1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
34 use ln::msgs::LocalFeatures;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
52 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
54 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
55 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
56 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
58 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
59 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
60 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
61 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
62 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
63 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
64 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
65 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
66 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
67 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
68 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
69 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
70 short_channel_id: u64,
71 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
72 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
75 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
76 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
77 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
78 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
81 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
82 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
83 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
84 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
88 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
89 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
90 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
91 short_channel_id: u64,
93 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
96 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
97 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
98 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
99 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
102 session_priv: SecretKey,
103 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
104 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
105 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
110 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
111 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
112 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
113 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
114 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
122 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
130 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
131 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
132 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
133 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
134 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
135 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
137 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
139 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
140 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
141 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
142 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
143 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
145 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
146 err: msgs::LightningError,
147 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
149 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
151 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
153 err: LightningError {
155 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
156 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
158 data: err.to_string()
162 shutdown_finish: None,
166 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
168 err: LightningError {
170 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
172 shutdown_finish: None,
176 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
177 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
180 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
182 err: LightningError {
184 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
185 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
187 data: err.to_string()
191 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
195 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
198 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
200 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
202 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
204 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
205 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
207 data: msg.to_string()
211 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
213 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
214 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
216 data: msg.to_string()
221 shutdown_finish: None,
226 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
227 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
228 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
229 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
230 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
232 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
234 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
236 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
245 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
246 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
247 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
248 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
249 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
250 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
252 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
256 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
257 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder {
258 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
259 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
260 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
261 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
262 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
263 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
264 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
265 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
266 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
267 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
268 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
270 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
271 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
272 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
273 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
275 pub(super) struct MutChannelHolder<'a> {
276 pub(super) by_id: &'a mut HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel>,
277 pub(super) short_to_id: &'a mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
278 pub(super) forward_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
279 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: &'a mut HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
280 pub(super) pending_msg_events: &'a mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
283 pub(super) fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutChannelHolder {
285 by_id: &mut self.by_id,
286 short_to_id: &mut self.short_to_id,
287 forward_htlcs: &mut self.forward_htlcs,
288 claimable_htlcs: &mut self.claimable_htlcs,
289 pending_msg_events: &mut self.pending_msg_events,
294 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
295 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
297 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
298 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
300 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
301 /// to individual Channels.
303 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
304 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
305 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
306 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
308 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
309 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
310 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
311 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
312 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
313 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
314 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
316 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
317 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
318 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
319 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
322 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
323 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
324 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
325 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
326 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfec.
327 pub struct ChannelManager<'a> {
328 default_configuration: UserConfig,
329 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
330 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
331 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor + 'a>,
332 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
335 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
337 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
338 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
339 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
342 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
344 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder>,
345 our_network_key: SecretKey,
347 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
348 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
349 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
350 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
351 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
353 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
358 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
359 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
360 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
361 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
362 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
364 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
365 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
366 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
367 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
368 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
369 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
370 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
372 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
373 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
374 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
375 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
376 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
377 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
380 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
382 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
383 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
386 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
388 macro_rules! secp_call {
389 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
392 Err(_) => return Err($err),
397 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
398 pub struct ChannelDetails {
399 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
400 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
401 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
402 /// lifetime of the channel.
403 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
404 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
405 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
406 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
407 /// The node_id of our counterparty
408 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
409 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
410 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
411 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
413 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
414 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
415 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
416 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
417 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
418 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
419 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
420 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
421 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
422 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
423 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
424 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
425 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
429 macro_rules! handle_error {
430 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
433 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
434 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
435 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
436 if let Some(update) = update_option {
437 let mut channel_state = $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
438 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
449 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
450 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
453 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
454 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
456 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
457 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
458 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
459 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
460 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
462 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
464 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
469 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
470 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
473 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
474 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
476 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
477 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
478 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
479 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
480 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
482 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
484 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
485 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
486 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
487 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
488 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
490 if let Some(update) = update {
491 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
493 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
494 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
495 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
496 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
497 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
498 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
502 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
503 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
504 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
506 shutdown_res.0.clear();
507 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
513 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
514 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
515 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
517 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
519 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
520 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
521 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
522 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
523 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
525 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
526 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
527 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
528 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
529 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
530 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
531 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
532 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
533 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
534 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
537 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
538 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
539 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
540 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
542 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
543 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
545 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
546 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
548 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
549 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
550 if !$resend_commitment {
551 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
554 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
556 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
557 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
563 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
564 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
565 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
567 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
568 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
572 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
573 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
574 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
575 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
576 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
579 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
584 impl<'a> ChannelManager<'a> {
585 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
587 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
588 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
590 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
592 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
594 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
595 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
597 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
598 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
599 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
600 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
601 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
603 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor + 'a>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager<'a>>, secp256k1::Error> {
604 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
606 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
607 default_configuration: config.clone(),
608 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
609 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
610 monitor: monitor.clone(),
613 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
614 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
617 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
618 by_id: HashMap::new(),
619 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
620 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
621 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
622 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
624 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
626 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
627 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
637 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
639 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
640 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
641 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
642 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
644 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
645 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
647 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
648 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
649 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
650 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
651 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
654 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
655 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
657 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
658 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
659 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
660 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
661 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
662 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
664 panic!("RNG is bad???");
667 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
669 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
670 node_id: their_network_key,
676 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
677 /// more information.
678 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
679 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
680 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
681 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
682 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
683 res.push(ChannelDetails {
684 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
685 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
686 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
687 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
688 inbound_capacity_msat,
689 outbound_capacity_msat,
690 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
691 is_live: channel.is_live(),
697 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
698 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
700 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
701 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
702 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
703 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
704 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
705 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
706 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
707 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
708 // really wanted anyway.
709 if channel.is_live() {
710 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
711 res.push(ChannelDetails {
712 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
713 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
714 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
715 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
716 inbound_capacity_msat,
717 outbound_capacity_msat,
718 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
726 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
727 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
728 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
730 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
731 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
732 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
734 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
735 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
736 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
737 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
739 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
740 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
741 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
744 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
745 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
746 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
748 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
749 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
751 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
754 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
755 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
757 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
758 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
763 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
764 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
765 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
774 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
775 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
776 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
777 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
778 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
780 for tx in local_txn {
781 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
785 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
786 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
787 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
788 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
791 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
792 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
793 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
794 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
795 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
802 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
803 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
804 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
805 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
806 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
812 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
813 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
814 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
815 for chan in self.list_channels() {
816 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
820 const ZERO:[u8; 65] = [0; 65];
821 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>) {
822 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
823 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
825 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
826 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
827 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
828 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
829 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
830 failure_code: $err_code,
831 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
836 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
837 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
840 let shared_secret = {
841 let mut arr = [0; 32];
842 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
845 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
847 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
848 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
849 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
850 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
851 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
852 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
853 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
854 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
857 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
858 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
859 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
860 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
861 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
864 let mut channel_state = None;
865 macro_rules! return_err {
866 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
868 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
869 if channel_state.is_none() {
870 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
872 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
873 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
874 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
875 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
876 })), channel_state.unwrap());
881 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
882 let next_hop_data = {
883 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
884 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
885 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
887 let error_code = match err {
888 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
889 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
891 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
897 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
899 // final_expiry_too_soon
900 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
901 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
903 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
904 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
905 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
907 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
908 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
909 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
912 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
913 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
914 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
915 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
917 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
919 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
921 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
922 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
923 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
926 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
927 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
928 chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
930 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
932 let blinding_factor = {
933 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
934 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
935 sha.input(&shared_secret);
936 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
939 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
941 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
943 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
946 hop_data: new_packet_data,
947 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
950 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
951 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
952 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
953 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
954 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
955 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
956 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
960 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
961 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
962 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
963 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
964 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
965 None => { // unknown_next_peer
966 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
968 Some(id) => id.clone(),
970 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
971 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
973 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
974 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
975 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
976 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
977 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
978 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
979 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
981 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
982 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
984 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
985 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
986 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
988 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
989 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
991 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
992 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
993 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
994 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
996 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
997 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1002 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1003 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1004 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1005 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1007 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1008 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1010 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1011 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1013 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1015 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1020 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1023 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1024 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1025 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1026 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1027 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1031 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1033 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1034 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1035 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1036 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1037 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1038 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1039 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1040 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1041 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1042 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1045 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1046 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1048 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1054 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1056 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1057 /// fields for more info.
1059 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1060 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1061 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1062 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1063 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1064 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1066 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1068 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1069 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1070 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1071 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1072 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1073 /// relevant updates.
1075 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1076 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1077 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1078 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1079 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1080 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1081 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1082 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1084 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1085 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1086 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1087 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1091 let session_priv = self.keys_manager.get_session_key();
1093 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1095 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1096 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1097 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1098 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash);
1100 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1102 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1103 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1105 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1106 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1107 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1110 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1111 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1113 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1114 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1116 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1117 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1119 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1120 route: route.clone(),
1121 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1122 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1123 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1125 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1126 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1127 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1128 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1129 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1130 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1131 // something else in case we will resend later!
1132 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1135 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1136 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1137 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1138 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1139 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1140 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1141 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1149 } else { unreachable!(); }
1153 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1154 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1156 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
1158 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1159 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1160 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1161 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1165 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1170 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1172 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1173 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1175 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1177 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1178 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1179 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1180 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1182 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1184 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1185 match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1187 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1188 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1189 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1190 } else { unreachable!(); })
1196 match handle_error!(self, res) {
1197 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1198 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1201 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {}!", e.err);
1202 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1203 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1204 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1211 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1212 // lock before add_update_monitor
1213 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1215 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1216 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None))) {
1218 log_error!(self, "Failed to store ChannelMonitor update for funding tx generation");
1219 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1220 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1221 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1226 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1229 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1230 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1231 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1232 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1234 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1239 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1240 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1241 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1244 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1245 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1246 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1248 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1254 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1255 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1257 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1259 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1261 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1262 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1264 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1265 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1266 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1267 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1268 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1272 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1274 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1275 /// Will likely generate further events.
1276 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1277 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1279 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1280 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1281 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1283 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1284 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1286 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1287 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1288 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1289 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1291 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1292 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1293 match forward_info {
1294 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1295 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1296 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1297 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1298 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1300 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1302 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1303 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1304 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1305 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1306 // problem, not ours.
1313 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1314 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1315 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1316 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1317 match forward_info {
1318 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1319 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1320 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1321 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1322 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1323 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1325 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1327 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1328 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1330 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1332 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1333 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1338 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1340 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1341 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1342 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1343 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1344 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1345 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1346 // this channel currently :/.
1352 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1353 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1354 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1356 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1357 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1359 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1361 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1362 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1363 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1366 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1368 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1369 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1370 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1371 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1372 // messages when we can.
1373 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1374 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1375 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1382 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1383 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1386 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1387 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1388 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1389 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1390 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1391 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1393 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1394 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1395 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1396 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1397 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1399 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1401 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1403 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1404 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1407 msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError => {},
1409 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
1410 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1411 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1412 node_id: their_node_id,
1422 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1423 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1426 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1427 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1428 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1429 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1430 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1431 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1432 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1434 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1442 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1443 match forward_info {
1444 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1445 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1446 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1447 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1448 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1450 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1451 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1452 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1454 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1455 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1456 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1459 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1460 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1468 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1470 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1471 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1475 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1476 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1479 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
1481 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1482 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1483 node_id: their_node_id,
1491 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1492 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1493 events.append(&mut new_events);
1496 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1497 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1498 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1500 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1501 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1502 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1503 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1504 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1505 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id {
1506 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1507 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1508 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1513 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1515 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1516 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1521 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1522 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1523 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1524 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1525 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1526 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1527 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1529 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1530 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1531 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1532 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1533 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1534 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1535 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1536 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1542 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1543 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1544 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1545 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1546 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1547 /// still-available channels.
1548 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1549 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1550 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1551 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1554 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1555 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1556 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1557 match &onion_error {
1558 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1560 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1562 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1563 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1564 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1565 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1566 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1567 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1568 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1573 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1574 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1575 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1576 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1578 error_code: onion_error_code
1582 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1586 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1587 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1588 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1589 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1591 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1592 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1593 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1594 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1595 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1596 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1598 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1604 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1605 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1606 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1607 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1608 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1609 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1611 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1612 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1613 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1617 let mut forward_event = None;
1618 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1619 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1621 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1622 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1623 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1625 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1626 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1629 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1630 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1631 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1632 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1633 time_forwardable: time
1640 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1641 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1642 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1644 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1645 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1646 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1647 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1648 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1649 /// motivated attackers.
1651 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1652 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1653 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1655 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1657 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1658 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1659 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1660 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1661 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1662 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1663 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1664 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1665 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1666 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1667 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1668 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1670 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1676 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1677 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1679 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1680 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1681 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1682 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1686 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1687 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1688 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1690 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1691 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1693 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1694 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1695 // why it's missing.
1700 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1701 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1702 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1703 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1704 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1705 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1706 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1707 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1709 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1713 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1714 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1715 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1716 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1717 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1718 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1719 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1720 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1728 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1729 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1730 //TODO: Do something with e?
1734 } else { unreachable!(); }
1740 match handle_error!(self, err) {
1743 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
1745 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1746 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1747 node_id: their_node_id,
1755 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1756 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1757 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1760 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1761 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1763 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1764 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1765 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1766 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1767 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1768 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1771 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1772 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1773 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
1774 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1775 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1776 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1777 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor();
1778 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1780 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1781 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1782 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1783 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1784 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1785 // on-chain confirmations.
1786 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1787 // should be written.
1788 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1789 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1791 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1792 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1793 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1799 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1802 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1803 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1804 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1806 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1808 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1809 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1810 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1811 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1816 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1817 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1818 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1819 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1820 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1825 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1829 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1834 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1835 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1836 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1837 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1840 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1841 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1842 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1845 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1846 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1847 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1848 msg: announcement_sigs,
1851 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1859 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1861 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1862 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1864 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1866 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1867 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1871 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1872 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1873 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1876 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_local_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1877 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1878 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1879 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1880 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1881 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1882 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1883 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1884 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1885 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1887 entry.insert(channel);
1893 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1894 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1895 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1896 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1897 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1898 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1899 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1900 //TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
1901 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1903 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_local_features), channel_state, chan);
1904 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1906 //TODO: same as above
1907 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1910 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1911 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1912 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1913 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1914 output_script: output_script,
1915 user_channel_id: user_id,
1920 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1921 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
1922 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1923 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1924 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1925 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1926 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1927 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1928 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1930 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1932 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1935 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1936 // lock before add_update_monitor
1937 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1939 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1940 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
1941 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
1942 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
1943 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
1944 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
1946 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1947 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
1948 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
1949 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
1950 // until we have persisted our monitor.
1951 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1955 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1956 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
1957 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1958 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1959 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1961 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1962 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1963 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1972 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1973 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1974 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1975 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
1976 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1977 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1978 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1979 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
1980 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1982 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1983 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1984 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
1986 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1988 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1991 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1992 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1993 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1994 user_channel_id: user_id,
1999 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2000 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2001 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2002 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2004 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2005 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2006 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2008 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2009 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2010 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2011 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2012 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2013 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2014 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2015 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2016 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2017 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2018 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2019 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2020 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2021 msg: announcement_sigs,
2026 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2030 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2031 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2032 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2033 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2035 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2036 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2037 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2038 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2039 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2041 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2042 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2043 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2044 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2048 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2049 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2050 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2054 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2055 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2056 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2058 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2059 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2061 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2064 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2065 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2067 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2068 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2069 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2070 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2078 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2079 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2080 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2081 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2082 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2083 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2084 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2085 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2086 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2088 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2089 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2090 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2091 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2096 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2097 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2098 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2099 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2100 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2101 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2102 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2104 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2105 } else { (tx, None) }
2107 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2110 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2111 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2113 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2114 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2115 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2116 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2124 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2125 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2126 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2127 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2129 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2130 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2131 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2132 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2134 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2135 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2137 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2139 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2140 //TODO: here MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2141 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2143 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2144 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2145 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2146 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2147 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2148 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2149 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2150 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2151 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2152 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2153 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2154 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2155 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2156 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2158 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2159 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2160 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2161 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2165 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2166 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2167 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2168 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2169 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2170 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2175 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2177 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2182 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2183 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2185 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2186 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2187 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2188 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2189 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2190 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2192 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2197 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2201 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2202 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2203 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2204 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2206 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2207 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2208 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2210 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2212 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2217 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2218 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2219 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2220 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2221 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2222 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2223 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2224 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2226 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2227 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2229 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2232 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2236 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2237 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2238 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2239 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2240 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2241 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2242 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2243 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2245 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2246 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2247 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2248 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2249 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2251 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2252 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2253 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2255 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2256 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2257 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2258 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2259 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2260 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2261 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2262 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2264 commitment_signed: msg,
2268 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2269 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2270 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2276 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2281 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2282 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2283 let mut forward_event = None;
2284 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2285 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2286 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2287 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2289 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2290 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2292 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2294 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2295 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2300 match forward_event {
2302 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2303 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2304 time_forwardable: time
2312 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2313 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2314 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2315 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2316 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2318 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2319 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2320 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2322 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2323 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2324 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2325 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2326 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2327 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2328 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2330 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2333 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2334 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2335 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2339 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2340 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2341 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2345 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2347 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2350 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2351 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2353 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2358 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2359 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2360 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2361 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2362 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2363 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2364 //TODO: here and below MsgHandleErrInternal, #153 case
2365 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2367 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2369 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2374 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2375 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2376 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2378 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2379 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2380 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2381 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2383 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2384 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2387 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2388 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2389 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2391 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2392 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2393 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2394 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2395 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2398 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2400 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2401 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2402 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2403 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2404 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2405 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2406 contents: announcement,
2408 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2416 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2417 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2418 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2420 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2421 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2422 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2423 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2425 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2426 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2427 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2428 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2429 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2430 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2431 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2432 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2433 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2435 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2436 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2438 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2439 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2442 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2443 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2444 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2448 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2449 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2450 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2451 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2456 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2457 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2458 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2459 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2465 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2469 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2474 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2475 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2476 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2486 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2487 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2488 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2489 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2491 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2492 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2494 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2495 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2496 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2498 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2499 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2500 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2501 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2502 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2504 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2505 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2507 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2508 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2510 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2511 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2512 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2514 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2517 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2518 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2519 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2520 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2521 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2522 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2523 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2524 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2534 match handle_error!(self, err) {
2535 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2537 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.action {
2539 log_error!(self, "Got bad keys: {}!", e.err);
2540 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2541 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2542 node_id: their_node_id,
2546 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })
2552 impl<'a> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<'a> {
2553 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2554 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2555 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2556 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2558 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2559 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2560 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2561 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2562 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2564 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2565 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2570 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2571 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2572 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2577 impl<'a> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<'a> {
2578 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2579 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2580 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2581 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2583 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2584 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2585 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2586 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2587 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2589 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2590 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2595 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2596 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2597 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2602 impl<'a> ChainListener for ChannelManager<'a> {
2603 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2604 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2605 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2606 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2607 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2609 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2610 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2611 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2612 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2613 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2614 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2615 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2616 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2617 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2618 msg: funding_locked,
2620 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2621 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2622 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2623 msg: announcement_sigs,
2626 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2627 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2628 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2629 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2634 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2635 for tx in txn_matched {
2636 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2637 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2638 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2639 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2640 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2642 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2643 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2644 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2645 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2646 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2647 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2656 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2657 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2658 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2660 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2661 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2662 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2663 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2664 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2665 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2666 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2675 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2676 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2678 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2679 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2682 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2683 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2684 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2685 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2687 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2688 let channel_state = channel_lock.borrow_parts();
2689 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2690 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2691 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2692 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2693 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2694 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2696 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2697 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2698 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2708 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2709 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2711 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2712 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2716 impl<'a> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<'a> {
2717 //TODO: Handle errors and close channel (or so)
2718 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2719 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2720 handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
2723 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2724 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2725 handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_local_features, msg))
2728 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2729 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2730 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg))
2733 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2734 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2735 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2738 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2739 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2740 handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg))
2743 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2744 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2745 handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg))
2748 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2749 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2750 handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2753 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2754 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2755 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2758 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2759 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2760 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2763 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2764 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2765 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2768 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2769 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2770 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg))
2773 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2774 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2775 handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg))
2778 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2779 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2780 handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg))
2783 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2784 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2785 handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg))
2788 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2789 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2790 handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg))
2793 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
2794 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2795 handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg))
2798 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2799 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2800 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2801 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2803 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2804 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2805 let short_to_id = channel_state.short_to_id;
2806 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2807 if no_connection_possible {
2808 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2809 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2810 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2811 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2812 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2814 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2815 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2816 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2826 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2827 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2828 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2829 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2830 chan.to_disabled_marked();
2831 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2832 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2833 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2835 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2836 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2837 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2845 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2847 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2848 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2849 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2850 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2851 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2852 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2853 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2854 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2855 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2856 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2857 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2858 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2859 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2860 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2861 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2865 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2866 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2868 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2869 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2870 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2875 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2876 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2878 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2879 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2880 let channel_state = channel_state_lock.borrow_parts();
2881 let pending_msg_events = channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2882 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2883 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2884 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2885 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2886 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2887 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2891 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2892 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2893 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2899 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2902 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2903 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2905 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2906 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2907 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2908 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2912 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2917 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2918 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2920 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2921 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2922 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2923 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2924 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2925 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2926 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2927 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2932 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2933 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2934 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2935 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2936 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2937 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2938 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2939 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2940 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2945 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2946 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2948 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2950 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2952 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2954 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2961 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2962 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2963 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2964 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2965 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2966 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2971 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2972 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2974 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2976 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2978 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2980 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2987 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2988 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2989 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2990 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2991 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2992 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2997 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3000 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3003 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3004 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3006 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3008 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3010 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3012 route.write(writer)?;
3013 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3014 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3021 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3022 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3023 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3024 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3025 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3026 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3027 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3028 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3030 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3035 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3036 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3038 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3042 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3044 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3045 data.write(writer)?;
3052 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3053 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3054 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3055 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3056 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3057 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3058 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3060 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3065 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3066 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3068 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3070 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3071 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3072 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3074 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3076 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3077 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3084 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3085 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3086 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3087 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3088 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3089 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3090 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3092 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3093 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3094 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3096 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3101 impl<'a> Writeable for ChannelManager<'a> {
3102 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3103 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3105 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3106 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3108 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3109 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3110 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3112 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3113 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3114 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3115 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3116 unfunded_channels += 1;
3119 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3120 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3121 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3122 channel.write(writer)?;
3126 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3127 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3128 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3129 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3130 for forward in pending_forwards {
3131 forward.write(writer)?;
3135 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3136 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3137 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3138 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3139 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3140 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3141 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3149 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3151 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3153 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3154 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3155 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3156 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3157 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3158 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3159 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3160 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3161 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3162 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3163 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3164 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, 'b> {
3165 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3166 /// deserialization.
3167 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface>,
3169 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3171 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3172 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3173 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3175 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3176 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3177 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3178 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor + 'b>,
3180 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3181 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3182 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3183 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3184 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3185 /// deserialization.
3186 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3187 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3188 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3189 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3191 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3192 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3194 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3195 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3196 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3197 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3199 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3201 pub channel_monitors: &'a HashMap<OutPoint, &'a ChannelMonitor>,
3204 impl<'a, 'b, R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, 'b>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<'b>) {
3205 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, 'b>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3206 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3207 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3208 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3209 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3212 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3213 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3214 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3216 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3218 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3219 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3220 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3221 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3222 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3223 let mut channel: Channel = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3224 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3225 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3228 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3229 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3230 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
3231 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3232 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3233 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3234 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3235 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3236 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3238 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3239 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3241 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3244 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3248 for (ref funding_txo, ref monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
3249 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3250 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3254 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3255 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3256 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3257 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3258 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3259 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3260 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3261 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3263 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3266 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3267 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3268 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3269 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3270 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3271 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3272 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3273 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3275 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3278 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3280 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3281 monitor: args.monitor,
3282 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3284 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3285 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3286 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3288 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3293 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3295 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3297 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3298 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3299 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3300 logger: args.logger,
3301 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3304 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3305 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3306 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3307 //connection or two.
3310 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))