1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
96 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
116 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
121 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
122 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
125 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
126 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
127 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
128 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
129 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
132 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
134 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
148 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
152 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
153 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
154 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 short_channel_id: u64,
158 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
159 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
161 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
162 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
167 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
169 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
170 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
171 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
173 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
174 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
177 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
178 struct ClaimableHTLC {
179 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
181 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
183 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
185 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
189 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
190 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
191 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
192 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
194 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
195 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
200 impl Readable for PaymentId {
201 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
202 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
206 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
207 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
208 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
209 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
210 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
213 session_priv: SecretKey,
214 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
215 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
216 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
217 payment_id: PaymentId,
218 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
219 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
222 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
223 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
224 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
226 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
228 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
230 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
233 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
234 payment_id.hash(hasher);
235 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
236 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
237 payment_params.hash(hasher);
242 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
245 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
246 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
248 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
249 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
250 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
251 payment_secret: None,
252 payment_params: None,
257 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
258 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
260 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
268 struct ReceiveError {
274 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
275 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
277 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
282 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
284 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
285 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
286 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
287 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
288 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
290 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
291 err: msgs::LightningError,
292 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
293 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
295 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
297 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
299 err: LightningError {
301 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
302 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
309 shutdown_finish: None,
313 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
315 err: LightningError {
317 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
320 shutdown_finish: None,
324 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
325 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
328 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
330 err: LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
333 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
339 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
340 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
344 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
347 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
349 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
350 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
354 log_level: Level::Warn,
357 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
359 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
361 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
363 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
364 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 shutdown_finish: None,
377 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
378 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
379 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
380 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
381 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
383 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
384 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
385 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
386 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
387 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
388 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
389 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
391 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
395 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
396 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
397 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
398 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
399 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
400 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
403 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
404 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
405 /// quite some time lag.
406 enum BackgroundEvent {
407 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
408 /// commitment transaction.
409 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
412 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
413 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
415 latest_features: InitFeatures,
418 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
419 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
421 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
424 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
425 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
426 struct PendingInboundPayment {
427 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
428 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
429 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
430 /// this payment being removed.
432 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
433 user_payment_id: u64,
434 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
435 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
436 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
439 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
440 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
441 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
443 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
446 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
447 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
448 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
449 pending_amt_msat: u64,
450 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
451 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
452 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
454 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
455 starting_block_height: u32,
457 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
458 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
459 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
461 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
462 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
463 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
465 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
466 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
467 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
468 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
469 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
471 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
473 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
474 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
478 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
479 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
481 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
485 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
487 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
491 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
493 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
498 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
500 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
501 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
502 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
507 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
508 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
509 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
510 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
512 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
513 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
516 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
517 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
520 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
521 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
522 let our_payment_hash;
523 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
524 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
525 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
527 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
529 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
533 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
537 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
538 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
539 let remove_res = match self {
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
542 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
543 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
544 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
548 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
549 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
550 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
551 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
552 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
553 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
560 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
561 let insert_res = match self {
562 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
563 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
564 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
566 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
567 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
570 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
571 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
572 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
573 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
574 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
581 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
583 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
584 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
585 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
586 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
593 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
594 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
595 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
596 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
597 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
598 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
599 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
601 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
602 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
604 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
605 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
606 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
607 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
608 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
609 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
610 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
611 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
613 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
614 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
616 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
617 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
619 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
620 /// to individual Channels.
622 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
623 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
624 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
625 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
627 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
628 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
629 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
630 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
631 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
632 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
633 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
635 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
636 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
637 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
638 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
641 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
642 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
643 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
644 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
645 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
647 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
648 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
649 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
650 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
651 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
654 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
655 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
656 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
657 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
658 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
662 // `total_consistency_lock`
664 // |__`forward_htlcs`
666 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
668 // | |__`claimable_htlcs`
670 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
672 // | |__`channel_state`
676 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
678 // | |__`per_peer_state`
680 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
684 // | |__`pending_events`
686 // | |__`pending_background_events`
688 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
689 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
690 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
691 K::Target: KeysInterface,
692 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
695 default_configuration: UserConfig,
696 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
697 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
701 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
703 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
705 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
706 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
708 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
709 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
710 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
711 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
712 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
714 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
715 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
716 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
717 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
719 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
720 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
722 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
723 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
724 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
725 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
726 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
727 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
728 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
729 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
731 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
733 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
734 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
736 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
738 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
739 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
740 /// and via the classic SCID.
742 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
743 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
745 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
747 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
749 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
751 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
752 /// failed/claimed by the user.
754 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
755 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
757 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
758 claimable_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>>,
760 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
761 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
762 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
763 /// active channel list on load.
765 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
766 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
768 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
770 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
771 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
772 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
774 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
775 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
776 /// the handling of the events.
779 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
780 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
781 /// would break backwards compatability.
782 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
783 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
784 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
786 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
787 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
789 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
791 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
792 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
793 /// confirmation depth.
795 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
796 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
797 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
799 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
801 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
803 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
805 our_network_key: SecretKey,
806 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
808 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
810 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
811 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
812 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
814 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
815 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
817 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
818 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
819 /// keeping additional state.
820 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
822 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
823 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
824 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
825 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
827 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
828 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
829 /// are currently open with that peer.
830 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
831 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
834 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
835 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
837 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
838 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
839 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
840 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
841 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
842 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
843 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
844 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
845 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
846 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
847 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
849 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
856 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
858 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
859 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
860 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
861 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
862 pub struct ChainParameters {
863 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
864 pub network: Network,
866 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
868 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
869 pub best_block: BestBlock,
872 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
878 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
879 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
880 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
881 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
882 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
883 /// updates are ready for persistence).
885 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
886 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
887 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
888 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
889 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
891 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
892 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
895 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
896 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
897 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
900 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
901 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
903 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
904 persistence_notifier: notifier,
905 should_persist: persist_check,
906 _read_guard: read_guard,
911 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
913 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
914 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
919 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
920 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
922 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
924 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
925 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
926 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
927 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
928 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
930 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
931 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
933 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
935 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
936 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
937 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
938 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
939 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
940 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
941 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
942 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
943 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
944 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
945 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
946 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
947 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
949 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
950 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
952 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
953 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
954 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
955 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
957 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
958 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
959 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
960 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
961 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
962 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
965 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
967 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
968 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
971 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
973 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
974 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
976 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
977 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
978 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
979 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
981 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
982 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
983 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
984 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
985 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
986 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
987 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
988 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
989 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
990 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
991 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
994 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
995 /// to better separate parameters.
996 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
997 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
998 /// The node_id of our counterparty
999 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1000 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1001 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1002 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1003 pub features: InitFeatures,
1004 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1005 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1006 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1008 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1010 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1011 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1012 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1013 /// payments to us through this channel.
1014 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1015 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1016 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1017 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1018 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1019 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1020 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1023 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1024 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1025 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1026 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1027 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1028 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1029 /// lifetime of the channel.
1030 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1031 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1032 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1033 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1034 /// our counterparty already.
1036 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1037 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1038 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1039 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1041 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1042 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1043 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1044 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1046 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1047 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1049 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1050 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1052 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1053 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1054 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1055 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1056 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1057 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1058 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1059 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1060 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1063 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1065 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1066 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1067 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1068 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1069 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1070 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1071 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1073 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1074 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1076 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1077 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1078 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1079 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1080 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1081 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1082 /// this value on chain.
1084 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1086 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1088 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1089 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1090 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1091 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1092 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1093 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1094 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1096 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1097 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1098 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1099 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1101 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1102 pub balance_msat: u64,
1103 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1104 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1105 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1106 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1108 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1110 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1111 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1112 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1113 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1114 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1115 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1116 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1117 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1119 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1120 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1121 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1122 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1123 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1124 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1125 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1127 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1128 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1129 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1130 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1131 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1132 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1133 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1134 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1135 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1137 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1139 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1140 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1141 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1142 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1143 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1144 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1145 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1146 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1147 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1149 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1150 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1151 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1152 pub is_outbound: bool,
1153 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1154 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1155 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1156 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1157 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1159 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1160 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1161 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1162 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1164 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1165 pub is_usable: bool,
1166 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1167 pub is_public: bool,
1168 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1169 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1170 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1171 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1172 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1173 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1175 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1176 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1179 impl ChannelDetails {
1180 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1181 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1182 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1184 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1185 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1186 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1187 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1190 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1191 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1192 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1194 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1195 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1196 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1197 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1201 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1202 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1203 /// states for more.
1204 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1205 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1206 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1207 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1208 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1209 ParameterError(APIError),
1210 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1211 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1212 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1213 /// payment in full.
1215 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1217 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1218 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1219 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1220 /// paths than the ones selected).
1222 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] does *not* need to be called for this payment and
1223 /// [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work for this payment.
1224 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1225 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1226 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1227 /// in over-/re-payment.
1229 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1230 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1231 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1233 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1234 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1235 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1236 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1238 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1239 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1240 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1241 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1242 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1243 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1244 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1245 payment_id: PaymentId,
1249 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1251 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1253 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1254 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1255 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1256 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1258 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1259 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1260 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1263 macro_rules! handle_error {
1264 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1267 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1268 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1270 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1271 // entering the macro.
1272 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1273 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1276 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1278 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1279 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1280 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1281 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1285 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1286 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1287 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1288 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1293 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1294 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1296 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1297 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1298 action: err.action.clone()
1302 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1303 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1306 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1313 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1314 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1315 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1316 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1317 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1318 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1320 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1321 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1322 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1323 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1324 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1326 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1327 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1329 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1333 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1334 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1335 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1337 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1338 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1340 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1341 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1343 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1344 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1345 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1346 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1347 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1348 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1354 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1355 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1359 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1361 $entry.remove_entry();
1369 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1370 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1374 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1376 $entry.remove_entry();
1384 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1385 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1387 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1388 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1394 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1395 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1397 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1398 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1399 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1400 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1401 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1402 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1403 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1404 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1405 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1406 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1407 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1408 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1409 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1410 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1413 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1414 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1415 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1416 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1417 match $action_type {
1418 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1419 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1421 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1422 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1424 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1425 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1426 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1427 if !$resend_commitment {
1428 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1431 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1433 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1434 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1436 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1441 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1442 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1444 $entry.remove_entry();
1448 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1449 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1450 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1452 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1453 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1455 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1456 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1458 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1459 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1461 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1462 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1466 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1467 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1468 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1469 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1470 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1472 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1473 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1474 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1475 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1476 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1477 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1478 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1479 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1480 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1481 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1486 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1487 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1488 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1490 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1491 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1492 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1493 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1494 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1495 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1498 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1503 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1504 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1505 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1506 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1507 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1509 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1510 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1511 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1513 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1514 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1515 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1516 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1519 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1520 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1521 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1522 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1523 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1524 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1525 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1526 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1527 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1528 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1529 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1530 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1533 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1534 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1535 // before it should be allowed to.
1536 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1537 send_channel_ready!($self, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1539 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1540 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1541 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1546 emit_channel_ready_event!($self, $channel_entry.get_mut());
1548 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1549 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1550 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1551 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1552 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1553 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1554 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1555 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1556 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1557 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1558 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1559 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1560 match $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1561 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
1563 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1564 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1565 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1566 let mut order = $order;
1568 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1570 break handle_monitor_update_res!($self, e, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1575 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1576 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1577 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1578 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1583 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1584 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1585 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1586 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1587 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1592 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1596 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1601 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1602 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1603 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1608 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1609 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1610 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1611 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1612 assert!(res.is_ok());
1615 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1619 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1620 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1621 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1623 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1625 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1626 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1631 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1632 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1633 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1634 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1635 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1638 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1640 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1641 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1643 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1645 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1646 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1647 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1648 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1649 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1650 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1651 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1652 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1654 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1655 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1656 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1660 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1662 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1663 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1664 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1666 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1667 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1668 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1669 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1670 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1671 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1672 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1674 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1675 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1678 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1679 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1681 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1683 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1685 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1687 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1688 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1689 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1690 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1698 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1699 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1700 &self.default_configuration
1703 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1704 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1705 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1708 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1709 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1711 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1713 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1717 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1722 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1724 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1725 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1726 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1727 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1728 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1731 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1732 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1734 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1735 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1736 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1738 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1739 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1740 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1741 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1742 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1743 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1745 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1746 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1747 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1748 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1749 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1750 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1754 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1755 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1756 Some(peer_state) => {
1757 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1758 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1759 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1760 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1761 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1762 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1763 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1767 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1772 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1775 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1778 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1779 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1781 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1782 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1783 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1786 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1788 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1791 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1793 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1794 node_id: their_network_key,
1797 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1800 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1801 let mut res = Vec::new();
1803 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1804 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1805 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1806 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1807 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1808 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1809 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1810 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1811 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1812 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1813 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1814 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1815 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1816 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1817 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1818 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1819 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1820 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1821 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1822 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1823 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1825 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1826 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1827 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1828 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1829 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1830 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1831 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1832 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1833 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1834 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1835 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1836 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1837 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1838 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1839 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1840 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1841 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1842 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1843 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1844 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1845 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1846 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1847 config: Some(channel.config()),
1851 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1852 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1853 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1854 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1860 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1861 /// more information.
1862 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1863 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1866 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1867 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1869 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1870 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1873 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1874 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1875 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1876 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1877 // really wanted anyway.
1878 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1881 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1882 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1883 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1884 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1885 Some(transaction) => {
1886 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1890 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1891 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1892 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1893 reason: closure_reason
1897 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1898 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1900 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1901 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1902 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1903 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1904 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1905 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1906 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1907 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1909 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1910 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1911 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1912 Some(peer_state) => {
1913 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1914 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1915 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1917 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1920 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1922 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1923 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1924 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1925 let (result, is_permanent) =
1926 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1928 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1933 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1934 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1938 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1939 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1940 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1941 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1945 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1953 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1954 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1955 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1958 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1962 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1963 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1964 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1966 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1967 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1969 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1970 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1971 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1972 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1974 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1976 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1977 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1978 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1979 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1980 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1983 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1984 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1985 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1987 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1988 /// the channel being closed or not:
1989 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1990 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1991 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1992 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1993 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1994 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1995 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1997 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1999 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2000 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2001 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2002 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2003 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2007 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2008 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2009 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2010 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2011 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2012 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2013 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
2015 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2016 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2017 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2018 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2019 // ignore the result here.
2020 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2024 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2025 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2026 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2027 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2029 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2030 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2031 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2032 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
2033 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2035 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2036 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2038 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2040 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2042 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2045 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2046 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2047 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2048 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2049 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2054 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2057 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2058 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2059 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2060 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2061 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2062 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2063 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2064 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2065 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2075 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2076 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2077 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2079 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2080 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2081 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2084 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2085 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2086 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2088 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2089 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2090 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2091 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2092 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2095 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2096 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2097 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2098 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2099 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2103 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2104 /// local transaction(s).
2105 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2106 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2107 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2111 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2112 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2114 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2115 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2116 return Err(ReceiveError {
2117 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2119 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2122 // final_expiry_too_soon
2123 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2124 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2125 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2126 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2127 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2128 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2129 return Err(ReceiveError {
2131 err_data: Vec::new(),
2132 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2135 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2136 return Err(ReceiveError {
2138 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2139 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2143 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2144 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2145 return Err(ReceiveError {
2146 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2147 err_data: Vec::new(),
2148 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2151 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2152 return Err(ReceiveError {
2153 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2154 err_data: Vec::new(),
2155 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2158 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2159 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2160 return Err(ReceiveError {
2161 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2162 err_data: Vec::new(),
2163 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2165 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2166 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2168 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2169 phantom_shared_secret,
2171 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2172 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2173 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2174 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2175 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2176 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2177 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2178 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2179 return Err(ReceiveError {
2180 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2181 err_data: Vec::new(),
2182 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2186 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2188 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2191 return Err(ReceiveError {
2192 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2193 err_data: Vec::new(),
2194 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2199 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2202 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2203 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2204 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2208 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2209 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2210 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2212 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2213 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2214 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2215 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2216 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2217 failure_code: $err_code,
2223 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2224 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2227 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2229 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2230 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2231 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2232 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2233 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2234 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2235 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2236 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2238 macro_rules! return_err {
2239 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2241 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2242 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2243 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2244 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2245 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2251 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2253 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2254 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2256 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2257 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2261 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2262 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2264 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2266 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2267 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2268 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2269 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2270 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2272 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2275 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2276 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2277 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2279 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2280 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2281 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2284 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2285 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2286 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2287 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2288 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2292 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2293 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2294 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2297 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2298 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2299 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2300 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2305 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2306 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2307 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2308 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2309 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2310 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2311 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2312 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2313 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2314 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2315 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2317 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2320 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2323 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2325 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2326 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2328 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2329 // no consistency guarantees.
2330 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2334 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2335 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2336 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2337 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2338 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2340 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2341 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2342 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2343 // we don't have the channel here.
2344 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2346 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2348 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2349 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2350 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2351 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2352 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2353 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2354 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2356 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2357 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2359 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2360 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2364 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2366 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2373 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2374 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2375 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2376 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2377 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2378 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2380 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2381 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2383 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2384 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2385 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2386 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2387 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2388 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2389 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2390 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2391 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2392 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2398 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2399 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2400 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2401 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2403 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2404 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2406 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2407 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2408 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2410 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2411 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2412 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2414 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2419 pending_forward_info
2422 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2423 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2424 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2426 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2427 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2428 if !chan.should_announce() {
2429 return Err(LightningError {
2430 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2431 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2434 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2435 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2438 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2441 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2442 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2443 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2444 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2445 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2446 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2447 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2448 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2449 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2453 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2455 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2456 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2457 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2459 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2460 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2462 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2463 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2464 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2465 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2466 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2467 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2468 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2469 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2472 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2473 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2475 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2481 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2482 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2483 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2484 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2485 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2487 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2488 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2489 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2490 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2491 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2493 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2495 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2497 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2498 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2499 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2500 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2503 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2504 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2505 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2507 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2508 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2510 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2511 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2513 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2514 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2516 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2517 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2519 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2520 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2521 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2524 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2525 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2526 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2528 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2529 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2531 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2532 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2533 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2534 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2535 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2536 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2537 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2538 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2539 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2540 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2542 _ => unreachable!(),
2545 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2546 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2547 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2548 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2549 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2550 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2551 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2552 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2561 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2562 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2563 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2564 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2569 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2570 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2572 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2577 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2579 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2580 /// fields for more info.
2582 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2583 /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2584 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2585 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2588 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2589 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2590 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2591 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2592 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2594 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2595 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2597 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2598 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2599 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2601 /// In general, a path may raise:
2602 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2603 /// node public key) is specified.
2604 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2605 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2607 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2608 /// relevant updates.
2610 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2611 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2612 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2614 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2615 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2616 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2617 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2620 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2621 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2622 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2624 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2625 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2626 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2627 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2628 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2632 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2633 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2636 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2637 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2638 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2639 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2642 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2643 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2645 err: "Payment already in progress"
2647 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2648 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2649 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2650 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2651 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2654 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2655 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2658 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2659 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2662 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2667 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2668 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2669 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2671 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2672 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2674 let mut total_value = 0;
2675 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2676 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2677 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2678 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2679 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2680 continue 'path_check;
2682 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2683 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2684 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2685 continue 'path_check;
2688 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2689 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2691 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2692 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2694 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2695 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2696 total_value = amt_msat;
2699 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2700 let mut results = Vec::new();
2701 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2702 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2703 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2706 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2707 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2708 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2709 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2712 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2713 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2714 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2715 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2717 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2718 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2722 results.push(path_res);
2724 let mut has_ok = false;
2725 let mut has_err = false;
2726 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2727 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2728 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2729 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2730 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2731 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2732 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2736 } else if res.is_err() {
2737 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2738 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2741 if has_err && has_ok {
2742 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2745 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2746 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2747 Some(RouteParameters {
2748 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2749 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2750 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2756 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2757 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2758 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2759 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2760 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2766 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2768 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2769 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2770 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2771 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2772 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2774 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2775 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2776 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2777 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2778 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2779 if path.len() == 0 {
2780 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2781 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2786 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2787 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2788 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2791 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2792 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2793 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2795 let res = match payment {
2796 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2797 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2799 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2800 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2801 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2802 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2805 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2807 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2808 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2809 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2812 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2813 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2814 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2817 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2818 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2819 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2823 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2824 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2829 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2830 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2834 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2837 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2839 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2840 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2841 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2842 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2844 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2845 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2846 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2848 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2849 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2850 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2851 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2852 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2854 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2855 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2856 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2857 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2858 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2860 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2868 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2869 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2870 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2871 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2872 /// never reach the recipient.
2874 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2875 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2877 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2878 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2880 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2882 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2883 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2884 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2886 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2888 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2889 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2891 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2892 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2897 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2898 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2899 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2900 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2901 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2903 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2906 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2907 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2911 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2912 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2914 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2915 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2920 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2922 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2923 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2924 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2927 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2928 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2929 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2930 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2931 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2932 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2935 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2936 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2937 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2938 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2939 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2941 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2943 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2945 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2946 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2947 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2948 } else { unreachable!(); })
2951 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2953 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2954 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2957 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2958 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2963 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2964 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2965 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2968 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2969 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2970 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2972 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2973 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2974 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2975 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2984 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2985 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2986 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2990 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2992 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2993 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2995 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2996 /// across the p2p network.
2998 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2999 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3001 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3002 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3003 /// keys per-channel).
3005 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3006 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3007 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3009 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3010 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3011 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3013 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3014 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3015 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3016 /// for more details.
3018 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3019 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3020 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3021 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3023 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3024 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3025 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3026 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3031 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3032 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
3033 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
3034 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
3035 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
3036 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3037 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3041 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3042 let mut output_index = None;
3043 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3044 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3045 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3046 if output_index.is_some() {
3047 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3048 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3051 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3052 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3053 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3056 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3059 if output_index.is_none() {
3060 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3061 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3064 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3068 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3070 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3071 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3072 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3073 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3075 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3076 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3078 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3079 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3081 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3083 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3084 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3085 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3086 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3087 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3088 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3089 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3090 pub fn update_channel_config(
3091 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3092 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3093 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3094 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3095 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3100 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3103 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3104 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3105 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3106 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3107 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3108 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3110 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3111 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3112 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3113 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3117 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3118 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3119 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3122 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3123 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3124 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3125 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3126 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3135 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3137 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3138 /// Will likely generate further events.
3139 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3140 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3142 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3143 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3144 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3145 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3147 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3148 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3150 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3151 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3152 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3154 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3155 match forward_info {
3156 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3157 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3158 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3159 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3160 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3161 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3163 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3164 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3165 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3166 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3167 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3168 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3171 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3172 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3174 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3177 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3178 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3184 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3185 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3187 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3191 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3192 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3194 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3198 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3199 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3200 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3201 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3202 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3204 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3205 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3206 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3207 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3208 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3210 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3212 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3213 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3217 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3218 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3219 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3220 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3226 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3229 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3232 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3233 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3234 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3235 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3236 // problem, not ours.
3242 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3243 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3245 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3249 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3250 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3251 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3252 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3253 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3256 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3257 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3258 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3259 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3260 match forward_info {
3261 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3262 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3264 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3265 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3266 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3267 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3268 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3269 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3270 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3271 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3272 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3273 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3275 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3277 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3278 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3280 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3282 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3283 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3284 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3285 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3291 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3293 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3294 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3295 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3296 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3297 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3298 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3299 // this channel currently :/.
3305 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3306 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3308 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3309 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3310 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3312 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3313 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3315 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3317 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3318 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3319 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3322 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3324 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3325 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3326 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3327 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3328 // messages when we can.
3329 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3330 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3331 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3338 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3339 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3342 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3343 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3344 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3345 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3346 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3347 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3349 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3350 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3351 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3352 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3353 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3356 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3360 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3361 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3363 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3367 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3368 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3369 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3370 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3371 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3372 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3373 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3374 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3375 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3377 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3384 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3385 match forward_info {
3386 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3387 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3388 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3389 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3390 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3391 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3392 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3394 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3395 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3397 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3400 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3401 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3402 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3403 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3404 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3405 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3406 phantom_shared_secret,
3408 value: amt_to_forward,
3410 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3415 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3416 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3417 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3418 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3419 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3421 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3422 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3423 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3424 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3425 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3426 phantom_shared_secret,
3428 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3429 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3434 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3435 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3436 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3438 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3439 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3440 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3443 let mut claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3444 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3445 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3446 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3447 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3448 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3449 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3453 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3454 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3455 total_value += htlc.value;
3456 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3457 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3458 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3459 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3460 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3461 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3463 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3465 _ => unreachable!(),
3468 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3469 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3470 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3471 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3472 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3473 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3474 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3477 amount_msat: total_value,
3479 payment_received_generated = true;
3481 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3482 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3484 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3486 payment_received_generated
3490 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3491 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3492 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3493 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3494 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3495 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3496 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3497 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3498 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3499 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3500 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3501 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3502 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3503 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3505 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3509 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3511 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3512 match self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
3513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3514 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3515 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3516 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3518 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3522 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3523 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3524 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3530 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3531 if payment_data.is_none() {
3532 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3533 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3536 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3537 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3538 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3539 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3540 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3541 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3542 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3543 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3545 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3546 if payment_received_generated {
3547 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3553 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3554 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3562 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3563 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3565 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3567 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3568 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3571 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3572 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3573 events.append(&mut new_events);
3576 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3578 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3579 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3581 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3582 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3583 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3584 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3585 if background_events.is_empty() {
3589 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3591 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3592 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3593 // monitor updating completing.
3594 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3601 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3602 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3603 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3604 self.process_background_events();
3607 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3608 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3609 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3610 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3611 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3612 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3613 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3615 if !chan.is_live() {
3616 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3617 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3618 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3620 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3621 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3623 let mut retain_channel = true;
3624 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3627 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3628 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3632 let ret_err = match res {
3633 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3634 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3635 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3636 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3637 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3638 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3639 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3640 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3641 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3642 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3643 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3650 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3651 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3659 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3663 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3664 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3665 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3666 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3667 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3668 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3669 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3671 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3673 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3675 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3676 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3677 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3678 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3679 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3680 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3682 handle_errors.push(err);
3692 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3693 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3694 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3695 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3696 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3697 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3698 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3700 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3701 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3702 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3703 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3704 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3705 if no_remaining_entries {
3706 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3708 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3709 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3710 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3711 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3712 no_remaining_entries = false;
3720 if no_remaining_entries {
3721 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3722 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3724 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3731 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3733 /// This currently includes:
3734 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3735 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3736 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3738 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3739 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3741 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3742 /// estimate fetches.
3743 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3744 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3745 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3746 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3748 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3750 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3751 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3753 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3754 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3755 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3756 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3757 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3758 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3759 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3761 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3763 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3765 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3766 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3767 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3768 if needs_close { return false; }
3771 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3772 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3773 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3774 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3775 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3776 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3777 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3778 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3782 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3783 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3785 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3786 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3787 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3791 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3792 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3797 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3803 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3804 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3805 // This should be unreachable
3806 debug_assert!(false);
3809 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3810 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3811 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3812 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3814 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3815 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3816 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3818 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3825 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3826 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3827 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3830 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3831 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3834 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3840 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3841 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3842 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3844 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3845 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3846 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3847 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3849 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3850 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3851 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3852 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3853 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3854 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3856 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(payment_hash);
3857 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3858 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3859 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3860 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3861 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3862 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
3863 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3864 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3865 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3870 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3871 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3873 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3875 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3876 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3877 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3878 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3879 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3880 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3881 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3883 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3885 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3886 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3888 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3893 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3894 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3895 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3896 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3897 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3898 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3899 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3900 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3901 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3902 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3904 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3905 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3906 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3907 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3909 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3910 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3911 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3912 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3913 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3917 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3918 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3919 // be surfaced to the user.
3920 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3921 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3922 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3924 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3925 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3926 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3927 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3928 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3930 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3933 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3934 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3938 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3939 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3940 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
3941 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3943 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3944 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3945 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3946 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3947 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3950 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3951 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3952 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3955 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3956 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3957 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3959 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3960 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3961 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3962 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3963 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3964 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3965 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3966 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3967 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3970 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3971 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3974 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3975 all_paths_failed = true;
3976 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3977 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3979 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3985 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3988 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3989 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3990 Some(RouteParameters {
3991 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3992 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3993 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3996 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3998 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3999 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4001 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4003 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4005 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4006 if !payment_retryable {
4007 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
4009 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4013 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4015 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4021 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
4022 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
4023 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
4024 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
4025 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4027 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4028 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4029 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4030 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4037 error_code: onion_error_code,
4039 error_data: onion_error_data
4043 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4049 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
4050 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
4051 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
4052 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
4054 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
4055 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
4056 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
4057 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4059 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4060 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4062 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4064 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4067 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4068 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4069 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4070 payment_failed_permanently: false,
4071 network_update: None,
4074 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4077 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4079 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4084 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4085 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4086 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4088 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
4089 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4090 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
4091 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4092 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4093 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4094 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4095 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4097 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4098 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4101 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4103 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4107 let mut forward_event = None;
4108 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4109 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4110 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4112 match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4113 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4114 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4116 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4117 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4120 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4121 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4122 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4123 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4124 time_forwardable: time
4127 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4128 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4129 failed_next_destination: destination
4135 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4136 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4138 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4139 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4140 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4142 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4143 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4144 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4145 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4147 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4148 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4149 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4150 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4151 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4152 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4153 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4154 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4158 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_hash);
4159 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4160 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4162 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4163 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4164 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4165 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4167 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4168 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4169 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4170 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4171 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4173 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4174 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4175 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4176 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4177 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4178 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4179 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4180 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4181 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4182 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4189 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4194 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4195 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4196 debug_assert!(false);
4200 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4201 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4202 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4203 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4204 if sources.len() != 1 {
4205 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4206 debug_assert!(false);
4212 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4214 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4215 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4218 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4219 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4220 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4224 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4225 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4226 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4227 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4228 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4229 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4230 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4231 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4232 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4234 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4235 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4236 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4237 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4238 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4239 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4241 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4245 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4247 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4248 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4249 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4250 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4251 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
4252 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4253 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4254 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4258 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4259 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4261 purpose: payment_purpose,
4262 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4266 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4267 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4268 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4269 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4274 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4275 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4276 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4277 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4278 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4280 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4284 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4285 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4286 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4287 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4288 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4289 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4291 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4292 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4293 payment_preimage, e);
4294 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4295 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4296 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4297 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4301 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4302 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4303 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4304 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4305 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4306 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4307 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4308 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4309 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4310 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4316 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4318 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4321 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4322 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4323 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4325 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4326 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4327 payment_preimage, e);
4330 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4331 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4333 chan.remove_entry();
4335 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4338 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4341 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4342 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4343 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4344 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4345 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4346 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4347 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4348 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4349 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4350 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4351 pending_events.push(
4352 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4354 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4364 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4366 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4367 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4368 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4369 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4370 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4371 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4372 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4373 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4374 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4375 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4376 pending_events.push(
4377 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4378 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4384 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4388 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4389 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4390 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4392 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4393 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4394 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4395 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4396 pending_events.push(
4397 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4406 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4409 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4410 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4411 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4412 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4413 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4414 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4415 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4418 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4419 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4420 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4421 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4422 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4425 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4426 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4427 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4428 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4429 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4430 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4431 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4432 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4433 // again on restart.
4434 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4435 payment_preimage, update_res);
4437 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4438 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4439 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4440 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4443 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4444 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4445 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4446 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4450 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4451 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4452 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4455 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4456 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4457 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4459 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4461 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4471 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4472 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4473 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4476 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4477 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4479 let chan_restoration_res;
4480 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4481 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4482 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4483 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4484 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4485 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4487 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4491 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4492 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4493 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4494 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4495 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4496 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4497 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4499 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4500 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4501 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4506 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4507 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4508 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4511 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4513 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4514 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4515 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4516 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4517 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4521 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4523 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4524 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4527 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4528 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4529 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4531 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4532 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4533 /// used to accept such channels.
4535 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4536 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4537 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4538 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4541 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4542 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4544 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4545 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4546 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4548 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4549 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4551 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4552 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4554 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4555 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4557 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4558 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4559 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4560 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4563 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4564 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4566 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4567 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4568 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4569 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4570 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4571 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4573 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4574 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4577 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4578 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4579 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4580 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4581 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4582 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4585 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4586 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4587 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4590 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4591 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4592 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4596 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4602 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4603 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4604 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4607 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4608 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4611 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4612 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4613 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4614 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4617 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4618 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4622 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4623 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4624 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4625 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4626 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4627 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4630 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4631 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4632 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4634 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4635 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4636 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4639 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4640 pending_events.push(
4641 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4642 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4643 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4644 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4645 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4646 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4651 entry.insert(channel);
4657 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4658 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4659 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4660 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4661 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4663 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4664 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4666 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4667 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4672 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4673 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4674 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4675 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4676 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4678 user_channel_id: user_id,
4683 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4684 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4685 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4686 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4687 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4688 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4689 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4690 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4691 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4693 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4695 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4698 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4699 // lock before watch_channel
4700 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4701 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4702 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4703 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4704 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4705 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4706 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4707 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4708 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4709 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4710 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4711 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4712 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4714 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4715 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4716 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4717 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4718 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4719 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4720 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4723 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4724 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4725 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4726 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4727 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4730 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4731 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4732 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4733 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4734 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4735 funding_msg.channel_id))
4737 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4738 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4741 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4742 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4745 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4746 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4754 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4756 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4757 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4758 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4759 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4761 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4762 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4764 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4765 Ok(update) => update,
4766 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4768 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4769 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4771 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4772 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4773 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4774 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4775 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4776 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4777 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4783 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4784 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4788 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4791 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4792 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4796 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4797 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4798 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4799 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4801 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4802 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4804 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4805 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4806 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4807 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4808 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4809 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4810 msg: announcement_sigs,
4812 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4813 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4814 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4815 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4816 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4817 // announcement_signatures.
4818 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4819 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4820 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4821 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4827 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4831 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4835 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4836 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4837 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4838 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4839 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4841 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4843 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4844 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4847 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4848 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4849 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4850 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4853 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4854 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4856 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4857 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4858 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4859 let (result, is_permanent) =
4860 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4862 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4867 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4868 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4869 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4879 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4880 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4881 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4884 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4888 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4889 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4890 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4891 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4892 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4893 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4894 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4895 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4897 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4898 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4899 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4900 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4905 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4906 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4907 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4908 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4909 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4910 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4911 } else { (tx, None) }
4913 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4916 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4917 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4918 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4920 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4921 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4922 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4923 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4927 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4932 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4933 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4934 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4935 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4937 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4938 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4939 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4940 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4942 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4943 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4944 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4946 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4947 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4948 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4949 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4952 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4953 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4954 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4955 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4956 match pending_forward_info {
4957 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4958 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4959 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4960 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4962 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4964 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4965 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4966 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4969 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4971 _ => pending_forward_info
4974 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4981 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4982 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4983 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4984 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4985 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4986 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4987 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4988 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4990 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4992 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4995 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4999 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5000 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5001 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5002 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5004 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5005 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5007 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
5009 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5014 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5015 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5016 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5017 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5018 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5019 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5020 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5022 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5023 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5024 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5026 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), chan);
5029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5033 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5034 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5035 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5036 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5037 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5038 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5039 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5041 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5042 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5043 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5044 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5045 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5046 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5047 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5052 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5053 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5057 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5058 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5059 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5061 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5062 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5063 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5064 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5065 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5066 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5067 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5068 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5070 commitment_signed: msg,
5076 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5081 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5082 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5083 let mut forward_event = None;
5084 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5085 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5086 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5087 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
5089 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5090 match forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
5091 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5092 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5093 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5095 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5096 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5097 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
5099 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5100 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5101 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
5106 match forward_event {
5108 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5109 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5110 time_forwardable: time
5118 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5119 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5121 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5122 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5123 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5124 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5125 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5126 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5128 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5129 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5130 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5131 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5132 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5133 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5134 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5135 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5136 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5137 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5138 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5139 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5141 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5142 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5143 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5144 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5145 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5146 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5148 } else { unreachable!(); }
5150 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5151 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5152 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5156 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5157 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5158 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5159 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5160 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
5162 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5165 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5167 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5168 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
5170 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5171 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5172 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5174 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
5175 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5182 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5183 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5184 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5185 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5186 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5187 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5188 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5190 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan);
5192 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5197 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5198 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5199 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5201 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5202 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5203 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5204 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5206 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5207 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5210 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5211 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5212 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5213 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5214 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5215 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5218 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5223 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5224 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5225 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5226 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5228 // It's not a local channel
5229 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5232 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5233 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5234 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5235 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5236 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5237 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5238 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5239 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5240 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5241 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5243 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5245 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5246 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5247 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5248 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5250 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5251 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5254 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5256 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5259 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5260 let chan_restoration_res;
5261 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5262 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5263 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5265 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5266 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5267 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5268 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5270 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5271 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5272 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5273 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5274 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5275 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5276 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5277 let mut channel_update = None;
5278 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5279 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5280 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5283 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5284 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5285 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5286 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5287 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5288 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5289 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5294 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5295 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5296 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5297 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5298 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5299 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5301 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5303 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5306 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5307 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5309 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5310 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5315 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5316 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5317 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5318 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5319 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5320 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5321 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5322 match monitor_event {
5323 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5324 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5325 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5326 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5329 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5330 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5333 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5334 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5335 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5336 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5337 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5338 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5339 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5340 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5341 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5342 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5343 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5347 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5348 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5350 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5352 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5353 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5354 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5355 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5356 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5361 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5362 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5368 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5369 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5372 has_pending_monitor_events
5375 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5376 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5377 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5379 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5380 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5383 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5384 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5385 /// update was applied.
5387 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5388 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5389 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5390 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5391 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5392 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5393 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5394 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5396 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5397 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5398 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5399 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5401 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5402 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5403 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5404 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5406 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5408 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5411 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5412 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5413 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5414 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5415 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5416 updates: commitment_update,
5420 has_monitor_update = true;
5421 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5422 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5423 if close_channel { return false; }
5430 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5431 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5432 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5439 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5440 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5441 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5444 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5445 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5451 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5452 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5453 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5454 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5455 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5456 let mut has_update = false;
5458 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5459 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5460 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5461 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5463 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5464 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5465 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5466 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5468 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5469 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5472 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5473 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5474 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5475 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5476 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5481 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5483 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5484 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5485 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5491 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5492 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5499 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5500 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5506 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5507 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5509 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5510 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5511 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5512 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5513 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5514 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5515 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5516 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5517 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5518 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5519 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5520 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5521 assert!(should_broadcast);
5522 } else { unreachable!(); }
5523 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5525 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5529 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5530 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5532 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5533 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5536 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5539 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5540 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5541 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5542 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5543 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5544 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5545 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5546 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5547 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5548 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5549 // never fail a payment too early.
5550 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5552 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5555 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5560 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5563 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5564 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5566 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5567 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5568 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5570 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5572 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5573 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5577 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5578 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5580 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5582 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5583 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5584 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5585 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5586 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5587 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5590 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5591 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5593 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5596 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5598 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5600 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5601 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5602 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5603 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5604 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5607 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5608 /// stored external to LDK.
5610 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5611 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5612 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5614 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5615 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5618 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5619 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5620 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5621 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5623 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5624 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5625 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5626 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5627 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5629 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5630 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5631 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5632 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5633 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5635 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5636 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5638 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5639 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5643 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5644 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5646 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5648 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5649 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5650 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5651 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5654 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5655 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5657 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5660 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5662 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5664 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5665 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5668 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5669 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5671 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5672 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5673 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5676 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5677 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5679 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5680 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5681 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5682 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5684 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5685 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5686 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5687 Some(_) => continue,
5688 None => return scid_candidate
5693 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5695 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5696 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5698 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5699 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5700 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5704 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5705 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5706 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5707 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5708 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5713 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5714 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5718 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5719 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5723 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5724 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5725 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5726 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5727 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5730 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5731 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5732 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5733 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5735 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5736 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5737 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5738 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5741 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5742 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5744 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5745 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5748 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5749 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5750 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5752 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5753 events.replace(pending_events);
5762 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5764 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5765 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5766 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5767 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5770 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5772 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5773 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5774 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5775 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5776 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5778 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5779 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5780 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5781 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5784 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5785 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5786 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5789 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5790 handler.handle_event(&event);
5798 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5800 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5801 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5802 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5803 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5806 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5808 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5809 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5810 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5811 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5812 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5815 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5816 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5819 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5820 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5821 let new_height = height - 1;
5823 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5824 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5825 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5826 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5827 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5828 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5831 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5835 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5837 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5838 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5839 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5840 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5843 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5844 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5845 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5846 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5848 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5849 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5851 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5852 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5853 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5855 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5856 if height < last_best_block_height {
5857 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5858 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5862 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5863 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5864 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5865 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5867 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5868 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5870 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5872 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5874 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5876 macro_rules! max_time {
5877 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5879 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5880 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5881 // having an explicit local time source.
5882 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5883 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5884 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5885 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5886 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5892 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5893 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5894 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5895 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5899 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5900 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5901 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
5902 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5903 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5904 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5910 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5911 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5912 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5913 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5914 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5915 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5916 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5917 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5922 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5924 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5925 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5926 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5927 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5930 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5931 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5933 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5934 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5935 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5936 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5937 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5939 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5940 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5942 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5943 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5944 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5945 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5946 let res = f(channel);
5947 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5948 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5949 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5950 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5952 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5954 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5955 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5956 if channel.is_usable() {
5957 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5958 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5959 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5960 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5965 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5969 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5971 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5972 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5973 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5974 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5975 msg: announcement_sigs,
5977 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5978 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5979 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5981 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5982 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5983 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5988 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5989 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5990 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5991 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5992 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5993 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5994 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5995 // is always consistent.
5996 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5997 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5998 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5999 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6000 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6003 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6004 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6005 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6006 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6007 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6008 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6009 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6013 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6014 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6015 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6016 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6017 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6018 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6019 data: reason_message,
6028 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6029 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6030 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6031 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6032 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6033 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6034 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6035 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6036 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
6037 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
6039 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
6040 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
6041 data: htlc_msat_height_data
6042 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6046 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6050 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6052 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6053 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
6057 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6058 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6059 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
6062 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6063 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6064 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6065 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6068 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6069 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
6071 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6072 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6075 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6076 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6077 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6078 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6079 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6082 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6083 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6084 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6087 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6088 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6089 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6090 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6094 impl<M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
6095 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6096 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6097 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6098 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6099 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6102 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6103 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6104 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6107 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6108 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6109 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6112 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6113 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6114 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6117 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6118 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6119 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6122 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6123 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6124 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6127 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6128 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6129 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6132 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6133 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6134 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6137 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6138 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6139 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6142 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6143 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6144 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6147 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6148 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6149 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6152 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6153 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6154 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6157 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6158 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6159 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6162 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6164 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6167 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6168 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6169 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6172 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6173 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6174 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6177 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6178 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6179 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6182 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6187 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6188 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6189 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6192 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6193 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6194 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6195 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6197 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6198 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6199 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6200 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6201 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6202 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6203 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6204 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6205 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6206 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6207 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6210 no_channels_remain = false;
6215 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6217 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6218 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6219 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6220 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6221 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6222 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6223 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6224 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6225 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6226 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6227 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6228 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6229 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6230 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6231 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6232 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6233 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6234 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6235 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6236 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6240 if no_channels_remain {
6241 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6244 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6245 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6249 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6250 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6251 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6255 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6260 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6261 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6262 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6263 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6264 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6267 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6268 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6273 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6274 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6275 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6276 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6277 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6278 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6279 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6280 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6281 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6285 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6286 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6287 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6292 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6293 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6294 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6295 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6296 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6304 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6308 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6309 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6311 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6312 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6313 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6314 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6315 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6320 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6321 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6322 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6323 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6326 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6327 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6328 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6336 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6337 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6341 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6342 provided_node_features()
6345 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6346 provided_init_features()
6350 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6351 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6352 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6353 provided_init_features().to_context()
6356 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6357 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6359 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6360 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6361 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6362 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6363 provided_init_features().to_context()
6366 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6367 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6368 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6369 provided_init_features().to_context()
6372 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6373 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6374 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6375 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6376 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6377 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6378 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6379 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6380 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6381 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6382 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6383 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6384 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6385 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6386 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6387 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6388 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6389 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6393 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6394 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6396 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6397 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6398 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6399 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6402 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6403 (2, node_id, required),
6404 (4, features, required),
6405 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6406 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6407 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6408 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6411 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6412 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6413 (2, channel_id, required),
6414 (3, channel_type, option),
6415 (4, counterparty, required),
6416 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6417 (6, funding_txo, option),
6418 (7, config, option),
6419 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6420 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6421 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6422 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6423 (16, balance_msat, required),
6424 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6425 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6426 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6427 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6428 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6429 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6430 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6431 (26, is_outbound, required),
6432 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6433 (30, is_usable, required),
6434 (32, is_public, required),
6435 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6436 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6439 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6440 (2, channels, vec_type),
6441 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6442 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6445 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6447 (0, onion_packet, required),
6448 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6451 (0, payment_data, required),
6452 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6453 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6455 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6456 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6457 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6461 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6462 (0, routing, required),
6463 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6464 (4, payment_hash, required),
6465 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6466 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6470 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6471 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6473 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6475 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6476 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6477 reason.write(writer)?;
6479 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6480 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6483 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6484 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6485 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6486 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6493 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6494 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6495 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6498 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6499 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6500 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6501 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6505 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6506 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6507 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6508 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6509 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6512 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6513 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6514 // messages contained in the variants.
6515 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6516 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6517 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6519 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6520 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6521 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6522 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6523 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6526 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6527 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6528 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6529 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6530 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6532 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6537 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6542 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6543 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6544 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6545 (2, outpoint, required),
6546 (4, htlc_id, required),
6547 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6550 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6551 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6552 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6553 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6554 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6556 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6557 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6558 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6559 (2, self.value, required),
6560 (4, payment_data, option),
6561 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6562 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6568 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6569 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6570 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6572 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6573 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6574 let mut total_msat = None;
6575 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6576 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6577 (0, prev_hop, required),
6578 (1, total_msat, option),
6579 (2, value, required),
6580 (4, payment_data, option),
6581 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6582 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6584 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6586 if payment_data.is_some() {
6587 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6589 if total_msat.is_none() {
6590 total_msat = Some(value);
6592 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6595 if total_msat.is_none() {
6596 if payment_data.is_none() {
6597 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6599 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6601 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6605 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6608 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6615 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6616 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6617 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6620 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6621 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6622 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6623 let mut payment_id = None;
6624 let mut payment_secret = None;
6625 let mut payment_params = None;
6626 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6627 (0, session_priv, required),
6628 (1, payment_id, option),
6629 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6630 (3, payment_secret, option),
6631 (4, path, vec_type),
6632 (5, payment_params, option),
6634 if payment_id.is_none() {
6635 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6637 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6639 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6640 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6641 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6642 path: path.unwrap(),
6643 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6648 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6649 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6654 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6655 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6657 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6659 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6660 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6661 (0, session_priv, required),
6662 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6663 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6664 (3, payment_secret, option),
6665 (4, path, vec_type),
6666 (5, payment_params, option),
6669 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6671 field.write(writer)?;
6678 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6679 (0, LightningError) => {
6683 (0, failure_code, required),
6684 (2, data, vec_type),
6688 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6690 (0, forward_info, required),
6691 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6692 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6693 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6696 (0, htlc_id, required),
6697 (2, err_packet, required),
6701 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6702 (0, payment_secret, required),
6703 (2, expiry_time, required),
6704 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6705 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6706 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6709 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6711 (0, session_privs, required),
6714 (0, session_privs, required),
6715 (1, payment_hash, option),
6716 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
6719 (0, session_privs, required),
6720 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6721 (2, payment_hash, required),
6722 (4, payment_secret, option),
6723 (6, total_msat, required),
6724 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6725 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6728 (0, session_privs, required),
6729 (2, payment_hash, required),
6733 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6734 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6735 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6736 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6737 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6740 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6741 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6743 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6745 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6747 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6748 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6749 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6753 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6754 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6755 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6756 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6757 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6758 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6759 unfunded_channels += 1;
6762 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6763 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6764 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6765 channel.write(writer)?;
6771 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6772 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6773 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6774 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6775 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6776 for forward in pending_forwards {
6777 forward.write(writer)?;
6782 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6783 let claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6784 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6786 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6787 (claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6788 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6789 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6790 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6791 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6792 htlc.write(writer)?;
6794 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6797 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6798 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6799 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6800 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6801 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6802 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6805 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6806 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6807 for event in events.iter() {
6808 event.write(writer)?;
6811 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6812 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6813 for event in background_events.iter() {
6815 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6817 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6818 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6823 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6824 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6825 // likely to be identical.
6826 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6827 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6829 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6830 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6831 hash.write(writer)?;
6832 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6835 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6836 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6837 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6838 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6839 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6842 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6843 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6845 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6846 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6847 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6848 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6851 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6852 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6856 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6857 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6858 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6860 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6861 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6862 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6867 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6868 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6869 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6870 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6871 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6872 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6873 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6880 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6882 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6884 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6885 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6886 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6887 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6888 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6889 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6890 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6891 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6892 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6893 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6894 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6895 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6896 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6898 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6899 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6901 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6902 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6904 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6905 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6906 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6907 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6908 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6909 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6911 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6912 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6913 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6914 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6915 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6916 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6919 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6920 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6922 pub keys_manager: K,
6924 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6926 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6927 pub fee_estimator: F,
6928 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6930 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6931 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6932 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6933 pub chain_monitor: M,
6935 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6936 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6937 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6938 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6939 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6940 /// deserialization.
6942 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6943 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6944 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6946 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6947 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6949 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6950 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6951 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6952 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6954 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6957 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6958 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6961 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6962 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6963 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6964 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6965 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6966 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6969 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6970 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6971 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6972 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6973 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6975 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6976 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6981 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6982 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6983 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6984 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
6985 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6986 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6987 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6988 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6991 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6992 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6993 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6997 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6998 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
6999 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7000 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7001 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7002 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7005 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7006 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7008 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7009 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7010 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7012 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7014 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7015 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7016 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7017 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7018 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7019 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7020 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7021 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7022 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7023 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7024 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7025 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7026 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7027 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7028 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7029 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7030 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7031 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7032 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7033 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7034 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7035 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7036 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7037 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7038 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7039 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7040 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7041 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7042 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7043 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7044 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7045 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7046 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7047 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7048 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7049 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7050 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7051 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7052 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7053 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7056 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7057 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7058 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7060 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7061 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7063 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7065 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7066 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7067 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7068 // safely discard the channel.
7069 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7070 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7071 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7072 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7073 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7076 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7077 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7078 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7079 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7080 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7081 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7085 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7086 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7087 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7088 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7092 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7093 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7094 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7095 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7096 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7097 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7098 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7099 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7100 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7102 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7105 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7106 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7107 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7108 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7109 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7110 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7111 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7112 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7114 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7117 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7118 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7119 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7120 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7121 let peer_state = PeerState {
7122 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7124 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7127 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7128 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7129 for _ in 0..event_count {
7130 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7131 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7135 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7136 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7137 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7138 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7139 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7140 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7141 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7142 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7146 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7147 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7148 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7149 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7150 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7151 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7155 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7156 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7158 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7159 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7160 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7161 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7162 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7166 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7167 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7168 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7169 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7170 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7171 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7172 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7174 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7175 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7179 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7180 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7181 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7182 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7183 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7184 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7185 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7186 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7187 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7188 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7189 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7190 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7191 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7192 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7194 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7195 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7198 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7199 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7202 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7203 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7204 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7205 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7206 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7207 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7209 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7211 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7212 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7213 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7214 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7215 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7216 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7217 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7219 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7220 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7221 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7222 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7223 if path.is_empty() {
7224 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7225 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7227 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7228 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7229 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7230 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7232 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7233 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7234 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7236 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7237 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7238 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7239 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7240 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7242 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7243 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7244 total_msat: path_amt,
7245 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7247 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7248 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7257 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7258 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7260 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7261 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7262 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7263 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7265 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7266 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7269 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7270 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7271 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7272 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7273 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7275 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7276 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7277 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7278 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7279 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7280 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7281 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7282 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7284 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7285 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7289 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7291 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7293 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7294 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7296 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7300 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7301 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7303 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7304 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7307 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7309 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7311 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7312 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7313 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7314 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7315 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7319 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7320 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7321 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7322 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7324 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7325 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7326 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7328 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7329 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7330 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7331 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7332 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7333 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7335 if chan.is_usable() {
7336 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7337 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7338 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7339 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7340 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7345 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7347 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7348 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7349 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7350 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7351 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7352 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7353 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7355 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7356 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7357 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7358 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7360 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7361 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7362 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7363 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7365 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7366 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7367 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7368 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7370 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7371 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7372 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7374 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7375 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7378 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7380 purpose: payment_purpose,
7381 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7387 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7389 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7390 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7391 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7393 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7395 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7397 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7399 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7400 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7401 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7403 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7404 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(claimable_htlcs),
7405 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7406 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7407 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7408 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7410 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7416 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7418 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7420 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7421 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7422 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7423 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7425 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7426 logger: args.logger,
7427 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7430 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7431 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7432 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7433 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7436 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7437 //connection or two.
7439 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7445 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7446 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7447 use core::time::Duration;
7448 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7449 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7450 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7451 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7452 use crate::ln::msgs;
7453 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7454 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7455 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7456 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7457 use crate::util::test_utils;
7458 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7461 fn test_notify_limits() {
7462 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7463 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7464 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7465 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7466 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7467 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7469 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7470 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7471 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7472 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7473 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7475 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7477 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7478 // to connect messages with new values
7479 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7480 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7481 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7482 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7484 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7485 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7486 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7487 // ... but the last node should not.
7488 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7489 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7490 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7491 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7493 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7494 // about the channel.
7495 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7496 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7497 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7499 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7501 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7502 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7503 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7504 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7505 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7506 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7508 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7509 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7510 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7512 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7513 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7514 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7515 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7516 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7517 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7519 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7520 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7521 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7522 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7523 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7524 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7525 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7526 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7528 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7529 // the channel info has updated.
7530 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7531 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7532 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7533 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7534 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7535 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7539 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7540 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7542 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7543 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7544 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7545 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7546 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7548 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7549 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7550 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7551 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7553 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7554 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7555 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7556 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7557 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7558 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7560 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7561 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7562 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7564 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7565 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7567 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7568 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7569 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7570 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7571 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7573 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7574 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7575 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7577 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7578 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7579 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7580 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7581 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7582 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7583 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7584 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7585 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7587 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7588 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7590 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7591 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7592 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7594 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7595 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7596 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7597 // lightning messages manually.
7598 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7599 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7602 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7603 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7604 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7606 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7607 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7609 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7610 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7612 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7613 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7614 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7616 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7617 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7618 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7620 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7622 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7624 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7625 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7628 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7629 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7630 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7631 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7633 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7634 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7635 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7636 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7638 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7641 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7642 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7643 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7644 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7646 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7649 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7650 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7651 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7652 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7659 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7660 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7661 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7662 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7663 // fails as expected.
7664 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7665 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7666 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7667 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7668 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7669 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7670 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7672 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7673 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7674 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7676 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7677 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7678 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7679 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7680 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7682 let route = find_route(
7683 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7684 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7686 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7688 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7689 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7690 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7691 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7692 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7694 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7695 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7696 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7697 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7698 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7700 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7701 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7702 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7703 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7704 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7705 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7706 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7707 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7708 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7710 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7711 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7713 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7714 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7715 let route = find_route(
7716 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7717 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7719 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7721 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7722 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7723 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7724 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7725 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7727 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7728 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7729 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7731 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7732 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7733 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7734 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7735 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7737 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7738 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7739 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7741 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7742 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7743 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7744 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7745 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7746 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7747 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7748 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7749 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7751 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7752 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7756 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7757 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7758 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7760 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7761 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7762 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7764 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7765 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7766 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7767 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7769 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7770 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7771 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7772 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7773 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7775 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7776 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7777 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7778 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7779 let route = find_route(
7780 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7781 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7784 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7785 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7786 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7787 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7790 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7791 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7792 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7793 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7794 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7795 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7796 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7798 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7802 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7803 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7804 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7805 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7806 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7807 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7809 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7810 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7811 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7812 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7814 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7815 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7816 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7817 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7818 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7820 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7821 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7822 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7823 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7824 let route = find_route(
7825 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7826 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7829 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7830 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7831 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7832 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7833 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7836 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7837 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7838 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7839 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7840 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7841 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7842 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7844 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7848 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7849 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7850 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7851 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7852 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7854 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7855 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7856 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7857 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7859 // Marshall an MPP route.
7860 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7861 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7862 route.paths.push(path);
7863 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7864 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7865 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7866 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7867 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7868 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7870 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
7871 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7872 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7873 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7878 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7879 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7880 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7881 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7882 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7883 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7885 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7886 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7888 total_msat: 100_000,
7891 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7892 // payment verification fails as expected.
7893 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7894 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7895 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7896 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7898 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7902 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7903 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7907 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7908 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7909 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7910 // the channel is successfully closed.
7911 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7912 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7913 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7914 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7916 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7917 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7918 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
7919 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7920 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7922 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7923 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7925 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7926 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7927 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7928 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7931 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7933 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7934 // as it has the funding transaction.
7935 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7936 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7937 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7939 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7942 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7944 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7946 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7947 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7948 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7950 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7951 // as it has the funding transaction.
7952 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7953 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7954 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7957 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7958 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7960 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7961 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7962 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7964 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7965 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7966 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7967 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
7969 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7970 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
7972 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
7973 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
7974 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
7975 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
7976 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7977 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7978 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7980 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
7981 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
7982 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
7983 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
7984 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7985 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7986 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7989 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
7991 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
7992 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
7993 // closing transaction).
7994 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
7995 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
7996 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7998 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
7999 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8000 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8001 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8002 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8005 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8007 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8009 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8010 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8011 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8013 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8015 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8016 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8020 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8022 use crate::chain::Listen;
8023 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8024 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8025 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8026 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8027 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8028 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8029 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8030 use crate::util::test_utils;
8031 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8032 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8034 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8035 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8036 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8038 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8042 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8043 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8044 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8045 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8046 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8047 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8048 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8053 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8054 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8057 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8058 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8059 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8061 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8062 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8064 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8065 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8067 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8068 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8070 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8071 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8072 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8073 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8074 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8076 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8078 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8080 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8081 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8082 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8083 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8084 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8086 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8088 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8090 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8091 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8092 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8093 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8094 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8097 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8098 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8099 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8101 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8102 } else { panic!(); }
8104 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8105 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8107 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8110 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8113 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8114 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8116 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8117 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8118 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8119 match msg_events[0] {
8120 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8121 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8122 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8126 match msg_events[1] {
8127 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8131 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8132 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8134 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8135 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8137 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8140 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8141 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8143 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8144 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8146 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8149 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8151 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8152 macro_rules! send_payment {
8153 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8154 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8155 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8156 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8157 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8158 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8159 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8160 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8161 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8162 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8164 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8165 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8167 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8168 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8170 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8171 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8172 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8173 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8174 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8175 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8176 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8177 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8179 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8180 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8181 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8182 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8184 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8185 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8186 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8187 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8188 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8190 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8193 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8194 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8195 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8196 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8198 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8203 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8204 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);