1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
177 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
178 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
180 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
181 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
186 impl Readable for PaymentId {
187 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
188 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
192 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
193 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
194 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
195 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
196 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
199 session_priv: SecretKey,
200 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
201 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
202 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
203 payment_id: PaymentId,
204 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
205 payee: Option<Payee>,
208 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
209 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
210 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
212 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
214 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
216 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
219 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
220 payment_id.hash(hasher);
221 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
222 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
230 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
231 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
233 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
234 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
235 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
236 payment_secret: None,
242 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
243 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
245 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
253 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
254 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
256 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
261 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
263 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
264 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
265 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
266 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
267 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
269 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
270 err: msgs::LightningError,
271 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
272 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
274 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
276 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
278 err: LightningError {
280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
288 shutdown_finish: None,
292 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
294 err: LightningError {
296 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
299 shutdown_finish: None,
303 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
304 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
307 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
309 err: LightningError {
311 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
312 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
318 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
319 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
323 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
326 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
330 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
334 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
343 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
345 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
346 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
354 shutdown_finish: None,
359 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
360 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
361 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
362 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
363 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
365 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
366 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
367 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
368 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
369 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
370 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
371 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
373 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
377 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
378 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
379 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
380 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
381 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
382 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
383 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
384 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
385 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
386 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
387 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
388 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
390 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
391 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
392 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
393 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
396 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
397 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
398 /// quite some time lag.
399 enum BackgroundEvent {
400 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
401 /// commitment transaction.
402 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
405 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
406 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
408 latest_features: InitFeatures,
411 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
412 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
414 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
417 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
418 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
419 struct PendingInboundPayment {
420 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
421 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
422 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
423 /// this payment being removed.
425 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
426 user_payment_id: u64,
427 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
428 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
429 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
432 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
433 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
434 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
436 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
439 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
440 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
441 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
442 pending_amt_msat: u64,
443 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
444 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
445 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
447 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
448 starting_block_height: u32,
450 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
451 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
452 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
454 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
455 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
459 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
460 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
462 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
466 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
468 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
472 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
474 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
479 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
481 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
482 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
483 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
487 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
488 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
489 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
490 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
491 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
492 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. }
495 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
496 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
499 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
500 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
501 let remove_res = match self {
502 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
504 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } => {
505 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
509 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
510 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
511 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
512 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
513 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
514 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
521 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
522 let insert_res = match self {
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
524 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
525 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
527 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
530 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
531 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
532 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
533 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
534 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
541 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
543 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
544 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
545 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } => {
552 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
553 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
554 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
555 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
556 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
557 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
558 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
559 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
561 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
562 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
563 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
564 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
565 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
566 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
567 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
568 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
569 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
571 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
572 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
574 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
575 /// to individual Channels.
577 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
578 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
579 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
580 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
582 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
583 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
584 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
585 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
586 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
587 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
588 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
590 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
591 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
592 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
593 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
596 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
597 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
598 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
599 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
600 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
602 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
603 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
604 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
605 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
606 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
607 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
608 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
609 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
610 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
611 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
614 default_configuration: UserConfig,
615 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
621 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
623 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
624 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
626 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
627 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
628 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
629 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
631 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
632 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
633 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
634 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
635 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
636 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
638 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
639 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
640 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
641 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
642 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
643 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
644 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
645 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
647 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
649 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
650 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
652 our_network_key: SecretKey,
653 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
655 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
656 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
657 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
659 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
660 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
661 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
662 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
664 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
665 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
666 /// are currently open with that peer.
667 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
668 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
671 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
672 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
674 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
675 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
676 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
677 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
678 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
679 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
680 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
681 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
682 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
684 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
691 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
693 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
694 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
695 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
696 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
697 pub struct ChainParameters {
698 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
699 pub network: Network,
701 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
703 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
704 pub best_block: BestBlock,
707 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
713 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
714 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
715 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
716 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
717 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
718 /// updates are ready for persistence).
720 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
721 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
722 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
723 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
724 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
726 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
727 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
730 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
731 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
732 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
735 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
736 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
738 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
739 persistence_notifier: notifier,
740 should_persist: persist_check,
741 _read_guard: read_guard,
746 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
748 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
749 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
754 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
755 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
757 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
759 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
760 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
761 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
762 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
763 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
765 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
766 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
768 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
770 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
771 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
772 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
773 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
774 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
775 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
776 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
778 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
779 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
781 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
782 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
783 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
784 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
786 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
787 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
788 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
789 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
790 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
791 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
794 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
796 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
797 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
800 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
802 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
803 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
804 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
805 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
806 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
807 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
808 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
809 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
810 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
811 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
812 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
815 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
816 /// to better separate parameters.
817 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
818 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
819 /// The node_id of our counterparty
820 pub node_id: PublicKey,
821 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
822 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
823 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
824 pub features: InitFeatures,
825 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
826 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
827 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
829 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
831 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
832 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
833 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
834 /// payments to us through this channel.
835 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
838 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
839 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
840 pub struct ChannelDetails {
841 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
842 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
843 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
844 /// lifetime of the channel.
845 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
846 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
847 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
848 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
849 /// our counterparty already.
851 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
852 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
853 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
854 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
855 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
856 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
857 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
858 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
859 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
860 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
861 /// this value on chain.
863 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
865 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
867 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
868 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
869 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
870 pub user_channel_id: u64,
871 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
872 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
873 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
874 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
876 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
877 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
878 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
879 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
880 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
881 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
882 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
883 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
884 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
886 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
887 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
888 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
889 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
890 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
891 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
892 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
893 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
894 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
896 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
898 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
899 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
900 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
901 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
902 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
903 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
904 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
905 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
906 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
908 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
909 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
910 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
911 pub is_outbound: bool,
912 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
913 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
914 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
915 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
916 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
918 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
919 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
920 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
921 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
923 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
925 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
929 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
930 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
932 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
933 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
934 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
935 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
936 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
937 ParameterError(APIError),
938 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
939 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
940 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
943 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
945 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
946 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
947 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
948 /// paths than the ones selected).
949 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
950 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
951 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
952 /// in over-/re-payment.
954 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
955 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
956 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
958 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
959 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
960 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
961 /// with the latest update_id.
963 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
964 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
965 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
966 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
967 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
968 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
969 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
970 payment_id: PaymentId,
974 macro_rules! handle_error {
975 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
978 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
979 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
981 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
982 // entering the macro.
983 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
984 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
987 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
989 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
990 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
991 if let Some(update) = update_option {
992 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
996 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
997 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
998 channel_id, user_channel_id,
999 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1004 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1005 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1007 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1008 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1009 action: err.action.clone()
1013 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1014 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1017 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1024 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1025 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1026 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1028 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1029 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1031 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1033 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1034 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1036 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1037 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1038 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1039 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1041 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1042 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1043 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1045 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1046 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1047 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1048 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1050 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1051 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1052 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1058 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1059 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1063 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1065 $entry.remove_entry();
1073 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1074 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1078 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1080 $entry.remove_entry();
1088 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1089 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1091 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1092 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1093 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1100 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1101 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1102 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1104 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1106 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1107 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1108 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1109 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1111 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1112 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1113 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1114 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1115 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1116 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1117 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1118 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1119 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1120 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1121 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1124 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1125 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1126 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1127 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1128 match $action_type {
1129 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1130 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1132 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1133 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1135 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1136 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1137 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1138 if !$resend_commitment {
1139 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1142 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1144 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1145 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1149 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1150 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1152 $entry.remove_entry();
1156 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1157 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1161 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1162 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1163 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1165 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1166 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1170 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1171 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1172 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1173 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1174 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1177 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1182 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1183 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1184 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1185 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1186 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1187 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1189 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1190 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1192 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1193 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1194 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1195 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1198 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1199 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1200 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1201 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1202 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1203 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1204 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1205 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1206 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1207 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1208 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1209 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1212 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1213 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1214 // before it should be allowed to.
1215 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1216 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1217 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1220 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1221 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1222 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1223 msg: announcement_sigs,
1226 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1229 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1230 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1231 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1232 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1233 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1234 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1235 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1236 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1237 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1238 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1239 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1240 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1241 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1242 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1243 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1244 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1245 let mut order = $order;
1247 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1249 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1253 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1254 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1255 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1256 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1261 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1262 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1263 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1264 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1265 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1270 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1274 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1279 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1280 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1281 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1286 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1287 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1288 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1289 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1290 assert!(res.is_ok());
1293 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1297 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1298 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1299 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1301 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1303 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1304 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1309 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1310 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1311 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1312 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1313 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1316 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1318 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1319 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1321 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1323 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1325 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1326 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1327 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1328 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1329 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1330 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1333 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1334 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1335 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1339 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1341 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1342 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1343 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1344 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1345 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1346 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1348 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1349 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1351 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1352 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1355 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1356 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1358 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1360 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1361 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1362 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1363 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1371 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1372 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1373 &self.default_configuration
1376 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1378 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1379 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1380 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1381 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1382 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1385 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1386 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1388 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1389 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1390 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1392 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1393 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1394 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1395 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1396 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1397 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1399 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1400 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1401 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1402 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1403 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1404 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1408 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1409 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1410 Some(peer_state) => {
1411 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1412 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1413 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1414 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1415 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1417 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1420 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1422 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1423 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1424 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1426 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1427 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1428 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1429 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1430 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1431 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1433 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1436 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1438 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1439 node_id: their_network_key,
1442 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1445 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1446 let mut res = Vec::new();
1448 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1449 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1450 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1451 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1452 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1453 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1454 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1455 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1456 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1457 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1458 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1459 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1460 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1462 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1463 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1464 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1465 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1466 inbound_capacity_msat,
1467 outbound_capacity_msat,
1468 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1469 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1470 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1471 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1472 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1473 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1474 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1478 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1479 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1480 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1481 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1487 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1488 /// more information.
1489 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1490 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1493 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1494 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1496 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1497 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1499 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1500 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1501 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1502 // really wanted anyway.
1503 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1506 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1507 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1508 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1509 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1510 Some(transaction) => {
1511 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1515 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1516 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1517 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1518 reason: closure_reason
1522 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1523 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1525 let counterparty_node_id;
1526 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1527 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1528 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1529 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1530 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1532 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1533 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1534 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1535 Some(peer_state) => {
1536 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1537 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1538 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1540 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1542 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1544 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1545 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1546 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1547 let (result, is_permanent) =
1548 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1550 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1556 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1557 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1561 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1562 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1563 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1564 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1568 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1572 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1576 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1577 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1580 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1584 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1585 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1586 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1588 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1589 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1591 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1592 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1593 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1594 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1596 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1598 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1599 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1600 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1601 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1602 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1605 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1606 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1607 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1609 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1610 /// the channel being closed or not:
1611 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1612 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1613 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1614 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1615 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1616 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1617 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1619 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1621 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1622 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1623 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1624 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1625 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1629 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1630 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1631 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1632 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1633 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1635 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1636 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1637 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1638 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1639 // ignore the result here.
1640 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1644 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1645 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1646 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1648 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1649 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1650 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1651 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1652 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1653 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1656 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1657 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1659 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1660 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1661 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1664 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1666 chan.remove_entry().1
1668 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1671 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1672 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1673 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1674 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1675 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1680 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1683 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1684 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1685 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1686 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1687 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1688 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1689 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1690 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1691 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1692 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1693 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1703 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1704 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1705 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1706 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1707 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1711 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1712 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1713 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1715 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1716 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1717 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1718 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1719 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1720 failure_code: $err_code,
1721 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1726 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1727 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1730 let shared_secret = {
1731 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1732 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1735 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1737 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1738 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1739 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1740 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1741 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1742 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1743 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1744 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1747 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1748 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1749 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1750 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1751 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1754 let mut channel_state = None;
1755 macro_rules! return_err {
1756 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1758 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1759 if channel_state.is_none() {
1760 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1762 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1763 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1764 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1765 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1766 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1771 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1772 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1773 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1774 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1776 let error_code = match err {
1777 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1778 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1779 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1780 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1781 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1783 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1786 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1787 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1788 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1795 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1798 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1799 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1800 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1801 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1802 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1803 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1804 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1805 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1806 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1807 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1808 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1809 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1813 // final_expiry_too_soon
1814 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1815 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1816 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1817 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1818 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1819 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1820 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1822 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1823 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1824 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1826 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1827 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1828 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1831 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1832 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1833 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1834 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1835 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1836 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1837 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1838 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1840 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1842 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1843 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1844 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1845 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1846 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1847 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1848 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1849 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1850 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1853 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1855 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1858 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1863 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1864 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1865 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1866 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1868 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1870 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1871 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1872 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1873 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1876 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1877 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1878 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1880 // Check two things:
1881 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1882 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1883 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1885 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1887 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1888 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1889 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1891 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1893 let blinding_factor = {
1894 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1895 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1896 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1897 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1900 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1902 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1904 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1907 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1908 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1911 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1912 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1913 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1914 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1915 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1919 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1920 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1921 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1924 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1925 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1926 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1927 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1931 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1932 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1933 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1934 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1935 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1936 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1937 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1938 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1939 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1940 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1941 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1943 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1946 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1948 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1949 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1950 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1951 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1952 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1955 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1956 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1957 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1958 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1959 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1960 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1961 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1963 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1964 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1966 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1967 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1968 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1969 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1970 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1972 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1973 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1975 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1976 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
1977 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
1978 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1979 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1980 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1982 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1983 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1985 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
1986 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
1987 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
1988 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
1989 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
1990 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
1991 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
1992 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
1993 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1994 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2000 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2001 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2002 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2003 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2005 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2006 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2008 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2009 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2010 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2012 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2014 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2019 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2022 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2023 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2024 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2026 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2027 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2028 if !chan.should_announce() {
2029 return Err(LightningError {
2030 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2031 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2034 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2035 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2038 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2039 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2040 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2041 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2042 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2043 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2044 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2045 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2046 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2050 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2052 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2053 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2055 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2056 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2057 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2058 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2059 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2060 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2061 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2062 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2065 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2066 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2068 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2074 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2075 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2076 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2077 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2078 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2079 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2081 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2082 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2083 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2084 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2085 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2087 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2089 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2091 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2092 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2094 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2095 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2096 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2097 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2098 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2099 err: "Payment already completed"
2104 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2105 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2106 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2109 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2111 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2112 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2113 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2114 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2115 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2116 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2117 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2118 total_msat: total_value,
2120 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2124 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2125 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2127 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2128 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2130 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2131 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2133 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2134 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2136 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2137 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2139 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2140 payee: payee.clone(),
2141 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2142 channel_state, chan)
2144 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2145 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2146 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2147 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2148 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2149 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2150 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2151 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2152 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2153 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2155 insert_outbound_payment!();
2157 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2158 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2159 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2160 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2161 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2162 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2163 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2164 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2170 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2172 } else { unreachable!(); }
2176 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2177 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2179 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2184 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2186 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2187 /// fields for more info.
2189 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2190 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2191 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2192 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2193 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2194 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2196 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2198 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2199 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2200 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2202 /// In general, a path may raise:
2203 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2204 /// node public key) is specified.
2205 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2206 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2208 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2209 /// relevant updates.
2211 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2212 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2213 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2215 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2216 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2217 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2218 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2220 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2221 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2222 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2223 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2224 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2227 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2228 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2229 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2231 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2232 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2233 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2234 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2235 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2237 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2238 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2240 let mut total_value = 0;
2241 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2242 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2243 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2244 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2245 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2246 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2247 continue 'path_check;
2249 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2250 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2251 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2252 continue 'path_check;
2255 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2256 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2258 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2259 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2261 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2262 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2263 total_value = amt_msat;
2266 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2267 let mut results = Vec::new();
2268 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2269 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2271 let mut has_ok = false;
2272 let mut has_err = false;
2273 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2274 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2275 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2276 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2277 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2278 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2279 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2283 } else if res.is_err() {
2284 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2285 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2288 if has_err && has_ok {
2289 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2292 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2293 if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
2294 Some(RouteParameters {
2295 payee: payee.clone(),
2296 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2297 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2303 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2304 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2305 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2306 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2312 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2314 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2315 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2316 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2317 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2319 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2320 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2321 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2322 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2323 if path.len() == 0 {
2324 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2325 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2330 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2331 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2332 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2334 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2335 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2337 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2338 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2339 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2340 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2343 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2345 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2346 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2347 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2350 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2351 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2352 err: "Payment already completed"
2357 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2358 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2362 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2365 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2366 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2367 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2368 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2369 /// never reach the recipient.
2371 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2373 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2374 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2376 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2378 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2379 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2380 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2382 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2384 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2385 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2386 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2391 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2392 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2393 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2394 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2396 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2398 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2400 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2401 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2402 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2403 } else { unreachable!(); })
2406 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2408 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2409 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2412 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2413 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2418 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2419 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2420 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2423 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2424 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2425 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2427 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2435 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2436 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2437 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2441 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2443 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2444 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2446 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2448 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2449 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2450 /// keys per-channel).
2452 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2453 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2454 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2456 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2457 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2458 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2460 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2461 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2462 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2464 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2465 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2466 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2467 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2471 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2472 let mut output_index = None;
2473 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2474 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2475 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2476 if output_index.is_some() {
2477 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2478 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2481 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2482 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2483 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2486 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2489 if output_index.is_none() {
2490 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2491 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2494 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2498 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2499 if !chan.should_announce() {
2500 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2504 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2506 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2508 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2509 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2511 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2512 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2513 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2514 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2515 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2520 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2521 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2522 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2524 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2527 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2528 // smaller than 500:
2529 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2531 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2532 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2533 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2534 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2535 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2536 /// our network addresses.
2538 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2539 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2541 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2542 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2543 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2544 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2546 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2548 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2549 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2550 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2552 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2553 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2556 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2557 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2558 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2560 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2561 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2562 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2563 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2564 rgb, alias, addresses,
2565 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2566 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2568 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2569 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2571 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2572 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2574 let mut announced_chans = false;
2575 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2576 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2577 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2579 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2584 announced_chans = true;
2586 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2587 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2588 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2592 if announced_chans {
2593 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2594 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2595 signature: node_announce_sig,
2596 contents: announcement
2602 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2604 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2605 /// Will likely generate further events.
2606 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2607 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2609 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2610 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2611 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2613 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2614 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2616 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2617 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2618 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2619 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2621 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2622 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2623 match forward_info {
2624 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2625 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2626 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2627 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2628 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2629 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2630 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2632 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2633 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2636 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2637 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2638 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2639 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2640 // problem, not ours.
2647 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2648 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2649 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2650 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2651 match forward_info {
2652 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2653 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2655 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2656 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2657 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2658 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2659 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2660 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2661 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2662 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2664 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2666 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2667 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2669 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2671 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2672 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2673 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2679 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2681 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2682 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2683 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2684 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2685 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2686 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2687 // this channel currently :/.
2693 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2694 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2696 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2697 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2698 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2700 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2701 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2703 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2705 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2706 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2707 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2710 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2712 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2713 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2714 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2715 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2716 // messages when we can.
2717 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2718 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2719 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2726 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2727 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2730 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2731 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2732 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2733 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2734 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2735 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2737 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2738 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2739 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2740 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2741 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2743 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2744 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2746 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2748 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2752 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2753 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2756 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2757 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2758 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2759 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2760 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2761 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2762 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2763 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2764 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2766 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2774 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2775 match forward_info {
2776 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2777 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2778 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2779 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2780 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2781 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2782 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2783 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2785 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2788 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2789 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2790 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2791 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2792 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2793 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2795 value: amt_to_forward,
2800 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2802 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2803 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2804 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2806 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2807 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2808 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2809 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2810 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2812 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2817 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2818 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2819 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2820 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2821 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2822 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2823 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2824 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2825 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2826 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2827 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2828 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2829 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2831 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2832 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2833 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2834 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2835 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2837 amt: amt_to_forward,
2838 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2841 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2842 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2843 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2851 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2854 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2855 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2858 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2859 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2860 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2861 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2862 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2863 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2864 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2866 let mut total_value = 0;
2867 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2868 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2869 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2870 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2871 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2872 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2876 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2877 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2878 total_value += htlc.value;
2879 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2880 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2881 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2882 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2883 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2884 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2886 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2888 _ => unreachable!(),
2891 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2892 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2893 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2894 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2897 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2898 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2900 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2901 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2902 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2906 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2907 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2909 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2911 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2912 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2919 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2920 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2928 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2929 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2932 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2933 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2936 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2937 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2938 events.append(&mut new_events);
2941 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2943 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2944 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2946 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2947 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2948 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2949 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2950 if background_events.is_empty() {
2954 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2956 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2957 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2958 // monitor updating completing.
2959 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2966 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2967 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2968 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2969 self.process_background_events();
2972 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2973 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2974 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2975 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2976 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2977 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2978 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2980 if !chan.is_live() {
2981 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2982 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2983 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2985 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2986 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2988 let mut retain_channel = true;
2989 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2992 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2993 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2997 let ret_err = match res {
2998 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2999 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3000 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3001 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3004 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3005 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3006 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3007 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3008 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3009 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3010 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3011 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3021 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3025 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3026 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3027 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3028 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3029 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3030 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3031 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3033 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3035 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3037 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3038 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3039 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3040 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3041 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3042 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3043 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3045 handle_errors.push(err);
3055 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3057 /// This currently includes:
3058 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3059 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3060 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3063 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3064 /// estimate fetches.
3065 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3066 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3067 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3068 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3070 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3072 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3074 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3075 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3076 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3077 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3078 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3079 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3080 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3081 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3083 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3085 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3087 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3088 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3089 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3090 if needs_close { return false; }
3093 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3094 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3095 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3096 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3097 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3098 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3099 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3100 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3104 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3105 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3107 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3108 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3109 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3113 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3114 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3123 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3124 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3130 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3131 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3132 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3133 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3134 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3135 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3136 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3138 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3139 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3140 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3141 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3142 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3143 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3144 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3145 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3146 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3147 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3148 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3154 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3155 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3156 // be surfaced to the user.
3157 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3158 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3160 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3161 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3162 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3163 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3164 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3165 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3167 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3170 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3172 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3173 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3174 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3176 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3177 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3178 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3179 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3180 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3181 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3182 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3183 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3184 Some(RouteParameters {
3186 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3187 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3190 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3191 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3192 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3194 rejected_by_dest: false,
3195 network_update: None,
3196 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3198 short_channel_id: None,
3208 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3215 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3216 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3217 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3218 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3219 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3220 /// still-available channels.
3221 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3222 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3223 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3224 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3227 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3228 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3229 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3231 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3232 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3233 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3234 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3235 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3236 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3237 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3238 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3241 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3245 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3246 all_paths_failed = true;
3249 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3252 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3253 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3254 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3255 Some(RouteParameters {
3256 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3257 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3258 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3261 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3262 match &onion_error {
3263 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3265 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3267 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3268 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3269 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3270 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3271 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3272 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3273 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3274 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3275 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3282 error_code: onion_error_code,
3284 error_data: onion_error_data
3288 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3294 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3295 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3296 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3297 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3299 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3300 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3301 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3302 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3303 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3304 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3305 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3306 network_update: None,
3309 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3312 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3314 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3320 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3321 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3322 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3324 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3325 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3327 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3329 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3333 let mut forward_event = None;
3334 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3335 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3337 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3338 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3339 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3341 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3342 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3345 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3346 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3347 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3348 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3349 time_forwardable: time
3356 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3357 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3358 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3360 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3361 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3362 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3363 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3365 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3367 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3368 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3369 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3370 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3372 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3374 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3375 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3376 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3377 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3379 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3380 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3381 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3382 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3384 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3385 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3386 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3387 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3388 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3390 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3391 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3392 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3398 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3399 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3400 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3402 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3403 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3404 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3405 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3406 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3407 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3408 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3410 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3411 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3412 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3413 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3414 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3415 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3416 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3417 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3419 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3420 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3421 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3422 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3423 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3424 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3426 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3431 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3432 // which were generated.
3433 channel_state.take();
3435 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3436 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3437 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3444 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3445 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3446 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3447 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3448 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3450 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3454 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3455 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3456 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3457 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3458 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3459 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3460 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3461 payment_preimage, e);
3462 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3463 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3464 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3465 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3468 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3469 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3470 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3471 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3472 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3473 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3474 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3475 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3476 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3477 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3483 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3485 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3488 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3489 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3490 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3491 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3492 payment_preimage, e);
3494 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3495 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3497 chan.remove_entry();
3499 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3502 } else { unreachable!(); }
3505 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3506 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3507 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3508 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3509 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3510 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3511 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3512 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3513 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3514 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3515 pending_events.push(
3516 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3518 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3523 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3531 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3533 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3534 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3535 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3536 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3537 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3538 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3539 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3540 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3541 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3542 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3543 pending_events.push(
3544 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3545 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3551 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3555 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3556 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3557 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3559 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3560 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3561 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3562 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3563 pending_events.push(
3564 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3572 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3577 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3580 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3581 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3582 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3583 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3584 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3585 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3586 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3589 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3590 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3591 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3592 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3593 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3596 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3597 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3598 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3599 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3600 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3601 payment_preimage, e);
3603 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3604 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3605 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3606 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3609 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3610 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3611 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3612 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3616 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3617 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3618 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3621 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3622 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3624 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3632 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3633 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3634 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3637 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3638 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3640 let chan_restoration_res;
3641 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3642 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3643 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3644 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3645 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3646 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3648 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3652 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3653 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3654 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3655 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3656 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3657 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3658 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3659 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3660 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3663 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3664 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3665 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3667 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3669 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3670 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3671 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3672 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3676 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3677 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3678 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3681 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
3682 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3685 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3686 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())
3687 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3688 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3689 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3690 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3691 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3693 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3694 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3695 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3697 entry.insert(channel);
3703 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3704 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3705 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3706 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3707 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3708 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3709 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3710 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3712 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3713 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3715 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3718 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3719 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3720 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3721 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3723 user_channel_id: user_id,
3728 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3729 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3730 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3731 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3732 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3733 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3734 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3735 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3736 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3738 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3743 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3744 // lock before watch_channel
3745 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3747 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3748 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3749 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3750 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3751 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3752 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3753 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3754 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3755 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3756 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3757 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3759 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3760 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3761 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3762 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3763 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3764 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3768 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3769 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3770 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3771 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3772 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3775 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3776 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3785 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3787 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3788 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3789 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3790 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3792 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3793 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3795 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3796 Ok(update) => update,
3797 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3799 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3800 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3801 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3802 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3803 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3804 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3805 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3806 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3816 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3817 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3821 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3822 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3823 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3824 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3825 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3826 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3827 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3829 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3830 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3831 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3832 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3833 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3834 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3835 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3836 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3837 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3838 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3839 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3840 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3841 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3842 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3843 msg: announcement_sigs,
3845 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3846 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3847 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3848 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3853 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3857 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3858 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3859 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3860 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3861 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3863 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3865 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3866 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3869 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3870 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3871 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3872 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3875 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3876 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3878 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3879 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3880 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3881 let (result, is_permanent) =
3882 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3884 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3890 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3891 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3892 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3902 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3903 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3906 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3910 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3911 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3912 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3913 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3914 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3915 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3916 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3917 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3919 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3920 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3921 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3922 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3927 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3928 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3929 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3930 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3931 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3932 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3933 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3935 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3936 } else { (tx, None) }
3938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3941 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3942 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3943 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3945 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3946 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3947 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3948 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3952 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3957 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3958 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3959 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3960 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3962 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3963 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3964 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3965 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3967 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3968 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3970 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3971 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3972 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3973 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3976 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3977 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3978 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3979 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3980 match pending_forward_info {
3981 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3982 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3983 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3984 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3985 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3986 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3987 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3988 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3992 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3993 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3994 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3995 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3996 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3997 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3998 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3999 // no problem just calling this
4000 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4001 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4004 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4006 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4007 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4008 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4011 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4013 _ => pending_forward_info
4016 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4018 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4023 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4024 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4025 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4026 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4027 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4029 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4030 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4032 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4034 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4037 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4041 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4042 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4043 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4044 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4045 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4046 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4047 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4049 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4051 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4056 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4057 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4058 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4059 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4060 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4061 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4062 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4064 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4065 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4066 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4068 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4071 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4075 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4076 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4077 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4078 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4079 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4080 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4081 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4083 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4084 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4085 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4086 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4087 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4088 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4089 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4094 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4095 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4097 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4098 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4099 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4101 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4102 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4103 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4104 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4105 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4106 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4107 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4108 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4110 commitment_signed: msg,
4116 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4121 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4122 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4123 let mut forward_event = None;
4124 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4125 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4126 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4127 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4129 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4130 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4131 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4132 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4133 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4135 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4136 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4137 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4139 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4140 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4141 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4146 match forward_event {
4148 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4149 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4150 time_forwardable: time
4158 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4159 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4161 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4162 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4163 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4165 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4166 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4168 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4169 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4170 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4171 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4172 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4173 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4174 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4175 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4176 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4177 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4178 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4180 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4181 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4182 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4183 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4184 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4186 } else { unreachable!(); }
4189 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4190 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4191 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4195 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4196 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4197 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4198 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4199 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4204 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4206 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4207 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4209 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4210 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4212 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4213 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4220 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4221 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4222 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4223 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4225 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4226 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4228 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4230 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4235 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4236 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4237 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4239 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4240 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4241 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4242 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4244 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4245 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4248 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4249 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4250 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4251 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4252 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4255 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4260 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4261 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4262 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4263 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4264 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4265 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4267 // It's not a local channel
4268 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4271 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4272 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4273 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4274 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4275 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4276 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4277 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4278 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4280 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4282 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4283 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4284 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4285 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4287 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4290 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4292 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4295 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4296 let chan_restoration_res;
4297 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4298 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4299 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4301 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4302 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4303 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4304 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4306 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4307 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4308 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4309 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4310 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4311 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4312 let mut channel_update = None;
4313 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4314 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4315 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4318 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4319 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4320 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4321 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4322 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4323 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4324 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4327 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4328 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4329 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4330 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4332 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4337 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4338 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4340 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4341 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4346 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4347 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4348 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4349 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4350 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4351 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4352 match monitor_event {
4353 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4354 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4355 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4356 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4358 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4359 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4362 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4363 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4364 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4365 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4366 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4367 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4368 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4369 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4370 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4371 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4373 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4374 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4375 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4379 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4380 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4382 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4384 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4385 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4386 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4387 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4388 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4393 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4394 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4399 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4400 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4403 has_pending_monitor_events
4406 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4407 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4408 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4409 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4410 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4411 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4414 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4415 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4416 /// update was applied.
4418 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4419 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4420 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4421 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4422 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4423 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4424 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4425 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4427 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4428 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4429 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4430 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4431 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4433 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4434 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4435 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4436 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4437 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4439 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4440 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4441 has_monitor_update = true;
4442 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4443 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4444 if close_channel { return false; }
4446 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4447 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4448 updates: commitment_update,
4455 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4456 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4457 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4464 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4465 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4466 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4469 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4470 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4476 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4477 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4478 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4479 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4480 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4481 let mut has_update = false;
4483 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4484 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4485 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4486 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4487 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4489 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4490 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4491 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4492 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4494 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4495 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4498 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4499 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4500 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4501 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4502 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4505 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4506 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4511 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4513 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4514 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4520 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4521 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4528 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4529 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4535 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4536 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4538 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4539 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4540 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4541 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4542 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4543 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4544 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4545 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4546 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4547 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4548 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4549 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4550 assert!(should_broadcast);
4551 } else { unreachable!(); }
4552 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4554 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4558 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4559 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4561 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4564 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4565 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4566 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4567 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4568 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4569 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4570 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4571 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4572 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4573 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4574 // never fail a payment too early.
4575 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4577 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4580 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4585 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4588 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4589 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4591 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4592 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4593 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4595 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4597 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4598 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4599 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4600 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4601 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4602 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4603 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4606 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4607 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4610 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4611 /// stored external to LDK.
4613 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4614 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4615 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4617 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4618 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4620 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4621 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4622 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4623 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4625 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4626 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4627 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4628 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4629 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4631 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4632 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4633 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4634 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4635 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4637 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4638 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4639 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4641 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4643 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4644 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4646 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4647 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4648 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4649 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4652 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4653 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4654 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4655 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4656 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4661 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4662 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4666 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
4667 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
4671 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4672 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4673 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4674 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4675 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4678 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4679 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4680 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4681 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4683 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4684 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4685 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4686 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4689 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4690 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4692 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4693 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4696 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4697 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4698 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4700 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4701 events.replace(pending_events);
4710 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4712 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4713 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4714 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4715 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4718 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4720 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4721 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4723 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4724 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4725 /// restarting from an old state.
4726 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4727 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4728 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4730 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4731 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4732 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4733 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4736 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4737 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4738 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4741 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4742 handler.handle_event(&event);
4750 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4752 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4753 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4754 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4755 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4758 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4760 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4761 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4762 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4763 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4764 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4767 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4768 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4769 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4772 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4773 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4774 let new_height = height - 1;
4776 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4777 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4778 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4779 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4780 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4781 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4784 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4788 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4790 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4791 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4792 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4793 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4796 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4797 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4798 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4799 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4801 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4802 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4804 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4805 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4808 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4809 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4810 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4811 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4813 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4814 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4816 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4818 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4820 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4822 macro_rules! max_time {
4823 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4825 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4826 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4827 // having an explicit local time source.
4828 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4829 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4830 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4831 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4832 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4838 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4839 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4840 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4841 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4842 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4845 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4846 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4847 const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4848 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4849 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4850 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4856 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4857 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4858 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4859 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4860 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4861 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4867 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4868 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4869 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4870 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4871 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4872 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4873 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4874 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4879 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4881 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4882 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4883 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4884 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4887 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4888 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4890 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
4891 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4892 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4893 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4894 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4896 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4897 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4899 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4900 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4901 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4902 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4903 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4904 let res = f(channel);
4905 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4906 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4907 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4908 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4909 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4913 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4914 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4915 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4916 msg: funding_locked,
4918 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4919 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4920 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4921 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4922 msg: announcement_sigs,
4924 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4925 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4926 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4927 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4928 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4931 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4933 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4935 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
4936 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4937 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4939 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4940 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4941 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4942 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4943 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4947 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
4948 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
4949 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4950 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4951 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4952 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
4953 data: reason_message,
4961 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4962 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4963 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4964 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4965 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4966 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4967 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4968 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4969 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4970 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4971 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4972 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4973 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4978 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4983 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4985 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4986 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4990 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4991 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4992 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4994 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4995 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4996 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4997 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5000 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5001 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5003 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5004 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5007 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5008 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5009 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5010 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5011 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5015 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5016 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5017 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5018 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5022 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5023 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5024 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5025 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5026 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5027 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5030 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5032 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5035 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5036 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5037 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5040 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5041 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5042 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5045 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5046 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5047 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5050 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5051 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5052 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5055 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5056 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5057 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5060 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5061 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5062 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5065 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5067 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5070 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5071 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5072 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5075 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5076 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5077 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5080 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5081 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5082 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5085 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5086 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5087 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5090 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5091 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5092 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5095 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5096 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5097 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5100 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5101 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5102 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5105 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5106 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5107 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5110 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5115 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5116 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5117 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5120 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5121 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5122 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5123 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5125 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5126 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5127 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5128 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5129 if no_connection_possible {
5130 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5131 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5132 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5133 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5134 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5136 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5137 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5138 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5142 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5149 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5150 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5151 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5152 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5153 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5154 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5155 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5157 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5160 no_channels_remain = false;
5166 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5168 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5169 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5170 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5171 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5172 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5173 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5174 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5175 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5176 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5177 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5178 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5179 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5180 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5181 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5182 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5183 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5184 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5185 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5186 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5190 if no_channels_remain {
5191 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5194 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5195 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5199 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5200 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5202 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5205 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5206 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5207 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5208 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5209 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5212 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5213 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5218 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5219 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5220 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5221 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5222 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5223 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5224 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5225 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5226 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5230 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5231 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5232 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5238 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5241 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5244 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5245 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5246 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5247 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5248 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5252 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5253 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5258 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5259 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5260 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5261 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5262 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5263 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5266 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5269 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5275 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5276 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5281 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5282 let result = *guard;
5290 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5291 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5292 let current_time = Instant::now();
5294 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5295 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5300 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5301 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5302 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5303 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5304 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5306 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5307 let result = *guard;
5308 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5312 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5313 None => return result,
5319 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5321 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5322 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5323 *persistence_lock = true;
5324 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5329 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5330 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5332 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5334 (0, onion_packet, required),
5335 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5338 (0, payment_data, required),
5339 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5341 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5342 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5343 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5347 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5348 (0, routing, required),
5349 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5350 (4, payment_hash, required),
5351 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5352 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5356 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5357 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5359 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5361 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5362 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5363 reason.write(writer)?;
5365 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5366 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5369 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5370 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5371 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5372 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5379 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5380 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5381 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5384 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5385 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5386 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5387 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5391 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5392 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5393 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5394 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5395 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5398 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5399 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5400 // messages contained in the variants.
5401 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5402 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5403 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5405 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5406 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5407 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5408 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5409 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5412 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5413 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5414 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5415 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5416 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5418 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5423 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5428 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5429 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5430 (2, outpoint, required),
5431 (4, htlc_id, required),
5432 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5435 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5436 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5437 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5438 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5441 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5442 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5443 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5448 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5449 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5450 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5456 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5457 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5458 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5460 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5461 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5462 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5466 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5467 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5468 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5470 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5472 if payment_data.is_some() {
5473 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5475 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5478 if payment_data.is_none() {
5479 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5481 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5485 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5493 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5494 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5495 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5498 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5499 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5500 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5501 let mut payment_id = None;
5502 let mut payment_secret = None;
5503 let mut payee = None;
5504 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5505 (0, session_priv, required),
5506 (1, payment_id, option),
5507 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5508 (3, payment_secret, option),
5509 (4, path, vec_type),
5512 if payment_id.is_none() {
5513 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5515 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5517 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5518 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5519 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5520 path: path.unwrap(),
5521 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5526 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5527 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5532 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5533 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5535 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5537 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5538 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5539 (0, session_priv, required),
5540 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5541 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5542 (3, payment_secret, option),
5543 (4, path, vec_type),
5547 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5549 field.write(writer)?;
5556 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5557 (0, LightningError) => {
5561 (0, failure_code, required),
5562 (2, data, vec_type),
5566 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5568 (0, forward_info, required),
5569 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5570 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5571 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5574 (0, htlc_id, required),
5575 (2, err_packet, required),
5579 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5580 (0, payment_secret, required),
5581 (2, expiry_time, required),
5582 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5583 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5584 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5587 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5589 (0, session_privs, required),
5592 (0, session_privs, required),
5593 (1, payment_hash, option),
5596 (0, session_privs, required),
5597 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
5598 (2, payment_hash, required),
5599 (4, payment_secret, option),
5600 (6, total_msat, required),
5601 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5602 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5606 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5607 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5608 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5609 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5610 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5613 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5614 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5616 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5618 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5620 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5621 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5622 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5625 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5626 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5627 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5628 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5629 unfunded_channels += 1;
5632 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5633 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5634 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5635 channel.write(writer)?;
5639 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5640 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5641 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5642 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5643 for forward in pending_forwards {
5644 forward.write(writer)?;
5648 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5649 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5650 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5651 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5652 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5653 htlc.write(writer)?;
5657 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5658 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5659 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5660 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5661 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5662 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5665 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5666 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5667 for event in events.iter() {
5668 event.write(writer)?;
5671 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5672 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5673 for event in background_events.iter() {
5675 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5677 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5678 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5683 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5684 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5686 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5687 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5688 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5689 hash.write(writer)?;
5690 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5693 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5694 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5695 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5696 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5697 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
5698 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5701 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5702 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5704 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5705 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5706 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5707 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5710 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5714 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5715 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5716 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5718 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5719 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5720 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5725 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5726 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5727 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5734 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5736 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5738 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5739 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5740 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5741 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5742 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5743 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5744 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5745 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5746 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5747 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5748 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5749 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5750 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5752 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5753 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5755 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5756 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5758 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5759 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5760 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5761 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5762 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5763 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5765 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5766 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5767 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5768 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5769 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5770 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5773 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5774 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5776 pub keys_manager: K,
5778 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5780 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5781 pub fee_estimator: F,
5782 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5784 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5785 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5786 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5787 pub chain_monitor: M,
5789 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5790 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5791 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5792 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5793 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5794 /// deserialization.
5796 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5797 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5798 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5800 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5801 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5803 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5804 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5805 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5806 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5808 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5811 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5812 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5815 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5816 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5817 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5818 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5819 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5820 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5823 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5824 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5825 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5826 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5827 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5829 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5830 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5835 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5836 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5837 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5838 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5839 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5840 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5841 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5842 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5845 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5846 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5847 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5851 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5852 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5853 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5854 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5855 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5856 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5859 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5860 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5862 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5863 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5864 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5866 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5868 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5869 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5870 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5871 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5872 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5873 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5874 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
5875 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5876 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5877 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5878 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5879 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5880 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5881 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5882 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5883 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5884 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5885 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5886 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5887 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5888 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5889 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5890 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5891 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5892 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5893 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5894 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5895 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5896 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5897 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5898 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5899 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5900 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5901 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5902 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5903 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5904 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5905 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5906 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5909 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5910 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5911 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5913 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5916 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5917 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5918 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5919 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5920 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5921 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5925 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5926 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5927 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
5928 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5932 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5933 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5934 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5935 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5936 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5937 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5938 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5939 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5940 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5942 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5945 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5946 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5947 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5948 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5949 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5950 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5951 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5952 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5954 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5957 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5958 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5959 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5960 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5961 let peer_state = PeerState {
5962 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5964 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5967 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5968 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5969 for _ in 0..event_count {
5970 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5971 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5975 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5976 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5977 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5978 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5979 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5980 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5981 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5982 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
5986 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5987 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5988 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5989 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5990 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5991 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5995 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5996 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5998 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5999 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6000 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6001 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6002 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6006 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6007 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6008 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6009 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6010 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6011 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6012 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6014 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6015 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6019 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6020 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6021 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6022 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6023 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6024 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6026 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6027 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6028 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6029 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6030 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6031 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6033 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6035 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6036 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6037 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6038 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6039 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6040 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6041 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6043 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6044 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6045 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6046 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6047 if path.is_empty() {
6048 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6049 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6051 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6052 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6053 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6054 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6055 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6056 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6057 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6058 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6060 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6061 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6062 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6063 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6064 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6066 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6067 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6068 total_msat: path_amt,
6069 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6071 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6072 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6081 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6082 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6084 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6085 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6088 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6090 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6091 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6092 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6094 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6096 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6101 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6103 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6104 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6106 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6107 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6110 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6111 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6113 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6115 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6116 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6117 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6118 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6120 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6121 logger: args.logger,
6122 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6125 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6126 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6129 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6130 //connection or two.
6132 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6138 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6139 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6140 use core::time::Duration;
6141 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6142 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6143 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6144 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6146 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6147 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6148 use util::errors::APIError;
6149 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6150 use util::test_utils;
6152 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6154 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6155 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6157 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6160 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6161 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6163 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6164 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6165 thread::spawn(move || {
6167 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6168 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6169 *persistence_lock = true;
6172 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6178 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6179 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6181 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6184 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6189 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6191 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6194 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6201 fn test_notify_limits() {
6202 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6203 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6204 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6205 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6206 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6207 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6209 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6210 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6211 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6212 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6213 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6215 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6217 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6218 // to connect messages with new values
6219 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6220 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6221 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6222 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6224 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6225 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6226 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6227 // ... but the last node should not.
6228 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6229 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6230 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6231 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6233 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6234 // about the channel.
6235 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6236 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6237 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6239 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6241 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6242 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6243 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6244 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6245 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6246 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6248 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6249 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6250 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6252 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6253 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6254 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6255 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6256 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6257 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6259 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6260 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6261 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6262 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6263 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6264 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6265 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6266 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6268 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6269 // the channel info has updated.
6270 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6271 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6272 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6273 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6274 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6275 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6279 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6280 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6282 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6283 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6284 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6285 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6286 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6288 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6289 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6290 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6291 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6292 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6293 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6294 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6296 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6298 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6300 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6301 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6303 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6304 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6305 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6306 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6307 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6309 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6310 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6311 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6313 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6314 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6315 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6316 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6317 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6318 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6319 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6320 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6321 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6323 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6324 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6326 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6327 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6328 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6330 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6331 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6332 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6333 // lightning messages manually.
6334 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6336 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6337 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6338 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6340 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6341 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6343 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6344 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6346 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6347 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6348 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6350 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6351 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6352 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6354 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6356 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6358 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6359 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6362 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6363 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6364 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6365 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6367 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6368 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6369 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6370 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6375 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6376 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6377 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6378 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6383 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6384 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6385 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6386 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6388 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6393 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6394 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6395 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6396 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6397 // fails as expected.
6398 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6399 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6400 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6401 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6402 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6403 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6405 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6406 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6407 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6409 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6410 let params = RouteParameters {
6411 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6412 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6413 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6415 let route = find_route(
6416 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6417 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6419 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6421 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6422 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6423 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6424 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6425 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6427 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6428 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6429 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6431 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6432 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6433 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6434 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6435 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6436 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6437 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6438 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6439 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6441 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6442 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6444 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6445 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6446 let route = find_route(
6447 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6448 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6450 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6452 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6453 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6454 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6455 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6456 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6458 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6459 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6460 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6462 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6463 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6464 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6465 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6466 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6468 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6469 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6470 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6472 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6473 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6474 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6475 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6476 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6477 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6478 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6479 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6480 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6482 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6483 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6487 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6488 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6489 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6490 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6491 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6492 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6493 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6495 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6496 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6497 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6498 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6500 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6501 let params = RouteParameters {
6502 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6503 final_value_msat: 10000,
6504 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6506 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6507 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6508 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6509 let route = find_route(
6510 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6511 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6514 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6515 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6516 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6519 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6520 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6521 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6522 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6523 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6524 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6525 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6527 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6531 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6532 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6533 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6534 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6535 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6536 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6538 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6539 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6540 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6541 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6543 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6544 let params = RouteParameters {
6545 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6546 final_value_msat: 10000,
6547 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6549 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6550 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6551 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6552 let route = find_route(
6553 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6554 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6557 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6558 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6559 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6560 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6563 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6564 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6565 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6566 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6567 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6568 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6569 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6571 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6575 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6576 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6577 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6578 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6579 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6581 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6582 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6583 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6584 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6586 // Marshall an MPP route.
6587 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6588 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6589 route.paths.push(path);
6590 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6591 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6592 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6593 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6594 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6595 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6597 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6598 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6599 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6600 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6605 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6608 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6609 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6610 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6611 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6612 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6613 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6614 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6615 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6616 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
6617 use util::test_utils;
6618 use util::config::UserConfig;
6619 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6621 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6622 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6623 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6625 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6629 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6630 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6631 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6632 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6633 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6634 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6635 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6640 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6641 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6644 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6645 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6646 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6648 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6649 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6651 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6652 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6654 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6655 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6657 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6658 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6659 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6660 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6661 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6663 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6665 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6667 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6668 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6669 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6670 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6671 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6673 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6675 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6677 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6678 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6679 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6680 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6681 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6684 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6685 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6686 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6688 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6689 } else { panic!(); }
6691 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6692 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6694 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6697 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6700 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6701 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6703 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6704 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6705 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6706 match msg_events[0] {
6707 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6708 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6709 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6713 match msg_events[1] {
6714 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6718 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6720 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6721 macro_rules! send_payment {
6722 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6723 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6724 let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6725 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6726 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6727 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6728 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6730 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6731 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6733 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6734 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
6736 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6737 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6738 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6739 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6740 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6741 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6742 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6743 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6745 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6746 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6747 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6749 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6750 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6751 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6752 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6753 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6755 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6758 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6759 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6760 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6761 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6763 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6768 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6769 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);