1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::Logger;
61 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
73 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
105 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
106 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
107 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
108 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
109 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
110 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
115 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
116 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
119 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
122 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
123 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
126 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
128 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
130 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
131 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
132 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
134 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
136 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
140 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
144 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
146 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
147 short_channel_id: u64,
149 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
151 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
152 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
156 struct ClaimableHTLC {
157 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
159 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
160 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
161 /// are part of the same payment.
162 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
166 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
167 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
168 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
169 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
172 session_priv: SecretKey,
173 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
174 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
175 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
180 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
181 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
183 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
184 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
189 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
190 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
192 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
200 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
202 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
203 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
204 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
205 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
206 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
208 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
209 err: msgs::LightningError,
210 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
212 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
214 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
216 err: LightningError {
218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
219 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
225 shutdown_finish: None,
229 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
231 err: LightningError {
233 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
235 shutdown_finish: None,
239 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
240 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
243 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
245 err: LightningError {
247 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
248 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
254 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
258 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
261 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
263 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
265 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
267 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
268 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
274 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
277 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
284 shutdown_finish: None,
289 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
290 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
291 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
292 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
293 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
295 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
296 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
297 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
298 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
299 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
300 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
301 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
303 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
307 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
308 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
309 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
310 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
311 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
312 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
313 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
314 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
315 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
316 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
317 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
318 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
320 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
321 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
322 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
323 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
326 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
327 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
328 /// quite some time lag.
329 enum BackgroundEvent {
330 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
331 /// commitment transaction.
332 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
335 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
336 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
338 latest_features: InitFeatures,
341 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
342 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
344 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
346 struct PendingInboundPayment {
347 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
348 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
349 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
350 /// this payment being removed.
352 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
353 user_payment_id: u64,
354 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
355 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
356 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
359 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
360 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
361 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
362 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
363 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
364 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
365 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
366 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
368 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
369 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
370 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
371 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
372 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
373 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
374 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
375 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
376 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
378 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
379 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
381 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
382 /// to individual Channels.
384 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
385 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
386 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
387 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
389 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
390 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
391 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
392 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
393 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
394 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
395 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
397 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
398 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
399 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
400 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
403 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
404 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
405 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
406 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
407 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
409 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
410 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
411 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
412 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
413 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
414 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
415 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
416 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
417 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
418 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
421 default_configuration: UserConfig,
422 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
428 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
430 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
431 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
433 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
434 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
435 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
436 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
438 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
439 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
440 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
441 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
442 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
443 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
445 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
446 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
447 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
448 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
449 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
450 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
451 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
452 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
454 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
455 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
457 our_network_key: SecretKey,
458 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
460 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
461 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
462 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
464 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
465 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
466 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
467 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
469 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
470 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
471 /// are currently open with that peer.
472 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
473 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
475 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
477 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
478 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
479 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
480 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
481 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
482 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
483 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
484 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
485 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
487 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
494 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
496 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
497 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
498 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
499 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
500 pub struct ChainParameters {
501 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
502 pub network: Network,
504 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
506 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
507 pub best_block: BestBlock,
510 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
516 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
517 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
518 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
519 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
520 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
521 /// updates are ready for persistence).
523 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
524 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
525 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
526 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
527 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
529 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
530 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
533 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
534 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
535 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
538 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
539 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
541 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
542 persistence_notifier: notifier,
543 should_persist: persist_check,
544 _read_guard: read_guard,
549 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
551 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
552 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
557 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
558 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
560 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
562 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
563 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
564 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
565 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
566 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
568 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
569 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
571 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
573 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
574 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
575 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
576 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
577 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
578 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
579 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
581 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
582 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
584 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
585 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
586 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
587 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
589 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
590 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
591 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
592 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
593 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
594 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
597 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
599 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
600 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
603 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
605 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
606 /// to better separate parameters.
607 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
608 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
609 /// The node_id of our counterparty
610 pub node_id: PublicKey,
611 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
612 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
613 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
614 pub features: InitFeatures,
615 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
616 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
617 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
619 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
621 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
622 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
623 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
624 /// payments to us through this channel.
625 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
628 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
629 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
630 pub struct ChannelDetails {
631 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
632 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
633 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
634 /// lifetime of the channel.
635 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
636 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
637 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
638 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
639 /// our counterparty already.
641 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
642 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
643 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
644 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
645 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
646 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
647 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
648 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
649 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
650 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
651 /// this value on chain.
653 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
655 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
657 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
658 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
659 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
661 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
662 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
663 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
664 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
666 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
667 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
668 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
669 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
670 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
671 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
672 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
673 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
674 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
676 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
677 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
678 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
679 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
680 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
681 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
682 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
683 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
684 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
686 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
688 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
689 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
690 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
691 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
692 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
693 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
694 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
695 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
696 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
698 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
699 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
700 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
701 pub is_outbound: bool,
702 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
703 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
704 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
705 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
706 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
708 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
709 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
710 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
711 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
713 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
715 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
719 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
720 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
722 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
723 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
724 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
725 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
726 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
727 ParameterError(APIError),
728 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
729 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
730 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
733 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
735 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
736 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
737 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
738 /// paths than the ones selected).
739 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
740 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
741 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
742 /// in over-/re-payment.
744 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
745 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
746 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
748 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
749 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
750 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
751 /// with the latest update_id.
752 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
755 macro_rules! handle_error {
756 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
759 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
760 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
762 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
763 // entering the macro.
764 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
767 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
769 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
770 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
771 if let Some(update) = update_option {
772 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
778 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
779 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
781 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
782 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
783 action: err.action.clone()
787 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
788 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
791 // Return error in case higher-API need one
798 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
799 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
800 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
802 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
803 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
805 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
806 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
807 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
808 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
810 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
811 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&$channel).ok()))
813 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
814 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
815 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
816 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
818 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
819 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&$channel).ok()))
825 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
826 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
830 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
832 $entry.remove_entry();
840 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
841 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
845 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
847 $entry.remove_entry();
855 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
856 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
857 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
859 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
861 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
862 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
863 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
864 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
866 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
867 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
868 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
869 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
870 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
871 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
872 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
873 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
874 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
875 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&$chan).ok()));
878 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
879 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
880 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
881 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
883 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
884 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
886 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
887 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
889 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
890 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
891 if !$resend_commitment {
892 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
895 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
897 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
898 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
902 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
903 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
905 $entry.remove_entry();
911 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
912 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
913 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
915 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
916 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
920 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
921 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
922 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
923 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
924 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
927 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
932 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
933 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
934 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
935 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
936 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
937 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
939 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
940 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
942 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
943 if !forwards.is_empty() {
944 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
945 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
948 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
949 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
950 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
951 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
952 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
953 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
954 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
955 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
956 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
957 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
958 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
959 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
962 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
963 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
964 // before it should be allowed to.
965 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
966 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
967 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
970 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
971 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
972 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
973 msg: announcement_sigs,
976 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
979 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
980 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
981 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
982 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
983 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
984 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
985 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
986 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
987 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
988 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
989 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
990 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
991 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
992 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
993 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
994 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
995 let mut order = $order;
997 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
999 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1003 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1004 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1005 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1006 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1011 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1012 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1013 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1014 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1015 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1020 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1024 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1029 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1030 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1031 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1036 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1037 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1038 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1039 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1040 assert!(res.is_ok());
1043 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1047 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1048 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1049 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1051 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1053 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1054 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1059 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1060 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1061 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1062 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1063 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1066 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1068 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1069 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1071 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1073 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1075 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1076 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1077 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1078 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1079 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1080 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1083 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1084 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1085 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1089 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1091 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1092 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1093 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1094 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1095 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1096 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1098 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1099 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1101 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1102 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1105 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1106 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1108 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1110 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1111 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1112 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1113 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1121 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1122 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1123 &self.default_configuration
1126 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1128 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1129 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1130 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1131 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1132 /// otherwise ignored.
1134 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1135 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1137 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1138 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1139 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1140 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1141 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1144 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1145 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1146 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1148 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1149 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1150 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1152 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1153 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1154 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1155 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1156 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1158 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1161 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1163 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1164 node_id: their_network_key,
1170 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1171 let mut res = Vec::new();
1173 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1174 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1175 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1176 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1177 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1178 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1179 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1180 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1181 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1182 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1183 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1184 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1185 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1187 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1188 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1189 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1190 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1191 inbound_capacity_msat,
1192 outbound_capacity_msat,
1193 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1194 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1195 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1196 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1197 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1198 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1199 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1203 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1204 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1205 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1206 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1212 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1213 /// more information.
1214 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1215 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1218 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1219 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1221 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1222 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1224 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1225 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1226 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1227 // really wanted anyway.
1228 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1231 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1232 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1233 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1235 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1236 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1239 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1240 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1241 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1242 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1243 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1244 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1245 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1246 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1249 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1250 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1251 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1253 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1254 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1256 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1259 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1260 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1262 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1263 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1268 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1269 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1270 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1279 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1280 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1281 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1282 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1283 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1285 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1286 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1287 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1288 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1289 // ignore the result here.
1290 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1294 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1296 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1297 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1298 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1299 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1300 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1301 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1304 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1305 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1307 chan.remove_entry().1
1309 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1312 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1313 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1314 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1315 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1316 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1321 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1324 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1325 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1326 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1327 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1328 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1329 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1330 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1331 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1332 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1333 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1334 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1344 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1345 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1346 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1347 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1348 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1352 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1353 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1354 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1356 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1357 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1358 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1359 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1360 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1361 failure_code: $err_code,
1362 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1367 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1368 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1371 let shared_secret = {
1372 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1373 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1376 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1378 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1379 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1380 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1381 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1382 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1383 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1384 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1385 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1388 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1389 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1390 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1391 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1392 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1395 let mut channel_state = None;
1396 macro_rules! return_err {
1397 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1399 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1400 if channel_state.is_none() {
1401 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1403 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1404 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1405 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1406 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1407 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1412 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1413 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1414 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1415 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1417 let error_code = match err {
1418 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1419 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1420 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1421 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1422 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1424 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1427 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1428 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1429 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1436 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1439 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1440 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1441 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1442 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1443 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1444 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1445 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1446 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1447 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1448 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1449 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1450 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1454 // final_expiry_too_soon
1455 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1456 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1457 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1458 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1459 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1460 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1462 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1463 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1464 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1466 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1467 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1468 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1471 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1472 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1473 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1474 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1477 if payment_data.is_none() {
1478 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1481 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1482 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1483 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1484 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1486 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1487 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1488 payment_data: payment_data.unwrap(),
1489 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1491 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1492 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1493 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1494 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1497 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1498 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1499 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1501 // Check two things:
1502 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1503 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1504 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1506 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1508 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1509 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1510 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1512 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1514 let blinding_factor = {
1515 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1516 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1517 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1518 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1521 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1523 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1525 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1528 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1529 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1532 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1533 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1534 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1535 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1536 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1540 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1541 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1542 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1545 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1546 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1547 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1548 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1552 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1553 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1554 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1555 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1556 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1557 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1558 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1559 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1560 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1561 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1563 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1565 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1566 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1568 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1569 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1570 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1571 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1572 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1573 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1574 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1576 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1577 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1579 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1580 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1581 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1583 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1584 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1586 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1587 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1588 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1589 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1590 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1592 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1593 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1595 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1596 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1597 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1598 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1604 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1605 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1606 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1607 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1609 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1610 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1612 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1613 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1614 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1616 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1618 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1623 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1626 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1627 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1628 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1629 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1630 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1634 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1636 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1637 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1639 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1640 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1641 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1642 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1643 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1644 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1645 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1646 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1649 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1650 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1652 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1658 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1659 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1660 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1661 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1662 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1663 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1665 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1666 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1667 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1668 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1669 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1671 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1674 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1676 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1677 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1678 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1679 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1680 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1683 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1684 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1686 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1687 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1689 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1690 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1692 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1694 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1695 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1696 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1698 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1699 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1700 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1701 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1702 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1703 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1704 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1705 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1706 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1709 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1710 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1711 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1712 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1713 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1714 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1715 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1716 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1724 } else { unreachable!(); }
1728 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1729 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1731 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1736 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1738 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1739 /// fields for more info.
1741 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1742 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1743 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1744 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1745 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1746 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1748 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1750 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1751 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1752 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1754 /// In general, a path may raise:
1755 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1756 /// node public key) is specified.
1757 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1758 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1760 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1761 /// relevant updates.
1763 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1764 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1765 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1767 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1768 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1769 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1770 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1772 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1773 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1774 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1775 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1776 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1777 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1779 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1780 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1781 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1782 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1783 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1785 let mut total_value = 0;
1786 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1787 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1788 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1789 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1790 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1791 continue 'path_check;
1793 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1794 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1795 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1796 continue 'path_check;
1799 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1800 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1802 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1803 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1806 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1807 let mut results = Vec::new();
1808 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1809 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1811 let mut has_ok = false;
1812 let mut has_err = false;
1813 for res in results.iter() {
1814 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1815 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1816 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1817 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1824 if has_err && has_ok {
1825 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1827 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1833 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1834 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1835 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1836 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1838 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1840 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1842 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1843 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1844 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1845 } else { unreachable!(); })
1848 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1850 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1851 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1854 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1855 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1860 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1861 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1862 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1865 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1866 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1867 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1869 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1877 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1878 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1879 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1883 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1885 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1886 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1888 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1890 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1891 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1892 /// keys per-channel).
1894 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1895 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1896 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1898 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1899 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1900 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1902 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
1903 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1904 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1906 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1907 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1908 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1909 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1913 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1914 let mut output_index = None;
1915 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1916 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1917 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1918 if output_index.is_some() {
1919 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1920 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1923 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1924 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1925 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1928 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1931 if output_index.is_none() {
1932 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1933 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1936 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1940 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1941 if !chan.should_announce() {
1942 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1946 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1948 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1950 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1951 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1953 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1954 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1955 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1956 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1957 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1962 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1963 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1964 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1966 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1969 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1970 // smaller than 500:
1971 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1973 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
1974 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
1975 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
1976 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
1977 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
1978 /// our network addresses.
1980 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
1981 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1983 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
1984 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
1985 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
1986 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
1988 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
1990 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
1991 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1992 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1994 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1995 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1998 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
1999 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2000 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2002 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2003 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2004 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2005 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2006 rgb, alias, addresses,
2007 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2008 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2010 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2011 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2013 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2014 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2016 let mut announced_chans = false;
2017 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2018 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2019 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2021 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2026 announced_chans = true;
2028 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2029 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2030 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2034 if announced_chans {
2035 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2036 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2037 signature: node_announce_sig,
2038 contents: announcement
2044 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2046 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2047 /// Will likely generate further events.
2048 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2049 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2051 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2052 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2053 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2055 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2056 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2058 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2059 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2060 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2061 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2063 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2064 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2065 match forward_info {
2066 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2067 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2068 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2069 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2070 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2071 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2072 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2074 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2075 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2078 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2079 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2080 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2081 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2082 // problem, not ours.
2089 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2090 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2091 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2092 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2093 match forward_info {
2094 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2095 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2097 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2098 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2099 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2100 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2101 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2102 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2103 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2104 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2106 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2108 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2109 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2111 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2113 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
2114 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2115 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2121 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2123 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2124 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2125 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2126 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2127 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2128 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2129 // this channel currently :/.
2135 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2136 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2138 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2139 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2140 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2142 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2143 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2145 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2147 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2148 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2149 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2152 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2154 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2155 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2156 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2157 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2158 // messages when we can.
2159 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2160 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2161 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2168 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2169 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2172 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2173 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2174 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2175 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2176 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2177 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2179 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2180 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2181 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2182 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2183 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2185 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
2187 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2189 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2193 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2194 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2197 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2198 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2199 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2200 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2201 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2202 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2203 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2204 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2205 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2207 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2215 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2216 match forward_info {
2217 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2218 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
2219 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2220 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2221 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2222 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2223 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2224 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2225 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2226 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2228 value: amt_to_forward,
2229 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
2230 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
2233 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2235 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2236 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2237 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2239 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2240 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2241 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2242 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2243 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2245 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2250 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2251 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2252 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2253 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2254 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2255 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2256 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2257 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2258 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2260 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2263 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2265 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2266 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2267 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2268 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2269 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2271 let mut total_value = 0;
2272 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2273 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2274 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2275 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2276 total_value += htlc.value;
2277 if htlc.payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2278 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2279 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc.payment_data.total_msat);
2280 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2282 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2284 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2285 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2286 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2287 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2290 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2291 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2293 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2294 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2296 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2298 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2299 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2301 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2303 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2304 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2311 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2312 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2314 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2315 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2323 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2324 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2327 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2328 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2331 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2332 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2333 events.append(&mut new_events);
2336 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2338 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2339 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2341 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2342 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2343 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2344 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2345 if background_events.is_empty() {
2349 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2351 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2352 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2353 // monitor updating completing.
2354 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2361 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2362 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2363 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2364 self.process_background_events();
2367 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2368 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2369 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2371 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2373 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2374 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2375 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2376 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2377 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2379 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2380 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2381 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2382 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2383 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2384 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2385 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2386 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2387 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2388 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2389 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2393 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2394 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2396 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2397 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2398 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2402 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2403 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2413 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2414 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2415 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2416 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2417 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2418 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2419 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2421 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2422 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2423 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2424 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2425 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2426 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2427 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2428 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2429 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2430 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2431 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2437 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2438 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2439 // be surfaced to the user.
2440 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2441 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2443 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2444 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2445 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2447 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2448 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2450 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2453 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2455 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2456 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2457 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2459 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2461 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2462 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2463 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2465 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2466 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2468 rejected_by_dest: false,
2476 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2483 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2484 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2485 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2486 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2487 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2488 /// still-available channels.
2489 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2490 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2491 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2492 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2495 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2496 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2497 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2499 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2501 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2502 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2503 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2505 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2508 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2509 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2510 match &onion_error {
2511 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2513 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2515 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2516 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2517 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2518 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2519 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2520 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2521 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2526 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2527 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2528 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2529 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2531 error_code: onion_error_code,
2533 error_data: onion_error_data
2537 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2543 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2544 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2545 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2546 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2548 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2549 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2550 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2551 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2552 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2553 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2555 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2557 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2563 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2564 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2565 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2566 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2567 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2568 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2570 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2571 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2572 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2576 let mut forward_event = None;
2577 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2578 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2580 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2582 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2584 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2585 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2588 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2589 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2590 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2591 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2592 time_forwardable: time
2599 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2600 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2601 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2603 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2604 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2605 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2606 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2608 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2610 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2611 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2612 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2613 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2615 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2617 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2618 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2619 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2620 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2622 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2623 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2624 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2625 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2627 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2628 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2629 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2630 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2631 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2633 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2634 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2635 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2641 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2642 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2643 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2645 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2646 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2647 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2648 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2649 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2650 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2651 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2653 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2655 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2656 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2657 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2658 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2659 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2660 } else { errs.push(e); }
2662 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2663 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2668 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2669 // which were generated.
2670 channel_state.take();
2672 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2673 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2674 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2681 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2682 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2683 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2684 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2685 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2691 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2692 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2693 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2694 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2695 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2696 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2697 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2698 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2700 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2704 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2705 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
2706 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2707 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2708 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2709 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2710 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2711 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2712 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2713 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2722 // TODO: Do something with e?
2723 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2724 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2725 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2726 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2727 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2728 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2729 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2733 } else { unreachable!(); }
2736 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2738 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2739 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2741 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2742 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2743 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2745 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2746 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2750 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2753 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2754 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2755 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2758 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2759 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2760 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2761 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2764 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2765 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2766 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2767 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2768 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2769 payment_preimage, e);
2773 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2775 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2776 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2777 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2783 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2784 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2785 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2788 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2789 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2792 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2793 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2795 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2796 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2797 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2798 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2800 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2801 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2802 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2803 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2804 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2805 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2806 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2807 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2808 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2809 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2811 let (mut pending_failures, chan_restoration_res) = {
2812 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2813 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2814 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2815 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2818 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2822 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2823 (pending_failures, handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked))
2825 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
2826 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2827 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2831 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2832 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2833 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2836 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2837 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2838 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2839 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2840 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2841 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2842 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2843 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2844 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2845 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2847 entry.insert(channel);
2853 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2854 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2855 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2856 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2857 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2858 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2859 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2860 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2862 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2863 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2865 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2868 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2869 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2870 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2871 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2873 user_channel_id: user_id,
2878 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2879 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2880 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2881 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2882 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2883 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2884 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2885 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2886 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2888 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2890 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2893 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2894 // lock before watch_channel
2895 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2897 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2898 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2899 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2900 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2901 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2902 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2903 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2904 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2905 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2906 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2907 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2909 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2910 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2911 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2912 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2913 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2914 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2918 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2919 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2920 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2922 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2925 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2926 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2935 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2937 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2938 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2939 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2940 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2941 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2942 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2943 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2945 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2946 Ok(update) => update,
2947 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2949 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2950 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2954 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2957 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
2958 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2962 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2963 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2964 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2965 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2967 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2968 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2970 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2971 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2972 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2973 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2974 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2975 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2976 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2977 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2978 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2979 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2980 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2981 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2982 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2983 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2984 msg: announcement_sigs,
2989 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2993 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2994 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2995 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2996 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2998 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3000 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3001 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3003 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3004 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3005 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3006 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3010 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3011 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3012 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3016 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
3017 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3018 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3020 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3021 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
3023 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3026 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3027 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3029 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3030 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3031 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3032 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3040 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3041 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3042 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3043 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3044 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3045 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3046 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3047 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3049 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3050 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3051 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3052 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3057 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3058 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3059 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3060 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3061 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3062 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3063 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3065 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3066 } else { (tx, None) }
3068 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3071 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3072 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3073 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3075 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3076 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3077 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3078 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3086 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3087 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3088 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3089 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3091 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3092 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3093 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3094 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3096 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3097 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3099 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3100 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3101 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3102 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3105 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3106 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3107 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3108 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3109 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3110 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3111 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3112 match pending_forward_info {
3113 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3114 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
3115 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3116 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3117 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3118 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3119 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3123 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3124 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3125 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3126 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3127 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3128 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3129 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3130 // no problem just calling this
3131 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3132 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3134 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3135 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3136 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3139 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3141 _ => pending_forward_info
3144 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3146 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3151 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3152 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3154 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3155 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3156 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3157 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3158 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3160 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3162 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3165 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
3169 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3170 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3171 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3172 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3173 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3174 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3175 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3177 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3179 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3184 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3185 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3186 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3187 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3188 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3189 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3190 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3192 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3193 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3194 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3196 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3199 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3203 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3204 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3205 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3206 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3207 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3208 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3209 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3211 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3212 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3213 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3214 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3215 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3216 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3217 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3222 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3223 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3224 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3226 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3227 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3228 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3230 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3231 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3232 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3233 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3234 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3235 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3236 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3237 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3239 commitment_signed: msg,
3243 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3244 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3245 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3251 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3256 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3257 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3258 let mut forward_event = None;
3259 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3260 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3261 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3262 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3264 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3265 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3266 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3267 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3269 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3270 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3271 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3274 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3275 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3280 match forward_event {
3282 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3283 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3284 time_forwardable: time
3292 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3293 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3295 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3296 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3297 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3298 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3299 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3300 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3302 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3303 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3304 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3305 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3306 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3307 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3308 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3309 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3311 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3313 } else { unreachable!(); }
3316 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3317 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3318 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3322 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3323 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3324 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3328 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3330 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3333 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3335 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3336 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3337 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3339 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3346 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3347 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3348 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3349 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3351 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3352 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3354 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3356 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3361 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3362 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3363 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3365 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3366 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3367 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3368 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3370 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3371 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3374 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3375 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3376 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3379 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3384 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3385 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3386 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3387 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3388 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3389 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3391 // It's not a local channel
3392 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3395 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3396 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3397 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3398 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3399 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3400 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3401 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3402 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3404 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3406 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3408 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3410 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3413 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3414 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround, chan_restoration_res) = {
3415 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3416 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3418 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3420 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3421 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3423 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3424 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3425 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3426 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3427 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3428 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3429 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3430 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3431 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3435 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3436 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround,
3437 handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked))
3439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3442 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3443 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3445 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3446 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3451 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3452 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3453 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3454 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3455 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3457 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3458 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3459 let counterparty_node_id;
3460 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3461 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3462 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3464 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3465 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3466 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3467 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3468 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3470 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3471 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3473 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3474 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3476 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3477 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3478 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3480 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3483 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating fee resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3484 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3485 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3486 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3487 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3488 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3489 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3490 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3491 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3501 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3502 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3503 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3507 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3508 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3509 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3510 let pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3511 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3512 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events {
3513 match monitor_event {
3514 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3515 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3516 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3517 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3519 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3520 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3523 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3524 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3525 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3526 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3527 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3528 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3529 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3530 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3531 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3533 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3534 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3535 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3539 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3540 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3541 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3542 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3550 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3551 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3554 has_pending_monitor_events
3557 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3558 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3559 /// update was applied.
3561 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3562 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3563 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3564 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3565 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3566 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3567 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3568 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3570 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3571 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3572 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3573 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3574 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3576 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3577 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3578 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3579 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3580 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3582 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3583 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3584 has_monitor_update = true;
3585 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3586 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3587 if close_channel { return false; }
3589 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3590 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3591 updates: commitment_update,
3598 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3599 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3606 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3607 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3608 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3611 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3612 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3618 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3619 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3621 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3622 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3623 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3624 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3625 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3626 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3627 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3628 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3629 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3630 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3631 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3632 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3633 assert!(should_broadcast);
3634 } else { unreachable!(); }
3635 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3637 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3641 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3642 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3644 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3646 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3647 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3648 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3649 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3650 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3651 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3652 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3653 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3654 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3655 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3656 // never fail a payment too early.
3657 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3659 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3667 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3670 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3671 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3673 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3674 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3675 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3677 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3679 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3680 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3681 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3682 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3683 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3684 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3685 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3688 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3689 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3692 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3693 /// stored external to LDK.
3695 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3696 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3697 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3699 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3700 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3702 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
3703 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3704 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3705 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3706 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3708 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3709 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3710 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3711 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3713 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3714 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3715 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3716 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3717 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3719 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3720 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3721 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3722 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3723 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3725 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3726 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3727 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3729 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3731 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3732 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3734 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3735 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3736 /// [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
3737 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3738 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3741 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
3742 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3743 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3744 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
3745 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
3750 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3751 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3752 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3753 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3754 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3757 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3758 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3759 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3760 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3762 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3763 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3764 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3765 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3768 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3769 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3772 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
3773 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3774 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3776 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3777 events.replace(pending_events);
3786 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3788 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3789 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3790 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3791 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3794 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
3796 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
3797 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
3799 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
3800 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
3801 /// restarting from an old state.
3802 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
3803 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3804 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3806 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3807 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3808 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3809 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3812 let mut pending_events = std::mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
3813 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3814 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3817 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
3818 handler.handle_event(event);
3826 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3828 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3829 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3830 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3831 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3834 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3836 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3837 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3838 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3839 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3840 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3843 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3844 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3845 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3848 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3850 let new_height = height - 1;
3852 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3853 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3854 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3855 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3856 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3857 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3860 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
3864 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3866 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3867 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3868 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3869 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3872 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3873 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3874 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3875 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3877 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3878 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3880 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3881 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3884 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3885 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3886 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3887 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3889 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3890 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3892 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3894 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3896 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
3898 macro_rules! max_time {
3899 ($timestamp: expr) => {
3901 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
3902 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3903 // having an explicit local time source.
3904 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
3905 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
3906 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3907 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3908 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3914 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
3915 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
3916 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3917 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
3918 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
3922 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3923 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3924 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3925 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3926 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3927 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3933 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3935 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3936 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3937 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3938 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3939 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3940 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3945 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3947 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3948 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3949 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3950 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3953 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3954 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3956 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3957 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3958 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3959 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3960 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3962 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3963 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3965 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3966 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3967 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3968 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3969 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3970 let res = f(channel);
3971 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3972 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3973 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3974 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3975 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3979 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3980 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3981 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3982 msg: funding_locked,
3984 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3985 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3986 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3987 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3988 msg: announcement_sigs,
3991 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3993 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3995 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3996 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3997 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3999 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4000 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4001 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4002 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
4003 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4007 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4008 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4009 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4016 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4017 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4018 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4019 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4020 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4021 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4022 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4023 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4024 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4025 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4026 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4027 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4028 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4033 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4038 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4040 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4041 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4045 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4046 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4047 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4049 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4050 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4051 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4052 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4055 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4056 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4058 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4059 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4062 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4063 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4064 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4065 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4066 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4070 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4071 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4072 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4073 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4077 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4078 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4079 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4080 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4081 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4082 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4085 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4086 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4087 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4090 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4091 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4092 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4095 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4096 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4097 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4100 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4101 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4102 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4105 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4106 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4107 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4110 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4111 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4112 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4115 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4116 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4117 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4120 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4121 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4122 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4125 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4127 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4130 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4131 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4132 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4135 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4136 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4137 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4140 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4141 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4142 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4145 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4146 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4147 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4150 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4151 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4152 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4155 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4157 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4160 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4161 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4162 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4165 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4170 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4171 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4172 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4175 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4176 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4177 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4178 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4180 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4181 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4182 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4183 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4184 if no_connection_possible {
4185 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4186 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4187 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4188 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4189 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4191 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4192 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
4193 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4203 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4204 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4205 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4206 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4207 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4208 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4209 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4213 no_channels_remain = false;
4219 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4221 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4222 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4223 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4224 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4225 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4226 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4227 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4228 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4229 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4230 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4231 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4232 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4233 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4234 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4235 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4236 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4237 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4238 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4239 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4243 if no_channels_remain {
4244 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4247 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4248 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4252 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4253 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4255 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4258 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4259 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4260 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4261 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4262 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4265 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4266 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4271 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4272 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4273 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4274 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4275 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4276 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4277 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4278 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4279 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4283 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4284 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4285 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4291 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4294 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4297 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4298 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4299 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4300 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4301 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4305 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4306 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4311 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4312 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4313 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4314 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4315 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4316 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4319 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4322 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4328 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4329 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4334 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4335 let result = *guard;
4343 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4344 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4345 let current_time = Instant::now();
4347 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4348 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4353 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4354 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4355 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4356 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4357 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4359 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4360 let result = *guard;
4361 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4365 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4366 None => return result,
4372 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4374 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4375 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4376 *persistence_lock = true;
4377 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4382 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4383 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4385 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4387 (0, onion_packet, required),
4388 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4391 (0, payment_data, required),
4392 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4396 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4397 (0, routing, required),
4398 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4399 (4, payment_hash, required),
4400 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4401 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4404 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4408 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4413 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4414 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4415 (2, outpoint, required),
4416 (4, htlc_id, required),
4417 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4420 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimableHTLC, {
4421 (0, prev_hop, required),
4422 (2, value, required),
4423 (4, payment_data, required),
4424 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4427 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4428 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4429 (0, session_priv, required),
4430 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4431 (4, path, vec_type),
4433 (1, PreviousHopData)
4436 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4437 (0, LightningError) => {
4441 (0, failure_code, required),
4442 (2, data, vec_type),
4446 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4448 (0, forward_info, required),
4449 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4450 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4451 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4454 (0, htlc_id, required),
4455 (2, err_packet, required),
4459 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4460 (0, payment_secret, required),
4461 (2, expiry_time, required),
4462 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4463 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4464 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4467 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4468 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4469 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4470 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4471 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4474 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4475 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4477 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4479 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4481 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4482 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4483 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4486 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4487 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4488 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4489 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4490 unfunded_channels += 1;
4493 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4494 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4495 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4496 channel.write(writer)?;
4500 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4501 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4502 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4503 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4504 for forward in pending_forwards {
4505 forward.write(writer)?;
4509 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4510 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4511 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4512 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4513 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4514 htlc.write(writer)?;
4518 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4519 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4520 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4521 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4522 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4523 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4526 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4527 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4528 for event in events.iter() {
4529 event.write(writer)?;
4532 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4533 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4534 for event in background_events.iter() {
4536 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4538 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4539 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4544 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4545 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4547 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4548 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4549 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4550 hash.write(writer)?;
4551 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4554 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4555 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4556 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4557 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4560 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4566 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4568 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4570 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4571 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4572 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4573 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4574 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4575 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4576 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4577 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4578 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4579 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4580 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4582 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4583 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4585 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4586 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4587 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4588 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4589 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4590 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4591 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4592 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4593 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4594 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4595 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4598 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4599 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4601 pub keys_manager: K,
4603 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4605 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4606 pub fee_estimator: F,
4607 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4609 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4610 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4611 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4612 pub chain_monitor: M,
4614 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4615 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4616 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4617 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4618 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4619 /// deserialization.
4621 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4622 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4623 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4625 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4626 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4628 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4629 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4630 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4631 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4633 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4636 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4637 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4640 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4641 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4642 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4643 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4644 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4645 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4648 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4649 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4650 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4651 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4652 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4654 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4655 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4660 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4661 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4662 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4663 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4664 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4665 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4666 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4667 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4670 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4671 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4672 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4676 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4677 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4678 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4679 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4680 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4681 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4684 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4685 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4687 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4688 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4689 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4691 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4693 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4694 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4695 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4696 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4697 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4698 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4699 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4700 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4701 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4702 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4703 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4704 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4705 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4706 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4707 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
4708 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
4709 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4710 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4711 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4712 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4713 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4714 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4715 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4716 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4717 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4718 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4719 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4720 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4721 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4722 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4724 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4725 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4727 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4730 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4731 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4732 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4733 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4734 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4735 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4739 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4740 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4741 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4745 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4746 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4747 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4748 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4749 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4750 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4751 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4752 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4753 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4755 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4758 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4759 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4760 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4761 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4762 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4763 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4764 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4765 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4767 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4770 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4771 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4772 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4773 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4774 let peer_state = PeerState {
4775 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4777 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4780 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4781 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4782 for _ in 0..event_count {
4783 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4784 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4789 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4790 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4791 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4792 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4793 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4794 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4798 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4799 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4801 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4802 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
4803 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
4804 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
4805 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4809 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4810 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
4811 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
4812 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
4813 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4817 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
4819 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4820 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4822 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4824 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4825 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4826 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4828 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4830 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4835 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4837 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
4838 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
4840 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4841 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4844 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4845 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
4847 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4849 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4850 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4851 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4852 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4854 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4855 logger: args.logger,
4856 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4859 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4860 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4863 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4864 //connection or two.
4866 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4872 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4874 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4876 use core::time::Duration;
4877 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4878 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4879 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4882 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4883 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4884 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4886 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4887 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4888 thread::spawn(move || {
4890 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4891 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4892 *persistence_lock = true;
4895 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4901 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4902 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4904 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4907 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4912 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4914 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4917 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4924 fn test_notify_limits() {
4925 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
4926 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
4927 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4928 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4929 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4930 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4932 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4934 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
4935 // to connect messages with new values
4936 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
4937 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
4938 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
4939 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
4941 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
4942 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4943 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4944 // ... but the last node should not.
4945 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4946 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
4947 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4948 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4950 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
4951 // about the channel.
4952 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
4953 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
4954 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4956 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
4958 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
4959 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
4960 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
4961 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
4962 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4963 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
4965 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
4966 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
4967 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
4971 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4974 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4975 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4976 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4977 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4978 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
4979 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4980 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4981 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4982 use routing::router::get_route;
4983 use util::test_utils;
4984 use util::config::UserConfig;
4985 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4987 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4988 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4989 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4991 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4995 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4996 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4997 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4998 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4999 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5000 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5001 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5006 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5007 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5010 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5011 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5012 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5014 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5015 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5017 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5018 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
5020 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5021 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5023 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5024 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5025 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5026 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5027 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5029 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5031 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5033 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5034 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5035 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5036 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5037 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5039 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5041 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5043 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5044 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5045 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5048 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5049 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5050 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5052 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5053 } else { panic!(); }
5055 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5056 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5058 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5061 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5064 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5065 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5067 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5068 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5070 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5072 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5073 macro_rules! send_payment {
5074 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5075 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5076 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5077 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5079 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5080 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5082 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5083 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5085 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5086 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5087 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5088 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5089 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5090 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5091 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5092 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5094 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5095 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5096 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5098 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5099 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5100 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5101 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5102 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5104 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5107 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5108 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5109 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5110 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5112 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5117 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5118 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);