1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
52 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
53 use util::config::UserConfig;
54 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
55 use util::{byte_utils, events};
56 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
58 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
59 use util::errors::APIError;
64 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
67 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
68 use core::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
73 use util::crypto::sign;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
101 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
104 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
105 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
111 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
112 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
113 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
114 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
115 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
120 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
121 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
124 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
127 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
128 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
131 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
133 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
135 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
136 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
137 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
139 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
141 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
149 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
150 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
151 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
152 short_channel_id: u64,
154 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
155 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
157 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
158 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
163 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
165 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
166 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
167 _legacy_hop_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
169 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
170 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
173 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
174 struct ClaimableHTLC {
175 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
177 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
179 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
181 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
185 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
186 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
187 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
188 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
190 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
191 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
196 impl Readable for PaymentId {
197 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
198 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
202 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
203 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
204 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
205 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
206 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
209 session_priv: SecretKey,
210 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
211 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
212 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
213 payment_id: PaymentId,
214 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
215 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
218 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
219 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
220 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
222 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
224 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
226 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
229 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
230 payment_id.hash(hasher);
231 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
232 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
233 payment_params.hash(hasher);
238 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
241 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
242 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
244 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
245 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
246 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
247 payment_secret: None,
248 payment_params: None,
253 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
254 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
256 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
264 struct ReceiveError {
270 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
271 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
273 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
278 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
280 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
281 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
282 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
283 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
284 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
286 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
287 err: msgs::LightningError,
288 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
289 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
291 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
293 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
295 err: LightningError {
297 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
298 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
305 shutdown_finish: None,
309 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
311 err: LightningError {
313 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
316 shutdown_finish: None,
320 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
321 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
324 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
326 err: LightningError {
328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
329 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
335 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
336 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
340 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
343 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
345 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
346 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
350 log_level: Level::Warn,
353 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
355 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
357 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
359 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
360 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
366 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
368 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
369 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
377 shutdown_finish: None,
382 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
383 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
384 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
385 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
386 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
388 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
389 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
390 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
391 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
392 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
393 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
394 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
396 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
400 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
401 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
402 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
403 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
404 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
405 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
406 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
407 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
409 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
410 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
411 /// and via the classic SCID.
413 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
414 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
415 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
416 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
417 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
418 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
419 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
421 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
422 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
423 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
424 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
427 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
428 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
429 /// quite some time lag.
430 enum BackgroundEvent {
431 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
432 /// commitment transaction.
433 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
436 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
437 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
439 latest_features: InitFeatures,
442 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
443 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
445 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
448 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
449 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
450 struct PendingInboundPayment {
451 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
452 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
453 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
454 /// this payment being removed.
456 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
457 user_payment_id: u64,
458 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
459 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
460 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
463 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
464 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
465 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
467 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
470 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
471 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
472 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
473 pending_amt_msat: u64,
474 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
475 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
476 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
478 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
479 starting_block_height: u32,
481 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
482 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
483 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
485 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
486 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
488 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
489 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
490 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
491 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
492 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
494 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
496 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
497 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
501 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
502 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
504 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
508 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
510 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
514 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
516 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
520 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
522 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
527 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
532 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
536 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
537 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
538 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
542 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
545 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
546 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
549 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
550 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
551 let our_payment_hash;
552 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
553 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
554 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
556 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
557 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
558 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
562 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
566 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
567 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
568 let remove_res = match self {
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
571 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
572 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
573 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
577 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
578 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
579 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
580 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
581 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
582 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
589 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
590 let insert_res = match self {
591 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
592 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
593 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
595 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
596 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
599 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
600 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
601 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
602 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
603 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
610 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
612 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
613 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
614 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
615 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
622 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
623 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
624 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
625 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
626 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
627 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
628 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
630 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
631 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
633 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
634 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
635 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
636 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
637 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
638 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
639 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
640 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
642 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
643 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
645 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
646 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
648 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
649 /// to individual Channels.
651 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
652 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
653 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
654 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
656 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
657 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
658 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
659 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
660 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
661 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
662 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
664 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
665 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
666 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
667 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
670 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
671 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
672 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
673 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
674 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
676 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
677 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
678 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
679 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
680 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
681 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
682 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
683 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
684 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
685 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
688 default_configuration: UserConfig,
689 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
695 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
697 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
698 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
700 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
701 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
702 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
703 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
705 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
706 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
707 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
708 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
709 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
710 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
712 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
713 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
714 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
715 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
716 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
717 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
718 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
719 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
721 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
723 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
724 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
726 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
727 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
728 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
729 /// active channel list on load.
730 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
732 our_network_key: SecretKey,
733 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
735 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
737 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
738 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
739 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
741 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
742 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
744 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
745 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
746 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
748 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
749 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
750 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
751 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
753 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
754 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
755 /// are currently open with that peer.
756 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
757 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
760 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
761 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
763 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
764 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
765 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
766 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
767 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
768 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
769 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
770 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
771 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
773 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
780 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
782 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
783 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
784 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
785 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
786 pub struct ChainParameters {
787 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
788 pub network: Network,
790 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
792 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
793 pub best_block: BestBlock,
796 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
802 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
803 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
804 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
805 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
806 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
807 /// updates are ready for persistence).
809 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
810 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
811 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
812 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
813 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
815 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
816 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
819 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
820 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
821 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
824 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
825 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
827 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
828 persistence_notifier: notifier,
829 should_persist: persist_check,
830 _read_guard: read_guard,
835 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
837 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
838 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
843 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
844 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
846 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
848 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
849 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
850 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
851 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
852 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
854 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
855 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
857 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
859 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
860 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
861 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
862 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
863 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
864 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
865 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
867 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
868 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
870 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
871 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
872 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
873 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
875 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
876 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
877 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
878 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
879 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
880 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
883 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
885 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
886 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
889 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
891 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
892 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
893 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
895 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
896 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
898 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
899 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
900 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
901 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
902 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
903 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
904 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
905 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
906 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
907 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
908 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
911 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
912 /// to better separate parameters.
913 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
914 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
915 /// The node_id of our counterparty
916 pub node_id: PublicKey,
917 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
918 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
919 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
920 pub features: InitFeatures,
921 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
922 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
923 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
925 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
927 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
928 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
929 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
930 /// payments to us through this channel.
931 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
932 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
933 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
934 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
935 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
936 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
937 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
940 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
941 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
942 pub struct ChannelDetails {
943 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
944 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
945 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
946 /// lifetime of the channel.
947 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
948 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
949 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
950 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
951 /// our counterparty already.
953 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
954 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
955 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
956 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
958 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
959 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
960 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
961 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
963 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
964 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
966 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
967 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
968 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
969 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
970 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
971 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
972 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
974 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
975 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
977 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
978 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
979 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
980 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
981 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
982 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
983 /// this value on chain.
985 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
987 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
989 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
990 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
991 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
992 pub user_channel_id: u64,
993 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
994 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
995 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
997 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
998 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
999 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1000 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1002 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1003 pub balance_msat: u64,
1004 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1005 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1006 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1007 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1009 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1011 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1012 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1013 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1014 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1015 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1016 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1017 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1018 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1020 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1021 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1022 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1023 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1024 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1025 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1026 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1028 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1029 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1030 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1031 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1032 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1033 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1034 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1035 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1036 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1038 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1040 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1041 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1042 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1043 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1044 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1045 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1046 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1047 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1048 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1050 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1051 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1052 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1053 pub is_outbound: bool,
1054 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1055 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1056 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1057 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1058 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1060 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1061 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1062 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1063 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1065 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1066 pub is_usable: bool,
1067 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1068 pub is_public: bool,
1069 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1070 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1071 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1072 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1073 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1076 impl ChannelDetails {
1077 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1078 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1079 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1081 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1082 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1083 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1084 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1088 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1089 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1090 /// states for more.
1091 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1092 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1093 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1094 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1095 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1096 ParameterError(APIError),
1097 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1098 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1099 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1100 /// payment in full.
1102 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1104 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1105 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1106 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1107 /// paths than the ones selected).
1108 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1109 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1110 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1111 /// in over-/re-payment.
1113 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1114 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1115 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1117 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1118 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1119 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1120 /// with the latest update_id.
1122 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1123 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1124 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1125 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1126 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1127 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1128 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1129 payment_id: PaymentId,
1133 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1135 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1137 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1138 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1139 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1140 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1142 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1143 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1144 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1147 macro_rules! handle_error {
1148 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1151 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1152 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1154 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1155 // entering the macro.
1156 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1157 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1160 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1162 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1163 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1164 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1165 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1169 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1170 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1171 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1172 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1177 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1178 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1180 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1181 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1182 action: err.action.clone()
1186 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1187 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1190 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1197 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1198 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1199 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1200 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1202 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1203 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1204 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1205 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1206 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1208 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1209 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1211 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1215 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1216 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1217 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1219 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1220 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1222 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1223 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1225 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1226 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1227 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1228 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1229 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1230 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1232 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1233 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1234 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1235 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1236 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1237 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1243 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1244 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1248 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1250 $entry.remove_entry();
1258 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1259 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1263 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1265 $entry.remove_entry();
1273 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1274 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1276 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1277 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1283 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1284 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1286 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1287 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1288 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1289 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1290 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1291 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1292 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1293 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1294 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1295 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1296 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1297 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1298 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1299 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1302 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1303 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1304 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1305 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1306 match $action_type {
1307 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1308 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1310 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1311 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1313 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1314 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1315 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1316 if !$resend_commitment {
1317 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1320 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1322 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1323 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1327 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1328 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1330 $entry.remove_entry();
1334 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1335 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1336 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1338 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1339 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1341 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1342 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1344 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1345 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1349 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1350 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1351 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1353 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1354 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1358 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1359 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1360 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1361 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1362 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1365 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1370 macro_rules! send_funding_locked {
1371 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $funding_locked_msg: expr) => {
1372 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1373 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1374 msg: $funding_locked_msg,
1376 // Note that we may send a funding locked multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1377 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1378 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1379 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1380 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1381 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1382 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1383 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1384 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1389 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1390 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1391 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1392 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1393 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1395 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1396 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1397 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1399 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1400 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1401 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1402 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1405 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1406 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1407 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1408 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1409 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1410 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1411 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1412 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1413 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1414 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1415 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1416 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1419 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1420 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1421 // before it should be allowed to.
1422 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1423 send_funding_locked!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1425 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1426 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1427 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1432 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1433 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1434 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1435 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1436 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1437 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1438 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1439 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1440 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1441 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1442 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1443 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1444 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1445 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1446 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1447 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1448 let mut order = $order;
1450 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1452 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1456 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1457 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1458 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1459 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1464 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1465 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1466 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1467 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1468 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1473 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1477 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1482 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1483 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1484 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1489 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1490 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1491 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1492 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1493 assert!(res.is_ok());
1496 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1500 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1501 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1502 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1504 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1506 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1507 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1512 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1513 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1514 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1515 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1516 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1519 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1521 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1522 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1524 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1526 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1527 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1528 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1529 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1530 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1531 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1532 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1533 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1535 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1536 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1537 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1541 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1543 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1544 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1545 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1546 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1547 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1548 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1550 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1551 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1552 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1554 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1555 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1558 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1559 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1561 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1562 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1564 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1566 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1567 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1568 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1569 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1577 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1578 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1579 &self.default_configuration
1582 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1583 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1584 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1587 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1588 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1590 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1592 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1596 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1601 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1603 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1604 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1605 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1606 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1607 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1610 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1611 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1613 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1614 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1615 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1617 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1618 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1619 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1620 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1621 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1622 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1624 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1625 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1626 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1627 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1628 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1629 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1633 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1634 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1635 Some(peer_state) => {
1636 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1637 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1638 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1639 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1640 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1641 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1642 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1646 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1651 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1654 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1656 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1657 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1658 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1660 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1661 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1662 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1663 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1665 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1667 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1670 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1672 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1673 node_id: their_network_key,
1676 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1679 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1680 let mut res = Vec::new();
1682 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1683 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1684 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1685 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1686 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1687 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1688 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1689 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1690 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1691 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1692 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1693 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1694 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1695 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1696 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1697 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1698 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1699 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1700 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1701 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1702 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1704 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1705 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1706 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1707 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1708 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1709 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1710 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1711 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1712 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1713 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1714 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1715 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1716 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1717 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1718 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1719 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1720 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1721 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1722 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1723 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1724 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat()
1728 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1729 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1730 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1731 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1737 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1738 /// more information.
1739 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1740 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1743 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1744 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1746 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1747 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1749 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1750 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1751 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1752 // really wanted anyway.
1753 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1756 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1757 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1758 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1759 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1760 Some(transaction) => {
1761 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1765 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1766 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1767 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1768 reason: closure_reason
1772 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1773 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1775 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1776 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1777 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1778 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1779 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1781 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1782 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1784 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1785 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1786 Some(peer_state) => {
1787 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1788 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1789 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1791 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1793 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1795 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1796 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1797 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1798 let (result, is_permanent) =
1799 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1801 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1807 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1808 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1812 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1813 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1814 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1815 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1819 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1827 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1828 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1831 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1835 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1836 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1837 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1839 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1840 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1842 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1843 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1844 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1845 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1847 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1849 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1850 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1851 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1852 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1853 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1856 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1857 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1858 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1860 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1861 /// the channel being closed or not:
1862 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1863 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1864 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1865 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1866 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1867 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1868 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1870 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1872 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1873 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1874 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1875 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1876 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1880 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1881 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1882 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1883 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1884 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1886 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1887 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1888 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1889 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1890 // ignore the result here.
1891 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1895 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1896 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1897 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1899 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1900 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1901 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1902 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1903 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1904 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1907 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1908 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1909 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1912 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1914 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1916 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1919 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1920 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1921 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1922 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1923 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1928 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1931 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1932 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1933 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1935 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1936 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1937 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1938 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1939 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1940 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1941 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1951 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1952 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1953 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1954 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1955 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1959 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1960 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1962 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1963 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1964 return Err(ReceiveError {
1965 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1967 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
1970 // final_expiry_too_soon
1971 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1972 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1973 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1974 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1975 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1976 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1977 return Err(ReceiveError {
1979 err_data: Vec::new(),
1980 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1983 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1984 return Err(ReceiveError {
1986 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
1987 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1991 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1992 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
1993 return Err(ReceiveError {
1994 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1995 err_data: Vec::new(),
1996 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1999 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2000 return Err(ReceiveError {
2001 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2002 err_data: Vec::new(),
2003 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2006 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2007 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2008 return Err(ReceiveError {
2009 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2010 err_data: Vec::new(),
2011 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2013 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2014 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2016 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2017 phantom_shared_secret,
2019 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2020 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2021 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2022 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2023 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2024 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2025 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2026 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2027 return Err(ReceiveError {
2028 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2029 err_data: Vec::new(),
2030 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2034 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2036 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2039 return Err(ReceiveError {
2040 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2041 err_data: Vec::new(),
2042 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2047 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2050 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2051 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2052 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2056 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2057 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2058 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2060 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2061 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2062 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2063 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2064 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2065 failure_code: $err_code,
2066 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2071 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2072 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2075 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2077 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2078 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2079 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2080 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2081 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2082 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2083 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2084 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2087 let mut channel_state = None;
2088 macro_rules! return_err {
2089 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2091 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2092 if channel_state.is_none() {
2093 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2095 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2096 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2097 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2098 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2099 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2104 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2106 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2107 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2109 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2110 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2114 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2115 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2117 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2119 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2120 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2121 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2122 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2123 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2125 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2128 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2129 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2131 let blinding_factor = {
2132 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2133 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2134 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2135 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2138 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2140 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2142 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2145 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2146 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2149 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2150 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2151 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2152 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2153 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2157 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2158 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2159 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2162 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2163 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2164 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2165 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2170 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2171 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2172 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2173 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2174 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2175 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2176 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2177 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2178 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2179 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2180 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2182 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2185 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2188 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2190 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2191 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2192 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2193 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2194 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2195 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2196 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2198 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2199 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2200 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2201 // we don't have the channel here.
2202 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2204 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2206 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2207 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2208 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2209 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2210 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2211 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2212 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2214 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2215 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2217 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2218 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2219 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2220 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2221 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2223 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2224 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2226 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2227 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2229 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2230 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2231 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2232 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2233 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2234 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2236 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2237 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2239 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2240 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2241 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2242 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2243 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2244 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2245 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2246 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2247 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2248 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2254 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2255 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2256 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2257 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2259 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2260 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2262 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2263 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2264 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2266 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2267 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2268 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2270 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2275 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2278 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2279 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2280 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2282 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2283 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2284 if !chan.should_announce() {
2285 return Err(LightningError {
2286 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2287 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2290 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2291 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2294 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2295 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2296 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2297 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2298 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2299 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2300 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2301 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2302 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2306 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2308 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2309 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2310 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2312 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2313 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2315 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2316 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2317 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2318 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2319 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2320 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2321 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2322 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2325 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2326 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2328 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2334 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2335 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2336 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2337 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2338 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2339 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2341 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2342 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2343 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2344 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2345 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2347 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2349 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2351 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2352 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2354 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2355 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2356 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2357 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2358 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2359 err: "Payment already completed"
2364 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2365 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2366 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2369 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2371 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2372 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2373 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2374 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2375 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2376 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2377 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2378 total_msat: total_value,
2380 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2384 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2385 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2387 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2388 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2390 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2391 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2393 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2394 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2396 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2397 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2399 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2400 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2401 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2402 channel_state, chan)
2404 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2405 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2406 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2407 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2408 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2409 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2410 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2411 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2412 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2413 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2415 insert_outbound_payment!();
2417 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2419 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2420 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2421 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2422 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2423 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2424 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2430 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2432 } else { unreachable!(); }
2436 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2437 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2439 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2444 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2446 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2447 /// fields for more info.
2449 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2450 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2451 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2452 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2453 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2454 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2456 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2458 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2459 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2460 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2462 /// In general, a path may raise:
2463 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2464 /// node public key) is specified.
2465 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2466 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2468 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2469 /// relevant updates.
2471 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2472 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2473 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2475 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2476 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2477 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2478 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2480 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2481 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2482 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2483 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2484 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2487 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2488 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2489 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2491 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2492 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2493 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2494 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2495 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2497 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2498 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2500 let mut total_value = 0;
2501 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2502 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2503 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2504 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2505 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2506 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2507 continue 'path_check;
2509 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2510 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2511 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2512 continue 'path_check;
2515 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2516 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2518 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2519 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2521 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2522 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2523 total_value = amt_msat;
2526 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2527 let mut results = Vec::new();
2528 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2529 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2531 let mut has_ok = false;
2532 let mut has_err = false;
2533 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2534 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2535 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2536 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2537 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2538 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2539 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2543 } else if res.is_err() {
2544 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2545 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2548 if has_err && has_ok {
2549 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2552 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2553 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2554 Some(RouteParameters {
2555 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2556 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2557 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2563 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2564 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2565 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2566 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2572 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2574 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2575 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2576 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2577 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2578 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2580 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2581 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2582 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2583 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2584 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2585 if path.len() == 0 {
2586 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2587 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2592 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2593 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2594 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2596 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2597 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2599 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2600 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2601 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2602 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2605 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2607 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2608 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2609 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2612 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2613 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2614 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2617 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2618 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2619 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2624 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2625 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2629 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2632 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2634 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2635 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2636 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2637 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2639 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2640 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2641 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2643 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2644 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2645 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2646 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2647 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2649 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2650 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2651 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2652 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2653 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2655 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2663 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2664 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2665 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2666 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2667 /// never reach the recipient.
2669 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2671 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2672 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2674 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2676 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2677 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2678 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2680 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2682 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2683 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2684 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2689 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2690 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2691 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2692 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2694 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2696 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2698 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2699 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2700 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2701 } else { unreachable!(); })
2704 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2706 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2707 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2710 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2711 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2716 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2717 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2718 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2721 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2722 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2723 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2725 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2733 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2734 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2735 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2739 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2741 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2742 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2744 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2745 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2747 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2748 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2749 /// keys per-channel).
2751 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2752 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2753 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2755 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2756 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2757 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2759 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2760 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2761 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2762 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2764 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2765 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2766 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2767 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2771 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2772 let mut output_index = None;
2773 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2774 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2775 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2776 if output_index.is_some() {
2777 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2778 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2781 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2782 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2783 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2786 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2789 if output_index.is_none() {
2790 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2791 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2794 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2799 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2800 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2801 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2803 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2806 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2807 // smaller than 500:
2808 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2810 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2811 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2812 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2813 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2814 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2815 /// our network addresses.
2817 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2818 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2820 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2821 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2822 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2823 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2825 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2827 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2828 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2829 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2831 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2832 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2835 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2836 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2837 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2839 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2840 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2841 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2842 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2843 rgb, alias, addresses,
2844 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2845 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2847 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2848 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2850 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2851 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2853 let mut announced_chans = false;
2854 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2855 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2856 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2858 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2863 announced_chans = true;
2865 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2866 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2867 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2871 if announced_chans {
2872 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2873 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2874 signature: node_announce_sig,
2875 contents: announcement
2881 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2883 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2884 /// Will likely generate further events.
2885 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2886 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2888 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2889 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2890 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2891 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2893 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2894 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2896 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2897 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2898 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2899 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2901 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2902 match forward_info {
2903 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2904 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2905 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2906 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2907 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2909 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2910 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2911 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2912 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2913 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2914 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2915 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2917 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2918 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
2924 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2925 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2926 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
2927 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
2928 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2930 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2931 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2932 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2933 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2934 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2936 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2938 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2939 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2943 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2944 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2945 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2946 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2952 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2955 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2958 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2959 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2960 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2961 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2962 // problem, not ours.
2969 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2970 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2971 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2972 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2973 match forward_info {
2974 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2975 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2977 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2978 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2979 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2980 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2981 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2982 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2983 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2984 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2985 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
2986 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2988 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2990 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2991 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2993 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2995 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
2996 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2997 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3003 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3005 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3006 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3007 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3008 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3009 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3010 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3011 // this channel currently :/.
3017 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3018 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3020 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3021 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3022 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3024 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3025 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3027 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3029 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3030 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3031 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3034 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3036 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3037 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3038 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3039 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3040 // messages when we can.
3041 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3042 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3043 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3050 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3051 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3054 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3055 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3056 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3057 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3058 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3059 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3061 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3062 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3063 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3064 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3065 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3067 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3069 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3073 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3074 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3077 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3078 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3079 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3080 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3081 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3082 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3083 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3084 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3085 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3087 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3095 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3096 match forward_info {
3097 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3098 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3099 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3100 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3101 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3102 let _legacy_hop_data = payment_data.clone();
3103 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3105 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3106 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3108 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3111 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3112 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3113 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3114 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3115 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3116 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3117 phantom_shared_secret,
3119 value: amt_to_forward,
3121 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3126 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3128 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3129 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3130 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3132 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3133 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3134 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3135 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3136 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3137 phantom_shared_secret,
3139 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3144 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3145 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3146 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3147 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3148 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3149 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3150 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3151 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3152 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3156 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3157 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3158 total_value += htlc.value;
3159 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3160 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3161 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3162 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3163 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3164 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3166 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3168 _ => unreachable!(),
3171 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3172 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3173 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3174 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3175 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3176 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3177 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3179 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3180 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3181 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3185 payment_received_generated = true;
3187 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3188 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3190 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3192 payment_received_generated
3196 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3197 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3198 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3199 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3200 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3201 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3202 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3203 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3204 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3205 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3206 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3207 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3208 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3209 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3211 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3215 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3217 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3218 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3219 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3220 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3221 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3223 amt: amt_to_forward,
3224 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3228 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3229 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3235 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3236 if payment_data.is_none() {
3237 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3238 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3241 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3242 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3243 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3244 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3245 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3246 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3247 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3248 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3250 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3251 if payment_received_generated {
3252 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3258 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3259 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3267 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3268 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3270 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3272 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3273 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3276 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3277 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3278 events.append(&mut new_events);
3281 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3283 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3284 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3286 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3287 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3288 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3289 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3290 if background_events.is_empty() {
3294 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3296 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3297 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3298 // monitor updating completing.
3299 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3306 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3307 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3308 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3309 self.process_background_events();
3312 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3313 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3314 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3315 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3316 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3317 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3318 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3320 if !chan.is_live() {
3321 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3322 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3323 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3325 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3326 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3328 let mut retain_channel = true;
3329 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3332 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3333 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3337 let ret_err = match res {
3338 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3339 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3340 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3341 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3344 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3345 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3346 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3347 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3348 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3349 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3350 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3351 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3361 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3365 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3366 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3367 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3368 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3369 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3370 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3371 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3373 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3375 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3377 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3378 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3379 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3380 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3381 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3382 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3383 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3385 handle_errors.push(err);
3395 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3397 /// This currently includes:
3398 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3399 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3400 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3403 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3404 /// estimate fetches.
3405 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3406 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3407 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3408 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3410 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3412 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3413 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3415 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3416 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3417 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3418 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3419 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3420 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3421 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3422 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3424 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3426 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3428 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3429 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3430 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3431 if needs_close { return false; }
3434 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3435 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3436 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3437 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3438 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3439 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3440 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3441 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3445 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3446 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3448 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3449 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3450 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3454 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3455 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3463 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3464 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3465 // This should be unreachable
3466 debug_assert!(false);
3469 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3470 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3471 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3472 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3474 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3475 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3476 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3478 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3486 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3487 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3490 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3491 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3497 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3498 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3499 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3500 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3501 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3502 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3503 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3505 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3506 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3507 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3508 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3509 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3510 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3511 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3512 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3513 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3514 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3515 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3521 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3522 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3524 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3526 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3527 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3528 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3529 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3530 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3531 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3532 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3534 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3536 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3537 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3539 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3544 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3545 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3546 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3547 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3548 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3549 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3550 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3551 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3552 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3554 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3555 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3556 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3557 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3559 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3560 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3561 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3562 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3563 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3567 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3568 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3569 // be surfaced to the user.
3570 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3571 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3573 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3574 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3575 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3576 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3577 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3581 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3582 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3583 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3585 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3586 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3587 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3588 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3589 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3590 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3591 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3592 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3593 Some(RouteParameters {
3594 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3595 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3596 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3599 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3600 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3601 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3603 rejected_by_dest: false,
3604 network_update: None,
3605 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3607 short_channel_id: None,
3614 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3615 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3617 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3623 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3630 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3631 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3632 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3633 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3634 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3635 /// still-available channels.
3636 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3637 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3638 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3639 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3642 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3643 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3644 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3646 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3647 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3648 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3649 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3650 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3651 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3652 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3653 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3654 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3657 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3658 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3661 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3662 all_paths_failed = true;
3663 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3664 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3666 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3672 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3675 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3676 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3677 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3678 Some(RouteParameters {
3679 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3680 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3681 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3684 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3686 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3687 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3689 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3691 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3692 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3693 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3694 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3695 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3696 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3697 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3698 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3705 error_code: onion_error_code,
3707 error_data: onion_error_data
3710 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3716 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3717 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3718 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3719 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3721 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3722 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3723 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3724 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3725 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3726 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3727 network_update: None,
3730 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3733 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3735 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3739 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3740 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3741 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3743 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3744 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3745 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3746 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3747 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3748 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3749 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3750 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3752 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3753 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3756 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3757 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3758 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3762 let mut forward_event = None;
3763 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3764 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3766 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3768 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3770 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3771 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3774 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3775 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3776 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3777 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3778 time_forwardable: time
3785 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3786 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3788 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3789 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3790 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3791 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3793 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3794 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3796 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3797 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3798 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3799 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3800 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3801 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3803 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3805 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3806 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3807 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3808 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3810 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3811 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3812 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3813 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3815 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3816 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3817 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3818 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3819 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3821 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3822 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3823 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3829 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3830 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3831 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3833 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3834 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3835 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3836 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3837 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3838 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3839 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3841 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3842 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3843 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3844 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3845 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3846 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3847 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3848 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3850 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3851 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3852 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3853 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3854 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3855 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3857 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3862 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3863 // which were generated.
3864 channel_state.take();
3866 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3867 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3868 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3875 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3876 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3877 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3878 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3879 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3881 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3885 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3886 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3887 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3888 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3889 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3890 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3891 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3892 payment_preimage, e);
3893 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3894 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3895 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3896 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3899 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3900 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3901 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3902 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3903 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3904 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3905 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3906 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3907 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3908 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3914 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3916 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3919 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3920 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3921 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3922 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3923 payment_preimage, e);
3925 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3926 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3928 chan.remove_entry();
3930 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3933 } else { unreachable!(); }
3936 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3937 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3938 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3939 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3940 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3941 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3942 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3943 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3944 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3945 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3946 pending_events.push(
3947 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3949 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3954 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3962 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3964 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3965 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3966 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3967 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3968 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3969 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3970 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3971 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3972 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3973 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3974 pending_events.push(
3975 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3976 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3982 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3986 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3987 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3988 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3990 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3991 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3992 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3993 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3994 pending_events.push(
3995 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4003 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4008 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4011 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4012 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4013 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4014 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4015 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4016 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4017 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4020 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4021 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4022 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4023 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4024 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4027 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4028 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4029 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4030 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4031 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4032 payment_preimage, e);
4034 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4035 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4036 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4037 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4040 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4041 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4042 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4043 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4047 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4048 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4049 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4052 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4054 let source_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4055 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4058 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4066 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4067 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4068 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4071 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4072 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4074 let chan_restoration_res;
4075 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4076 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4077 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4078 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4079 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4080 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4082 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4086 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4087 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4088 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4089 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4090 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4091 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4093 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4094 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4095 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4100 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4101 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4102 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4104 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4106 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4107 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4108 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4109 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4113 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4116 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4118 /// For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4119 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4120 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel` call.
4122 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4123 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4124 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4125 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4127 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4128 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4129 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4130 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4131 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4132 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4134 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4135 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4136 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4139 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4140 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4146 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4147 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4148 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4151 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4152 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4155 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4156 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4157 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4158 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4161 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4162 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4166 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4167 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4168 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4170 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4171 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4173 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4174 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4175 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4176 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4177 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4180 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4181 pending_events.push(
4182 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4183 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4184 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4185 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4186 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4187 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4192 entry.insert(channel);
4198 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4199 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4200 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4201 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4202 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4203 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4204 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4205 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4207 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4208 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4210 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4213 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4214 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4215 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4216 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4217 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4219 user_channel_id: user_id,
4224 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4225 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4226 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4227 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4228 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4229 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4231 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4232 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4234 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4236 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4239 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4240 // lock before watch_channel
4241 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4243 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4244 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4245 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4246 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4247 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4248 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4249 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4250 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4251 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4252 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4253 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4255 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4256 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4257 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4258 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4259 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4260 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4264 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4265 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4266 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4267 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4268 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4270 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4271 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4272 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4281 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4283 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4284 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4285 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4286 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4287 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4288 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4289 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4291 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4292 Ok(update) => update,
4293 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4295 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4296 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4297 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4298 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4299 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4300 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4301 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4302 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4309 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4312 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4313 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4317 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4318 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4319 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4320 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4321 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4322 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4323 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4325 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4326 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4327 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4329 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4330 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4331 msg: announcement_sigs,
4333 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4334 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4335 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4336 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4337 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4338 // announcement_signatures.
4339 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4340 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4341 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4342 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4349 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4353 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4354 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4355 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4356 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4357 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4359 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4360 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4361 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4362 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4365 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4366 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4367 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4368 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4371 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4372 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4374 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4375 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4376 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4377 let (result, is_permanent) =
4378 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4380 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4386 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4387 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4388 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4395 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4398 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4399 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4402 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4406 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4407 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4408 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4409 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4410 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4411 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4412 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4413 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4415 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4416 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4417 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4418 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4423 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4424 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4425 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4426 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4427 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4428 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4429 } else { (tx, None) }
4431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4434 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4435 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4436 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4438 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4439 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4440 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4441 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4445 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4450 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4451 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4452 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4453 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4455 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4456 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4457 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4458 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4460 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4461 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4463 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4464 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4465 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4466 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4469 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4470 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4471 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4472 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4473 match pending_forward_info {
4474 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4475 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4476 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4477 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4479 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4481 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4482 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4483 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4486 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4488 _ => pending_forward_info
4491 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4493 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4498 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4499 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4500 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4501 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4502 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4503 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4504 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4505 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4507 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4509 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4512 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4516 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4517 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4518 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4519 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4520 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4521 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4522 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4524 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4526 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4531 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4532 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4533 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4534 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4536 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4537 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4539 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4540 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4541 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4543 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4546 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4550 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4551 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4552 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4553 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4554 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4555 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4556 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4558 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4559 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4560 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4561 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4562 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4563 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4564 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4569 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4570 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4572 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4573 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4574 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4576 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4577 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4578 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4579 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4580 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4581 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4582 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4583 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4585 commitment_signed: msg,
4591 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4596 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4597 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4598 let mut forward_event = None;
4599 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4600 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4601 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4602 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4604 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4605 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4606 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4607 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4608 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4610 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4611 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4612 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4614 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4615 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4616 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4621 match forward_event {
4623 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4624 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4625 time_forwardable: time
4633 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4634 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4636 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4637 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4638 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4639 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4640 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4641 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4643 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4644 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4645 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4646 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4647 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4648 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4649 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4650 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4651 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4652 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4653 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4655 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4656 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4657 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4658 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4659 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4661 } else { unreachable!(); }
4664 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4665 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4666 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4670 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4671 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4672 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4673 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4674 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4676 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4679 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4681 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4682 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4684 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4685 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4687 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4688 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4695 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4696 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4697 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4698 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4699 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4700 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4701 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4703 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4710 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4711 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4712 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4714 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4715 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4716 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4717 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4719 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4720 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4723 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4724 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4725 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4726 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4727 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4728 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4731 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4736 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4737 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4738 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4739 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4740 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4741 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4743 // It's not a local channel
4744 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4747 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4748 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4749 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4750 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4751 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4752 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4753 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4754 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4756 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4758 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4759 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4760 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4761 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4763 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4768 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4771 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4772 let chan_restoration_res;
4773 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4774 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4775 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4777 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4778 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4779 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4780 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4782 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4783 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4784 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4785 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4786 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4787 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4788 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4789 let mut channel_update = None;
4790 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4791 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4792 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4795 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4796 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4797 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4798 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4799 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4800 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4801 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4806 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4807 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4808 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4809 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4810 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4811 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4813 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4818 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4819 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4821 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4822 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4827 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4828 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4829 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4830 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4831 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4832 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4833 match monitor_event {
4834 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4835 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4836 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4837 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4839 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4840 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4843 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4844 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4845 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4846 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4847 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4848 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4849 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4850 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4851 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4852 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4853 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4857 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4858 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4860 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4862 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4863 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4864 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4865 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4866 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4871 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4872 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4877 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4878 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4881 has_pending_monitor_events
4884 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4885 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4886 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4888 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4889 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4892 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4893 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4894 /// update was applied.
4896 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4897 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4898 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4899 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4900 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4901 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4902 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4903 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4905 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4906 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4907 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4908 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4909 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4911 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4912 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4913 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4914 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4915 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4917 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4918 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4919 has_monitor_update = true;
4920 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
4921 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4922 if close_channel { return false; }
4924 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4925 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4926 updates: commitment_update,
4933 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4934 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4935 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4942 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4943 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4944 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4947 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4948 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4954 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4955 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4956 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4957 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4958 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4959 let mut has_update = false;
4961 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4962 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4963 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4964 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4965 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4967 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4968 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4969 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4970 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4972 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4973 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4976 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4977 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4978 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4979 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4980 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4985 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4987 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4988 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4989 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
4995 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4996 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5003 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5004 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5010 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5011 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5013 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5014 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5015 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5016 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5017 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5018 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5019 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5020 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5021 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5022 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5023 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5024 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5025 assert!(should_broadcast);
5026 } else { unreachable!(); }
5027 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5029 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5033 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5034 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5036 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5037 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5040 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5043 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5044 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5045 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5046 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5047 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5048 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5049 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5050 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5051 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5052 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5053 // never fail a payment too early.
5054 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5056 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5059 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5064 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5067 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5068 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5070 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5071 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5072 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5074 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5076 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5077 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5081 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5082 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5084 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5086 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5087 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5088 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5089 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5090 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5091 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5094 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5095 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5097 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5100 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5102 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5104 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5105 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5106 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5107 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5108 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5111 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5112 /// stored external to LDK.
5114 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5115 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5116 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5118 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5119 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5122 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5123 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5124 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5125 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5127 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5128 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5129 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5130 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5131 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5133 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5134 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5135 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5136 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5137 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5139 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5140 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5142 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5143 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5147 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5148 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5150 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5152 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5153 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5154 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5155 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5158 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5159 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5161 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5164 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5166 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5168 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5169 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5172 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5173 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5175 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5176 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5177 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5180 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5181 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5183 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5184 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5185 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5186 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5188 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5189 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5190 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5192 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5197 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5199 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5200 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5202 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5203 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5204 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5208 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5209 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5210 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5211 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5212 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5217 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5218 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5222 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5223 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5227 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5228 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5229 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5230 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5231 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5234 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5235 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5236 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5237 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5239 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5240 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5241 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5242 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5245 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5246 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5248 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5249 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5252 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5253 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5254 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5256 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5257 events.replace(pending_events);
5266 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5268 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5269 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5270 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5271 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5274 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5276 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5277 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5279 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5280 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5281 /// restarting from an old state.
5282 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5283 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5284 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5286 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5287 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5288 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5289 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5292 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5293 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5294 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5297 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5298 handler.handle_event(&event);
5306 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5308 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5309 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5310 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5311 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5314 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5316 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5317 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5318 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5319 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5320 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5323 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5324 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5327 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5328 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5329 let new_height = height - 1;
5331 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5332 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5333 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5334 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5335 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5336 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5339 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5343 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5345 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5346 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5347 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5348 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5351 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5352 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5353 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5354 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5356 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5357 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5359 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5360 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5361 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5363 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5364 if height < last_best_block_height {
5365 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5366 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5370 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5371 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5372 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5373 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5375 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5376 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5378 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5380 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5382 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5384 macro_rules! max_time {
5385 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5387 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5388 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5389 // having an explicit local time source.
5390 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5391 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5392 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5393 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5394 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5400 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5401 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5402 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5403 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5404 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5407 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5408 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5409 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5410 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5411 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5412 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5413 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5414 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5415 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5423 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5424 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5425 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5426 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5427 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5428 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5434 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5435 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5436 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5437 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5438 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5439 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5440 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5441 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5446 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5448 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5449 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5450 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5451 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5454 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5455 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5457 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5458 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5459 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5460 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5461 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5463 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5464 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5466 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5467 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5468 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5469 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5470 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5471 let res = f(channel);
5472 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5473 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5474 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5475 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5479 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5480 send_funding_locked!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, funding_locked);
5481 if channel.is_usable() {
5482 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5483 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5484 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5485 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5490 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5493 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5494 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5495 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5496 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5497 msg: announcement_sigs,
5499 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5500 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5501 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5503 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5504 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5505 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5510 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5511 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5512 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5513 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5514 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5515 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5516 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5520 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5521 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5522 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5523 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5524 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5525 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5526 data: reason_message,
5534 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5535 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5536 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5537 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5538 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5539 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5540 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5541 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5542 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5543 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5544 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5545 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5546 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5551 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5556 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5558 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5559 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5563 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5564 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5565 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5568 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5569 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5570 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5571 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5574 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5575 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5577 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5578 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5581 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5582 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5583 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5584 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5585 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5589 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5590 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5591 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5592 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5596 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5597 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5598 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5599 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5600 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5601 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5604 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5606 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5609 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5610 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5611 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5614 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5615 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5616 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5619 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5620 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5621 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5624 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5625 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5626 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5629 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5630 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5631 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5634 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5635 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5636 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5639 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5641 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5644 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5645 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5646 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5649 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5650 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5651 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5654 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5655 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5656 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5659 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5660 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5661 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5664 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5665 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5666 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5669 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5671 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5674 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5675 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5676 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5679 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5680 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5681 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5684 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5689 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5691 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5694 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5695 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5696 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5697 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5699 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5700 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5701 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5702 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5703 if no_connection_possible {
5704 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5705 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5706 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5707 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5708 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5709 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5710 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5714 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5721 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5722 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5723 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5724 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5725 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5726 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5727 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5730 no_channels_remain = false;
5736 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5738 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5739 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5740 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5741 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5742 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5743 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5744 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5745 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5746 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5747 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5748 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5749 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5750 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5751 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5752 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5753 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5754 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5755 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5756 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5757 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
5761 if no_channels_remain {
5762 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5765 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5766 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5770 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5771 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5773 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5776 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5777 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5778 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5779 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5780 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5784 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5789 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5790 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5791 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5792 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5793 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5794 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5795 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5796 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5797 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5801 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5802 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5803 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5809 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5812 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5815 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5816 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5817 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5818 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5819 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5824 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
5825 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5826 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
5827 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5830 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
5831 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
5832 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5840 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5841 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5846 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5847 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5848 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5849 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5850 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5851 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5854 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5857 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5863 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5864 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5869 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5870 let result = *guard;
5878 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5879 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5880 let current_time = Instant::now();
5882 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5883 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5888 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5889 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5890 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5891 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5892 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5894 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5895 let result = *guard;
5896 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5900 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5901 None => return result,
5907 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5909 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5910 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5911 *persistence_lock = true;
5912 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5917 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5918 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5920 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5921 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5922 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5923 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
5926 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
5927 (2, node_id, required),
5928 (4, features, required),
5929 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
5930 (8, forwarding_info, option),
5931 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
5932 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
5935 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
5936 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
5937 (2, channel_id, required),
5938 (3, channel_type, option),
5939 (4, counterparty, required),
5940 (6, funding_txo, option),
5941 (8, short_channel_id, option),
5942 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
5943 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
5944 (14, user_channel_id, required),
5945 (16, balance_msat, required),
5946 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
5947 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
5948 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
5949 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap())),
5950 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
5951 (22, confirmations_required, option),
5952 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
5953 (26, is_outbound, required),
5954 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
5955 (30, is_usable, required),
5956 (32, is_public, required),
5957 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
5958 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
5961 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
5962 (2, channels, vec_type),
5963 (4, phantom_scid, required),
5964 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
5967 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5969 (0, onion_packet, required),
5970 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5973 (0, payment_data, required),
5974 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
5975 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5977 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5978 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5979 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5983 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5984 (0, routing, required),
5985 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5986 (4, payment_hash, required),
5987 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5988 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5992 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5993 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5995 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5997 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5998 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5999 reason.write(writer)?;
6001 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6002 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6005 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6006 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6007 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6008 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6015 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6016 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6017 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6020 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6021 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6022 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6023 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6027 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6028 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6029 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6030 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6031 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6034 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6035 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6036 // messages contained in the variants.
6037 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6038 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6039 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6041 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6042 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6043 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6044 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6045 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6048 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6049 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6050 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6051 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6052 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6054 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6059 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6064 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6065 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6066 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6067 (2, outpoint, required),
6068 (4, htlc_id, required),
6069 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6072 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6073 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6074 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6075 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => Some(_legacy_hop_data),
6078 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6079 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => None,
6080 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6082 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6083 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6084 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6085 (2, self.value, required),
6086 (4, payment_data, option),
6087 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6088 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6094 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6095 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6096 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6098 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6099 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6100 let mut total_msat = None;
6101 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6102 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6103 (0, prev_hop, required),
6104 (1, total_msat, option),
6105 (2, value, required),
6106 (4, payment_data, option),
6107 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6108 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6110 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6112 if payment_data.is_some() {
6113 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6115 if total_msat.is_none() {
6116 total_msat = Some(value);
6118 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6121 if payment_data.is_none() {
6122 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6124 if total_msat.is_none() {
6125 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6127 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data.unwrap() }
6131 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6134 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6141 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6142 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6143 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6146 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6147 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6148 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6149 let mut payment_id = None;
6150 let mut payment_secret = None;
6151 let mut payment_params = None;
6152 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6153 (0, session_priv, required),
6154 (1, payment_id, option),
6155 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6156 (3, payment_secret, option),
6157 (4, path, vec_type),
6158 (5, payment_params, option),
6160 if payment_id.is_none() {
6161 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6163 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6165 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6166 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6167 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6168 path: path.unwrap(),
6169 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6174 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6175 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6180 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6181 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6183 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6185 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6186 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6187 (0, session_priv, required),
6188 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6189 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6190 (3, payment_secret, option),
6191 (4, path, vec_type),
6192 (5, payment_params, option),
6195 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6197 field.write(writer)?;
6204 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6205 (0, LightningError) => {
6209 (0, failure_code, required),
6210 (2, data, vec_type),
6214 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6216 (0, forward_info, required),
6217 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6218 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6219 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6222 (0, htlc_id, required),
6223 (2, err_packet, required),
6227 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6228 (0, payment_secret, required),
6229 (2, expiry_time, required),
6230 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6231 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6232 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6235 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6237 (0, session_privs, required),
6240 (0, session_privs, required),
6241 (1, payment_hash, option),
6244 (0, session_privs, required),
6245 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6246 (2, payment_hash, required),
6247 (4, payment_secret, option),
6248 (6, total_msat, required),
6249 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6250 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6253 (0, session_privs, required),
6254 (2, payment_hash, required),
6258 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6259 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6260 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6261 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6262 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6265 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6266 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6268 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6270 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6272 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6273 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6274 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6277 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6278 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6279 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6280 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6281 unfunded_channels += 1;
6284 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6285 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6286 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6287 channel.write(writer)?;
6291 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6292 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6293 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6294 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6295 for forward in pending_forwards {
6296 forward.write(writer)?;
6300 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6301 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6302 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6303 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6304 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6305 htlc.write(writer)?;
6309 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6310 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6311 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6312 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6313 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6314 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6317 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6318 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6319 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6320 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6321 for event in events.iter() {
6322 event.write(writer)?;
6325 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6326 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6327 for event in background_events.iter() {
6329 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6331 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6332 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6337 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6338 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6340 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6341 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6342 hash.write(writer)?;
6343 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6346 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6347 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6348 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6349 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6350 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6353 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6354 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6356 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6357 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6358 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6359 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6362 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6363 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6367 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6368 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6369 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6371 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6372 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6373 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6378 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6379 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6380 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6381 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6382 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6389 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6391 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6393 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6394 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6395 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6396 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6397 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6398 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6399 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6400 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6401 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6402 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6403 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6404 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6405 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6407 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6408 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6410 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6411 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6413 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6414 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6415 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6416 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6417 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6418 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6420 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6421 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6422 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6423 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6424 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6425 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6428 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6429 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6431 pub keys_manager: K,
6433 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6435 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6436 pub fee_estimator: F,
6437 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6439 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6440 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6441 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6442 pub chain_monitor: M,
6444 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6445 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6446 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6447 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6448 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6449 /// deserialization.
6451 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6452 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6453 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6455 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6456 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6458 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6459 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6460 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6461 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6463 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6466 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6467 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6470 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6471 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6472 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6473 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6474 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6475 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6478 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6479 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6480 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6481 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6482 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6484 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6485 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6490 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6491 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6492 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6493 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6494 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6495 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6496 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6497 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6500 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6501 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6502 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6506 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6507 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6508 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6509 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6510 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6511 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6514 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6515 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6517 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6518 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6519 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6521 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6523 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6524 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6525 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6526 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6527 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6528 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6529 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6530 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6531 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6532 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6533 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6534 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6535 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6536 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6537 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6538 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6539 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6540 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6541 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6542 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6543 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6544 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6545 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6546 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6547 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6548 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6549 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6550 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6551 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6552 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6553 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6554 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6555 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6556 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6557 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6558 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6559 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6560 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6561 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6564 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6565 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6566 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6568 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6571 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6572 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6573 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6574 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6575 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6576 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6580 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6581 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6582 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6583 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6587 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6588 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6589 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6590 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6591 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6592 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6593 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6594 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6595 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6597 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6600 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6601 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6602 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6603 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6604 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6605 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6606 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6607 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6609 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6612 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6613 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6614 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6615 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6616 let peer_state = PeerState {
6617 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6619 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6622 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6623 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6624 for _ in 0..event_count {
6625 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6626 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6630 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6631 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6632 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6633 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6634 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6635 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6636 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6637 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6641 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6642 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6643 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6644 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6645 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6646 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6650 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6651 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6653 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6654 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6655 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6656 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6657 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6661 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6662 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6663 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6664 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6665 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6666 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6667 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6669 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6670 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6674 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6675 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6676 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6677 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6678 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6679 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6680 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6681 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6682 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6683 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6685 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6686 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6689 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6690 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6691 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6692 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6693 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6694 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6696 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6698 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6699 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6700 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6701 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6702 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6703 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6704 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6706 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6707 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6708 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6709 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6710 if path.is_empty() {
6711 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6712 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6714 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6715 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6716 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6717 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6718 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6719 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6720 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6721 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6723 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6724 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6725 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6726 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6727 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6729 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6730 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6731 total_msat: path_amt,
6732 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6734 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6735 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6744 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6745 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6747 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6748 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6751 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6753 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6755 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6756 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6757 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6758 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6759 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6763 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6764 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6765 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6766 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6768 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6769 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6770 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6772 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6773 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6774 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6775 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6776 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6777 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6779 if chan.is_usable() {
6780 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
6781 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6782 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6783 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6784 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6789 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6790 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6791 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6793 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6794 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6795 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6797 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6799 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6804 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6806 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6807 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6808 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6810 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
6811 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6817 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6818 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6820 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6822 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6823 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6824 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6825 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6827 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6828 logger: args.logger,
6829 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6832 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6833 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6836 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6837 //connection or two.
6839 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6845 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6846 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6847 use core::time::Duration;
6848 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6849 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6850 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6851 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6852 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6853 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6855 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6856 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6857 use util::errors::APIError;
6858 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6859 use util::test_utils;
6860 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
6862 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6864 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6865 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6867 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6870 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6871 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6873 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6874 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6875 thread::spawn(move || {
6877 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6878 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6879 *persistence_lock = true;
6882 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6888 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6889 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6891 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6894 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6899 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6901 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6904 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6911 fn test_notify_limits() {
6912 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6913 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6914 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6915 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6916 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6917 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6919 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6920 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6921 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6922 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6923 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6925 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6927 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6928 // to connect messages with new values
6929 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6930 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6931 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6932 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6934 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6935 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6936 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6937 // ... but the last node should not.
6938 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6939 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6940 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6941 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6943 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6944 // about the channel.
6945 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6946 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6947 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6949 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6951 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6952 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6953 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6954 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6955 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6956 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6958 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6959 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6960 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6962 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6963 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6964 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6965 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6966 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6967 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6969 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6970 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6971 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6972 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6973 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6974 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6975 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6976 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6978 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6979 // the channel info has updated.
6980 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6981 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6982 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6983 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6984 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6985 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6989 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6990 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6992 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6993 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6994 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6995 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6996 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6998 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6999 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7000 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7001 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7002 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7003 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7004 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7006 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7007 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7008 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7010 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7011 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7013 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7014 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7015 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7016 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7017 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7019 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7020 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7021 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7023 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7024 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7025 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7026 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7027 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7028 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7029 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7030 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7031 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7033 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7034 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7036 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7037 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7038 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7040 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7041 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7042 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7043 // lightning messages manually.
7044 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7046 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7047 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7048 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7050 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7051 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7053 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7054 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7056 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7057 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7058 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7060 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7061 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7062 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7064 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7066 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7068 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7069 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7072 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7073 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7074 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7075 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7077 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7078 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7079 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7080 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7082 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7085 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7086 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7087 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7088 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7090 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7093 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7094 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7095 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7096 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7098 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7103 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7104 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7105 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7106 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7107 // fails as expected.
7108 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7109 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7110 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7111 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7112 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7113 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7114 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7116 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7117 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7118 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7120 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7121 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7122 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7123 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7124 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7126 let route = find_route(
7127 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7128 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7130 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7132 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7133 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7134 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7135 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7136 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7138 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7139 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7140 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7142 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7143 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7144 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7145 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7146 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7147 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7148 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7149 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7150 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7152 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7153 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7155 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7156 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7157 let route = find_route(
7158 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7159 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7161 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7163 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7164 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7165 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7166 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7167 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7169 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7170 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7171 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7173 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7174 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7175 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7176 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7177 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7179 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7180 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7181 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7183 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7184 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7185 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7186 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7187 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7188 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7189 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7190 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7191 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7193 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7194 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7198 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7199 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7200 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7201 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7202 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7203 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7204 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7206 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7207 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7208 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7209 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7211 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7212 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7213 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7214 final_value_msat: 10000,
7215 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7217 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7218 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7219 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7220 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7221 let route = find_route(
7222 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7223 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7226 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7227 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7228 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7231 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7232 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7233 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7234 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7235 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7236 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7237 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7239 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7243 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7244 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7245 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7246 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7247 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7248 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7250 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7251 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7252 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7253 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7255 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7256 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7257 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7258 final_value_msat: 10000,
7259 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7261 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7262 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7263 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7264 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7265 let route = find_route(
7266 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7267 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7270 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7271 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7272 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7273 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7276 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7277 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7278 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7279 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7280 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7281 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7282 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7284 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7288 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7289 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7290 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7291 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7292 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7294 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7295 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7296 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7297 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7299 // Marshall an MPP route.
7300 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7301 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7302 route.paths.push(path);
7303 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7304 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7305 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7306 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7307 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7308 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7310 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7311 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7312 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7313 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7318 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7319 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7320 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7321 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7322 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7323 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7325 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7326 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7328 total_msat: 100_000,
7331 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7332 // payment verification fails as expected.
7333 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7334 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7335 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7336 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7338 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7342 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7343 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7347 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7350 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7351 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7352 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7353 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7354 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7355 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7356 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7357 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7358 use util::test_utils;
7359 use util::config::UserConfig;
7360 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7362 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7363 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7364 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7366 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7370 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7371 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7372 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7373 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7374 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7375 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7376 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7381 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7382 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7385 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7386 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7387 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7389 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7390 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7392 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7393 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7395 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7396 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7398 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7399 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7400 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7401 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7402 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7404 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7406 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7408 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7409 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7410 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7411 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7412 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7414 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7416 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7418 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7419 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7420 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7421 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7422 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7425 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7426 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7427 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7429 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7430 } else { panic!(); }
7432 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7433 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7435 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7438 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7441 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7442 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7444 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7445 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7446 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7447 match msg_events[0] {
7448 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7449 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7450 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7454 match msg_events[1] {
7455 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7459 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7461 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7462 macro_rules! send_payment {
7463 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7464 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7465 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7466 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7467 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7468 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7469 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7470 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7471 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7472 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7474 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7475 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7477 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7478 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7480 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7481 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7482 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7483 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7484 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7485 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7486 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7487 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7489 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7490 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7491 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7493 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7494 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7495 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7496 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7497 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7499 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7502 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7503 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7504 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7505 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7507 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7512 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7513 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);