1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
46 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
68 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
69 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
70 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
71 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
72 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
73 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
74 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
76 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
79 use crate::prelude::*;
81 use core::cell::RefCell;
83 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
84 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
85 use core::time::Duration;
88 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
89 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
90 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
92 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
94 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
95 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
96 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
98 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
99 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
100 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
101 // before we forward it.
103 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
104 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
105 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
106 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
107 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
112 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
113 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
114 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
115 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
118 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
119 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
120 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
126 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
127 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
128 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
129 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
130 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
131 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
132 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
138 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
139 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
140 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
142 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
143 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
144 /// may overshoot this in either case)
145 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
146 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
147 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
148 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
149 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
152 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
153 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
154 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
155 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
158 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
159 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
160 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
161 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
162 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
165 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
166 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
168 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
169 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
170 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
176 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
177 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
180 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
181 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
184 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
188 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
189 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
190 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
191 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
192 short_channel_id: u64,
193 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
195 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
196 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
198 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
199 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
204 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
206 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
207 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
208 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
210 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
211 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
214 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
215 struct ClaimableHTLC {
216 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
218 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
220 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
221 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
222 sender_intended_value: u64,
223 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
225 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
226 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
227 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
228 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
230 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
231 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
234 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
235 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
236 events::ClaimedHTLC {
237 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
238 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
239 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
240 value_msat: val.value,
245 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
246 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
248 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
249 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
250 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
253 /// Number of bytes in the id.
254 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
257 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
258 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
263 impl Readable for PaymentId {
264 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
265 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
270 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
271 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
272 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
276 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
278 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
279 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
280 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
282 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
283 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
288 impl Readable for InterceptId {
289 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
290 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
295 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
296 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
297 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
298 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
299 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
302 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
304 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
305 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
306 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
308 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
309 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
313 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
314 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
315 (0, short_channel_id, required),
316 (2, htlc_id, required),
318 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
319 (0, session_priv, required),
324 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
325 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
326 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
327 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
328 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
331 session_priv: SecretKey,
332 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
333 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
334 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
335 payment_id: PaymentId,
338 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
339 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
340 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
342 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
344 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
346 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
349 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
350 payment_id.hash(hasher);
351 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
357 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
359 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
360 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
361 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
362 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
363 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
364 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
368 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
369 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
370 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
371 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
372 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
373 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
375 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
381 struct InboundOnionErr {
387 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
388 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
390 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
391 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
392 pub enum FailureCode {
393 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
394 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
395 TemporaryNodeFailure,
396 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
397 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
398 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
399 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
400 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
401 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
402 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
403 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
404 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
405 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
407 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
408 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
409 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
412 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
413 fn into(self) -> u16 {
415 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
416 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
417 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
418 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
423 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
424 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
425 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
426 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
427 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
429 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
430 err: msgs::LightningError,
431 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
432 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
433 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
435 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
437 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
439 err: LightningError {
441 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
442 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
449 shutdown_finish: None,
450 channel_capacity: None,
454 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
455 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
458 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
459 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
460 let action = if let (Some(_), ..) = &shutdown_res {
461 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
462 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
463 // commitment upon reconnecting.
464 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
466 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
469 err: LightningError { err, action },
470 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
471 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
472 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
476 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
479 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
482 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
486 log_level: Level::Warn,
489 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
491 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
493 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
495 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
496 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
504 shutdown_finish: None,
505 channel_capacity: None,
509 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
510 self.chan_id.is_some()
514 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
515 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
516 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
517 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
518 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
520 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
521 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
522 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
523 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
524 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, PartialEq)]
525 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
526 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
529 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
533 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
534 struct ClaimingPayment {
536 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
537 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
538 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
539 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
541 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
542 (0, amount_msat, required),
543 (2, payment_purpose, required),
544 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
545 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
546 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
549 struct ClaimablePayment {
550 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
551 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
552 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
555 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
556 struct ClaimablePayments {
557 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
558 /// failed/claimed by the user.
560 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
561 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
563 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
564 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
565 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
567 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
568 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
569 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
570 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
573 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
574 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
575 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
576 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
578 enum BackgroundEvent {
579 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
580 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
581 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
582 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
584 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
585 /// are regenerated on startup.
586 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
587 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
588 /// channel to continue normal operation.
590 /// In general this should be used rather than
591 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
592 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
593 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
595 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
596 /// are regenerated on startup.
597 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
598 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
599 funding_txo: OutPoint,
600 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
602 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
603 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
605 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
606 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
607 channel_id: ChannelId,
612 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
613 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
614 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
615 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
616 /// event can be generated.
617 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
618 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
619 /// operation of another channel.
621 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
622 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
623 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
624 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
626 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
627 event: events::Event,
628 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
630 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
631 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
632 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
634 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
635 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
636 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
637 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
638 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
640 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
641 /// stored for later processing.
642 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
643 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
644 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
645 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
649 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
650 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
651 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
652 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
653 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
654 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
655 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
656 (4, blocking_action, required),
658 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
659 (0, event, upgradable_required),
660 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
661 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
662 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
663 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
664 // downgrades to prior versions.
665 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
669 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
670 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
671 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
672 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
673 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
676 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
677 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
678 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
679 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
683 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
684 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
685 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
686 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
687 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
688 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
690 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
691 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
692 channel_id: ChannelId,
693 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
698 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
699 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
700 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
701 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
702 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
707 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
708 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
712 /// State we hold per-peer.
713 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
714 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
716 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
717 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
718 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
720 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
721 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
722 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
723 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
724 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
725 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
726 latest_features: InitFeatures,
727 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
728 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
729 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
730 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
731 /// user but which have not yet completed.
733 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
734 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
735 /// for a missing channel.
736 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
737 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
738 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
740 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
741 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
742 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
743 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
745 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
746 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
747 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
748 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
749 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
750 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
751 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
752 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
753 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
754 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
755 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
756 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
757 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
758 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
759 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
763 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
764 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
765 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
766 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
767 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
768 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
771 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
772 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
773 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
776 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
777 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
778 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
781 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
782 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
783 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
784 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
788 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
789 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
790 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
791 /// The original OpenChannel message.
792 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
793 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
794 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
797 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
798 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
799 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
801 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
802 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
804 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
807 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
808 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
809 struct PendingInboundPayment {
810 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
811 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
812 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
813 /// this payment being removed.
815 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
816 user_payment_id: u64,
817 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
818 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
819 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
822 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
823 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
824 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
825 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
826 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
827 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
828 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
829 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
831 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
832 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
833 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
841 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
843 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
844 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
845 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
850 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
851 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
852 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
853 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
854 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
855 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
856 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
857 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
858 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
860 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
861 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
862 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
871 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
873 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
874 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
875 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
880 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
882 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
884 pub trait AChannelManager {
885 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
886 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
887 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
888 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
889 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
890 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
891 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
892 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
893 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
894 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
895 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
896 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
897 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
898 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
899 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
900 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
901 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
902 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
903 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
904 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
905 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
906 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
907 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
908 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
909 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
910 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
911 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
912 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
913 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
914 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
915 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
916 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
917 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
918 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
919 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
920 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
923 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
924 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
926 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
927 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
928 ES::Target: EntropySource,
929 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
930 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
931 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
935 type Watch = M::Target;
937 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
939 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
941 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
943 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
944 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
946 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
948 type Router = R::Target;
950 type Logger = L::Target;
952 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
955 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
956 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
958 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
959 /// to individual Channels.
961 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
962 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
963 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
964 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
966 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
967 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
968 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
969 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
970 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
971 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
972 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
973 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
974 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
976 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
977 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
978 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
980 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
981 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
982 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
983 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
984 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
986 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
987 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
988 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
989 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
991 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
992 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
993 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
995 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
996 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
997 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
998 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
999 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1001 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1002 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1003 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1004 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1005 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1006 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1007 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1008 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1011 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1012 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1013 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1014 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1015 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1019 // `pending_offers_messages`
1021 // `total_consistency_lock`
1023 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1025 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1027 // |__`per_peer_state`
1029 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1031 // |__`claimable_payments`
1033 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1039 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1041 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1045 // |__`pending_events`
1047 // |__`pending_background_events`
1049 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1051 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1052 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1053 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1054 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1055 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1056 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1060 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1061 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1062 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1068 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1070 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1072 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1073 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1075 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1076 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1077 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1078 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1080 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1081 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1083 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1084 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1085 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1086 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1087 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1088 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1089 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1090 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1092 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1094 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1095 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1097 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1099 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1100 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1101 /// and via the classic SCID.
1103 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1104 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1106 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1108 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1110 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1111 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1112 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1114 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1115 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1117 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1118 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1120 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1121 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1123 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1124 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1125 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1126 /// active channel list on load.
1128 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1129 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1131 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1133 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1134 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1135 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1137 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1138 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1139 /// the handling of the events.
1141 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1142 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1145 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1146 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1147 /// would break backwards compatability.
1148 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1149 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1150 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1152 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1153 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1155 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1157 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1158 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1159 /// confirmation depth.
1161 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1162 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1163 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1165 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1167 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1169 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1171 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1173 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1175 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1176 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1177 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1179 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1180 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1182 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1183 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1184 /// keeping additional state.
1185 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1187 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1188 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1189 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1190 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1192 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1193 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1195 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1196 /// are currently open with that peer.
1198 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1199 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1202 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1204 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1205 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1206 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1207 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1208 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1210 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1211 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1212 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1213 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1214 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1216 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1217 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1219 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1220 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1221 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1222 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1223 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1225 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1226 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1228 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1229 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1230 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1231 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1232 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1234 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1236 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1238 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1239 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1240 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1241 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1242 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1243 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1244 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1245 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1246 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1247 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1248 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1250 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1251 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1252 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1254 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1256 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1257 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1259 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1263 signer_provider: SP,
1268 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1270 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1271 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1272 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1273 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1274 pub struct ChainParameters {
1275 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1276 pub network: Network,
1278 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1280 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1281 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1284 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1288 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1289 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1292 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1293 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1294 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1295 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1296 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1297 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1299 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1300 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1301 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1302 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1303 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1304 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1306 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1307 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1310 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1311 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1312 /// events to handle.
1314 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1315 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1317 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1318 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1321 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1322 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1323 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1324 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1326 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1327 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1328 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1329 should_persist: move || {
1330 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1331 // processing and return that.
1332 let notify = persist_check();
1333 match (notify, force_notify) {
1334 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1335 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1336 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1337 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1338 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1341 _read_guard: read_guard,
1345 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1346 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1347 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1348 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1349 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1350 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1352 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1353 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1354 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1355 should_persist: persist_check,
1356 _read_guard: read_guard,
1361 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1362 fn drop(&mut self) {
1363 match (self.should_persist)() {
1364 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1365 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1366 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1368 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1369 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1370 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1375 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1376 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1378 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1380 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1381 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1382 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1383 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1384 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1386 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1387 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1389 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1391 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1392 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1393 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1394 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1395 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1396 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1397 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1398 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1399 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1400 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1401 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1402 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1403 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1405 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1406 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1408 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1409 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1410 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1411 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1413 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1414 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1415 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1416 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1417 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1418 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1421 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1423 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1424 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1427 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1429 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1430 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1432 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1433 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1434 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1436 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1437 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1438 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1440 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1441 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1442 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1443 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1445 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1446 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1447 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1449 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1450 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1451 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1453 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1454 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1455 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1456 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1457 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1458 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1459 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1460 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1461 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1462 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1463 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1466 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1467 /// to better separate parameters.
1468 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1469 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1470 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1471 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1472 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1473 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1474 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1475 pub features: InitFeatures,
1476 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1477 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1478 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1480 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1482 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1483 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1484 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1485 /// payments to us through this channel.
1486 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1487 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1488 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1489 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1490 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1491 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1492 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1495 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1496 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1497 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1498 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1499 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1500 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1501 /// lifetime of the channel.
1502 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1503 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1504 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1505 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1506 /// our counterparty already.
1508 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1509 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1510 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1511 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1513 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1514 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1515 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1516 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1518 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1519 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1521 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1522 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1524 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1525 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1526 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1527 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1528 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1529 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1530 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1531 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1532 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1535 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1537 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1538 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1539 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1540 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1541 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1542 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1543 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1545 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1546 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1548 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1549 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1550 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1551 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1552 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1553 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1554 /// this value on chain.
1556 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1558 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1560 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1561 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1562 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1563 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1564 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1565 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1566 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1568 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1569 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1570 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1571 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1572 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1573 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1575 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1576 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1577 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1578 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1579 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1581 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1582 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1583 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1584 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1586 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1587 pub balance_msat: u64,
1588 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1589 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1590 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1591 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1593 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1595 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1596 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1597 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1598 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1599 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1600 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1601 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1602 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1604 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1605 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1606 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1607 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1608 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1609 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1610 /// route which is valid.
1611 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1612 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1613 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1614 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1615 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1616 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1618 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1619 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1620 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1621 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1622 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1623 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1624 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1625 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1626 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1628 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1630 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1631 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1632 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1633 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1634 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1636 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1637 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1638 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1639 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1640 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1641 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1642 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1644 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1645 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1646 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1647 pub is_outbound: bool,
1648 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1649 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1650 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1651 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1652 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1654 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1655 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1656 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1657 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1658 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1659 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1660 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1662 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1663 pub is_usable: bool,
1664 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1665 pub is_public: bool,
1666 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1667 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1668 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1669 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1670 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1671 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1673 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1674 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1677 impl ChannelDetails {
1678 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1679 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1680 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1682 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1683 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1684 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1685 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1688 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1689 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1690 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1692 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1693 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1694 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1695 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1698 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1699 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1700 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1703 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1704 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1706 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1707 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1708 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1710 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1711 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1712 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1713 features: latest_features,
1714 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1715 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1716 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1717 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1718 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1719 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1720 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1721 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1722 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1723 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1725 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1726 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1727 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1728 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1729 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1730 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1731 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1732 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1733 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1734 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1735 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1736 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1737 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1738 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1739 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1740 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1741 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1742 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1743 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1744 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1745 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1746 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1747 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1748 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1749 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1750 config: Some(context.config()),
1751 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1756 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1757 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1758 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1759 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1760 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1761 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1762 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1763 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1764 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1766 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1768 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1769 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1771 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1772 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1773 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1774 /// to drop the channel.
1778 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1779 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1780 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1781 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1782 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1784 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1785 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1786 payment_id: PaymentId,
1788 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1790 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1791 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1792 payment_id: PaymentId,
1793 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1795 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1796 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1797 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1800 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1801 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1802 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1804 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1805 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1806 payment_id: PaymentId,
1807 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1808 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1809 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1811 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1812 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1813 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1815 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1816 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1817 payment_id: PaymentId,
1818 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1819 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1823 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1825 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1827 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1828 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1829 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1830 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1832 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1833 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1834 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1837 macro_rules! handle_error {
1838 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1839 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1840 // entering the macro.
1841 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1842 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1846 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1847 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1849 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1850 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1851 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1852 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1856 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1857 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1858 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1859 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1860 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1861 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1866 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1867 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1869 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1870 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1871 action: err.action.clone()
1875 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1876 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1877 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1878 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1879 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1883 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1888 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1891 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1892 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1893 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1899 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1900 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1901 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1902 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1903 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1904 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1906 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1907 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1908 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1909 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1910 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1912 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1913 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1915 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1919 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1920 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1921 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1923 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1924 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1926 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1927 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1929 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1930 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1931 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1932 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1933 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1934 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1936 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1937 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1941 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1942 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1944 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1945 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1947 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1948 match $channel_phase {
1949 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1950 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1952 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1953 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1955 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1956 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1962 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1963 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1967 let key = *$entry.key();
1968 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1970 $entry.remove_entry();
1978 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1979 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1983 let key = *$entry.key();
1984 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1986 $entry.remove_entry();
1994 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1995 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1997 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1998 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2004 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2005 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2006 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2007 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2008 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2010 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2011 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2012 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2013 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2014 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2015 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2016 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2017 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2018 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2019 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2024 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2025 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2026 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2027 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2028 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2029 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2030 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2031 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2032 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2034 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2039 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2040 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2041 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2042 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2043 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2044 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2045 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2046 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2047 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2049 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2054 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2055 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2056 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2057 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2058 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2059 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2060 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2061 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2062 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2063 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2064 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2066 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2067 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2068 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2074 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2075 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2077 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2078 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2079 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2080 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2081 updates.announcement_sigs);
2082 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2083 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2086 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2087 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2088 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2089 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2091 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2092 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2093 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2094 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2095 let mut batch_completed = false;
2096 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2097 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2098 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2099 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2101 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2102 channel_state.2 = true;
2104 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2106 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2108 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2111 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2112 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2113 if batch_completed {
2114 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2115 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2116 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2117 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2118 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2119 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2120 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2121 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2122 chan.set_batch_ready();
2123 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2124 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2128 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2129 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2130 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2135 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2137 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2138 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2140 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2141 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2142 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2143 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2148 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2149 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2150 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2152 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2153 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2154 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2155 panic!("{}", err_str);
2157 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2158 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2159 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2162 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2168 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2169 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2170 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2172 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2173 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2174 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2175 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2176 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2177 // filter for uniqueness here.
2178 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2179 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2180 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2181 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2183 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2184 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2186 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2187 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2188 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2194 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2195 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2196 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2197 while !processed_all_events {
2198 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2205 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2206 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2207 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2209 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2210 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2211 result = $self.process_background_events();
2213 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2214 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2215 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2216 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2220 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2221 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2222 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2223 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2226 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2228 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2229 $event_to_handle = event;
2231 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2232 post_event_actions.push(action);
2237 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2238 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2239 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2240 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2241 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2242 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2245 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2246 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2247 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2248 processed_all_events = false;
2252 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2253 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2254 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2256 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2257 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2258 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2264 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2266 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2267 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2268 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2269 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2270 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2271 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2275 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2277 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2279 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2280 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2282 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2284 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2285 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2286 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2289 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2290 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2291 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2293 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2294 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2295 current_timestamp: u32,
2297 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2298 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2299 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2300 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2302 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2303 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2304 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2309 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2311 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2312 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2313 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2314 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2315 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2316 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2317 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2318 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2320 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2323 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2324 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2326 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2328 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2330 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2332 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2333 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2334 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2335 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2336 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2337 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2338 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2339 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2341 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2351 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2352 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2353 &self.default_configuration
2356 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2357 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2358 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2361 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2362 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2364 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2366 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2370 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2375 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2377 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2378 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2379 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2380 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2381 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2383 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2384 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2386 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2387 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2388 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2390 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2391 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2392 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2394 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2395 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2396 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2397 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2398 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2399 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2401 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2402 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2403 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2404 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2405 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2406 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2409 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2410 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2411 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2413 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2415 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2416 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2418 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2420 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2421 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2422 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2423 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2424 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2425 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2429 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2434 let opt_msg = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2435 if opt_msg.is_none() {
2436 log_trace!(self.logger, "Awaiting signer for open_channel, setting signer_pending_open_channel");
2437 channel.signer_pending_open_channel = true;
2440 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2441 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2444 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2446 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2452 if let Some(msg) = opt_msg {
2453 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2454 node_id: their_network_key,
2459 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2462 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2463 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2464 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2465 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2466 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2467 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2468 // the same channel.
2469 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2471 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2472 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2473 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2474 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2475 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2476 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2477 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2478 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2479 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2483 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2484 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2485 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2493 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2494 /// more information.
2495 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2496 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2497 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2498 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2499 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2500 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2501 // the same channel.
2502 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2504 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2505 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2506 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2507 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2508 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2509 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2510 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2511 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2519 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2520 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2522 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2523 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2525 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2526 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2527 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2528 // really wanted anyway.
2529 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2532 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2533 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2534 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2535 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2537 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2538 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2539 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2540 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2541 let context_to_details = |context| {
2542 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2544 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2546 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2547 .map(context_to_details)
2553 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2554 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2556 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2557 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2558 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2560 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2561 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2562 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2563 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2564 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2565 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2567 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2568 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2569 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2571 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2572 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2573 payment_id: *payment_id,
2574 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2575 total_msat: *total_msat,
2578 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2579 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2581 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2582 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2584 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2589 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2590 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2591 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2592 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2593 Some(transaction) => {
2594 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2595 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2600 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2601 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2602 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2603 reason: closure_reason,
2604 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2605 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2609 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2610 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2612 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2613 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2615 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2617 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2618 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2620 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2621 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2623 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2624 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2625 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2626 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2627 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2628 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2629 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2630 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2631 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2633 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2634 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2635 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2636 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2637 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2641 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2642 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2644 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2645 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2646 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2647 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2651 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2652 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2653 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2654 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2658 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2659 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2665 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2666 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2667 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2669 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2670 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2671 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2672 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2677 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2678 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2679 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2680 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2683 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2684 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2690 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2691 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2692 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2694 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2695 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2697 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2698 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2699 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2700 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2702 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2704 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2705 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2706 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2709 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2710 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2711 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2712 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2713 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2714 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2717 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2718 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2719 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2721 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2722 /// the channel being closed or not:
2723 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2724 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2725 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2726 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2727 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2728 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2729 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2731 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2732 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2733 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2734 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2736 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2738 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2739 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2740 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2743 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2744 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2745 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2746 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2747 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2750 fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2751 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2752 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2753 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2754 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2757 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2758 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2759 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2760 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2761 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2762 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2763 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2765 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2766 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2767 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2768 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2769 // ignore the result here.
2770 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2772 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2773 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2774 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2775 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2776 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2777 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2778 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2779 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2780 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2781 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2782 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2783 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2784 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2787 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2790 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2791 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2794 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2795 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2799 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2800 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2801 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2802 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2803 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2804 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2805 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2806 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2807 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2808 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2809 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2811 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2813 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2814 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2815 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2816 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2817 mem::drop(peer_state);
2818 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2820 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2821 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2822 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2824 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2825 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2826 // Unfunded channel has no update
2827 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2830 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2831 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2832 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2833 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2835 (None, *peer_node_id)
2837 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2840 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2841 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2842 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2843 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2844 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2845 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2846 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2847 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2848 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2854 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2857 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2858 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2859 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2860 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2861 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2862 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2863 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2864 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2865 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2866 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2867 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2868 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2879 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2880 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2881 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2883 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2884 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2885 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2888 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2889 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2890 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2892 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2893 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2894 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2895 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2896 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2899 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2900 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2901 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2902 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2903 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2907 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2908 /// local transaction(s).
2909 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2910 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2911 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2915 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2916 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2917 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2918 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2919 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2920 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2921 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2923 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2924 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2928 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2929 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2930 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2931 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2932 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2933 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2934 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2935 err_data: Vec::new(),
2939 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2940 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2941 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2944 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2945 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2946 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2947 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2948 outgoing_cltv_value,
2949 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2953 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2954 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2955 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2956 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2957 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2958 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2959 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2960 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2962 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2963 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2964 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2966 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2967 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2969 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2970 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2971 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2972 err_data: Vec::new(),
2973 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2977 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2978 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2979 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2980 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2982 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2985 // final_expiry_too_soon
2986 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2987 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2989 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2990 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2991 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2992 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2993 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2994 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2995 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2996 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2997 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2998 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2999 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
3002 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
3003 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
3004 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
3006 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3008 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
3009 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
3013 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
3014 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
3015 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
3016 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
3017 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
3018 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
3019 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3020 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
3021 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3022 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3023 err_data: Vec::new(),
3024 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
3027 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
3028 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3029 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3030 err_data: Vec::new(),
3031 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
3034 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
3038 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3041 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
3042 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3045 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3046 phantom_shared_secret,
3050 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3051 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3052 err_data: Vec::new(),
3053 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3056 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3059 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3060 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3061 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3062 outgoing_cltv_value,
3063 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3067 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3068 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3069 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3070 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3071 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3073 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3074 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3075 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3076 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3077 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3078 failure_code: $err_code,
3084 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3085 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3088 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3089 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3090 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3092 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3093 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3094 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3095 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3096 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3097 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3098 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3099 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3101 macro_rules! return_err {
3102 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3104 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3105 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3106 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3107 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3108 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3109 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3115 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3116 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3117 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3120 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3121 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3123 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3124 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3127 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3128 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3129 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3130 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3133 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3134 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3135 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3137 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3138 // inbound channel's state.
3139 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3140 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3141 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3143 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3147 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3148 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3149 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3150 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3151 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3152 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3153 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3154 // phantom or an intercept.
3155 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3156 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3157 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3161 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3164 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3166 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3167 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3168 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3169 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3170 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3172 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3173 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3174 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3175 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3178 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3179 // have no consistency guarantees.
3180 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3184 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3185 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3186 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3187 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3188 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3190 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3191 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3192 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3193 // we don't have the channel here.
3194 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3196 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3198 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3199 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3200 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3201 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3202 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3203 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3204 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3205 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3206 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3207 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3208 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3210 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3213 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3214 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3216 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3217 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3221 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3222 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3223 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3224 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3226 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3233 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3234 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3235 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3236 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3237 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3238 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3240 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3241 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3243 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3244 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3245 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3246 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3247 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3248 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3249 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3250 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3251 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3252 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3258 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3259 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3260 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3261 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3263 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3264 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3266 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3267 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3268 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3270 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3271 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3272 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3273 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3274 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3275 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3276 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3280 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3282 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3285 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3286 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3287 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3288 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3289 macro_rules! return_err {
3290 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3292 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3293 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3294 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3295 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3296 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3297 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3303 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3305 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3306 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3309 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3310 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3311 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3312 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3313 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3315 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3318 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3319 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3320 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3321 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3322 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3328 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3329 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3330 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3332 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3333 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3334 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3336 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3337 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3338 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3339 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3340 return Err(LightningError {
3341 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3342 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3345 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3346 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3349 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3352 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3353 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3354 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3355 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3357 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3358 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3359 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3361 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3362 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3363 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3365 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3366 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3370 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3373 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3375 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3377 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3378 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3379 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3380 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3381 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3384 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3385 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3387 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3388 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3389 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3390 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3391 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3392 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3393 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3394 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3396 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3397 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3398 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3400 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3402 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3409 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3410 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3411 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3412 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3417 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3418 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3419 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3422 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3423 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3425 log_trace!(self.logger,
3426 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3427 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3428 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3429 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3431 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3432 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3433 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3435 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3436 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3438 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3439 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3440 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3441 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3444 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3445 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3446 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3447 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3448 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3449 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3450 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3451 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3452 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3453 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3455 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3456 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3457 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3459 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3460 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3462 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3463 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3464 Some(monitor_update) => {
3465 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3467 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3468 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3469 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3470 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3471 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3472 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3473 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3481 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3484 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3485 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3486 // `channel_by_id` map.
3487 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3488 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3493 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3494 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3496 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3501 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3503 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3504 /// fields for more info.
3506 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3507 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3509 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3511 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3512 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3513 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3514 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3515 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3517 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3518 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3519 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3520 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3521 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3523 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3524 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3525 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3526 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3528 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3530 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3531 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3532 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3534 /// In general, a path may raise:
3535 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3536 /// node public key) is specified.
3537 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3538 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3539 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3540 /// relevant updates.
3542 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3543 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3544 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3546 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3547 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3548 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3549 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3550 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3551 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3552 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3553 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3554 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3555 self.pending_outbound_payments
3556 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3557 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3558 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3561 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3562 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3563 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3564 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3565 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3566 self.pending_outbound_payments
3567 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3568 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3569 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3570 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3574 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3575 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3576 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3577 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3578 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3579 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3583 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3584 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3585 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3589 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3590 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3593 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3594 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3596 self.pending_outbound_payments
3597 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3598 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3599 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3600 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3601 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3605 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3606 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3607 /// retries are exhausted.
3609 /// # Event Generation
3611 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3612 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3614 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3615 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3616 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3618 /// # Requested Invoices
3620 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3621 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3622 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3623 /// once the invoice has been received.
3625 /// # Restart Behavior
3627 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3628 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3629 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3631 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3632 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3634 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3637 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3638 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3639 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3640 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3641 /// never reach the recipient.
3643 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3644 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3646 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3647 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3649 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3650 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3651 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3652 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3653 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3654 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3655 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3658 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3659 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3661 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3664 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3665 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3666 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3667 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3668 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3669 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3670 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3671 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3674 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3675 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3676 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3677 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3678 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3680 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3681 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3682 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3685 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3688 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3689 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3692 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3693 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3695 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3696 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3697 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3698 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3699 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3700 let payment_params =
3701 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3703 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3705 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3708 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3709 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3711 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3712 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3713 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3714 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3716 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3717 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3718 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3719 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3720 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3721 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3722 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3723 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3724 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3725 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3727 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3728 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3729 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3730 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3734 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3736 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3737 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3740 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3742 let mut res = Vec::new();
3744 for mut path in route.paths {
3745 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3746 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3747 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3748 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3749 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3752 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3755 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3756 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3758 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3760 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3761 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3766 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3769 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3774 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3775 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3776 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3778 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3779 let used_liquidity =
3780 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3782 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3783 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3785 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3788 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3793 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3794 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3795 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3802 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3803 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3804 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3805 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3806 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3807 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3808 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3809 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3810 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3812 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3813 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3814 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3815 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3816 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3818 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3819 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3820 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3821 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3822 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3823 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3824 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3825 } else { unreachable!(); });
3827 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3828 Err((chan, err)) => {
3829 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3830 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3832 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3833 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3834 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3840 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3841 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3843 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3844 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3847 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3848 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3849 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3853 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3854 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3855 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3859 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3860 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3861 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3863 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3864 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3865 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3866 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3868 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3875 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3876 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3877 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3881 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3883 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3884 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3886 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3887 /// across the p2p network.
3889 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3890 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3892 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3893 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3894 /// keys per-channel).
3896 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3897 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3898 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3900 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3901 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3902 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3904 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3905 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3906 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3907 /// for more details.
3909 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3910 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3911 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3912 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3915 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3917 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3918 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3920 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3921 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3922 /// signature for each channel.
3924 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3925 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3926 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3927 let mut result = Ok(());
3929 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3930 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3931 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3932 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3933 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3938 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3939 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3940 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3944 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3945 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3946 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3947 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3948 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3949 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3950 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3951 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3956 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3957 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3958 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3959 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3963 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3964 match states.entry(txid) {
3965 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3966 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3967 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3971 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3974 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3975 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3976 temporary_channel_id,
3977 counterparty_node_id,
3978 funding_transaction.clone(),
3981 let mut output_index = None;
3982 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3983 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3984 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3985 if output_index.is_some() {
3986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3987 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3990 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3993 if output_index.is_none() {
3994 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3995 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3998 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3999 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4000 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4006 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4007 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4008 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4009 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4010 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4011 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4012 .into_iter().flatten()
4013 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4015 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4016 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4018 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4020 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4021 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4022 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4023 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4024 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4026 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4027 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
4028 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
4032 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4033 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4039 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4041 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4042 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4043 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4044 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4046 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4047 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4049 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4050 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4052 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4054 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4055 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4056 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4057 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4058 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4059 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4060 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4061 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4062 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4063 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4064 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4065 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4066 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4071 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4072 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4073 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4074 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4075 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4076 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4077 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4078 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4079 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4083 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4084 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4085 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4086 config.apply(config_update);
4087 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4090 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4091 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4092 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4093 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4094 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4095 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4102 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4103 debug_assert!(false);
4104 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4106 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4107 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4114 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4116 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4117 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4118 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4119 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4121 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4122 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4124 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4125 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4127 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4129 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4130 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4131 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4132 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4133 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4134 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4135 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4136 pub fn update_channel_config(
4137 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4138 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4139 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4142 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4143 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4145 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4146 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4148 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4149 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4150 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4151 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4152 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4154 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4155 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4156 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4159 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4162 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4163 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4164 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4165 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4166 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4167 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4168 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4170 let next_hop_scid = {
4171 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4172 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4173 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4174 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4175 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4176 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4177 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4178 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4179 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4180 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4183 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4185 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4186 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4187 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4189 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4190 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4191 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4196 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4197 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4198 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4201 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4202 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4203 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4205 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4207 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4208 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4209 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4210 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4211 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4214 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4215 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4216 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4217 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4218 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4220 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4224 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4225 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4227 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4230 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4231 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4234 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4235 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4236 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4239 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4240 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4241 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4242 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4243 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4244 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4245 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4246 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4249 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4250 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4251 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4252 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4257 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4259 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4260 /// Will likely generate further events.
4261 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4264 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4265 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4266 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4268 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4269 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4271 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4272 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4273 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4275 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4276 match forward_info {
4277 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4278 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4279 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4280 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4281 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4284 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4285 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4286 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4288 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4289 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4290 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4291 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4292 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4293 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4294 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4297 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4298 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4300 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4303 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4304 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4310 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4311 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4313 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4317 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4318 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4320 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4324 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4325 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4326 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4327 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4328 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4329 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4330 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4333 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4334 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4335 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4336 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4337 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4339 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4341 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4342 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4346 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4347 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4348 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4349 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4351 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4352 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4358 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4361 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4364 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4365 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4366 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4367 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4368 // problem, not ours.
4374 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4375 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4376 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4378 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4382 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4383 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4384 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4385 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4388 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4389 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4390 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4391 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4392 match forward_info {
4393 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4394 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4395 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4396 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4397 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4400 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4401 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4402 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4403 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4404 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4405 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4406 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4407 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4408 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4410 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4411 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4412 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4415 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4416 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4418 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4420 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4421 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4422 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4423 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4428 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4429 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4431 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4432 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4433 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4434 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4436 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4439 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4441 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4442 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4443 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4450 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4454 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4455 match forward_info {
4456 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4457 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4458 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4459 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4460 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4463 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4464 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4465 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4466 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4467 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4468 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4469 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4471 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4472 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4473 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4477 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4478 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4481 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4484 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4485 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4486 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4487 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4488 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4489 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4490 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4491 phantom_shared_secret,
4493 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4494 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4495 // if routing nodes overpay
4496 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4497 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4499 total_value_received: None,
4500 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4503 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4506 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4508 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4509 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4510 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4511 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4512 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4513 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4515 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4516 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4517 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4518 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4519 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4520 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4521 phantom_shared_secret,
4523 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4524 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4526 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4529 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4530 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4531 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4532 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4533 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4536 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4537 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4538 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4539 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4540 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4541 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4543 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4544 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4545 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4547 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4548 .entry(payment_hash)
4549 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4550 .or_insert_with(|| {
4551 committed_to_claimable = true;
4553 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4556 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4557 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4558 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4559 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4561 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4562 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4563 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4565 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4566 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4567 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4570 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4572 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4573 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4574 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4575 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4576 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4577 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4578 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4579 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4580 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4581 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4583 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4585 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4586 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4587 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4588 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4589 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4590 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4592 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4593 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4594 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4595 committed_to_claimable = true;
4597 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4598 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4599 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4600 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4601 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4602 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4603 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4604 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4605 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4606 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4610 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4611 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4612 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4613 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4614 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4616 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4618 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4619 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4621 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4622 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4623 committed_to_claimable = true;
4626 payment_claimable_generated
4630 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4631 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4632 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4633 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4634 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4635 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4636 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4637 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4639 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4640 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4641 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4642 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4643 Ok(result) => result,
4645 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4646 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4649 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4650 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4651 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4652 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4653 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4654 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4657 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4658 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4659 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4661 check_total_value!(purpose);
4663 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4664 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4665 check_total_value!(purpose);
4669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4670 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4671 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4672 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4674 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4675 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4676 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4677 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4678 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4679 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4680 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4681 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4683 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4684 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4685 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4687 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4688 if payment_claimable_generated {
4689 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4695 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4696 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4704 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4705 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4706 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4707 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4709 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4710 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4712 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4714 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4715 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4716 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4718 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4720 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4721 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4722 events.append(&mut new_events);
4725 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4727 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4728 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4729 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4731 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4733 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4734 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4735 if background_events.is_empty() {
4736 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4739 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4741 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4742 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4743 // monitor updating completing.
4744 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4746 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4747 let mut updated_chan = false;
4749 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4750 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4751 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4752 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4753 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4754 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4755 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4756 updated_chan = true;
4757 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4758 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4760 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4763 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4768 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4769 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4772 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4773 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4774 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4775 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4776 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4777 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4778 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4780 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4781 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4782 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4783 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4784 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4790 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4793 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4794 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4795 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4796 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4797 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4800 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4801 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4802 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4803 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4804 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4805 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4806 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4808 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4810 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4811 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4812 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4813 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4815 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4816 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4818 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4819 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4823 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4824 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4825 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4826 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4827 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4828 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4829 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4831 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4832 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4835 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4836 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4837 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4838 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4839 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4841 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4846 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4847 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4855 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4857 /// This currently includes:
4858 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4859 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4860 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4862 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4863 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4864 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4865 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4866 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4867 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4868 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4869 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4871 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4872 /// estimate fetches.
4874 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4875 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4876 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4877 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4878 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4880 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4881 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4883 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4884 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4885 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4886 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4888 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4889 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4890 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4891 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4892 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4893 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4895 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4896 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4897 log_error!(self.logger,
4898 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4899 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4900 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4901 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4902 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4903 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4904 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4905 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4906 channel_id: *chan_id,
4907 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4918 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4919 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4920 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4921 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4922 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4923 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4924 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4926 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4927 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4932 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4933 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4935 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4936 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4937 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4938 if needs_close { return false; }
4941 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4942 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4943 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4944 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4945 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4946 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4947 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4948 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4950 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4951 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4952 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4953 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4957 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4959 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4962 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4964 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4965 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4966 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4967 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4971 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4973 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4979 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4981 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4982 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4983 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4984 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4985 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4986 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4987 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4988 channel_id: *chan_id,
4989 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4997 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4998 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4999 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5001 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5002 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5003 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5008 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5009 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5010 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5011 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5012 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5013 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5014 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5015 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5021 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5023 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5024 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5029 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5030 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5031 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5032 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5033 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5034 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5035 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5036 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5037 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5038 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5039 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5040 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5041 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5042 // have no channels to the peer.
5043 let remove_entry = {
5044 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5045 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5048 entry.remove_entry();
5051 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5056 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5057 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5058 // This should be unreachable
5059 debug_assert!(false);
5062 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5063 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5064 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5065 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5066 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5067 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5068 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5071 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5072 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5073 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5075 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5076 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5083 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5084 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5085 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5086 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5087 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5090 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5091 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5094 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5095 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5098 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5099 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5100 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5101 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5102 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5103 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5104 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5107 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5108 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5111 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5112 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5113 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5114 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5115 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5122 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5123 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5124 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5126 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5127 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5128 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5129 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5131 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5132 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5133 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5134 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5135 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5136 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5139 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5140 /// reason for the failure.
5142 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5143 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5144 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5146 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5147 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5148 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5149 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5150 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5151 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5152 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5157 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5158 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5159 match failure_code {
5160 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5161 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5162 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5163 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5164 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5165 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5167 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5168 let fail_data = match data {
5169 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5172 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5177 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5178 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5180 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5182 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5183 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5184 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5185 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5186 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5187 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5188 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5190 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5192 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5193 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5195 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5200 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5201 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5202 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5203 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5204 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5205 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5206 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5207 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5208 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5209 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5211 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5212 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5213 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5214 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5216 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5217 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5218 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5219 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5220 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5224 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5225 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5226 // be surfaced to the user.
5227 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5228 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5229 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5231 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5232 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5233 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5234 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5235 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5236 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5238 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5239 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5241 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5242 debug_assert!(false);
5243 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5246 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5248 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5251 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5252 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5253 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5254 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5258 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5259 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5260 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5261 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5262 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5263 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5264 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5265 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5266 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5267 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5270 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5271 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5272 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5275 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5276 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5277 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5279 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5280 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5281 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5282 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5283 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5285 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5286 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5287 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5289 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5290 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5291 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5292 push_forward_ev = true;
5294 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5295 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5296 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5298 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5299 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5302 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5303 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5304 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5305 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5306 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5307 failed_next_destination: destination,
5313 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5314 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5316 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5317 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5318 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5319 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5321 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5322 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5323 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5324 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5326 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5327 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5328 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5330 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5331 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5332 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5333 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5334 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5335 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5336 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5337 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5338 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5341 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5342 /// even type numbers.
5346 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5347 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5349 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5350 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5351 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5354 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5355 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5357 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5360 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5361 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5362 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5363 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5364 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5365 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5366 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5367 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5372 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5373 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5374 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5375 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5376 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5378 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5379 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5380 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5384 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5385 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5386 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5387 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5388 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5389 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5390 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5391 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5392 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5393 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5394 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5403 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5405 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5406 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5407 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5408 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5409 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5410 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5411 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5412 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5413 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5415 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5416 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5417 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5418 debug_assert!(false);
5422 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5424 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5425 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5426 debug_assert!(false);
5430 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5431 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5433 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5434 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5435 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5436 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5439 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5440 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5441 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5442 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5446 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5447 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5448 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5449 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5450 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5451 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5454 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5455 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5456 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5457 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5458 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5463 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5464 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5465 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5466 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5467 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5468 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5469 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5471 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5474 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5475 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5476 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5477 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5481 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5482 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5483 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5484 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5486 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5487 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5488 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5489 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5491 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5492 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5493 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5494 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5497 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5498 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5499 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5500 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5504 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5505 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5506 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5509 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5510 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5511 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5512 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5513 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5514 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5515 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5518 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5519 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5520 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5522 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5525 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5526 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5528 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5529 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5530 // monitor update as a background event.
5531 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5532 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5533 counterparty_node_id,
5534 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5535 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5539 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5540 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5545 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5547 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5549 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5550 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5551 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5552 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5553 blocking_action: blocker,
5555 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5557 debug_assert!(false,
5558 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5561 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5562 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5563 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5564 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5565 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5567 let mut found_blocker = false;
5568 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5569 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5570 // which case we need to only remove the one
5571 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5572 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5573 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5574 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5576 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5579 debug_assert!(false);
5588 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5589 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5590 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5596 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5597 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5598 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5599 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5600 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5601 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5602 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5603 // again on restart.
5604 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5605 payment_preimage, update_res);
5608 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5609 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5611 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5612 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5613 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5614 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5615 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5616 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5617 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5618 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5619 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5620 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5623 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5624 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5625 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5626 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5627 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5628 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5632 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5633 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5636 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5637 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5638 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5641 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5642 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5643 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5644 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5645 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5647 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5648 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5649 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5651 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5652 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5655 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5656 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5657 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5658 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5659 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5660 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5661 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5662 let chan_to_release =
5663 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5664 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5666 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5667 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5668 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5669 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5674 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5675 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5676 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5677 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5678 // in the background.
5679 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5680 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5681 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5682 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5684 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5685 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5686 funding_txo, update, ..
5688 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5689 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5690 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5691 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5693 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5699 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5700 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5701 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5703 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5704 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5706 monitor_update.updates[0],
5707 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5712 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5713 // immediately once we get going.
5714 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5717 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5719 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5722 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5723 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5724 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5725 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5726 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5727 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5731 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5732 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5733 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5736 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5737 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5739 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5740 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5741 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5742 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5744 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5748 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5749 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5750 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5756 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5757 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5758 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5761 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5762 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5763 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5764 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5766 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5768 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5769 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5770 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5772 payment_purpose: purpose,
5775 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5777 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5781 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5783 sender_intended_total_msat,
5787 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5788 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5790 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5791 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5792 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5795 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5796 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5798 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5799 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5800 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5801 Some(blocking_action),
5808 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5809 /// update completion.
5810 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5811 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5812 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5813 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5814 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5815 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5816 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5817 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5818 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5819 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5820 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5821 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5822 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5824 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5826 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5827 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5828 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5829 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5832 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5833 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5835 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5836 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5837 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5842 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5843 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5844 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5845 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5850 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5851 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5852 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5853 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5854 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5859 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5863 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5869 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5870 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5871 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5875 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5876 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5877 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5881 log_debug!(self.logger, "Outgoing message queue is{}", if pending_msg_events.is_empty() { " empty" } else { "..." });
5882 for msg in pending_msg_events.iter() {
5883 log_debug!(self.logger, " {:?}", msg);
5889 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5890 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5892 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5893 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5895 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5896 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5897 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5898 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5899 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5904 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5905 let mut peer_state_lock;
5906 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5907 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5908 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5909 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5911 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5914 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5915 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5916 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5917 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5918 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5921 let remaining_in_flight =
5922 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5923 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5926 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5927 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5928 remaining_in_flight);
5929 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5932 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5935 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5937 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5938 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5941 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5942 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5943 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5945 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5946 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5947 /// used to accept such channels.
5949 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5950 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5951 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5952 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5955 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5956 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5958 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5959 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5960 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5962 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5963 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5965 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5966 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5968 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5969 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5971 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5972 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5973 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5974 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5977 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5978 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5980 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5981 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5982 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5983 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5984 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5985 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5986 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5987 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5989 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5990 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5991 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5993 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5994 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5995 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5996 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5997 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5998 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5999 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
6001 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
6005 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6006 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6007 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6008 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6009 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6010 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6011 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6014 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6015 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
6017 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6018 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6019 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6020 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6021 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6022 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6023 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6024 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6027 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6028 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
6032 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6033 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6034 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6036 match channel.accept_inbound_channel() {
6038 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6039 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6043 log_trace!(self.logger, "Awaiting signer for accept_channel; setting signing_pending_accept_channel");
6044 channel.signer_pending_accept_channel = true;
6048 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6053 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6054 /// or 0-conf channels.
6056 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6057 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6058 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6059 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6060 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6061 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6063 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6064 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6065 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6066 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6067 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6068 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6069 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6073 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6076 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6077 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6079 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6080 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6082 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6083 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6084 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6085 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6086 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6088 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6091 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6092 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6093 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6096 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6097 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6102 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6105 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6106 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6107 // likely to be lost on restart!
6108 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6109 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6112 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6113 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6116 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6117 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6118 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6119 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6120 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6122 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6123 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6125 debug_assert!(false);
6126 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6128 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6129 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6131 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6132 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6133 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6134 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6135 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6136 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6138 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6139 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6140 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6143 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6144 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6145 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6146 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6147 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6150 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6151 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6153 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6156 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6157 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6158 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6159 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6160 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6161 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6162 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6163 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6164 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6166 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6167 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6168 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6173 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6174 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6175 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6176 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6177 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6178 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6179 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6182 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6187 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6188 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6189 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6191 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6192 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6195 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6196 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6198 match channel.accept_inbound_channel() {
6200 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6201 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6205 log_trace!(self.logger, "Awaiting signer for accept_channel; setting signer_pending_accept_channel");
6206 channel.signer_pending_accept_channel = true;
6210 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6214 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6215 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6216 // likely to be lost on restart!
6217 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6218 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6219 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6221 debug_assert!(false);
6222 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6224 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6225 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6226 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6228 match phase.get_mut() {
6229 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6230 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6231 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6234 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6238 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6241 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6242 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6243 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6244 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6245 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6247 user_channel_id: user_id,
6252 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6253 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6255 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6256 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6258 debug_assert!(false);
6259 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6262 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6263 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6264 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6265 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6266 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6267 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6269 Err((inbound_chan, ChannelError::Ignore(_))) => {
6270 // If we get an `Ignore` error then something transient went wrong. Put the channel
6271 // back into the table and bail.
6272 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(msg.temporary_channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan));
6275 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6276 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6277 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6278 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6279 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6280 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6281 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6282 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6283 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6287 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6288 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6290 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6293 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6294 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6295 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6296 "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6297 chan.context.channel_id()
6300 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6301 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6302 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6303 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6304 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6305 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6306 chan.context.channel_id()))
6308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6309 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6310 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6311 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6312 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6314 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6315 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6316 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6317 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6318 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6319 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6320 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6325 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6326 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6327 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6329 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6333 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6334 let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6335 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6336 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6338 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6339 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6348 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6349 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6350 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6351 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6353 debug_assert!(false);
6354 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6357 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6358 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6359 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6360 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6361 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6362 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6363 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6364 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6365 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6366 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6369 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6373 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6377 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6381 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6382 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6383 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6384 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6385 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6387 debug_assert!(false);
6388 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6390 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6391 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6392 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6393 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6394 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6395 log_debug!(self.logger, "<== channel_ready");
6396 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6397 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6398 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6399 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6400 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6401 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6402 msg: announcement_sigs,
6404 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6405 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6406 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6407 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6408 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6409 // announcement_signatures.
6410 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6411 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6412 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6413 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6420 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6421 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6426 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6427 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6430 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6431 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6436 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6437 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6438 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6440 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6441 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6443 debug_assert!(false);
6444 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6446 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6447 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6448 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6449 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6451 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6452 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6453 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6455 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6458 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6459 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6460 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6461 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6463 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6464 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6465 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6466 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6467 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6468 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6472 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6473 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6474 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6475 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6478 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6479 let context = phase.context_mut();
6480 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6481 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6482 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6483 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6487 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6490 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6491 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6492 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6493 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6495 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6496 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6502 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6503 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6504 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6505 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6506 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6508 debug_assert!(false);
6509 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6511 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6512 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6513 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6514 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6515 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6516 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6517 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6518 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6519 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6520 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6521 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6526 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6527 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6528 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6529 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6530 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6531 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6532 } else { (tx, None) }
6534 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6535 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6538 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6541 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6542 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6543 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6545 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6546 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6547 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6548 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6549 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6553 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6554 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6556 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6557 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6558 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6563 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6564 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6565 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6566 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6568 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6569 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6570 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6571 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6573 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6574 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6576 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6577 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6578 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6580 debug_assert!(false);
6581 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6583 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6584 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6585 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6586 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6587 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6588 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6589 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6590 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6591 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6592 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6594 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6595 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6596 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6597 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6598 match pending_forward_info {
6599 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6600 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6601 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6602 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6604 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6605 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6606 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6607 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6608 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6611 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6613 _ => pending_forward_info
6616 log_debug!(self.logger, "<== update_add_htlc: htlc_id={} amount_msat={}", msg.htlc_id, msg.amount_msat);
6617 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6619 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6620 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6623 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6628 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6630 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6631 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6632 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6634 debug_assert!(false);
6635 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6637 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6638 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6639 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6640 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6641 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6642 log_debug!(self.logger, "<== update_fulfill_htlc: htlc_id={}", msg.htlc_id);
6643 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6644 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6645 log_trace!(self.logger,
6646 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6648 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6649 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6650 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6652 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6653 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6654 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6655 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6656 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6657 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6658 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6661 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6662 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6665 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6668 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6672 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6673 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6674 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6675 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6676 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6678 debug_assert!(false);
6679 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6681 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6682 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6683 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6684 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6685 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6686 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6688 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6689 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6697 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6698 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6699 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6700 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6701 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6703 debug_assert!(false);
6704 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6706 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6708 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6709 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6710 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6711 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6712 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6714 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6715 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6717 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6718 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6726 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6727 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6728 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6730 debug_assert!(false);
6731 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6733 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6734 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6735 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6736 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6737 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6738 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6739 log_debug!(self.logger, "<== commitment_signed: {} htlcs", msg.htlc_signatures.len());
6740 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6741 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6742 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6743 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6747 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6748 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6751 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6756 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6757 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6758 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6759 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6760 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6761 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6762 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6763 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6764 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6765 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6766 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6768 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6769 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6771 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6772 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6773 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6774 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6775 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6776 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6778 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6779 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6780 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6782 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6783 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6784 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6785 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6786 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6787 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6788 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6789 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6790 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6793 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6794 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6797 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6798 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6799 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6800 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6801 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6802 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6803 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6804 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6807 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6808 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6809 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6814 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6815 // payments are being processed.
6816 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6817 push_forward_event = true;
6819 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6820 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6827 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6828 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6831 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6832 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6833 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6835 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6839 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6840 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6841 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6842 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6843 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6845 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6846 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6847 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6848 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6849 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6850 // real by taking more time.
6851 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6852 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6853 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6858 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6859 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6860 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6861 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6862 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6863 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6864 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6866 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6867 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6868 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6869 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6870 channel_funding_outpoint,
6871 counterparty_node_id,
6876 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6877 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6878 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6880 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6881 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6882 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6883 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6885 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6886 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6887 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6893 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6894 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6895 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6896 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6898 debug_assert!(false);
6899 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6900 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6901 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6902 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6904 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6905 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6906 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6907 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6908 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6909 *counterparty_node_id)
6911 log_debug!(self.logger, "<== revoke_and_ack");
6912 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6913 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6914 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6915 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6916 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6917 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6918 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6922 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6923 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6929 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6933 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6935 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6937 debug_assert!(false);
6938 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6940 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6941 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6942 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6944 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6945 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6947 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6948 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6951 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6956 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6957 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6958 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6960 debug_assert!(false);
6961 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6963 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6964 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6965 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6967 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6968 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6969 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6972 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6973 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6974 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6975 msg, &self.default_configuration
6976 ), chan_phase_entry),
6977 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6978 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6979 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6982 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6983 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6986 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6991 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6992 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6993 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6994 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6996 // It's not a local channel
6997 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7000 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7001 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7002 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7003 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7005 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7006 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7007 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7008 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7009 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7010 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7011 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7012 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7013 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7014 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7015 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7017 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7019 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7020 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7021 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7022 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7024 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7025 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7026 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7029 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7033 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7034 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7037 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7039 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7042 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7044 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7045 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7047 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7049 debug_assert!(false);
7050 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7051 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7055 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7056 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7057 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7058 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7059 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7060 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7061 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7062 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7063 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7064 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7065 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7066 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7067 let mut channel_update = None;
7068 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7069 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7070 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7073 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7074 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7075 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7076 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7077 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7078 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7079 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7084 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7085 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7086 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7087 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7088 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7089 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7093 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7094 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7097 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7098 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7099 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7100 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7101 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7102 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7103 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7104 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7105 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7107 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7108 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7109 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7110 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7111 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7112 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7113 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7114 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7115 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7116 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7117 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7118 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7119 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7120 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7121 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7122 next_funding_txid: None,
7125 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7126 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7127 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7133 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7134 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7135 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7136 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7139 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7140 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7145 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7146 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7147 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7149 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7150 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7151 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7152 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7153 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7154 match monitor_event {
7155 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7156 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7157 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7158 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7160 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7161 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7162 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7163 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7166 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7167 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7168 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7170 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7171 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7172 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7173 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7176 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7177 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7178 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7179 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7180 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7181 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7182 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7183 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7184 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7185 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7186 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7190 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7191 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7192 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7193 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7194 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7202 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7203 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7209 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7210 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7213 has_pending_monitor_events
7216 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7217 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7218 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7220 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7221 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7222 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7225 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7226 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7227 /// update was applied.
7228 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7229 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7230 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7232 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7233 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7234 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7235 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7237 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7238 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7240 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7241 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7242 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7243 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7245 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7246 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7247 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7248 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7249 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7250 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7252 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7253 has_monitor_update = true;
7255 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7256 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7257 continue 'peer_loop;
7266 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7267 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7268 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7274 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7275 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7277 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7278 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7280 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7281 #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7282 // actually finish implementing it fully.
7283 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7284 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7286 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7287 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7289 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7290 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7291 match (msgs.commitment_update, msgs.raa) {
7292 (Some(cu), Some(raa)) if msgs.order == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
7293 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: cu });
7294 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg: raa });
7296 (Some(cu), Some(raa)) if msgs.order == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
7297 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg: raa });
7298 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: cu });
7300 (Some(cu), _) => pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: cu }),
7301 (_, Some(raa)) => pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg: raa }),
7304 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7305 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7310 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
7311 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7316 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7317 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7320 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7321 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7322 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7323 if let Some(msg) = msgs.accept_channel {
7324 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg });
7327 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7328 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.chain_hash, &self.logger);
7329 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7330 if let Some(msg) = msgs.open_channel {
7331 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { node_id, msg });
7337 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7338 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7339 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7340 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7341 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7342 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7343 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7347 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7348 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7349 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7350 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7351 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7357 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7358 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7359 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7360 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7361 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7362 let mut has_update = false;
7363 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7365 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7367 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7368 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7369 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7370 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7371 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7373 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7374 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
7375 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7376 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
7377 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7379 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7380 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7383 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7384 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7385 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7386 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7387 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7392 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7394 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7395 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7396 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7397 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7403 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7404 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7409 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7415 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7416 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7419 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7420 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7426 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7427 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7429 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7430 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7431 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7432 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7433 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7434 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7435 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7436 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7437 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7438 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7439 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7440 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7441 assert!(should_broadcast);
7442 } else { unreachable!(); }
7443 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7444 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7445 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7448 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7452 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7453 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7454 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7458 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7459 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7460 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7461 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7465 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7468 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7470 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7471 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7472 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7473 &self, description: String
7474 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7475 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7476 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7477 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7478 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7479 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7481 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7482 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7486 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7487 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7491 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7492 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7494 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7495 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7496 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7499 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7500 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7501 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7503 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7504 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7508 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7509 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7510 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7511 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7515 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7516 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7520 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7521 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7523 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7525 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7526 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7527 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7528 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7529 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7530 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7531 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7532 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7533 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7534 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7535 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7536 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7538 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7539 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7541 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7542 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7545 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7546 self.pending_outbound_payments
7547 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7548 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7550 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7555 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7556 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7557 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7559 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7560 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7561 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7562 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7563 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7564 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7565 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7567 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7568 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7572 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7573 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7576 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7577 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7578 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7582 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7583 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7584 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7585 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7589 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7590 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7591 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7595 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7596 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7598 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7599 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7600 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7601 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7602 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7603 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7604 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7605 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7606 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7607 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7608 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7609 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7610 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7611 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7612 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7615 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7616 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7617 let builder = match quantity {
7619 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7621 let builder = match amount_msats {
7623 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7625 let builder = match payer_note {
7627 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7630 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7631 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7633 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7634 self.pending_outbound_payments
7635 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7636 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7638 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7640 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7641 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7642 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7643 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7644 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7647 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7649 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7650 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7651 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7652 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7653 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7654 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7655 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7656 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7657 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7659 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7666 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7669 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7670 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7671 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7675 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7676 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7677 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7678 /// received and no retries will be made.
7680 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7681 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7682 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7683 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7684 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7686 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7687 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7689 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7690 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7691 let payment_paths = vec![
7692 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7694 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7695 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7696 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7698 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7699 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7700 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7702 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7703 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7704 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7706 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7707 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7709 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7710 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7711 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7712 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7713 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7716 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7718 for path in refund.paths() {
7719 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7720 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7721 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7722 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7724 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7730 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7734 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7737 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7738 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7740 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7741 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7742 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7743 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7745 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7747 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7748 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7752 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7753 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7755 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7757 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7758 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7760 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7761 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7762 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7763 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7764 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7765 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7766 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7767 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7768 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7769 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7770 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7773 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7774 /// stored external to LDK.
7776 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7777 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7778 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7780 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7781 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7784 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7785 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7786 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7787 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7789 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7790 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7791 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7792 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7793 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7795 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7796 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7797 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7798 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7799 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7801 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7802 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7804 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7805 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7809 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7810 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7812 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7814 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7815 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7817 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7818 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7819 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7820 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7821 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7822 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7823 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7826 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7827 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7829 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7830 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7831 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7834 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7836 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7837 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7838 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7839 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7842 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7844 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7845 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7846 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7847 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7848 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7850 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7851 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7852 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7854 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7856 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7859 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7860 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7861 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7865 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7866 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7868 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7869 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7870 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7871 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7873 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7874 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7875 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7876 Some(_) => continue,
7877 None => return scid_candidate
7882 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7884 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7885 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7887 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7888 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7889 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7893 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7894 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7895 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7897 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7898 /// times to get a unique scid.
7899 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7900 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7901 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7903 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7904 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7905 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7906 return scid_candidate
7910 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7911 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7912 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7913 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7915 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7916 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7917 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7918 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7919 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7920 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7922 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7923 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7924 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7933 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7934 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7935 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7936 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7937 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7941 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7942 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7943 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7944 events.push_back((event, None));
7948 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7949 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7950 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7954 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7955 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7959 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7960 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7963 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7964 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7965 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7966 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7967 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7969 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7970 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7971 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7972 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7974 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7975 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7976 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7977 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7979 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7983 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7984 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7985 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7986 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7987 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7988 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7989 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7993 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7994 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7995 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7996 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7997 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7998 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7999 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8000 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8001 if further_update_exists {
8002 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8007 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8008 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8013 log_debug!(self.logger,
8014 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8015 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8021 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8022 for action in actions {
8024 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8025 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
8027 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
8033 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8034 /// using the given event handler.
8036 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8037 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8041 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8045 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8047 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8048 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8049 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8050 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8051 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8052 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8056 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8057 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8058 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8059 /// is always placed next to each other.
8061 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8062 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8063 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8064 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8066 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8067 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8068 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8069 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8070 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8071 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8072 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8074 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8075 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8076 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8077 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8080 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8081 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8083 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8084 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8087 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8088 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8089 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8090 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8091 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8092 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8093 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8097 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8098 events.replace(pending_events);
8107 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8109 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8110 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8111 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8112 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8113 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8114 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8118 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8120 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8121 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8122 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8124 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8128 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8130 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8131 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8132 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8133 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8134 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8135 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8139 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8141 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8142 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8143 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8144 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8145 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8148 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8149 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8152 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8153 let _persistence_guard =
8154 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8155 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8156 let new_height = height - 1;
8158 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8159 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8160 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8161 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8162 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8163 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8166 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8170 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8172 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8173 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8174 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8175 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8176 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8177 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8181 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8182 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8183 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8184 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8186 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8187 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8189 let _persistence_guard =
8190 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8191 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8192 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
8193 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8195 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8196 if height < last_best_block_height {
8197 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8198 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8202 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8203 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8204 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8205 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8207 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8208 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8210 let _persistence_guard =
8211 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8212 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8213 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8215 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8217 macro_rules! max_time {
8218 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8220 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8221 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8222 // having an explicit local time source.
8223 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8224 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8225 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8226 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8227 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8233 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8234 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8235 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8236 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8240 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8241 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8242 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8243 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8244 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8245 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8246 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
8247 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
8254 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8255 let _persistence_guard =
8256 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8257 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8258 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8259 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8260 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8261 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8262 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8263 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8268 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8270 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8271 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8272 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8273 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8274 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8275 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8279 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8280 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8282 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8283 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8284 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8285 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8286 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8288 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8289 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8291 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8292 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8293 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8294 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8295 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8296 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8298 // Retain unfunded channels.
8299 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8300 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8301 let res = f(channel);
8302 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8303 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8304 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8305 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8306 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8308 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8309 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8310 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8311 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8312 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8313 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8314 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8324 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8325 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8328 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8330 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8331 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8332 msg: announcement_sigs,
8334 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8335 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8336 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8338 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8339 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8340 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8345 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8346 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8347 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8348 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8349 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8350 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8351 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8352 // is always consistent.
8353 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8354 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8355 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8356 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8357 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8360 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8361 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8362 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8363 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8364 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8365 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8366 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8370 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8371 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8372 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8373 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8374 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8375 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8376 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8377 data: reason_message,
8390 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8391 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8392 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8393 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8394 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8395 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8396 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8397 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8398 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8399 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8401 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8402 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8403 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8407 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8410 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8411 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8412 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8413 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8414 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8415 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8416 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8417 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8418 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8419 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8422 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8423 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8424 _ => unreachable!(),
8426 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8427 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8428 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8429 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8435 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8437 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8438 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8442 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8443 /// may have events that need processing.
8445 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8446 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8448 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8449 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8450 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8451 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8454 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8455 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8456 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8459 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8460 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8461 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8464 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8465 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8466 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8467 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8470 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8471 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8472 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8473 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8476 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8477 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8479 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8480 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8481 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8482 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8483 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8486 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8487 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8488 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8489 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8492 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8493 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8494 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8495 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8498 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8499 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8500 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8501 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8504 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8505 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8506 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8507 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8511 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8512 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8514 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8515 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8516 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8517 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8518 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8519 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8523 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8524 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8525 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8526 // change to the contents.
8527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8528 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8529 let persist = match &res {
8530 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8531 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8532 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8534 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8536 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8541 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8542 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8543 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8544 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8547 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8548 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8549 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8550 // change to the contents.
8551 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8552 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8553 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8557 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8558 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8559 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8560 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8563 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8564 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8565 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8568 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8570 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8573 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8574 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8575 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8576 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8577 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8579 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8580 let persist = match &res {
8581 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8582 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8584 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8589 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8590 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8591 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8594 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8596 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8599 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8600 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8601 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8602 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8603 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8604 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8605 let persist = match &res {
8606 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8607 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8608 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8610 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8615 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8617 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8620 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8621 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8622 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8623 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8624 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8625 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8626 let persist = match &res {
8627 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8628 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8629 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8631 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8636 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8637 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8638 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8639 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8641 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8642 let persist = match &res {
8643 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8644 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8645 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8647 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8652 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8654 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8657 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8658 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8659 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8662 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8663 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8664 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8665 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8666 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8667 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8668 let persist = match &res {
8669 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8670 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8671 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8673 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8678 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8680 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8683 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8684 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8685 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8688 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8693 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8694 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8695 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8696 let persist = match &res {
8697 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8698 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8699 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8701 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8706 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8707 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8708 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8709 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8710 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8712 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8713 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8714 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8715 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8716 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8717 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8718 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8719 let context = match phase {
8720 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8721 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8722 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8727 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8728 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8731 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8735 // Clean up for removal.
8736 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8737 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8738 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8741 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8742 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8743 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8744 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8746 // V1 Channel Establishment
8747 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8748 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8749 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8750 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8751 // V2 Channel Establishment
8752 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8753 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8754 // Common Channel Establishment
8755 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8756 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8757 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8758 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8759 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8760 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8761 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8762 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8763 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8764 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8765 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8766 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8767 // Channel Operations
8768 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8769 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8770 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8771 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8772 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8773 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8775 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8776 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8777 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8778 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8779 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8780 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8781 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8782 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8783 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8786 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8787 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8788 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8789 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8792 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8794 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8796 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8797 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8801 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8802 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8803 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8807 let mut res = Ok(());
8809 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8810 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8811 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8812 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8813 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8814 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8815 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8818 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8819 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8821 if inbound_peer_limited {
8823 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8825 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8826 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8827 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8828 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8829 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8830 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8831 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8832 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8836 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8837 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8838 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8840 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8841 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8842 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8843 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8846 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8849 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8850 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8855 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8857 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8858 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8859 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8860 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8861 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8863 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8864 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8865 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8866 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8867 // worry about closing and removing them.
8868 debug_assert!(false);
8872 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8873 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8874 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8879 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8880 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8885 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8886 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8888 match &msg.data as &str {
8889 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8890 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8892 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8893 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8894 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8895 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8896 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8897 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8898 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8899 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8900 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8901 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8902 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8903 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8904 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8905 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8906 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8907 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8911 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8912 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8913 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8914 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8915 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8916 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8918 log_level: Level::Trace,
8928 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8929 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8930 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8931 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8932 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8933 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8934 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8935 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8936 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8937 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8938 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8940 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8941 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8942 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8946 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8947 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8948 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8949 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8950 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8951 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8952 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8953 if let Ok(opt_msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8954 if let Some(msg) = opt_msg {
8955 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8956 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8965 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8966 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8970 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8971 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8974 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8975 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8978 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8979 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8982 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8983 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8984 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8985 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8988 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8989 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8990 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8991 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8994 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8995 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8996 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8997 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9000 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9001 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9002 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9003 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9006 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9007 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9008 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9009 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9012 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9013 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9014 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9015 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9018 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9019 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9020 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9021 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9024 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9025 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9026 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9027 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9030 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9031 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9032 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9033 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9037 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9038 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9040 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9041 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9042 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9043 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9044 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9045 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9049 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9050 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9051 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9054 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9055 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9058 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
9059 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9061 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9062 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9064 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9065 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9068 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9070 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9071 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9072 let payment_paths = vec![
9073 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9075 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9076 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9077 payment_paths, payment_hash
9079 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9080 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9081 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9083 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9084 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9085 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9087 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9088 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9089 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9092 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9093 let payment_paths = vec![
9094 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9096 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9097 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9098 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9099 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9100 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9102 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9103 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9104 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9106 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9107 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9109 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9110 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9111 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9112 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9114 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9115 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9119 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9120 Err(error) => Some(error),
9124 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9128 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9129 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9131 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9133 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9134 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9137 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9138 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9139 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9146 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9147 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9153 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9154 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9158 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9159 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9160 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9161 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9162 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9166 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9167 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9169 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9170 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9171 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9172 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9173 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9176 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9177 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9178 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9179 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9182 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9183 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9184 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9185 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9188 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9189 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9190 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9191 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9194 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9195 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9196 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9197 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9198 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9199 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9200 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9201 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9202 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9203 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9204 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9205 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9206 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9207 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9208 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9209 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9210 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9211 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9212 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9213 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9218 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9219 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9221 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9222 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9223 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9224 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9227 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9228 (2, node_id, required),
9229 (4, features, required),
9230 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9231 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9232 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9233 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9236 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9237 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9238 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9239 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9240 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9241 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9242 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9243 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9244 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9245 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9246 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9247 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9248 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9249 (7, self.config, option),
9250 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9251 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9252 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9253 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9254 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9255 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9256 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9257 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9258 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9259 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9260 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9261 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9262 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9263 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9264 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9265 (32, self.is_public, required),
9266 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9267 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9268 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9269 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9270 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9276 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9277 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9278 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9279 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9280 (2, channel_id, required),
9281 (3, channel_type, option),
9282 (4, counterparty, required),
9283 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9284 (6, funding_txo, option),
9285 (7, config, option),
9286 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9287 (9, confirmations, option),
9288 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9289 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9290 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9291 (16, balance_msat, required),
9292 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9293 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9294 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9295 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9296 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9297 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9298 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9299 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9300 (26, is_outbound, required),
9301 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9302 (30, is_usable, required),
9303 (32, is_public, required),
9304 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9305 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9306 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9307 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9308 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9311 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9312 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9313 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9314 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9315 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9319 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9321 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9322 outbound_scid_alias,
9326 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9327 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9329 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9330 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9331 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9332 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9333 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9334 confirmations_required,
9336 force_close_spend_delay,
9337 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9338 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9339 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9340 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9341 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9342 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9343 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9344 channel_shutdown_state,
9349 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9350 (2, channels, required_vec),
9351 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9352 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9355 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9357 (0, onion_packet, required),
9358 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9361 (0, payment_data, required),
9362 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9363 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9364 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9365 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9367 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9368 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9369 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9370 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9371 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9372 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9376 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9377 (0, routing, required),
9378 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9379 (4, payment_hash, required),
9380 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9381 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9382 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9383 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9387 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9388 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9390 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9392 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9393 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9394 reason.write(writer)?;
9396 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9397 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9400 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9401 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9402 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9403 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9410 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9411 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9412 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9415 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9416 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9417 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9418 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9422 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9423 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9424 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9425 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9426 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9429 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9430 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9431 // messages contained in the variants.
9432 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9433 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9434 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9436 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9437 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9438 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9439 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9440 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9443 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9444 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9445 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9446 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9447 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9449 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9454 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9459 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9460 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9461 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9462 (2, outpoint, required),
9463 (4, htlc_id, required),
9464 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9465 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9468 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9469 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9470 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9471 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9472 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9474 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9475 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9476 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9477 (2, self.value, required),
9478 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9479 (4, payment_data, option),
9480 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9481 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9482 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9483 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9489 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9490 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9491 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9492 (0, prev_hop, required),
9493 (1, total_msat, option),
9494 (2, value_ser, required),
9495 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9496 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9497 (5, total_value_received, option),
9498 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9499 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9500 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9502 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9503 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9504 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9506 if payment_data.is_some() {
9507 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9509 if total_msat.is_none() {
9510 total_msat = Some(value);
9512 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9515 if total_msat.is_none() {
9516 if payment_data.is_none() {
9517 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9519 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9521 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9525 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9528 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9529 total_value_received,
9530 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9532 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9533 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9538 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9539 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9540 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9543 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9544 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9545 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9546 let mut payment_id = None;
9547 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9548 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9549 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9550 (0, session_priv, required),
9551 (1, payment_id, option),
9552 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9553 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9554 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9555 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9557 if payment_id.is_none() {
9558 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9560 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9562 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9563 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9564 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9566 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9567 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9568 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9569 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9573 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9574 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9575 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9577 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9580 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9581 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9586 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9587 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9589 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9591 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9592 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9593 (0, session_priv, required),
9594 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9595 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9596 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9597 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9598 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9599 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9602 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9604 field.write(writer)?;
9611 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9612 (0, forward_info, required),
9613 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9614 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9615 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9616 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9619 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9621 (0, htlc_id, required),
9622 (2, err_packet, required),
9627 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9628 (0, payment_secret, required),
9629 (2, expiry_time, required),
9630 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9631 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9632 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9635 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9637 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9638 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9639 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9640 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9641 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9642 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9646 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9647 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9649 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9651 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9653 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9654 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9655 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9658 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9660 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9661 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9662 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9663 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9664 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9665 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9666 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9669 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9670 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9674 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9676 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9677 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9678 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9679 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9680 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9681 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9684 channel.write(writer)?;
9690 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9691 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9692 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9693 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9694 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9695 for forward in pending_forwards {
9696 forward.write(writer)?;
9701 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9703 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9704 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9705 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9707 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9708 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9709 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9710 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9711 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9712 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9713 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9714 htlc.write(writer)?;
9716 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9717 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9720 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9721 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9722 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9723 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9724 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9725 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9726 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9729 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9730 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9731 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9732 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9733 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9735 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9736 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9737 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9738 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9739 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9740 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9741 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9746 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9747 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9748 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9749 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9750 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9751 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9752 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9753 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9754 0u64.write(writer)?;
9756 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9757 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9758 event.write(writer)?;
9762 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9763 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9764 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9765 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9766 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9767 0u64.write(writer)?;
9769 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9770 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9771 // likely to be identical.
9772 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9773 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9775 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9776 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9777 hash.write(writer)?;
9778 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9781 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9782 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9783 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9784 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9785 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9788 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9789 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9791 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9792 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9793 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9794 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9797 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9798 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9799 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9800 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9804 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9805 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9806 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9808 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9809 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9810 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9816 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9817 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9818 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9819 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9822 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9823 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9824 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9825 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9826 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9829 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9830 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9831 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9832 if !updates.is_empty() {
9833 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9834 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9839 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9840 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9841 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9842 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9843 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9844 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9845 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9846 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9847 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9848 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9849 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9850 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9851 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9858 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9859 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9860 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9861 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9864 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9865 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9866 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9867 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9868 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9869 // check that the event is sane here.
9870 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9871 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9872 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9873 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9879 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9880 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9881 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9882 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9883 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9884 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9887 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9888 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9889 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9890 events.push_back((ev, action));
9891 } else if action.is_some() {
9892 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9899 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9900 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9901 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9902 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9903 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9904 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9907 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9909 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9911 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9912 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9913 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9914 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9915 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9916 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9917 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9918 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9919 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9920 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9921 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9922 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9923 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9925 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9926 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9928 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9929 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9931 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9932 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9933 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9934 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9935 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9936 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9938 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9939 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9941 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9942 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9943 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9944 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9945 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9946 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9950 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9951 pub entropy_source: ES,
9953 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9954 pub node_signer: NS,
9956 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9957 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9959 pub signer_provider: SP,
9961 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9963 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9964 pub fee_estimator: F,
9965 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9967 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9968 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9969 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9970 pub chain_monitor: M,
9972 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9973 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9974 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9975 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9976 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9977 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9979 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9981 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9982 /// deserialization.
9984 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9985 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9986 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9988 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9989 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9991 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9992 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9993 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9994 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9996 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9999 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10000 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
10003 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10004 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10006 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10007 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10008 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10009 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10010 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10011 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10015 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10016 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10017 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10018 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10019 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
10021 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10022 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10027 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10028 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10029 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10030 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10032 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10033 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10034 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10035 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10036 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10037 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10041 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10042 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10043 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10047 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10048 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10050 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10051 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10052 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10053 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10054 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10055 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10059 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10060 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10062 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10063 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10064 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10066 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10068 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10069 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10070 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10071 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10072 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10073 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10074 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10075 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10076 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10077 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10079 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10080 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10081 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10082 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10083 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10084 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10085 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10086 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10087 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10088 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10089 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10090 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10091 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10093 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10094 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10095 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10097 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10098 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10099 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10101 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10102 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10103 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10105 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10106 if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10107 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10109 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
10110 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10111 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10114 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
10115 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10116 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10117 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10118 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10119 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10120 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10122 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10123 let mut found_htlc = false;
10124 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10125 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10128 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10129 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10130 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10131 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10132 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10133 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10134 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10135 log_info!(args.logger,
10136 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10137 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10138 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10142 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10143 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10144 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10145 channel.context.update_holder_per_commitment_point(&args.logger);
10146 channel.context.update_holder_commitment_secret(&args.logger);
10147 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10148 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10150 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10151 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10153 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10154 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10155 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10156 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10158 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10159 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10160 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10161 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10165 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10166 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10167 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10168 // safely discard the channel.
10169 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10170 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10171 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10172 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10173 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10174 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10175 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10178 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10179 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10180 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10181 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10182 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10183 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10187 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10188 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10189 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10190 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10191 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10192 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10193 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10195 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10199 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10200 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10201 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10202 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10203 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10204 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10205 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10206 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10207 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10209 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10212 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10213 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10214 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10215 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10216 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10217 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10218 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10219 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10221 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10224 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10227 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10228 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10229 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10230 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10231 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10232 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10233 is_connected: false,
10237 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10238 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10239 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10240 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10241 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10242 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10243 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10244 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10247 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10248 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10249 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10250 for _ in 0..event_count {
10251 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10252 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10257 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10258 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10259 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10261 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10262 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10263 // on-startup monitor updates.
10264 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10265 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10267 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10271 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10272 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10274 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10275 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10276 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10277 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10278 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10282 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10283 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10284 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10285 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10286 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10287 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10288 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10290 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10291 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10295 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10296 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10297 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10298 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10299 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10300 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10301 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10302 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10303 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10304 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10305 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10306 let mut events_override = None;
10307 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10308 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10309 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10310 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10311 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10312 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10313 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10314 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10315 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10316 (8, events_override, option),
10317 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10318 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10319 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10320 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10322 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10323 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10326 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10327 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10330 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10331 pending_events_read = events;
10334 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10335 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10338 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10339 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10340 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10341 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10342 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10343 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10345 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10347 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10348 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10349 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10352 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10353 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10354 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10355 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10356 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10358 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10359 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10360 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10362 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10363 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10364 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10365 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10366 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10368 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10369 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10370 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10371 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10372 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10373 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10374 pending_background_events.push(
10375 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10376 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10377 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10378 update: update.clone(),
10381 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10382 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10383 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10384 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10385 pending_background_events.push(
10386 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10387 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10388 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10391 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10392 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10393 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10395 max_in_flight_update_id
10399 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10400 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10401 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10402 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10403 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10404 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10406 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10407 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10408 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10409 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10410 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10411 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10412 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10413 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10414 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10417 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10418 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10419 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10420 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10421 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10422 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10423 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10424 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10425 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10426 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10427 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10430 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10431 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10432 debug_assert!(false);
10433 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10438 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10439 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10440 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10441 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10442 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10443 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10444 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10445 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10447 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10448 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10449 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10451 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10452 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10453 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10454 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10455 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10456 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10457 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10458 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10463 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10464 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10466 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10467 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10468 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10469 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10472 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10473 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10474 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10475 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10476 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10477 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10478 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10480 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10481 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10482 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10483 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10484 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10485 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10486 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10487 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10490 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10491 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10492 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10493 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10494 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10495 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10496 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10497 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10499 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10500 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10501 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10502 retry_strategy: None,
10503 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10504 payment_params: None,
10505 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10506 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10507 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10508 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10509 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10510 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10511 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10512 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10513 total_msat: path_amt,
10514 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10515 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10517 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10518 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10523 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10524 match htlc_source {
10525 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10526 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10527 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10528 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10530 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10531 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10532 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10533 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10534 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10535 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10536 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10537 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10538 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10539 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10540 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10545 !forwards.is_empty()
10547 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10548 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10549 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10550 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10551 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10552 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10553 intercepted_id != ev_id
10560 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10561 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10562 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10563 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10564 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10565 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10566 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10567 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10568 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10569 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10570 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10572 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10573 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10574 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10576 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10577 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10578 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10585 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10586 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10588 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10590 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10591 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10592 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10593 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10594 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10595 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10596 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10597 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10598 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10599 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10602 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10603 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10604 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10605 // channel still live case here.
10609 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10610 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10615 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10616 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10617 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10618 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10619 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10620 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10621 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10622 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10626 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10627 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10629 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10630 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10631 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10632 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10634 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10635 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10636 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10638 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10639 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10641 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10642 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10644 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10647 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10648 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10649 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10651 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10655 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10656 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10657 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10658 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10659 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10661 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10662 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10663 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10664 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10665 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10666 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10667 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10668 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10670 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10671 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10675 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10677 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10679 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10680 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10682 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10683 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10688 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10689 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10691 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10693 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10695 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10696 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10697 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10698 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10702 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10703 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10704 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10705 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10706 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10707 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10708 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10709 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10711 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10712 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10713 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10715 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10716 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10717 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10718 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10719 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10720 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10722 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10723 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10724 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10725 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10726 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10727 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10731 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10732 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10733 debug_assert!(false);
10734 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10739 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10741 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10742 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10743 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10744 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10745 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10746 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10747 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10748 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10749 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10750 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10751 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10753 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10754 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10756 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10757 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10758 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10759 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10761 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10762 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10763 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10764 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10766 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10767 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10768 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10769 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10771 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10772 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10773 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10774 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10775 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10776 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10777 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10780 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10781 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10784 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10787 purpose: payment.purpose,
10788 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10789 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10790 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10796 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10797 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10798 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10799 for action in actions.iter() {
10800 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10801 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10802 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10804 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10805 log_trace!(args.logger,
10806 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10807 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10808 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10809 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10810 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10812 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10813 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10814 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10815 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10819 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10820 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10824 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10826 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10827 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10831 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10833 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10834 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10835 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10836 router: args.router,
10838 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10840 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10841 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10842 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10843 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10845 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10846 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10847 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10848 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10849 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10850 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10852 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10854 our_network_pubkey,
10857 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10859 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10861 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10862 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10863 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10864 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10865 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10867 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10868 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10870 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10872 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10874 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10875 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10876 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10878 logger: args.logger,
10879 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10882 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10883 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10884 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10885 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10886 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10889 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10890 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10891 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10892 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10893 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10894 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10897 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10898 //connection or two.
10900 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10906 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10907 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10908 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10909 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10910 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10911 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10912 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10913 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10914 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10915 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10916 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10917 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10918 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10919 use crate::util::test_utils;
10920 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10921 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10924 fn test_notify_limits() {
10925 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10926 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10927 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10928 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10929 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10930 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10932 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10933 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10934 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10935 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10936 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10938 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10940 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10941 // to connect messages with new values
10942 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10943 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10944 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10945 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10946 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10947 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10949 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10950 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10951 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10952 // ... but the last node should not.
10953 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10954 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10955 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10956 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10958 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10959 // about the channel.
10960 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10961 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10962 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10964 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10966 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10967 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10968 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10969 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10970 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10971 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10973 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10974 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10975 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10977 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10978 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10979 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10980 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10981 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10982 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10984 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10985 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10986 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10987 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10988 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10989 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10990 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10991 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10993 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10994 // the channel info has updated.
10995 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10996 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10997 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10998 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10999 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11000 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11004 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11005 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11007 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11008 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11009 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11010 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11011 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11013 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11014 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11015 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11016 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11018 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11019 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11020 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11021 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11022 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11023 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11024 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11025 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11027 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11028 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11029 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11031 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11032 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11033 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11035 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11036 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11037 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11038 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11039 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11041 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11042 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11043 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11045 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11046 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11047 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11048 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11049 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11050 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11051 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11052 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11053 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11055 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11056 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11057 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11059 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11060 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11061 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11063 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11064 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11065 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11066 // lightning messages manually.
11067 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11068 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11071 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11072 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11073 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11074 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11076 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11077 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11079 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11080 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11082 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11083 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11084 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11086 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11087 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11088 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11090 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11092 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11094 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11095 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11098 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11099 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11100 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11101 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11103 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11104 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11105 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11106 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11108 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11111 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11112 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11113 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11114 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11116 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11121 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11122 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11123 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11126 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11127 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11128 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11129 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11130 // fails as expected.
11131 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11132 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11133 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11134 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11135 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11136 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11137 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11138 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11139 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11140 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11141 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11142 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11143 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11144 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11145 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11147 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11148 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11149 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11151 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11152 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11153 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11154 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11155 let route = find_route(
11156 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11157 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11159 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11160 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11162 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11163 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11164 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11165 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11166 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11168 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11169 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11170 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11171 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11172 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11174 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11175 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11176 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11177 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11178 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11179 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11180 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11181 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11182 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11184 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11185 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11187 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11188 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11189 let route = find_route(
11190 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11191 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11193 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11194 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11196 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11197 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11198 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11199 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11200 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11202 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11203 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11204 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11205 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11207 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11208 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11209 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11210 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11211 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11213 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11214 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11215 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11217 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11218 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11219 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11220 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11221 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11222 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11223 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11224 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11225 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11227 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11228 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11230 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11231 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11232 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11233 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11235 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11236 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11237 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11238 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11239 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11241 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11242 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11243 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11246 let route = find_route(
11247 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11248 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11250 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11251 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11252 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11254 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11255 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11256 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11257 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11258 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11260 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11261 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11262 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11264 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11265 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11266 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11267 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11268 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11269 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11270 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11271 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11272 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11274 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11275 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11279 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11280 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11281 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11282 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11283 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11284 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11285 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11287 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11288 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11290 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11291 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11292 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11293 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11294 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11295 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11296 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11297 let route = find_route(
11298 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11299 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11302 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11303 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11304 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11305 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11306 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11307 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11310 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11311 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11312 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11313 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11314 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11315 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11316 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11318 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11322 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11323 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11324 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11325 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11326 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11327 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11328 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11329 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11330 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11332 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11333 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11335 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11336 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11337 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11338 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11339 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11340 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11341 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11342 let route = find_route(
11343 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11344 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11347 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11348 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11349 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
11350 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11351 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11352 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11353 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11354 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11357 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11358 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11359 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11360 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11361 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11362 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11363 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11365 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11369 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11370 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11373 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11375 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11376 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11377 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11378 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11380 // Marshall an MPP route.
11381 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11382 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11383 route.paths.push(path);
11384 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11385 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11386 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11387 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11388 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11389 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11391 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11392 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11394 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11395 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11397 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11402 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11403 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11404 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11405 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11406 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11408 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11410 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11411 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11413 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11414 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11416 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11419 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11420 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11421 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11422 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11423 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11424 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11427 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11430 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11431 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11436 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11437 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11438 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11439 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11440 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11441 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11443 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11444 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11446 total_msat: 100_000,
11449 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11450 // payment verification fails as expected.
11451 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11452 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11453 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11454 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11456 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11460 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11461 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11465 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11466 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11467 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11468 // the channel is successfully closed.
11469 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11470 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11471 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11472 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11474 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11475 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11476 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11477 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11478 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11480 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11481 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
11483 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11484 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11485 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11486 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11489 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11491 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11492 // as it has the funding transaction.
11493 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11494 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11495 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11498 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11500 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11502 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11504 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11505 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11506 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11508 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11511 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11512 // as it has the funding transaction.
11513 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11514 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11515 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11518 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11519 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11521 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11522 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11523 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11524 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11526 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11527 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11528 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11529 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11531 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11532 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11534 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11535 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11536 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11537 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11538 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11539 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11540 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11544 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11545 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11546 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11547 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11548 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11549 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11550 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11553 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11555 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11556 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11557 // closing transaction).
11558 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11559 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11560 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11562 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11563 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11564 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11565 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11566 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11569 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11571 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11573 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11574 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11575 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11577 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11579 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11580 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11583 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11584 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11585 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11588 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11589 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11590 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11593 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11594 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11595 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11598 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11599 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11600 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11603 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11605 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11606 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11608 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11609 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11611 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11612 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11617 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11618 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11619 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11620 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11621 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11622 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11623 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11624 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11627 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11628 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11629 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11631 // Test the API functions.
11632 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
11634 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11636 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11638 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11640 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11642 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11644 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11648 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11649 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11650 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11651 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11652 // the given `channel_id`.
11653 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11654 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11655 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11656 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11658 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11661 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11663 // Test the API functions.
11664 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11666 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11668 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11670 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11672 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11674 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11678 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11679 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11683 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11685 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11687 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11688 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11690 let mut funding_tx = None;
11691 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11692 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11693 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11696 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11697 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11698 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11699 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11700 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11702 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11704 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11706 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11708 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11710 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11712 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11715 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11716 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11717 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11718 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11719 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11721 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11722 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11724 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11725 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11726 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11727 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11728 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11729 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11730 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11733 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11734 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11735 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11736 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11737 }, true).unwrap_err();
11739 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11740 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11741 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11742 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11743 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11744 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11745 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11747 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11748 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11750 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11751 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11752 }, true).unwrap_err();
11754 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11755 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11756 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11757 }, false).unwrap();
11758 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11760 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11761 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11763 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11764 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11765 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11766 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11767 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11769 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11770 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11771 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11773 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11774 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11775 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11777 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11778 // "protected" and can connect again.
11779 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11780 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11781 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11783 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11785 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11787 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11788 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11792 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11793 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11794 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11796 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11797 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11799 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11801 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11802 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11804 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11805 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11806 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11807 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11810 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11812 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11813 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11814 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11816 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11817 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11818 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11820 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11821 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11822 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11823 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11827 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11828 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11829 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11830 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11831 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11832 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11833 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11834 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11835 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11837 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11839 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11840 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11842 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11843 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11844 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11845 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11846 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11847 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11850 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11851 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11853 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11854 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11856 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11858 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11859 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11862 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11863 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11864 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11865 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11866 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11868 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11869 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11871 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11872 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11873 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11874 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11880 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11881 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11883 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11884 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11885 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11887 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11888 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11890 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11892 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11896 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11897 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11898 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11899 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11900 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11901 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11902 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11903 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11905 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11906 payment_metadata: None,
11907 keysend_preimage: None,
11908 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11909 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11911 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11913 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11914 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11915 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11916 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11917 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11919 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11920 } else { panic!(); }
11922 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11923 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11925 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11926 payment_metadata: None,
11927 keysend_preimage: None,
11928 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11929 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11931 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11933 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11934 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11938 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11939 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11940 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11941 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11942 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11944 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11946 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11947 payment_metadata: None,
11948 keysend_preimage: None,
11949 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11950 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11952 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11953 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11955 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11956 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11957 // is not satisfied.
11958 assert!(result.is_ok());
11962 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11963 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11964 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11965 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11966 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11968 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11969 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11971 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11972 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11973 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11974 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11975 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11977 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11978 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11980 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11981 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11982 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11983 match &msg_events[0] {
11984 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11985 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11987 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11988 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11989 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11992 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11995 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11996 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11998 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11999 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12002 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12006 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12007 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12008 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12009 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12010 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12011 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12012 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12013 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12014 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12015 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12016 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12018 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
12019 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12020 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12022 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12023 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12025 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12026 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12031 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12032 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12034 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12035 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12037 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12038 // not have generated any events.
12039 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12043 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12044 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12045 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12046 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12047 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12048 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12049 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12050 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12052 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12053 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12054 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12056 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12057 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12058 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12059 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12060 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12062 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12063 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12066 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12067 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12068 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12070 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12071 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12072 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12073 ..Default::default()
12075 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12076 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12077 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12079 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12080 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12083 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12084 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12085 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12086 ..Default::default()
12088 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12089 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12090 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12091 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12093 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12094 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12097 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12098 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12099 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12100 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12101 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12104 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12105 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12106 ..Default::default()
12108 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12111 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12112 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12113 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12114 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12118 fn test_payment_display() {
12119 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12120 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12121 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12122 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12123 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12124 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12128 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12129 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12130 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12131 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12132 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12133 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12135 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12136 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12137 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12138 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12139 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12140 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12141 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12142 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12144 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12145 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12146 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12149 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12150 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12152 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12153 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12155 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12156 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12157 }, false).unwrap();
12158 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12159 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12160 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12162 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12164 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12165 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12166 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12167 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12168 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12169 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12170 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12171 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12172 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12173 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12174 } else { panic!() };
12175 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12176 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12177 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12178 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12180 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12182 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12183 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12184 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12191 use crate::chain::Listen;
12192 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12193 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12194 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12195 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12196 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12197 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12198 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12199 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12200 use crate::util::test_utils;
12201 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12203 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12204 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12205 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
12207 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12209 use criterion::Criterion;
12211 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12212 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12213 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12214 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12215 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12216 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12217 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12219 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12220 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12222 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12223 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12225 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12227 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12230 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12231 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12234 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12235 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12236 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12238 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12239 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12241 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12242 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12243 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12244 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12245 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12247 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12248 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12249 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12251 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12252 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12253 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12254 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12256 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12257 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12258 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12260 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12261 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12262 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12263 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12264 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12266 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12267 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12268 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12270 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12271 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12273 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12274 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12275 }, false).unwrap();
12276 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
12277 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12278 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12281 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12282 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12283 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12285 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12286 } else { panic!(); }
12288 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12289 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12290 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12291 match events_b[0] {
12292 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12293 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12295 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12298 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12299 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12300 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12301 match events_a[0] {
12302 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12303 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12305 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12308 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12310 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12311 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12312 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12314 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12315 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12316 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12317 match msg_events[0] {
12318 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12319 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12320 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12324 match msg_events[1] {
12325 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12329 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12330 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12331 match events_a[0] {
12332 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12333 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12338 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12339 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12340 match events_b[0] {
12341 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12342 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12344 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12347 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12348 macro_rules! send_payment {
12349 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12350 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12351 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12352 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12353 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12354 payment_count += 1;
12355 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
12356 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12358 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12359 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12360 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12361 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12362 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12363 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12364 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12365 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12366 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12367 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12368 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12370 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12371 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12372 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12373 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12375 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12376 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12377 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12378 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12379 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12381 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12384 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12385 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12386 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12387 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12389 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12393 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12394 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12395 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);