1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
76 use alloc::string::ToString;
77 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
78 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
79 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
80 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
81 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
82 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
83 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
85 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
86 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
87 use util::logger::Logger;
89 use core::convert::TryInto;
92 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
94 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
95 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
96 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
97 // retrieve said payment type bits.
98 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
100 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
101 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
103 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
104 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
105 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
106 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
107 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
108 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
109 /// registered with LDK.
110 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
111 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
112 /// registered with LDK.
113 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
117 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
118 hkdf_extract_expand(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material)
128 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
130 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
131 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
132 unknown => Err(unknown),
137 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
138 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
140 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
142 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
143 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
144 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
146 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
147 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
148 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
149 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
151 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
152 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
153 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
156 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
157 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
159 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
160 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
161 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
162 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
164 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
165 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
167 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
170 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
171 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
175 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
176 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
177 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
179 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
181 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
182 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
183 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
184 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
185 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
186 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
188 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
189 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
190 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
195 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
196 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
197 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
198 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
200 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
201 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
202 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
204 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
207 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
209 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
210 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
213 /// The metadata is constructed as:
214 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
215 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
217 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
218 /// match what was constructed.
220 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
221 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
222 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
223 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
225 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
226 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
227 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
230 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
231 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
232 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
234 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
236 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
237 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
238 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
239 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: &msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
240 where L::Target: Logger
242 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
244 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
245 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
246 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
247 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
248 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
249 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
250 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
252 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
254 let mut payment_preimage = None;
255 match payment_type_res {
256 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
257 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
258 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
259 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
260 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
261 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
265 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
266 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
267 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
268 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
269 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
274 Err(unknown_bits) => {
275 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
280 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
281 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
285 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
286 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
293 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
294 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
296 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
297 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
298 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
299 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
300 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
303 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
304 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
306 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
310 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
311 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
312 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
313 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
315 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
316 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
317 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
318 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
321 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
324 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
326 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
327 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
328 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
329 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
330 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
331 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
332 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
334 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
337 fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
338 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(salt);
340 let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
341 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
343 let metadata_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
345 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
346 hmac.input(&metadata_key);
348 let ldk_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
350 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
351 hmac.input(&ldk_pmt_hash_key);
353 let user_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
363 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
365 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
366 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
367 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
369 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
370 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
371 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
372 // before we forward it.
374 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
375 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
376 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
377 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
378 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
380 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
381 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
383 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
384 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
387 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
388 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
391 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
392 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
396 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
397 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
398 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
399 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
400 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
401 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
402 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
405 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
406 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
407 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
408 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
411 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
412 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
413 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
414 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
415 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
418 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
420 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
422 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
423 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
424 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
426 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
428 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
432 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
436 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
437 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
438 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
439 short_channel_id: u64,
441 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
443 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
444 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
449 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
450 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
451 /// are part of the same payment.
453 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
454 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.104 and earlier.
455 _legacy_hop_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
457 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
458 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
461 struct ClaimableHTLC {
462 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
465 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
469 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
470 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
471 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
472 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
474 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
475 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
480 impl Readable for PaymentId {
481 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
482 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
486 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
487 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
488 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
489 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
490 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
493 session_priv: SecretKey,
494 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
495 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
496 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
497 payment_id: PaymentId,
498 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
499 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
500 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
503 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
504 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
505 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
507 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
509 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
511 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_metadata, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
514 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
515 payment_id.hash(hasher);
516 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
517 payment_metadata.hash(hasher);
518 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
519 payment_params.hash(hasher);
526 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
527 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
529 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
530 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
531 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
532 payment_secret: None,
533 payment_metadata: None,
534 payment_params: None,
539 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
540 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
542 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
550 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
551 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
553 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
558 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
560 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
561 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
562 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
563 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
564 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
566 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
567 err: msgs::LightningError,
568 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
569 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
571 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
573 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
575 err: LightningError {
577 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
578 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
585 shutdown_finish: None,
589 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
591 err: LightningError {
593 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
596 shutdown_finish: None,
600 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
601 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
604 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
606 err: LightningError {
608 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
609 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
615 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
616 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
620 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
623 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
625 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
626 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
630 log_level: Level::Warn,
633 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
635 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
637 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
639 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
640 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
646 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
648 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
649 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
657 shutdown_finish: None,
662 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
663 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
664 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
665 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
666 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
668 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
669 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
670 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
671 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
672 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
673 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
674 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
676 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
680 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
681 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
682 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
683 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
684 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
685 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
686 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
687 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
688 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
689 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
690 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
691 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
693 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
694 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
695 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
696 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
699 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
700 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
701 /// quite some time lag.
702 enum BackgroundEvent {
703 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
704 /// commitment transaction.
705 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
708 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
709 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
711 latest_features: InitFeatures,
714 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
715 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
717 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
720 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
721 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
722 struct PendingInboundPayment {
723 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
724 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
725 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
726 /// this payment being removed.
728 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
729 user_payment_id: u64,
730 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
731 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
732 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
735 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
736 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
737 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
739 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
742 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
743 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
744 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
745 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
746 pending_amt_msat: u64,
747 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
748 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
749 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
751 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
752 starting_block_height: u32,
754 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
755 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
756 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
758 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
759 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
761 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
762 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
763 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
764 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
765 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
767 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
769 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
770 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
774 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
775 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
777 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
781 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
783 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
787 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
789 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
793 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
795 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
800 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
802 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
803 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
804 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
805 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
809 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
810 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
811 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
812 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
813 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
814 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
815 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
818 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
819 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
822 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
823 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
824 let our_payment_hash;
825 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
826 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
827 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
829 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
830 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
831 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
835 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
839 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
840 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
841 let remove_res = match self {
842 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
843 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
844 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
845 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
846 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
850 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
851 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
852 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
853 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
854 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
855 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
862 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
863 let insert_res = match self {
864 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
865 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
866 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
868 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
869 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
872 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
873 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
874 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
875 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
876 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
883 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
885 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
886 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
887 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
888 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
895 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
896 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
897 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
898 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
899 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
900 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
901 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
902 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
904 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
905 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
906 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
907 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
908 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
909 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
910 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
911 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
912 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
914 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
915 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
917 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
918 /// to individual Channels.
920 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
921 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
922 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
923 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
925 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
926 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
927 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
928 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
929 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
930 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
931 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
933 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
934 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
935 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
936 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
939 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
940 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
941 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
942 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
943 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
945 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
946 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
947 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
948 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
949 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
950 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
951 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
952 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
953 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
954 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
957 default_configuration: UserConfig,
958 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
964 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
966 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
967 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
969 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
970 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
971 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
972 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
974 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
975 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
976 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
977 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
978 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
979 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
981 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
982 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
983 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
984 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
985 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
986 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
987 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
988 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
990 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
992 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
993 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
995 our_network_key: SecretKey,
996 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
998 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1000 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
1001 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
1002 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
1004 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1005 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1006 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1007 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1009 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
1010 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1011 /// are currently open with that peer.
1012 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1013 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1016 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1017 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1019 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1020 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1021 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1022 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1023 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1024 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1025 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1026 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1027 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1029 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1036 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1038 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1039 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1040 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1041 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1042 pub struct ChainParameters {
1043 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1044 pub network: Network,
1046 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1048 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1049 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1052 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1058 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1059 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1060 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1061 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1062 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1063 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1065 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1066 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1067 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1068 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1069 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1071 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1072 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1075 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1076 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1077 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1080 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1081 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1083 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1084 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1085 should_persist: persist_check,
1086 _read_guard: read_guard,
1091 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1092 fn drop(&mut self) {
1093 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1094 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1099 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1100 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1102 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1104 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1105 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1106 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1107 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1108 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1110 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1111 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1113 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1115 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1116 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1117 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1118 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1119 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1120 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1121 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1123 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1124 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1126 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1127 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1128 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1129 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1131 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1132 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1133 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1134 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1135 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1136 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1139 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1141 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1142 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1145 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1147 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1148 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1149 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1151 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1152 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1153 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1154 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1155 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1156 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1157 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1158 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1159 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1160 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1161 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1164 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1165 /// to better separate parameters.
1166 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1167 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1168 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1169 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1170 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1171 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1172 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1173 pub features: InitFeatures,
1174 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1175 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1176 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1178 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1180 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1181 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1182 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1183 /// payments to us through this channel.
1184 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1187 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1188 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1189 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1190 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1191 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1192 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1193 /// lifetime of the channel.
1194 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1195 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1196 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1197 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1198 /// our counterparty already.
1200 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1201 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1202 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1203 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1204 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1205 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1206 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1207 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1208 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1209 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1210 /// this value on chain.
1212 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1214 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1216 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1217 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1218 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1219 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1220 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1221 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1222 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1224 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1225 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1226 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1227 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1229 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1230 pub balance_msat: u64,
1231 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1232 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1233 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1234 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1236 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1238 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1239 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1240 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1241 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1242 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1243 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1244 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1245 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1246 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1248 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1249 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1250 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1251 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1252 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1253 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1254 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1255 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1256 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1258 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1260 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1261 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1262 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1263 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1264 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1265 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1266 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1267 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1268 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1270 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1271 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1272 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1273 pub is_outbound: bool,
1274 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1275 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1276 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1277 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1278 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1280 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1281 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1282 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1283 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1285 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1286 pub is_usable: bool,
1287 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1288 pub is_public: bool,
1291 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1292 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1293 /// states for more.
1294 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1295 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1296 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1297 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1298 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1299 ParameterError(APIError),
1300 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1301 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1302 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1303 /// payment in full.
1305 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1307 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1308 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1309 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1310 /// paths than the ones selected).
1311 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1312 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1313 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1314 /// in over-/re-payment.
1316 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1317 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1318 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1320 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1321 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1322 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1323 /// with the latest update_id.
1325 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1326 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1327 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1328 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1329 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1330 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1331 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1332 payment_id: PaymentId,
1336 macro_rules! handle_error {
1337 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1340 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1341 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1343 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1344 // entering the macro.
1345 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1346 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1349 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1351 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1352 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1353 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1354 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1358 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1359 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1360 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1361 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1366 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1367 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1369 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1370 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1371 action: err.action.clone()
1375 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1376 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1379 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1386 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1387 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1388 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1390 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1391 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1393 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1394 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1396 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1397 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1398 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1399 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1401 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1402 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1403 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1405 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1406 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1407 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1408 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1410 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1411 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1412 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1418 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1419 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1423 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1425 $entry.remove_entry();
1433 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1434 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1438 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1440 $entry.remove_entry();
1448 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1449 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1451 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1452 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1453 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1460 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1461 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1462 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1464 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1466 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1467 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1468 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1469 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1471 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1472 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1473 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1474 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1475 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1476 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1477 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1478 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1479 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1480 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1481 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1484 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1485 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1486 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1487 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1488 match $action_type {
1489 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1490 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1492 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1493 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1495 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1496 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1497 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1498 if !$resend_commitment {
1499 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1502 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1504 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1505 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1509 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1510 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1512 $entry.remove_entry();
1516 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1517 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1521 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1522 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1523 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1525 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1526 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1530 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1531 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1532 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1533 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1534 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1537 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1542 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1543 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1544 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1545 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1546 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1547 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1549 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1550 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1552 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1553 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1554 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1555 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1558 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1559 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1560 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1561 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1562 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1563 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1564 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1565 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1566 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1567 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1568 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1569 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1572 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1573 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1574 // before it should be allowed to.
1575 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1576 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1577 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1580 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1581 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1582 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1583 msg: announcement_sigs,
1586 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1589 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1590 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1591 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1592 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1593 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1594 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1595 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1596 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1597 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1598 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1599 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1600 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1601 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1602 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1603 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1604 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1605 let mut order = $order;
1607 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1609 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1613 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1614 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1615 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1616 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1621 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1622 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1623 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1624 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1625 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1630 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1634 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1639 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1640 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1641 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1646 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1647 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1648 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1649 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1650 assert!(res.is_ok());
1653 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1657 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1658 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1659 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1661 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1663 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1664 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1669 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1670 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1671 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1672 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1673 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1676 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1678 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1679 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1681 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1683 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1685 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1686 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1687 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1688 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1689 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1690 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1691 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1692 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1694 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1695 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1696 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1700 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1702 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1703 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1704 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1705 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1706 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1707 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1709 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1710 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1712 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1713 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1716 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1718 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1719 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1721 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1723 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1724 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1725 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1726 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1734 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1735 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1736 &self.default_configuration
1739 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1741 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1742 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1743 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1744 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1745 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1748 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1749 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1751 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1752 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1753 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1755 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1756 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1757 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1758 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1759 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1760 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1762 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1763 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1764 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1765 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1766 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1767 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1771 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1772 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1773 Some(peer_state) => {
1774 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1775 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1776 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1777 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1778 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1780 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1783 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1785 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1786 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1787 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1789 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1790 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1791 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1793 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1794 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1796 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1799 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1801 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1802 node_id: their_network_key,
1805 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1808 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1809 let mut res = Vec::new();
1811 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1812 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1813 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1814 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1815 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1816 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1817 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1818 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1819 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1820 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1821 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1822 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1823 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1824 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1826 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1827 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1828 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1829 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1831 inbound_capacity_msat,
1832 outbound_capacity_msat,
1833 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1834 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1835 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1836 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1837 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1838 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1839 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1843 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1844 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1845 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1846 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1852 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1853 /// more information.
1854 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1855 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1858 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1859 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1861 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1862 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1864 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1865 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1866 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1867 // really wanted anyway.
1868 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1871 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1872 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1873 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1874 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1875 Some(transaction) => {
1876 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1880 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1881 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1882 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1883 reason: closure_reason
1887 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1888 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1890 let counterparty_node_id;
1891 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1892 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1893 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1894 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1895 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1896 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1897 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1898 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1899 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1900 Some(peer_state) => {
1901 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1902 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1903 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1905 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1907 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1909 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1910 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1911 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1912 let (result, is_permanent) =
1913 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1915 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1921 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1922 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1926 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1927 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1928 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1929 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1933 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1937 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1941 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1942 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1945 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1949 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1950 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1951 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1953 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1954 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1956 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1957 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1958 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1959 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1961 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1963 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1964 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1965 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1966 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1967 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1970 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1971 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1972 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1974 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1975 /// the channel being closed or not:
1976 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1977 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1978 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1979 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1980 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1981 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1982 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1984 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1986 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1987 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1988 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1989 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1990 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1994 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1995 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1996 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1997 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1998 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2000 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2001 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2002 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2003 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2004 // ignore the result here.
2005 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2009 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2010 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2011 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2013 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2014 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2015 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2016 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2017 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2018 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2021 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2022 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2024 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2025 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2026 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2029 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2031 chan.remove_entry().1
2033 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2036 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2037 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2038 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2039 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2040 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2045 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2048 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2049 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2050 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2051 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2052 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2053 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2054 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2055 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2056 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2057 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2058 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2068 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2069 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2070 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2071 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2072 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2076 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2077 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2078 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2080 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2081 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2082 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2083 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2084 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2085 failure_code: $err_code,
2086 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2091 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2092 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2095 let shared_secret = {
2096 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2097 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2100 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
2102 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2103 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2104 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2105 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2106 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2107 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2108 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2109 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2112 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
2113 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
2114 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
2115 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
2116 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
2119 let mut channel_state = None;
2120 macro_rules! return_err {
2121 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2123 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2124 if channel_state.is_none() {
2125 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2127 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2128 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2129 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2130 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2131 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2136 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
2137 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
2138 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
2139 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
2141 let error_code = match err {
2142 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
2143 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
2144 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
2145 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
2146 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
2148 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
2151 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
2152 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
2153 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2160 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
2163 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
2164 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
2165 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
2166 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
2167 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
2168 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
2169 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
2170 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
2171 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2172 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2173 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2174 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2178 // final_expiry_too_soon
2179 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2180 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2181 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2182 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2183 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2184 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2185 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
2187 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2188 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
2189 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2191 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2192 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
2193 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2196 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
2197 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
2198 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
2199 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2200 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2201 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2202 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2203 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2205 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2207 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2208 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2209 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2210 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2211 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2212 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2213 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2214 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
2215 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2218 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2220 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2223 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
2228 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2229 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2230 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2231 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2233 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2235 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2236 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2237 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2238 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2241 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
2242 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
2243 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2245 // Check two things:
2246 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
2247 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
2248 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
2250 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
2252 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
2253 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
2254 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
2256 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2258 let blinding_factor = {
2259 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2260 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2261 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2262 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2265 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2267 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2269 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2272 hop_data: new_packet_data,
2273 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2276 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2277 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2278 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2279 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2280 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2284 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2285 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2286 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2289 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2290 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2291 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2292 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2296 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2297 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2298 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2299 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2300 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2301 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2302 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2303 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2304 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
2305 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2306 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2308 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2311 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2313 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2314 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2315 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2316 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2317 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2320 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2321 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2322 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2323 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2324 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2325 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2326 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2328 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2329 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2331 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2332 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2333 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2334 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2335 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2337 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2338 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2340 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2341 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2342 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2343 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2344 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2345 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2347 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2348 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2350 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2351 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2352 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2353 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2354 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2355 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2356 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2357 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2358 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2359 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2365 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2366 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2367 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2368 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2370 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2371 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2373 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2374 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2375 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2377 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2379 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2384 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2387 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2388 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2389 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2391 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2392 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2393 if !chan.should_announce() {
2394 return Err(LightningError {
2395 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2396 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2399 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2400 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2403 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2404 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2405 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2406 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2407 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2408 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2409 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2410 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2411 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2415 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2417 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2418 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2420 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2421 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2422 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2423 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2424 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2425 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2426 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2427 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2430 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2431 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2433 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2439 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2440 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_metadata: &Option<Vec<u8>>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2441 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2442 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2443 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2444 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2446 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2447 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2448 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, payment_metadata.clone(), cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2449 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2450 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2452 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2454 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2456 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2457 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2459 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2460 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2461 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2462 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2463 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2464 err: "Payment already completed"
2469 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2470 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2471 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2474 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2476 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2477 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2478 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2479 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2480 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2481 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2482 payment_metadata: payment_metadata.clone(),
2483 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2484 total_msat: total_value,
2486 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2490 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2491 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2493 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2494 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2496 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2497 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2499 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2500 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2502 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2503 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2505 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2506 payment_metadata: payment_metadata.clone(),
2507 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2508 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2509 channel_state, chan)
2511 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2512 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2513 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2514 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2515 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2516 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2517 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2518 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2519 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2520 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2522 insert_outbound_payment!();
2524 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2525 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2526 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2527 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2528 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2529 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2530 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2531 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2537 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2539 } else { unreachable!(); }
2543 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2544 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2546 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2551 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2553 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2554 /// fields for more info.
2556 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2557 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2558 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2559 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2560 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2561 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2563 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2565 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2566 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2567 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2569 /// In general, a path may raise:
2570 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2571 /// node public key) is specified.
2572 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2573 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2575 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2576 /// relevant updates.
2578 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2579 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2580 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2582 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2583 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2584 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2585 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2587 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2588 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2589 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2590 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2591 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None, None)
2594 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2595 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2596 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2598 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2599 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2600 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2601 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2602 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2604 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2605 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2607 let mut total_value = 0;
2608 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2609 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2610 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2611 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2612 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2613 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2614 continue 'path_check;
2616 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2617 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2618 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2619 continue 'path_check;
2622 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2623 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2625 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2626 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2628 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2629 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2630 total_value = amt_msat;
2633 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2634 let mut results = Vec::new();
2635 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2636 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, &payment_metadata, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2638 let mut has_ok = false;
2639 let mut has_err = false;
2640 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2641 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2642 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2643 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2644 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2645 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2646 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2650 } else if res.is_err() {
2651 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2652 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2655 if has_err && has_ok {
2656 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2659 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2660 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2661 Some(RouteParameters {
2662 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2663 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2664 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2670 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2671 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2672 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2673 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2679 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2681 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2682 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2683 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2684 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2685 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2687 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2688 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2689 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2690 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2691 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2692 if path.len() == 0 {
2693 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2694 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2699 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_metadata) = {
2700 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2701 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2703 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2704 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, payment_metadata, ..
2706 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2707 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2708 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2709 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2712 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_metadata.clone())
2714 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2715 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2716 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2719 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2720 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2721 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2724 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2725 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2726 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2731 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2732 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2736 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, payment_metadata, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2739 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2741 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2742 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2743 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2744 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2746 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2747 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2748 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2750 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2751 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2752 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2753 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2754 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2756 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2757 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2758 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2759 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2760 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2762 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2770 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2771 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2772 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2773 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2774 /// never reach the recipient.
2776 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2778 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2779 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2781 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2783 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2784 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2785 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2787 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2789 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2790 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2791 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2796 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2797 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2798 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2799 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2801 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2803 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2805 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2806 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2807 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2808 } else { unreachable!(); })
2811 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2813 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2814 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2817 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2818 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2823 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2824 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2825 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2828 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2830 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2832 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2840 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2841 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2842 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2846 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2848 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2849 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2851 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2852 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2854 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2855 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2856 /// keys per-channel).
2858 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2859 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2860 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2862 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2863 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2864 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2866 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2867 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2868 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2869 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2871 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2872 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2873 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2874 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2878 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2879 let mut output_index = None;
2880 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2881 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2882 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2883 if output_index.is_some() {
2884 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2885 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2888 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2889 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2890 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2893 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2896 if output_index.is_none() {
2897 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2898 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2901 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2905 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2906 if !chan.should_announce() {
2907 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2911 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2913 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2915 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2916 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2918 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2919 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2920 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2921 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2922 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2927 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2928 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2929 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2931 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2934 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2935 // smaller than 500:
2936 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2938 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2939 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2940 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2941 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2942 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2943 /// our network addresses.
2945 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2946 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2948 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2949 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2950 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2951 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2953 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2955 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2956 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2957 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2959 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2960 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2963 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2964 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2965 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2967 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2968 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2969 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2970 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2971 rgb, alias, addresses,
2972 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2973 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2975 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2976 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2978 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2979 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2981 let mut announced_chans = false;
2982 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2983 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2984 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2986 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2991 announced_chans = true;
2993 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2994 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2995 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2999 if announced_chans {
3000 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
3001 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
3002 signature: node_announce_sig,
3003 contents: announcement
3009 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3011 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3012 /// Will likely generate further events.
3013 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3014 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3016 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3017 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3018 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3020 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3021 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3023 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3024 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3025 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3026 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3028 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
3029 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3030 match forward_info {
3031 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
3032 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3033 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3034 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3035 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3036 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3037 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3039 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
3040 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
3043 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3044 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3045 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3046 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3047 // problem, not ours.
3054 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3055 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3056 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3057 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3058 match forward_info {
3059 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3060 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3062 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3063 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3064 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3065 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3066 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3067 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3068 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3069 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3071 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3073 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3074 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3076 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3078 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
3079 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3080 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3086 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3088 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3089 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3090 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3091 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3092 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3093 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3094 // this channel currently :/.
3100 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3101 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3103 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3104 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3105 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3107 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3108 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3110 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3112 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3113 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3114 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3117 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3119 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3120 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3121 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3122 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3123 // messages when we can.
3124 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3125 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3126 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3133 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3134 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3137 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3138 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3139 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3140 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3141 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3142 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3144 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3145 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3146 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3147 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3148 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3150 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3151 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3153 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3155 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3159 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3160 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3163 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3164 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3165 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3166 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3167 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3168 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3169 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3170 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3171 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3173 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3181 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3182 match forward_info {
3183 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3184 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3185 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3186 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data) = match routing {
3187 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3188 let _legacy_hop_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
3189 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
3190 payment_metadata: None, // Object is only for serialization backwards compat
3191 total_msat: payment_data.total_msat
3193 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data))
3195 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3196 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
3198 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3201 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3202 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3203 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3204 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3205 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3206 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3208 value: amt_to_forward,
3209 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3214 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3216 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3217 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3218 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3220 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3221 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3222 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3223 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3224 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3226 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3231 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3232 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3233 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3234 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3235 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3236 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3237 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3238 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3239 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3243 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3244 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3245 total_value += htlc.value;
3246 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3247 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3248 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3249 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3250 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3251 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3253 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3255 _ => unreachable!(),
3258 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3260 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, claimable_htlc.total_msat);
3261 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3264 } else if total_value == claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3265 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3267 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3268 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3269 payment_metadata: $payment_data.payment_metadata,
3270 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3274 payment_received_generated = true;
3276 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3277 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3280 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3281 payment_received_generated
3285 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3286 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3287 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3288 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3289 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3290 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3291 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3292 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3293 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3294 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3295 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3296 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3297 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3298 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3300 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3304 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3306 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3307 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3309 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3310 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3312 amt: amt_to_forward,
3313 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3317 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3318 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3325 if payment_data.is_none() {
3326 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3327 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3330 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3331 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3332 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3333 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3334 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3335 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3336 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3337 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3339 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3340 if payment_received_generated {
3341 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3347 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3348 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3356 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3357 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3360 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3361 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3364 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3365 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3366 events.append(&mut new_events);
3369 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3371 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3372 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3374 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3375 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3376 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3377 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3378 if background_events.is_empty() {
3382 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3384 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3385 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3386 // monitor updating completing.
3387 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3394 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3395 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3396 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3397 self.process_background_events();
3400 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3401 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3402 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3403 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3404 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3405 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3406 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3408 if !chan.is_live() {
3409 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3410 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3411 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3413 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3414 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3416 let mut retain_channel = true;
3417 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3420 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3421 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3425 let ret_err = match res {
3426 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3427 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3428 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3429 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3432 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3433 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3434 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3435 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3436 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3437 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3438 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3439 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3449 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3453 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3454 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3455 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3456 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3457 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3458 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3459 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3461 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3463 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3465 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3466 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3467 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3468 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3469 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3470 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3471 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3473 handle_errors.push(err);
3483 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3485 /// This currently includes:
3486 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3487 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3488 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3491 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3492 /// estimate fetches.
3493 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3494 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3495 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3496 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3498 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3500 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3502 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3503 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3504 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3505 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3506 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3507 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3508 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3509 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3511 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3513 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3515 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3516 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3517 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3518 if needs_close { return false; }
3521 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3522 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3523 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3524 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3525 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3526 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3527 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3528 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3532 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3533 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3535 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3536 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3537 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3541 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3542 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3551 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3552 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3558 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3559 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3560 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3561 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3562 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3563 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3564 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3566 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3567 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3568 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3569 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3570 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3571 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3572 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3573 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3574 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3575 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3576 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3582 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3583 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3584 // be surfaced to the user.
3585 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3586 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3588 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3589 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3590 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3592 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3593 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3595 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3598 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3600 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3601 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3602 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3604 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3605 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3606 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3607 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3608 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3609 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3610 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3611 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3612 Some(RouteParameters {
3613 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3614 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3615 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3618 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3619 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3620 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3622 rejected_by_dest: false,
3623 network_update: None,
3624 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3626 short_channel_id: None,
3633 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3634 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3636 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3642 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3649 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3650 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3651 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3652 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3653 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3654 /// still-available channels.
3655 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3656 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3657 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3658 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3661 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3662 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3663 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3665 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3666 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3667 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3668 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3669 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3670 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3671 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3672 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3673 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3676 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3677 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3680 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3681 all_paths_failed = true;
3682 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3683 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3685 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3691 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3694 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3695 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3696 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3697 Some(RouteParameters {
3698 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3699 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3700 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3703 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3705 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3706 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3708 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3710 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3711 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3712 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3713 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3714 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3715 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3716 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3717 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3724 error_code: onion_error_code,
3726 error_data: onion_error_data
3729 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3735 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3736 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3737 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3738 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3740 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3741 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3742 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3743 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3744 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3745 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3746 network_update: None,
3749 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3752 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3754 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3758 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3759 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3760 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3762 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3763 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3764 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3765 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3766 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3767 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3769 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3770 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3771 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3775 let mut forward_event = None;
3776 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3777 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3779 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3781 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3783 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3784 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3787 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3788 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3789 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3790 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3791 time_forwardable: time
3798 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3799 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3801 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3802 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3803 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3804 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3806 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3807 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3809 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3810 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3811 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3812 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3813 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3814 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3816 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3818 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3819 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3820 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3821 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3823 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3824 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3825 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3826 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3828 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3829 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3830 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3831 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3832 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3834 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3835 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3836 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3842 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3843 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3844 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3846 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3847 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3848 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3849 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3850 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3851 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3852 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3854 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3855 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3856 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3857 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3858 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3859 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3860 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3861 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3863 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3864 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3865 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3866 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3867 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3868 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3870 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3875 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3876 // which were generated.
3877 channel_state.take();
3879 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3880 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3881 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3888 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3889 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3890 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3891 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3892 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3894 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3898 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3899 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3900 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3901 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3902 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3903 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3904 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3905 payment_preimage, e);
3906 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3907 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3908 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3909 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3912 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3913 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3914 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3915 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3916 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3917 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3918 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3919 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3920 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3921 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3927 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3929 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3932 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3933 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3934 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3935 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3936 payment_preimage, e);
3938 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3939 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3941 chan.remove_entry();
3943 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3946 } else { unreachable!(); }
3949 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3950 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3951 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3952 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3953 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3954 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3955 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3956 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3957 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3958 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3959 pending_events.push(
3960 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3962 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3967 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3975 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3977 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3978 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3979 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3980 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3981 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3982 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3983 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3984 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3985 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3986 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3987 pending_events.push(
3988 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3989 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3995 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3999 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4000 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4001 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4003 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4004 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4005 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4006 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4007 pending_events.push(
4008 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4016 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4021 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4024 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4025 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4026 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4027 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4028 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4029 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4030 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4033 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4034 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4035 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4036 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4037 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4040 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4041 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4042 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4043 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4044 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4045 payment_preimage, e);
4047 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4048 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4049 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4050 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4053 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4054 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4055 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4056 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4060 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4061 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4062 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4065 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4066 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4068 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4076 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4077 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4078 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4081 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4082 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4084 let chan_restoration_res;
4085 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4086 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4087 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4088 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4089 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4090 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4092 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4096 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
4097 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
4098 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4099 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
4100 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
4101 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
4102 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4103 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4104 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4107 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
4108 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4109 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4111 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4113 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4114 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4115 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4116 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4120 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4121 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4122 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4125 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4126 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4129 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4130 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4131 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4132 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4133 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4134 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4135 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4136 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4137 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4138 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4139 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
4141 entry.insert(channel);
4147 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4148 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4149 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4150 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4151 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4152 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4153 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4154 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4156 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4157 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4159 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4162 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4163 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4164 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4165 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4167 user_channel_id: user_id,
4172 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4173 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4174 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4175 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4176 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4177 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4178 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4179 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4180 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4182 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4184 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4187 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4188 // lock before watch_channel
4189 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4191 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4192 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4193 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4194 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4195 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4196 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4197 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4198 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4199 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4200 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4201 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4203 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4204 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4205 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4206 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4207 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4208 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4212 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4213 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4214 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4215 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4216 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4218 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4219 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4220 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4229 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4231 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4232 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4233 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4234 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4235 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4236 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4237 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4239 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4240 Ok(update) => update,
4241 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4243 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4244 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4245 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4246 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4247 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4248 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4249 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4250 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4257 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4260 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4261 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4265 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4266 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4267 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4268 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4269 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4270 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4271 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4273 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4274 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
4275 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4276 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
4277 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
4278 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
4279 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
4280 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
4281 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
4282 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
4283 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
4284 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
4285 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4286 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4287 msg: announcement_sigs,
4289 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4290 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4291 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4292 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4297 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4301 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4302 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4303 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4304 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4305 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4307 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4309 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4310 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4313 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4314 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4315 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4316 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4319 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4320 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4322 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4323 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4324 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4325 let (result, is_permanent) =
4326 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4328 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4334 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4335 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4336 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4343 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4346 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4347 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4350 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4354 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4355 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4356 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4357 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4358 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4359 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4360 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4361 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4363 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4364 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4365 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4366 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4371 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4372 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4373 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4374 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4375 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4376 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4377 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4379 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4380 } else { (tx, None) }
4382 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4385 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4386 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4387 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4389 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4390 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4391 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4392 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4396 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4401 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4402 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4403 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4404 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4406 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4407 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4408 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4409 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4411 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4412 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4414 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4415 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4416 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4417 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4420 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4421 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4422 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4423 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4424 match pending_forward_info {
4425 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4426 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4427 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4428 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4429 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4430 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4431 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4432 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4436 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4437 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4438 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4439 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4440 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4441 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4442 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4443 // no problem just calling this
4444 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4445 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4448 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4450 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4451 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4452 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4455 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4457 _ => pending_forward_info
4460 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4462 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4467 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4468 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4469 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4470 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4471 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4472 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4473 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4474 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4476 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4478 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4481 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4485 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4486 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4487 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4488 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4489 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4490 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4491 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4493 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4495 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4500 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4501 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4502 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4503 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4504 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4505 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4506 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4508 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4509 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4510 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4512 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4519 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4520 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4521 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4522 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4523 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4524 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4525 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4527 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4528 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4529 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4530 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4531 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4532 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4533 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4538 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4539 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4541 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4542 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4543 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4545 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4546 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4547 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4548 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4549 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4550 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4551 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4552 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4554 commitment_signed: msg,
4560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4565 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4566 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4567 let mut forward_event = None;
4568 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4569 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4570 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4571 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4573 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4574 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4575 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4576 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4577 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4579 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4580 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4581 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4583 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4584 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4585 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4590 match forward_event {
4592 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4593 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4594 time_forwardable: time
4602 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4603 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4605 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4606 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4607 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4608 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4609 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4610 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4612 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4613 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4614 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4615 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4616 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4617 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4618 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4619 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4620 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4621 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4622 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4624 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4625 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4626 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4627 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4628 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4630 } else { unreachable!(); }
4633 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4634 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4635 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4639 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4640 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4641 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4642 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4643 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4645 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4648 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4650 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4651 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4653 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4654 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4656 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4657 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4664 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4665 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4666 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4667 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4668 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4669 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4670 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4672 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4674 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4679 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4680 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4681 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4683 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4684 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4685 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4686 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4688 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4689 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4692 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4693 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4694 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4695 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4696 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4699 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4704 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4705 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4706 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4707 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4708 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4709 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4711 // It's not a local channel
4712 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4715 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4716 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4717 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4718 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4719 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4720 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4721 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4722 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4724 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4726 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4727 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4728 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4729 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4731 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4736 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4739 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4740 let chan_restoration_res;
4741 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4742 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4743 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4745 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4746 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4747 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4748 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4750 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4751 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4752 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4753 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4754 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4755 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4756 let mut channel_update = None;
4757 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4758 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4759 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4762 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4763 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4764 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4765 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4766 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4767 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4768 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4771 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4772 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4773 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4774 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4776 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4778 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4781 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4782 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4784 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4785 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4790 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4791 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4792 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4793 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4794 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4795 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4796 match monitor_event {
4797 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4798 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4799 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4800 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4802 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4803 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4806 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4807 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4808 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4809 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4810 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4811 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4812 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4813 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4814 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4815 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4817 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4818 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4819 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4823 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4824 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4826 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4828 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4829 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4830 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4831 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4832 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4837 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4838 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4843 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4844 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4847 has_pending_monitor_events
4850 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4851 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4852 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4853 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4854 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4855 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4858 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4859 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4860 /// update was applied.
4862 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4863 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4864 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4865 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4866 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4867 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4868 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4869 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4871 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4872 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4873 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4874 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4875 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4877 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4878 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4879 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4880 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4881 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4883 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4884 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4885 has_monitor_update = true;
4886 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4887 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4888 if close_channel { return false; }
4890 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4891 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4892 updates: commitment_update,
4899 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4900 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4901 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4908 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4909 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4910 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4913 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4914 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4920 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4921 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4922 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4923 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4924 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4925 let mut has_update = false;
4927 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4928 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4929 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4930 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4931 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4933 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4934 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4935 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4936 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4938 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4939 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4942 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4943 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4944 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4945 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4946 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4949 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4950 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4955 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4957 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4958 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4964 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4965 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4972 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4973 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4979 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4980 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4982 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4983 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4984 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4985 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4986 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4987 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4988 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4989 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4990 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4991 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4992 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4993 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4994 assert!(should_broadcast);
4995 } else { unreachable!(); }
4996 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4998 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5002 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5003 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5005 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5006 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5009 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5011 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5012 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5013 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5014 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5015 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5016 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5017 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5018 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5019 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5020 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5021 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5022 // never fail a payment too early.
5023 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5025 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5033 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5036 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5037 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5039 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5040 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5041 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5043 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5045 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5046 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5050 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5051 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5053 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5055 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5056 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5057 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5058 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5059 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5060 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5063 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5064 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5067 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5069 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5071 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5072 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5073 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5074 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5075 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5078 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5079 /// stored external to LDK.
5081 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5082 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5083 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5085 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5086 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5089 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5090 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5091 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5092 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5094 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5095 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5096 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5097 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5098 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5100 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5101 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5102 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5103 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5104 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5106 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5108 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5109 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5111 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5112 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5116 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5117 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5119 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5121 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5122 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5123 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5124 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5127 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5128 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5131 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5133 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5135 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5136 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5139 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5140 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5142 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5143 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5144 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5147 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
5148 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5149 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5150 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5151 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5156 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5157 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5161 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5162 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5166 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5167 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5168 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5169 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5170 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5173 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5174 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5175 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5176 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5178 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5179 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5180 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5181 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5184 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5185 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5187 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5188 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5191 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5192 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5193 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5195 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5196 events.replace(pending_events);
5205 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5207 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5208 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5209 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5210 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5213 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5215 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5216 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5218 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5219 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5220 /// restarting from an old state.
5221 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5222 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5223 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5225 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5226 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5227 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5228 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5231 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5232 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5233 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5236 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5237 handler.handle_event(&event);
5245 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5247 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5248 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5249 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5250 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5253 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5255 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5256 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5257 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5258 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5259 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5262 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5263 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5264 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5267 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5268 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5269 let new_height = height - 1;
5271 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5272 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5273 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5274 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5275 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5276 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5279 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
5283 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5285 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5286 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5287 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5288 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5291 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5292 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5293 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5294 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5296 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5297 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5299 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5300 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
5303 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5304 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5305 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5306 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5308 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5309 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5311 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5313 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5315 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
5317 macro_rules! max_time {
5318 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5320 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5321 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5322 // having an explicit local time source.
5323 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5324 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5325 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5326 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5327 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5333 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5334 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5335 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5336 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5337 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5340 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5341 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5342 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5343 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5344 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5345 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5346 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5347 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5348 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5356 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5357 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5358 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5359 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5360 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5361 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5367 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5368 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5369 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5370 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5371 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5372 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
5373 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5374 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5379 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5381 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5382 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5383 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5384 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5387 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5388 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5390 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
5391 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5392 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5393 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5394 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5396 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5397 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5399 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5400 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5401 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5402 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5403 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5404 let res = f(channel);
5405 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
5406 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5407 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5408 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5409 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5413 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
5414 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5415 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5416 msg: funding_locked,
5418 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
5419 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5420 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5421 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5422 msg: announcement_sigs,
5424 } else if channel.is_usable() {
5425 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5426 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5427 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5428 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5431 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5433 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5435 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5436 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5437 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5439 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5440 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5441 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5442 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5443 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5447 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5448 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5449 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5450 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5451 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5452 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5453 data: reason_message,
5461 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5462 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5463 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5464 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5465 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5466 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5467 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5468 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5469 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5470 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5471 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5472 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5473 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5478 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5483 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5485 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5486 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5490 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5491 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5492 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5495 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5496 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5497 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5498 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5501 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5502 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5504 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5505 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5508 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5509 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5510 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5511 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5512 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5516 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5517 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5518 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5519 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5523 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5524 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5525 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5526 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5527 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5528 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5531 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5532 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5533 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5536 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5538 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5541 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5542 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5543 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5546 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5547 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5548 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5551 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5552 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5553 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5556 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5557 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5558 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5561 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5562 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5563 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5566 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5567 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5568 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5571 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5573 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5576 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5577 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5578 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5581 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5583 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5586 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5587 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5588 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5591 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5592 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5593 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5596 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5598 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5601 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5602 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5603 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5606 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5607 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5608 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5611 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5616 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5617 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5618 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5621 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5622 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5623 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5624 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5626 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5627 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5628 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5629 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5630 if no_connection_possible {
5631 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5632 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5633 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5634 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5635 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5637 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5638 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5639 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5643 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5650 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5651 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5652 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5653 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5654 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5655 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5656 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5658 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5661 no_channels_remain = false;
5667 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5669 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5670 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5671 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5672 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5673 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5674 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5675 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5676 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5677 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5678 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5679 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5680 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5681 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5682 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5683 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5684 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5685 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5686 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5687 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5691 if no_channels_remain {
5692 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5695 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5696 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5700 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5701 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5703 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5706 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5707 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5708 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5709 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5710 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5713 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5714 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5719 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5720 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5721 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5722 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5723 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5724 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5725 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5726 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5727 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5731 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5732 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5733 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5739 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5742 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5743 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5745 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5746 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5747 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5748 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5749 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5753 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5754 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5759 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5760 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5761 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5762 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5763 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5764 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5767 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5770 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5776 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5777 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5782 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5783 let result = *guard;
5791 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5792 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5793 let current_time = Instant::now();
5795 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5796 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5801 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5802 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5803 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5804 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5805 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5807 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5808 let result = *guard;
5809 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5813 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5814 None => return result,
5820 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5822 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5823 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5824 *persistence_lock = true;
5825 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5830 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5831 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5833 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5835 (0, onion_packet, required),
5836 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5839 (0, payment_data, required),
5840 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5842 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5843 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5844 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5848 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5849 (0, routing, required),
5850 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5851 (4, payment_hash, required),
5852 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5853 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5857 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5858 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5860 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5862 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5863 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5864 reason.write(writer)?;
5866 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5867 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5870 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5871 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5872 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5873 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5880 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5881 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5882 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5885 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5886 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5887 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5888 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5892 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5893 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5894 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5895 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5896 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5899 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5900 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5901 // messages contained in the variants.
5902 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5903 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5904 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5906 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5907 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5908 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5909 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5910 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5913 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5914 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5915 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5916 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5917 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5919 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5924 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5929 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5930 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5931 (2, outpoint, required),
5932 (4, htlc_id, required),
5933 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5936 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5937 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5938 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5939 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => Some(_legacy_hop_data),
5942 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5943 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => None,
5944 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5946 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5947 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
5948 (1, self.total_msat, required),
5949 (2, self.value, required),
5950 (4, payment_data, option),
5951 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5952 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5958 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5959 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5960 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5962 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5963 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5964 let mut total_msat = None;
5965 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5966 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5967 (0, prev_hop, required),
5968 (1, total_msat, option),
5969 (2, value, required),
5970 (4, payment_data, option),
5971 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5972 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5974 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5976 if payment_data.is_some() {
5977 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5979 if total_msat.is_none() {
5980 total_msat = Some(value);
5982 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5985 if payment_data.is_none() {
5986 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5988 if total_msat.is_none() {
5989 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
5991 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data.unwrap() }
5995 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5997 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6004 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6005 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6006 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6009 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6010 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6011 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6012 let mut payment_id = None;
6013 let mut payment_secret = None;
6014 let mut payment_params = None;
6015 let mut payment_metadata = None;
6016 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6017 (0, session_priv, required),
6018 (1, payment_id, option),
6019 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6020 (3, payment_secret, option),
6021 (4, path, vec_type),
6022 (5, payment_params, option),
6023 (7, payment_metadata, option),
6025 if payment_id.is_none() {
6026 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6028 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6030 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6031 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6032 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6033 path: path.unwrap(),
6034 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6040 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6041 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6046 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6047 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6049 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, ref payment_metadata, payment_params } => {
6051 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6052 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6053 (0, session_priv, required),
6054 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6055 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6056 (3, payment_secret, option),
6057 (4, path, vec_type),
6058 (5, payment_params, option),
6059 (7, payment_metadata, option),
6062 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6064 field.write(writer)?;
6071 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6072 (0, LightningError) => {
6076 (0, failure_code, required),
6077 (2, data, vec_type),
6081 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6083 (0, forward_info, required),
6084 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6085 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6086 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6089 (0, htlc_id, required),
6090 (2, err_packet, required),
6094 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6095 (0, payment_secret, required),
6096 (2, expiry_time, required),
6097 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6098 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6099 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6102 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6104 (0, session_privs, required),
6107 (0, session_privs, required),
6108 (1, payment_hash, option),
6111 (0, session_privs, required),
6112 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6113 (2, payment_hash, required),
6114 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6115 (4, payment_secret, option),
6116 (6, total_msat, required),
6117 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6118 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6121 (0, session_privs, required),
6122 (2, payment_hash, required),
6126 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6127 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6128 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6129 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6130 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6133 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6134 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6136 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6138 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6140 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6141 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6142 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6145 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6146 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6147 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6148 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6149 unfunded_channels += 1;
6152 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6153 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6154 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6155 channel.write(writer)?;
6159 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6160 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6161 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6162 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6163 for forward in pending_forwards {
6164 forward.write(writer)?;
6168 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6169 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6170 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6171 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6172 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6173 htlc.write(writer)?;
6177 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6178 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6179 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6180 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6181 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6182 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6185 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6186 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6187 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6188 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6189 for event in events.iter() {
6190 event.write(writer)?;
6193 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6194 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6195 for event in background_events.iter() {
6197 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6199 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6200 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6205 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6206 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6208 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6209 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6210 hash.write(writer)?;
6211 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6214 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6215 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6216 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6217 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6218 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6221 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6222 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6224 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6225 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6226 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6227 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6230 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6231 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6235 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6236 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6237 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6239 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6240 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6241 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6246 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6247 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6248 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6249 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required)
6256 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6258 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6260 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6261 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6262 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6263 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6264 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6265 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6266 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6267 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6268 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6269 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6270 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6271 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6272 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6274 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6275 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6277 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6278 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6280 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6281 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6282 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6283 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6284 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6285 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6287 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6288 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6289 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6290 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6291 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6292 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6295 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6296 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6298 pub keys_manager: K,
6300 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6302 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6303 pub fee_estimator: F,
6304 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6306 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6307 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6308 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6309 pub chain_monitor: M,
6311 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6312 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6313 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6314 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6315 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6316 /// deserialization.
6318 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6319 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6320 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6322 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6323 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6325 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6326 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6327 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6328 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6330 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6333 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6334 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6337 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6338 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6339 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6340 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6341 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6342 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6345 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6346 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6347 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6348 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6349 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6351 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6352 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6357 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6358 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6359 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6360 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6361 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6362 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6363 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6364 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6367 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6368 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6369 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6373 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6374 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6375 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6376 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6377 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6378 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6381 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6382 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6384 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6385 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6386 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6388 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6390 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6391 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6392 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6393 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6394 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6395 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6396 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6397 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6398 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6399 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6400 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6401 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6402 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6403 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6404 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6405 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6406 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6407 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6408 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6409 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6410 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6411 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6412 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6413 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6414 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6415 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6416 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6417 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6418 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6419 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6420 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6421 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6422 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6423 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6424 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6425 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6426 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6427 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6428 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6431 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6432 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6433 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6435 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6438 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6439 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6440 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6441 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6442 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6443 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6447 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6448 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6449 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6450 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6454 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6455 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6456 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6457 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6458 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6459 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6460 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6461 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6462 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6464 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6467 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6468 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6469 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6470 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6471 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6472 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6473 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6474 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6476 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6479 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6480 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6481 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6482 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6483 let peer_state = PeerState {
6484 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6486 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6489 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6490 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6491 for _ in 0..event_count {
6492 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6493 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6497 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6498 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6499 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6500 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6501 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6502 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6503 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6504 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6508 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6509 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6510 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6511 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6512 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6513 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6517 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6518 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6520 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6521 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6522 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6523 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6524 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6528 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6529 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6530 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6531 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6532 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6533 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6534 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6536 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6537 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6541 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6542 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6543 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6544 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6545 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6546 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6547 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6548 (5, received_network_pubkey, option)
6551 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6552 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6553 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6554 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6555 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6556 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6558 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6560 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6561 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6562 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6563 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6564 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6565 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6566 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6568 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6569 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6570 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6571 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, payment_metadata, .. } = htlc_source {
6572 if path.is_empty() {
6573 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6574 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6576 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6577 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6578 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6579 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6580 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6581 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6582 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6583 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6585 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6586 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6587 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6588 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6589 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6592 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6593 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6594 total_msat: path_amt,
6595 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6597 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6598 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6607 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6608 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6610 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6611 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6614 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret());
6615 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6616 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6617 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6618 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6622 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6623 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6624 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6626 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6627 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6628 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6630 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6632 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6637 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6639 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6640 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6641 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6643 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6647 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6648 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6650 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6652 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6653 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6654 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6655 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6657 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6658 logger: args.logger,
6659 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6662 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6663 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6666 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6667 //connection or two.
6669 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6675 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6676 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6677 use core::time::Duration;
6678 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6679 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6680 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6681 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6682 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6683 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6685 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6686 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6687 use util::errors::APIError;
6688 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6689 use util::test_utils;
6691 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6693 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6694 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6696 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6699 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6700 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6702 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6703 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6704 thread::spawn(move || {
6706 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6707 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6708 *persistence_lock = true;
6711 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6717 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6718 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6720 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6723 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6728 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6730 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6733 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6740 fn test_notify_limits() {
6741 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6742 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6743 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6744 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6745 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6746 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6748 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6749 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6750 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6751 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6752 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6754 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6756 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6757 // to connect messages with new values
6758 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6759 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6760 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6761 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6763 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6764 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6765 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6766 // ... but the last node should not.
6767 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6768 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6769 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6770 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6772 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6773 // about the channel.
6774 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6775 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6776 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6778 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6780 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6781 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6782 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6783 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6784 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6785 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6787 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6788 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6789 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6791 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6792 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6793 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6794 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6795 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6796 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6798 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6799 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6800 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6801 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6802 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6803 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6804 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6805 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6807 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6808 // the channel info has updated.
6809 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6810 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6811 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6812 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6813 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6814 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6818 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6819 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6821 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6822 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6823 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6824 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6825 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6827 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6828 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6829 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6830 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6831 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6832 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6833 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), &None, 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6835 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6836 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6837 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6839 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6840 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6842 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6843 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6844 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6845 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6846 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6848 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6849 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6850 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6852 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6853 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6854 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6855 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6856 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6857 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6858 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6859 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6860 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6862 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6863 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), &None, 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6865 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6866 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6867 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6869 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6870 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6871 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6872 // lightning messages manually.
6873 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6875 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6876 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6877 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6879 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6880 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6882 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6883 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6885 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6886 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6887 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6889 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6890 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6891 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6893 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6895 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6897 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6898 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6901 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6902 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6903 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6904 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6906 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6907 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6908 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6909 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6914 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6915 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6916 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6917 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6922 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6923 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6924 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6925 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6927 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6932 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6933 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6934 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6935 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6936 // fails as expected.
6937 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6938 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6939 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6940 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6941 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6942 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6944 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6945 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6946 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6948 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6949 let route_params = RouteParameters {
6950 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6951 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6952 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6954 let route = find_route(
6955 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6956 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6958 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6960 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6961 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6962 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6963 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6964 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6966 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6967 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6968 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6970 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6971 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6972 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6973 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6974 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6975 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6976 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6977 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6978 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6980 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6981 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6983 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6984 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6985 let route = find_route(
6986 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6987 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6989 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6991 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6992 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6993 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6994 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6995 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6997 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6998 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6999 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7001 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7002 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7003 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7004 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7005 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7007 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7008 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7009 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7011 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7012 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7013 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7014 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7015 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7016 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7017 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7018 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7019 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7021 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7022 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7026 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7027 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7028 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7029 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7030 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7031 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7032 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7034 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7035 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7036 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7037 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7039 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7040 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7041 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7042 final_value_msat: 10000,
7043 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7045 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7046 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7047 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7048 let route = find_route(
7049 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7050 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7053 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7054 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7055 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7058 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7059 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7060 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7061 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7062 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7063 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7064 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7066 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7070 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7071 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7072 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7073 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7074 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7075 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7077 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7078 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7079 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7080 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7082 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7083 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7084 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7085 final_value_msat: 10000,
7086 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7088 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7089 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7090 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7091 let route = find_route(
7092 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7093 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7096 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7097 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7098 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7099 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7102 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7103 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7104 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7105 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7106 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7107 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7108 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7110 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7114 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7115 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7116 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7117 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7118 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7120 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7121 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7122 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7123 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7125 // Marshall an MPP route.
7126 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7127 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7128 route.paths.push(path);
7129 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7130 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7131 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7132 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7133 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7134 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7136 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7137 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7138 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7139 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7144 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7145 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7146 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7147 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7148 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7149 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7151 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7152 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7154 payment_metadata: None,
7155 total_msat: 100_000,
7158 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7159 // payment verification fails as expected.
7160 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7161 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7162 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7163 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7165 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7169 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7170 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7174 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
7177 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7178 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
7179 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7180 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7181 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7182 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7183 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7184 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7185 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
7186 use util::test_utils;
7187 use util::config::UserConfig;
7188 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
7190 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7191 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7192 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7194 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7198 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7199 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7200 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7201 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7202 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7203 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7204 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7209 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7210 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7213 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7214 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7215 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7217 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7218 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7220 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7221 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7223 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7224 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7226 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7227 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7228 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7229 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7230 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7232 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7234 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7236 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7237 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7238 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7239 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7240 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7242 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7244 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7246 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7247 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7248 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7249 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7250 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7253 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7254 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7255 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7257 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7258 } else { panic!(); }
7260 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7261 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7263 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7266 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7269 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7270 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7272 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7273 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7274 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7275 match msg_events[0] {
7276 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7277 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7278 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7282 match msg_events[1] {
7283 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7287 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7289 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7290 macro_rules! send_payment {
7291 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7292 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7293 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7294 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7295 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7296 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph,
7297 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
7299 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7300 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7302 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7303 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7305 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7306 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7307 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7308 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7309 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7310 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7311 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7312 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7314 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7315 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7316 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7318 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7319 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7320 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7321 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7322 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7324 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7327 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7328 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7329 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7330 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7332 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7337 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7338 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);