 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3764 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3765 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3766 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3767 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3768 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3770 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3771 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3772 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3774 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3776 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3777 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3778 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3779 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3784 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3785 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3787 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3789 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3791 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3793 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3800 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3801 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3802 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3803 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3804 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3805 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3810 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3811 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3813 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3815 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3817 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3819 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3826 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3827 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3828 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3829 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3830 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3831 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3836 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3840 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3843 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3850 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3851 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3853 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3855 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3857 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3859 path.write(writer)?;
3860 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3861 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3868 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3869 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3870 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3871 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3872 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3873 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3874 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3875 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3877 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3882 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3883 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3885 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3889 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3891 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3892 data.write(writer)?;
3899 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3900 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3901 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3902 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3903 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3904 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3905 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3907 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3912 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3913 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3915 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3917 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3918 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
3919 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3920 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3922 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3924 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3925 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3932 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3933 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3934 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3935 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3936 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3937 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
3938 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3939 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3941 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3942 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3943 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3945 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3950 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3951 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3952 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3953 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3954 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3957 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3958 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3960 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3961 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3963 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3964 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3965 self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3967 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3968 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3969 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3970 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3971 unfunded_channels += 1;
3974 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3975 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3976 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3977 channel.write(writer)?;
3981 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3982 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3983 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3984 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3985 for forward in pending_forwards {
3986 forward.write(writer)?;
3990 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3991 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3992 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3993 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3994 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3995 htlc.write(writer)?;
3999 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4000 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4001 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4002 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4003 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4004 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4007 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4008 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4009 for event in events.iter() {
4010 event.write(writer)?;
4013 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4014 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4015 for event in background_events.iter() {
4017 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4019 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4020 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4025 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4031 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4033 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4035 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4036 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4037 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4038 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4039 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4040 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4041 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4042 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4043 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4044 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4045 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4047 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4048 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4050 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4051 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4052 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4053 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4054 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4055 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4056 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4057 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4058 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4059 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4060 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4063 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4064 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4066 pub keys_manager: K,
4068 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4070 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4071 pub fee_estimator: F,
4072 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4074 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4075 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4076 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4077 pub chain_monitor: M,
4079 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4080 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4081 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4082 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4083 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4084 /// deserialization.
4086 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4087 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4088 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4090 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4091 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4093 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4094 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4095 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4096 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4098 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4101 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4102 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4105 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4106 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4107 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4108 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4109 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4110 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4113 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4114 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4115 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4116 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4117 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4119 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4120 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4125 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4126 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4127 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4128 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4129 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4130 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4131 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4132 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4135 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4136 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4137 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4141 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4142 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4143 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4144 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4145 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4146 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4149 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4150 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4151 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4152 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4153 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4156 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4157 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4158 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4160 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4162 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4163 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4164 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4165 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4166 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4167 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4168 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4169 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4170 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4171 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4172 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4173 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4174 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4175 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4176 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4177 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4178 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4179 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4180 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4181 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4182 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4183 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4184 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4186 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4187 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4189 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4192 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4196 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4197 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4198 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4202 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4203 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4204 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4205 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4206 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4207 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4208 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4209 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4210 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4212 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4215 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4216 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4217 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4218 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4219 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4220 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4221 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4222 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4224 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4227 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4228 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4229 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4230 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4231 let peer_state = PeerState {
4232 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4234 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4237 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4238 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4239 for _ in 0..event_count {
4240 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4241 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4246 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4247 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4248 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4249 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4250 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4251 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4255 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4257 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4258 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4260 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4262 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4263 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4264 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4266 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
4267 last_block_hash: RwLock::new(last_block_hash),
4270 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4275 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4277 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4279 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4281 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4283 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4284 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4285 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4286 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4288 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4289 logger: args.logger,
4290 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4293 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4294 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4297 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4298 //connection or two.
4300 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4306 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4308 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4310 use std::time::Duration;
4313 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4314 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4315 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4317 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4318 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4319 thread::spawn(move || {
4321 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4322 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4323 *persistence_lock = true;
4326 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4332 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4333 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4335 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4338 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4343 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4345 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4348 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {