1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
69 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
74 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
75 use core::time::Duration;
78 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
79 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry};
81 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
84 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
85 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
88 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
89 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
90 // before we forward it.
92 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
93 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
94 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
95 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
96 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
102 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
103 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
104 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
113 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
119 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
120 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
121 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
122 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
123 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
124 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
129 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
130 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
136 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
137 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
141 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
143 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
144 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
145 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
149 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
151 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
152 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
156 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
163 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
164 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
165 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
166 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
167 short_channel_id: u64,
169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
170 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
173 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
178 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
180 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
181 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
182 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
185 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
189 struct ClaimableHTLC {
190 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
192 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
194 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
196 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
200 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
205 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
206 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
211 impl Readable for PaymentId {
212 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
213 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
218 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
219 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
220 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
221 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
223 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
224 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
229 impl Readable for InterceptId {
230 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
231 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
235 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
236 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
237 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
238 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
239 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
242 session_priv: SecretKey,
243 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
244 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
245 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
246 payment_id: PaymentId,
247 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
248 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
249 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
250 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
252 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
255 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
256 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
257 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
259 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
261 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
263 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
266 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
267 payment_id.hash(hasher);
268 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
269 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
270 payment_params.hash(hasher);
275 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
278 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
279 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
281 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
282 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
283 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
284 payment_secret: None,
285 payment_params: None,
290 struct ReceiveError {
296 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
297 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
299 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
300 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
301 pub enum FailureCode {
302 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
303 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
304 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
305 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
306 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
307 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
308 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
309 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
310 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
311 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
312 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
315 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
317 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
318 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
319 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
320 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
321 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
323 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
324 err: msgs::LightningError,
325 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
326 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
328 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
330 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
332 err: LightningError {
334 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
335 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
342 shutdown_finish: None,
346 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
348 err: LightningError {
350 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
353 shutdown_finish: None,
357 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
358 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
361 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
363 err: LightningError {
365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
373 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
377 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
380 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
382 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
383 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
387 log_level: Level::Warn,
390 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
392 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
394 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
396 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
397 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
405 shutdown_finish: None,
410 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
411 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
412 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
413 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
414 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
416 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
417 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
418 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
419 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
420 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
421 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
422 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
424 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
428 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
429 struct ClaimingPayment {
431 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
432 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
434 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
435 (0, amount_msat, required),
436 (2, payment_purpose, required),
437 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
440 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
441 struct ClaimablePayments {
442 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
443 /// failed/claimed by the user.
445 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
446 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
448 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
449 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
450 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
452 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
453 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
454 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
455 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
458 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
459 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
460 /// quite some time lag.
461 enum BackgroundEvent {
462 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
463 /// commitment transaction.
464 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
467 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
468 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
469 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
470 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
471 /// event can be generated.
472 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
473 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
474 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
477 /// State we hold per-peer.
478 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
479 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
481 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
482 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
484 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
485 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
486 latest_features: InitFeatures,
487 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
488 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
489 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
490 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
491 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
492 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
496 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
497 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
498 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
499 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
500 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
501 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
504 self.channel_by_id.len() == 0
508 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
509 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
511 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
514 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
515 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
516 struct PendingInboundPayment {
517 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
518 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
519 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
520 /// this payment being removed.
522 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
523 user_payment_id: u64,
524 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
525 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
526 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
529 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
530 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
531 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
532 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
533 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
534 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
535 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
537 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
538 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
546 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
548 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
553 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
554 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
555 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
556 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
557 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
558 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
559 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
560 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
562 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
563 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
565 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
566 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
568 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
569 /// to individual Channels.
571 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
572 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
573 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
574 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
576 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
577 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
578 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
579 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
580 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
581 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
582 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
584 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
585 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
586 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
587 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
590 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
591 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
592 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
593 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
594 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
596 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
597 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
598 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
599 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
600 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
603 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
604 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
605 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
606 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
607 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
611 // `total_consistency_lock`
613 // |__`forward_htlcs`
615 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
617 // |__`per_peer_state`
619 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
621 // | |__`claimable_payments`
623 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
629 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
631 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
635 // | |__`pending_events`
637 // | |__`pending_background_events`
639 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
641 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
642 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
643 ES::Target: EntropySource,
644 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
645 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
646 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
650 default_configuration: UserConfig,
651 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
652 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
658 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
660 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
662 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
663 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
665 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
666 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
667 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
668 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
670 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
671 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
673 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
674 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
675 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
676 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
677 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
678 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
679 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
680 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
682 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
684 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
685 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
687 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
689 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
690 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
691 /// and via the classic SCID.
693 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
694 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
696 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
698 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
700 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
701 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
702 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
704 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
705 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
707 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
708 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
710 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
711 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
713 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
714 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
715 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
716 /// active channel list on load.
718 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
719 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
721 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
723 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
724 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
725 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
727 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
728 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
729 /// the handling of the events.
731 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
732 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
735 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
736 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
737 /// would break backwards compatability.
738 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
739 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
740 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
742 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
743 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
745 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
747 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
748 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
749 /// confirmation depth.
751 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
752 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
753 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
755 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
757 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
759 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
761 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
763 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
765 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
766 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
767 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
769 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
770 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
772 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
773 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
774 /// keeping additional state.
775 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
777 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
778 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
779 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
780 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
782 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
783 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
785 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
786 /// are currently open with that peer.
788 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
789 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
792 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
794 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
795 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
796 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
797 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
798 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
800 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
801 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
802 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
803 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
804 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
805 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
806 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
807 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
808 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
809 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
810 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
812 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
821 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
823 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
824 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
825 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
826 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
827 pub struct ChainParameters {
828 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
829 pub network: Network,
831 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
833 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
834 pub best_block: BestBlock,
837 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
843 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
844 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
845 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
846 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
847 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
848 /// updates are ready for persistence).
850 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
851 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
852 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
853 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
854 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
856 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
857 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
860 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
861 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
862 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
865 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
866 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
868 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
869 persistence_notifier: notifier,
870 should_persist: persist_check,
871 _read_guard: read_guard,
876 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
878 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
879 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
884 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
885 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
887 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
889 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
890 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
891 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
892 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
893 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
895 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
896 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
898 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
900 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
901 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
902 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
903 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
904 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
905 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
906 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
907 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
908 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
909 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
910 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
911 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
912 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
914 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
915 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
917 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
918 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
919 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
920 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
922 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
923 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
924 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
925 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
926 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
927 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
930 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
932 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
933 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
936 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
938 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
939 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
941 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
942 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
943 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
944 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
946 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
947 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
948 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
949 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
950 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
951 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
952 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
953 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
954 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
955 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
956 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
959 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
960 /// to better separate parameters.
961 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
962 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
963 /// The node_id of our counterparty
964 pub node_id: PublicKey,
965 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
966 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
967 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
968 pub features: InitFeatures,
969 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
970 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
971 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
973 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
975 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
976 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
977 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
978 /// payments to us through this channel.
979 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
980 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
981 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
982 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
983 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
984 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
985 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
988 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
989 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
990 pub struct ChannelDetails {
991 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
992 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
993 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
994 /// lifetime of the channel.
995 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
996 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
997 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
998 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
999 /// our counterparty already.
1001 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1002 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1003 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1004 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1006 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1007 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1008 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1009 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1011 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1012 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1014 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1015 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1017 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1018 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1019 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1020 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1021 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1022 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1023 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1024 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1025 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1028 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1030 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1031 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1032 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1033 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1034 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1035 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1036 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1038 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1039 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1041 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1042 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1043 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1044 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1045 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1046 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1047 /// this value on chain.
1049 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1051 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1053 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1054 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1055 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1056 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1058 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1059 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1060 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1061 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1063 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1064 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1065 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1066 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1068 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1069 pub balance_msat: u64,
1070 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1071 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1072 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1073 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1075 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1077 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1078 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1079 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1080 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1081 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1082 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1083 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1084 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1086 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1087 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1088 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1089 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1090 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1091 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1092 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1094 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1095 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1096 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1097 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1098 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1099 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1100 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1101 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1102 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1104 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1106 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1107 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1108 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1109 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1110 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1112 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1113 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1114 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1115 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1116 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1117 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1118 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1120 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1121 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1122 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1123 pub is_outbound: bool,
1124 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1125 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1126 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1127 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1128 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1130 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1131 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1132 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1133 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1135 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1136 pub is_usable: bool,
1137 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1138 pub is_public: bool,
1139 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1140 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1141 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1142 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1143 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1144 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1146 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1147 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1150 impl ChannelDetails {
1151 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1152 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1153 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1155 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1156 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1157 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1158 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1161 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1162 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1163 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1165 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1166 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1167 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1168 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1172 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1173 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1174 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1175 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1176 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1178 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1180 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1181 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1182 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1185 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1186 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1187 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1189 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1190 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1191 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1193 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1194 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1195 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1197 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1198 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1202 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1204 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1206 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1207 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1208 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1209 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1211 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1212 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1213 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1216 macro_rules! handle_error {
1217 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1220 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1221 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1222 // entering the macro.
1223 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1224 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1226 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1228 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1229 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1230 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1231 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1235 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1236 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1237 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1238 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1243 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1244 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1246 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1247 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1248 action: err.action.clone()
1252 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1253 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1254 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1255 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1256 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1260 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1267 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1268 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1269 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1270 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1271 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1272 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1274 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1275 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1276 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1277 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1278 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1280 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1281 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1283 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1287 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1288 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1289 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1291 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1292 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1294 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1295 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1297 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1298 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1299 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1300 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1301 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1302 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1308 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1309 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1313 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1315 $entry.remove_entry();
1323 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1324 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1328 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1330 $entry.remove_entry();
1338 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1339 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1341 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1342 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1348 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1349 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1351 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1352 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1353 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1354 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1355 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1356 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1357 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1358 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1359 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1360 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1361 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1362 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1363 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1364 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1367 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1368 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1369 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1370 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1371 match $action_type {
1372 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1373 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1375 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1376 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1378 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1379 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1380 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1381 if !$resend_commitment {
1382 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1385 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1387 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1388 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1390 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1395 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1396 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1398 $entry.remove_entry();
1402 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1403 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1404 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1406 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1407 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1409 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1410 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1412 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1413 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1415 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1416 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1420 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1421 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1422 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1423 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1424 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1426 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1427 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1428 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1429 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1430 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1431 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1432 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1433 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1434 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1435 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1440 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1441 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1442 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1444 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1445 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1446 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1447 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1448 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1449 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1452 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1457 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1459 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1460 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1461 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1462 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1463 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1464 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1468 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1470 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1471 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1473 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1475 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1476 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1477 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1478 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1479 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1480 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1481 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1482 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1484 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1485 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1486 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1491 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1493 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1494 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1495 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1496 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1497 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1498 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1499 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1500 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1502 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1505 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1506 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1508 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1510 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1512 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1514 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1515 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1516 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1517 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1527 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1528 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1529 &self.default_configuration
1532 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1533 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1534 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1537 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1538 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1540 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1542 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1546 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1551 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1553 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1554 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1555 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1556 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1557 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1559 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1560 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1562 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1563 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1564 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1566 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1567 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1568 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1569 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1570 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1571 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1573 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1574 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1575 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1576 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1577 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1578 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1581 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1582 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1583 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1585 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1587 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1588 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1590 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1592 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1593 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1594 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1595 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1596 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1597 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1601 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1606 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1608 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1609 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1610 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1612 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1614 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1617 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1620 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1621 node_id: their_network_key,
1624 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1627 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1628 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1629 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1630 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1631 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1632 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1633 // the same channel.
1634 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1636 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1637 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1638 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1639 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1640 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1641 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1642 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1643 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1644 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1645 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1646 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1647 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1648 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1649 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1650 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1651 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1652 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1653 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1654 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1655 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1656 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1657 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1658 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1659 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1661 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1662 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1663 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1664 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1665 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1666 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1667 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1668 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1669 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1670 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1671 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1672 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1673 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1674 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1675 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1676 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1677 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1678 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1679 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1680 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1681 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1682 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1683 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1684 config: Some(channel.config()),
1692 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1693 /// more information.
1694 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1695 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1698 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1699 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1701 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1702 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1705 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1706 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1707 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1708 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1709 // really wanted anyway.
1710 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1713 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1714 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1716 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1717 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1718 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1720 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1721 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1722 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1723 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1724 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1725 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1726 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1727 total_msat: *total_msat,
1730 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1731 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1733 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1734 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1736 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1741 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1742 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1743 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1744 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1745 Some(transaction) => {
1746 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1750 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1751 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1752 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1753 reason: closure_reason
1757 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1758 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1760 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1761 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1762 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1764 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1765 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1767 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1768 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1769 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1771 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1772 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1774 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1775 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1776 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
1777 let (result, is_permanent) =
1778 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1780 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1785 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1786 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1790 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1791 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1792 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1793 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1797 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1801 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1805 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1806 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1807 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1808 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1811 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1815 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1816 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1817 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1819 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1820 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1822 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1823 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1824 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1825 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1827 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1829 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1830 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1831 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1832 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1833 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1836 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1837 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1838 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1840 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1841 /// the channel being closed or not:
1842 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1843 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1844 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1845 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1846 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1847 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1848 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1850 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1852 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1853 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1854 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1855 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1856 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1860 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1861 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1862 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1863 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1864 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1865 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1866 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1867 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1869 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1870 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1871 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1872 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1873 // ignore the result here.
1874 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1878 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1879 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1880 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1881 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1883 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1884 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1886 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1887 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1888 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1889 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1890 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1892 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1894 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1896 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1899 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1900 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1901 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1902 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1903 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1908 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1911 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1913 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1914 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1915 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1916 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1917 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1918 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
1919 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1920 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1921 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1922 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1933 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1934 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1935 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1937 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1938 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1939 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1942 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1943 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1944 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1946 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1947 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1948 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1949 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1950 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1953 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1954 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1955 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1956 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1957 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1961 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1962 /// local transaction(s).
1963 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1964 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1965 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1969 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1970 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1972 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1973 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1974 return Err(ReceiveError {
1975 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1977 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1980 // final_expiry_too_soon
1981 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1982 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1984 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1985 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1986 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1987 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1988 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1989 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
1990 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
1991 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
1992 return Err(ReceiveError {
1993 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
1994 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1997 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1998 return Err(ReceiveError {
2000 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2001 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2005 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2006 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2007 return Err(ReceiveError {
2008 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2009 err_data: Vec::new(),
2010 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2013 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2014 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2015 return Err(ReceiveError {
2016 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2017 err_data: Vec::new(),
2018 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2020 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2021 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2023 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2024 phantom_shared_secret,
2026 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2027 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2028 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2029 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2030 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2031 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2032 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2033 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2034 return Err(ReceiveError {
2035 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2036 err_data: Vec::new(),
2037 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2041 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2043 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2046 return Err(ReceiveError {
2047 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2048 err_data: Vec::new(),
2049 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2054 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2057 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2058 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2059 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2060 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2064 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2065 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2066 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2068 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2069 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2070 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2071 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2072 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2073 failure_code: $err_code,
2079 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2080 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2083 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2084 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2085 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2087 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2088 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2089 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2090 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2091 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2092 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2093 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2094 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2096 macro_rules! return_err {
2097 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2099 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2100 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2101 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2102 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2103 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2104 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2110 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2112 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2113 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2115 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2116 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2120 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2121 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2123 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2125 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2126 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2127 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2128 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2129 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2131 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2134 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2135 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2136 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2138 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2139 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2140 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2143 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2144 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2145 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2146 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2150 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2151 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2152 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2155 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2156 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2157 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2158 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2159 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2164 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2165 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2166 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2167 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2168 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2169 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2170 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2171 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2172 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2173 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2174 // phantom or an intercept.
2175 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2176 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2177 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2181 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2184 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2186 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2187 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2188 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2189 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2190 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2192 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2193 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2194 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2196 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2197 // have no consistency guarantees.
2198 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2202 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2203 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2204 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2205 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2206 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2208 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2209 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2210 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2211 // we don't have the channel here.
2212 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2214 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2216 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2217 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2218 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2219 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2220 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2221 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2222 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2224 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2225 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2227 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2228 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2232 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2233 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2234 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2235 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2237 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2244 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2245 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2246 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2247 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2248 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2249 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2251 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2252 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2254 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2255 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2256 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2257 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2258 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2259 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2260 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2261 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2262 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2263 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2269 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2270 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2271 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2272 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2274 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2275 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2277 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2278 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2279 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2281 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2282 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2283 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2284 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2285 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2286 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2287 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2291 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2296 pending_forward_info
2299 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2300 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2301 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2303 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2304 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2305 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2306 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2307 if !chan.should_announce() {
2308 return Err(LightningError {
2309 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2310 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2313 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2314 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2316 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2317 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2320 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2321 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2322 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2323 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2325 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2326 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2327 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2328 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2330 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2331 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2335 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2337 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2338 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2339 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2341 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2342 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2344 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2345 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2346 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2347 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2348 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2349 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2350 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2351 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2353 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2354 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2355 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2357 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2359 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2365 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2366 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2368 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2369 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2371 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2372 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2373 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2374 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2375 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2377 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2379 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2381 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2382 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2383 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2384 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2387 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2388 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2389 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" })?;
2390 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2391 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2392 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2394 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2395 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2397 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2398 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2400 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2401 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2403 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2404 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2405 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2408 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2409 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
2410 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2412 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2413 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2415 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2416 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2417 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2418 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2419 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2420 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2421 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2422 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2423 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2424 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2426 _ => unreachable!(),
2429 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2430 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2431 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2432 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2433 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2434 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2435 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2436 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2445 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2446 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2447 // `channel_by_id` map.
2448 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2449 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2454 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2455 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2457 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2462 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2464 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2465 /// fields for more info.
2467 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2468 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2470 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2472 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2473 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2474 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2475 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2476 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2478 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2479 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2480 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2481 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2482 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2484 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2485 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2486 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2487 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2489 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2491 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2492 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2493 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2495 /// In general, a path may raise:
2496 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2497 /// node public key) is specified.
2498 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2499 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2501 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2502 /// relevant updates.
2504 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2505 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2506 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2508 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2510 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2511 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2512 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2513 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2514 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2516 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2517 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2518 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2520 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2521 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2522 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2523 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2524 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2525 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2526 self.pending_outbound_payments
2527 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2528 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2529 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2532 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2533 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2534 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2535 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2536 self.pending_outbound_payments
2537 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2538 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2539 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2540 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2541 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2545 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2546 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2547 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2548 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2549 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2553 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2554 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2555 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2559 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2560 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2561 /// retries are exhausted.
2563 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2564 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2566 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2567 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2568 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2570 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2571 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2573 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2574 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2575 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2576 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2577 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2580 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2581 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2582 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2583 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2584 /// never reach the recipient.
2586 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2587 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2589 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2590 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2592 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2594 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2595 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2596 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2597 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2598 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2600 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2601 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2604 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2605 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2607 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2610 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2611 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2612 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2613 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2614 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2615 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2617 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2618 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2621 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2622 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2623 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2624 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2625 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2626 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2627 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2628 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2631 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2634 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2635 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2638 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2639 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2640 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2641 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2642 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2643 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2644 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2645 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2647 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2648 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2651 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2653 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2655 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2656 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2657 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2658 } else { unreachable!(); })
2661 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2664 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2665 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2668 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2669 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2674 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2675 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2678 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2679 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2680 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2682 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2683 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2684 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2685 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2694 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2695 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2696 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2700 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2702 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2703 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2705 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2706 /// across the p2p network.
2708 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2709 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2711 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2712 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2713 /// keys per-channel).
2715 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2716 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2717 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2719 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2720 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2721 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2723 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2724 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2725 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2726 /// for more details.
2728 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2729 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2730 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2731 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2733 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2734 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2735 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2736 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2741 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2742 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2743 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2744 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2745 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2746 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2747 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2751 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2752 let mut output_index = None;
2753 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2754 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2755 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2756 if output_index.is_some() {
2757 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2758 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2761 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2762 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2763 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2766 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2769 if output_index.is_none() {
2770 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2771 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2774 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2778 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2780 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2781 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2782 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2783 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2785 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2786 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2788 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2789 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2791 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2793 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2794 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2795 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2796 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2797 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2798 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2799 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2800 pub fn update_channel_config(
2801 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2802 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2803 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2804 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2805 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2809 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2810 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2812 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2813 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2814 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2815 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2816 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2817 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2818 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2819 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2820 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2824 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2825 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2826 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2829 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2830 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2831 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2832 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2833 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2841 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2842 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2844 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2845 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2847 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2848 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2849 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2850 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2851 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2853 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2854 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2856 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2859 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2860 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2861 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2862 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2863 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2866 let next_hop_scid = {
2867 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2868 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2869 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2870 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2871 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2872 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2874 if !chan.is_usable() {
2875 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2876 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2879 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2881 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2882 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2887 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2888 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2889 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2892 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2893 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2894 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2896 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2898 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2899 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2902 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2903 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2904 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2905 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2906 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2908 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2912 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2913 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2915 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2918 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2919 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2920 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2922 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2923 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2924 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2927 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2928 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2929 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2930 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2931 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2932 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2933 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2936 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2937 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2938 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2939 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2944 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2946 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2947 /// Will likely generate further events.
2948 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2949 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2951 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2952 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2953 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2955 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2956 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2958 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2959 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2960 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2962 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2963 match forward_info {
2964 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2965 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2966 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2967 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
2968 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
2971 macro_rules! failure_handler {
2972 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
2973 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2975 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2976 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2977 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2978 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2979 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2980 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2983 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
2984 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
2986 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
2989 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2990 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
2996 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2997 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2999 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3003 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3004 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3006 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3010 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3011 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3012 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3013 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3014 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3016 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3017 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3018 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3019 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3020 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3022 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3024 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3025 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3029 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3030 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3031 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3032 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3038 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3041 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3044 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3045 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3046 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3047 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3048 // problem, not ours.
3054 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3055 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3057 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3061 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3062 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3063 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3064 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3067 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3068 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3069 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3070 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3071 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3074 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3075 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3076 match forward_info {
3077 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3078 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3079 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3080 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3081 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3084 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3085 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3086 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3087 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3088 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3089 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3090 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3091 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3093 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3094 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3095 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3097 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3098 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3100 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3102 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3103 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3104 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3105 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3110 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3111 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3113 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3114 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3115 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3116 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3118 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3119 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3121 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3123 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3124 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3125 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3134 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3135 match forward_info {
3136 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3137 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3138 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3139 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3142 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3143 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3144 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3145 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3147 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3148 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3150 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3153 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3154 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3155 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3156 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3157 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3158 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3159 phantom_shared_secret,
3161 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3163 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3168 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3169 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3170 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3171 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3172 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3174 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3175 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3176 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3177 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3178 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3179 phantom_shared_secret,
3181 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3182 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3186 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3187 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3188 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3189 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3190 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3193 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3194 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3195 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3197 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3198 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3199 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3202 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3203 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3204 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3207 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3208 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3209 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3210 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3212 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3216 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3217 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3218 total_value += htlc.value;
3219 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3220 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3221 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3222 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3223 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3224 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3226 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3228 _ => unreachable!(),
3231 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3232 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3233 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3234 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3235 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3236 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3237 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3238 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3239 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3242 amount_msat: total_value,
3243 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3244 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3246 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3248 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3249 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3251 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3253 payment_claimable_generated
3257 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3258 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3259 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3260 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3261 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3262 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3263 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3264 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3265 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3266 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3267 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3268 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3269 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3270 Ok(result) => result,
3272 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3273 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3277 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3278 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3279 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3280 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3281 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3282 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3286 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3288 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3289 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3290 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3291 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3294 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3296 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3297 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3298 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3299 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3300 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3302 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3304 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3305 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3309 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3310 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3317 if payment_data.is_none() {
3318 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3319 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3322 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3323 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3324 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3325 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3326 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3327 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3328 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3329 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3331 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3332 if payment_claimable_generated {
3333 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3339 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3340 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3348 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3349 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3350 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3351 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3352 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3353 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3355 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3356 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3358 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3360 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3361 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3362 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3364 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3366 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3367 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3368 events.append(&mut new_events);
3371 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3373 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3374 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3376 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3377 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3378 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3379 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3380 if background_events.is_empty() {
3384 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3386 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3387 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3388 // monitor updating completing.
3389 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3396 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3397 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3398 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3399 self.process_background_events();
3402 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3403 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3404 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3405 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3406 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3407 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3408 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3410 if !chan.is_live() {
3411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3412 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3413 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3415 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3416 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3418 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3419 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3423 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3424 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3425 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3426 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3427 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3428 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3429 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3431 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3433 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3434 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3435 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3436 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3437 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3438 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3439 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3447 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3449 /// This currently includes:
3450 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3451 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3452 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3454 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3455 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3456 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3458 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3459 /// estimate fetches.
3460 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3461 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3462 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3463 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3465 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3467 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3468 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3469 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3471 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3472 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3473 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3474 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3475 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3476 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3477 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3478 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3479 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3481 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3482 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3483 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3484 if needs_close { return false; }
3487 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3488 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3489 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3490 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3491 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3492 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3493 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3494 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3498 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3499 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3501 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3502 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3503 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3507 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3508 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3513 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3517 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3518 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3523 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3524 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3525 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3526 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3527 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3528 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3529 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3530 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3531 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3532 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3533 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3534 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3535 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3536 // have no channels to the peer.
3537 let remove_entry = {
3538 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3539 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3542 entry.remove_entry();
3545 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3550 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3551 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3552 // This should be unreachable
3553 debug_assert!(false);
3556 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3557 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3558 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3559 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3561 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3562 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3563 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3565 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3572 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3573 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3574 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3575 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3576 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3579 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3580 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3583 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3585 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3586 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3587 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3588 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3589 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3596 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3597 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3598 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3600 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3601 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3602 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3603 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3605 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3606 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3607 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3608 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3609 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3610 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3613 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3614 /// reason for the failure.
3616 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3617 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
3618 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3620 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3621 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3622 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3623 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3624 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3625 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3626 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3631 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3632 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3633 match failure_code {
3634 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3635 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3636 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3637 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3638 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3639 HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3644 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3645 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3647 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3649 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3650 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3651 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3652 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3653 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3654 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3655 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3657 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3659 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3660 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3662 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3667 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3668 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3669 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3670 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3671 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3672 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3673 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3674 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3675 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3676 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3678 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3679 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3680 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3681 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3683 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3684 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3685 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3686 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3687 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3691 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3692 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3693 // be surfaced to the user.
3694 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3695 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3696 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3698 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3699 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3700 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3701 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3702 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3703 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3704 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3705 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3707 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3709 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3712 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3713 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3714 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3715 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3719 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3720 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3721 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3722 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3723 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3724 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3725 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3726 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3727 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3730 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3731 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3732 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3735 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3736 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3737 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3739 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3740 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3741 session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3742 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3743 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3745 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3746 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3747 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3749 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3750 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3751 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3752 push_forward_ev = true;
3754 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3755 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3756 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3759 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3762 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3763 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3764 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3765 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3766 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3767 failed_next_destination: destination,
3773 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3774 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3776 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3777 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3778 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3780 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3781 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3782 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3783 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3785 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3786 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3787 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3788 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3789 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3790 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3791 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3793 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3796 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3797 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3798 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3799 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3800 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3801 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3802 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3803 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3808 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3809 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3810 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3812 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3813 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3814 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3815 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3820 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3822 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3823 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3824 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3825 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3826 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3828 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3829 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3831 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3832 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3833 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3834 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3835 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3837 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3838 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3839 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3840 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3841 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3842 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3843 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3844 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3851 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3852 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3857 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3858 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3860 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3865 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3866 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3867 debug_assert!(false);
3872 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3873 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3874 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3875 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3876 if sources.len() != 1 {
3877 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3878 debug_assert!(false);
3884 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3886 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3887 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3888 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3889 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3892 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3893 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3894 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3895 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3899 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3900 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
3901 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3902 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3904 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3905 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3906 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3907 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3908 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3913 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3914 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3915 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3916 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3917 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3918 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3919 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3921 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3924 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3925 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3926 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3927 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3931 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3932 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3933 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3934 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3936 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3937 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3939 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3940 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3944 let mut peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
3945 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
3946 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
3950 if let Some(hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan)) = peer_state_opt.as_mut().map(|peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id))
3952 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3953 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3954 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3955 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3956 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
3957 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3959 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3960 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3961 payment_preimage, e);
3962 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
3963 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3964 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3965 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3966 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
3969 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3970 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3971 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3972 peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3973 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3974 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3975 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3976 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3977 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3978 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3984 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3985 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3986 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3992 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3993 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
3994 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3996 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3997 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3998 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
3999 // again on restart.
4000 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4001 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4002 payment_preimage, e);
4005 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4007 chan.remove_entry();
4009 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4010 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4011 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4012 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
4016 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4017 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4018 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4022 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4023 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4024 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4025 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4026 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4027 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4028 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4029 // again on restart.
4030 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4031 payment_preimage, update_res);
4033 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4034 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4035 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4036 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4037 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4038 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4039 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4040 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4045 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4046 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4049 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4051 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4052 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4054 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4055 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4056 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4057 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4058 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4059 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4060 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4063 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4064 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4066 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4068 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4074 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4075 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4076 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4082 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4083 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4084 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4087 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4088 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4090 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4091 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4092 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4093 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4094 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4098 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4099 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4105 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4106 /// update completion.
4107 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4108 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4109 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4110 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4111 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4112 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4113 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4115 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4116 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4117 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4118 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4121 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4122 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4124 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4125 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4126 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4131 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4133 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4134 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4135 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4136 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4141 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4142 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4143 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4144 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4145 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4150 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4154 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4160 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4161 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4162 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4168 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4169 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4172 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4173 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4174 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4176 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4177 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4178 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4179 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4180 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4185 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4186 let mut peer_state_lock;
4187 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4188 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4189 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4190 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4192 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4193 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4197 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4201 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4202 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4203 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4204 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4205 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4206 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4208 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4209 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4210 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4215 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4216 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4217 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4220 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4222 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4223 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4225 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4226 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4227 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4228 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4232 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4234 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4235 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4238 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4239 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4240 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4242 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4243 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4244 /// used to accept such channels.
4246 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4247 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4248 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4249 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4252 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4253 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4255 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4256 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4257 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4259 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4260 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4262 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4263 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4265 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4266 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4268 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4269 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4270 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4271 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4274 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4275 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4277 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4278 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4279 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4280 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4281 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4282 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4283 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4284 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4285 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4288 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4289 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4290 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4291 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4292 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4293 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4296 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4297 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4298 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4301 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4302 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4303 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4306 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4307 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4313 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4314 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4315 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4318 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4319 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4322 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4323 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4324 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4326 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4327 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4328 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4330 debug_assert!(false);
4331 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4333 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4334 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4335 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4336 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4337 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4340 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4341 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4345 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4346 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4347 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4348 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4350 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4351 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4352 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4353 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4355 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4356 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4357 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4360 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4361 pending_events.push(
4362 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4363 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4364 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4365 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4366 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4367 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4372 entry.insert(channel);
4378 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4379 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4380 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4381 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4383 debug_assert!(false);
4384 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4386 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4387 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4388 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4389 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4390 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4391 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4393 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4396 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4397 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4398 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4399 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4400 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4402 user_channel_id: user_id,
4407 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4408 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4409 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4411 debug_assert!(false);
4412 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4414 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4415 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4416 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4417 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4418 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4420 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4422 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4425 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4426 // lock before watch_channel
4427 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4428 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4429 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4430 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4431 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4432 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4433 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4434 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4435 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4436 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4437 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4438 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4439 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4441 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4442 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4443 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4444 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4445 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4446 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4447 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4450 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4451 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4452 // the channel above.
4453 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4454 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4455 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4457 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4460 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4461 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4462 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4463 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4464 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4465 funding_msg.channel_id))
4467 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4468 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4471 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4472 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4475 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4476 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4484 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4486 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4487 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4488 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4490 debug_assert!(false);
4491 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4494 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4495 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4496 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4497 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4498 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
4499 Ok(update) => update,
4500 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4502 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4503 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4505 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4506 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4507 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4508 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4509 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4510 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4511 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4517 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4518 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4522 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4525 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4526 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4530 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4532 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4534 debug_assert!(false);
4535 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4538 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4539 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4540 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4541 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4542 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4543 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4544 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4545 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4546 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4547 msg: announcement_sigs,
4549 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4550 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4551 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4552 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4553 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4554 // announcement_signatures.
4555 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4556 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4557 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4558 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4564 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4568 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4572 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4573 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4574 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4575 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4576 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4578 debug_assert!(false);
4579 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4581 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4582 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4583 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4584 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4586 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4587 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4588 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4589 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4592 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4593 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4595 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4596 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4597 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4598 let (result, is_permanent) =
4599 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4601 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4606 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4607 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4608 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4618 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4619 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4620 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4621 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4624 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4628 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4629 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4630 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4632 debug_assert!(false);
4633 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4635 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4636 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4637 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4638 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4639 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4640 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4641 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4642 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4643 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4648 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4649 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4650 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4651 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4652 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4653 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4654 } else { (tx, None) }
4656 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4659 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4660 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4661 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4663 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4664 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4665 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4666 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4667 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4671 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4676 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4677 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4678 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4679 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4681 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4682 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4683 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4684 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4686 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4687 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4688 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4690 debug_assert!(false);
4691 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4693 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4694 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4695 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4698 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4699 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4700 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4701 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4702 match pending_forward_info {
4703 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4704 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4705 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4706 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4708 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4709 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4710 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4711 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4712 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4715 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4717 _ => pending_forward_info
4720 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4727 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4728 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4729 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4730 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4732 debug_assert!(false);
4733 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4735 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4736 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4737 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4739 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4741 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4744 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4748 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4749 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4750 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4752 debug_assert!(false);
4753 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4755 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4756 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4757 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4758 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4759 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4761 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4766 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4768 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4770 debug_assert!(false);
4771 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4773 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4774 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4775 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4777 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4778 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4779 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4781 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4788 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4789 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4790 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4792 debug_assert!(false);
4793 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4795 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4796 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4797 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4798 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4799 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4800 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4801 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4802 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4803 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4804 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update);
4805 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4810 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4811 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4815 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4816 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4817 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4819 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4820 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4821 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4822 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4823 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4824 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4825 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4826 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4828 commitment_signed: msg,
4834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4839 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4840 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4841 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4842 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4843 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4844 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4845 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4846 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4847 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4848 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4849 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4851 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4852 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4854 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4855 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4856 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4857 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4858 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4859 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4861 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4862 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4863 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4865 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4866 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4867 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4869 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4870 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4871 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4872 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4873 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4876 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4877 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4880 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4881 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4882 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4883 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4884 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4885 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4886 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4889 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4890 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4891 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4896 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4897 // payments are being processed.
4898 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4899 push_forward_event = true;
4901 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4902 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4909 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4910 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4913 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4914 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4915 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4917 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
4921 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
4922 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
4923 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4924 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
4925 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
4927 if !forward_ev_exists {
4928 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4930 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
4935 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4936 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4938 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4939 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4941 debug_assert!(false);
4942 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4944 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4945 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4946 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4947 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4948 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4949 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4950 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4951 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4952 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update);
4953 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4954 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4955 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4956 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4957 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4958 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4959 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4961 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4962 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
4963 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4964 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4965 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4966 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4968 } else { unreachable!(); }
4970 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4971 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4972 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4976 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4977 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4978 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4979 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4980 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
4981 chan.get().get_user_id()))
4983 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4986 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4988 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4989 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
4991 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4992 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4993 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4995 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
4996 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5003 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5004 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5005 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5007 debug_assert!(false);
5008 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5010 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5011 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5012 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5013 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5014 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5016 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5021 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5022 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5023 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5025 debug_assert!(false);
5026 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5028 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5029 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5030 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5031 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5032 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5033 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5036 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5037 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5038 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5039 msg, &self.default_configuration
5041 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5042 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5043 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5046 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5051 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5052 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5053 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5054 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5056 // It's not a local channel
5057 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5060 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5061 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5062 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5063 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5065 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5066 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5067 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5068 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5069 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5070 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5071 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5072 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5073 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5074 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5076 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5078 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5079 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5080 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5081 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5083 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5084 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5087 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5089 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5092 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5094 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5095 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5097 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5099 debug_assert!(false);
5100 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5102 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5103 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5104 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5105 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5106 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5107 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5108 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5109 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5110 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5111 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5112 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5113 let mut channel_update = None;
5114 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5115 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5116 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5119 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5120 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5121 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5122 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5123 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5124 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5125 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5130 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5131 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5132 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5133 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5134 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5135 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5139 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5143 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5144 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5147 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5148 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5153 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5154 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5155 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5156 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5157 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5158 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5159 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5160 match monitor_event {
5161 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5162 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5163 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5164 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5166 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5167 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5168 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5169 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5172 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5173 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5174 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5175 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5177 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5178 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5179 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5180 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5183 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5184 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5185 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5186 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5187 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5188 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5189 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5190 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5191 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5192 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5193 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5197 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5198 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5200 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5202 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5203 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5204 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5205 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5206 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5213 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5214 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5220 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5221 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5224 has_pending_monitor_events
5227 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5228 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5229 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5231 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5232 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5235 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5236 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5237 /// update was applied.
5238 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5239 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5240 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5241 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5243 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5245 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5246 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5247 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5248 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5249 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5250 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5251 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5252 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5254 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5256 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5259 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5260 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
5261 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5262 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5263 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5264 updates: commitment_update,
5268 has_monitor_update = true;
5269 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5270 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5271 if close_channel { return false; }
5278 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5279 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5280 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5288 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5289 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5290 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5293 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5294 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5300 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5301 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5302 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5303 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5304 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5305 let mut has_update = false;
5307 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5309 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5310 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5311 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5312 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5313 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5314 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5315 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5316 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5318 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5319 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5322 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5323 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5324 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5325 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5326 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5331 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5333 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5334 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5335 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5341 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5342 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5350 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5351 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5357 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5358 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5360 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5361 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5362 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5363 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5364 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5365 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5366 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5367 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5368 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5369 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5370 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5371 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5372 assert!(should_broadcast);
5373 } else { unreachable!(); }
5374 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5376 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5380 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5381 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5383 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5384 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5387 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5389 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5390 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5391 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5392 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5393 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5394 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5395 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5396 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5397 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5398 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5399 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5400 // never fail a payment too early.
5401 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5403 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5411 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5414 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5415 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5417 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5418 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5419 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5420 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5422 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5424 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5425 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5429 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5430 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5432 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5434 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5435 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5437 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5438 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5439 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5440 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5441 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5442 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5443 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5444 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5445 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5446 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5447 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5450 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5451 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5453 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5456 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5458 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5460 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5461 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5462 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5463 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5464 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5467 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5468 /// stored external to LDK.
5470 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5471 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5472 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5474 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5475 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5478 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5479 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5480 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5481 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5483 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5484 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5485 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5486 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5487 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5489 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5490 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5491 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5492 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5493 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5495 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5496 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5498 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5499 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5503 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5504 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5506 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5508 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5509 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5511 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5512 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5513 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5514 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5515 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5516 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5517 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5520 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5521 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5523 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5526 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5528 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5530 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5531 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5534 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5535 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5537 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5538 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5539 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5542 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5543 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5545 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5546 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5547 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5548 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5550 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5551 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5552 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5553 Some(_) => continue,
5554 None => return scid_candidate
5559 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5561 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5562 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5564 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5565 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5566 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5570 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5571 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5572 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5574 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5575 /// times to get a unique scid.
5576 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5577 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5578 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5580 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5581 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5582 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5583 return scid_candidate
5587 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5588 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5589 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5590 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5592 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5593 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5594 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5595 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5596 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5597 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5598 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5599 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5608 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5609 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5610 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5611 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5612 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5616 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5617 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5618 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5623 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5624 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5625 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5629 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5630 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5634 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5635 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5638 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5639 /// using the given event handler.
5641 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5642 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5645 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5646 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5647 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5649 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5651 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5652 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5653 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5654 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5657 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5658 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5659 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5662 for event in pending_events {
5663 handler(event).await;
5666 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5667 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5672 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5674 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5675 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5676 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5677 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5678 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5679 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5683 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5684 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5685 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5686 /// is always placed next to each other.
5688 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5689 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5690 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5691 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5693 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5694 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5695 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5696 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5697 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5698 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5699 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5701 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5702 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5703 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5704 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5707 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5708 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5710 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5711 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5714 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5715 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5716 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5717 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5718 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5719 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5720 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5724 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5725 events.replace(pending_events);
5734 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5736 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5737 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5738 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5739 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5740 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5741 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5745 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5747 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5748 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5749 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5750 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5751 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5753 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5754 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5755 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5756 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5759 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5760 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5761 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5764 for event in pending_events {
5765 handler.handle_event(event);
5773 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5775 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5776 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5777 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5778 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5779 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5780 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5784 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5786 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5787 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5788 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5789 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5790 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5793 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5794 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5797 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5798 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5799 let new_height = height - 1;
5801 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5802 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5803 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5804 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5805 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5806 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5809 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5813 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5815 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5816 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5817 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5818 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5819 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5820 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5824 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5825 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5826 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5827 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5829 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5830 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5832 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5833 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5834 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5836 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5837 if height < last_best_block_height {
5838 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5839 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5843 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5844 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5845 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5846 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5848 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5849 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5851 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5853 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5855 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5857 macro_rules! max_time {
5858 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5860 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5861 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5862 // having an explicit local time source.
5863 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5864 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5865 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5866 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5867 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5873 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5874 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5875 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5876 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5880 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5881 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5882 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5883 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5884 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5885 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5886 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5887 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5894 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5896 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5897 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5898 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5899 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5900 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5901 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5906 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5908 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5909 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5910 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5911 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5912 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5913 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5917 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5918 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5920 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5921 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5922 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5923 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5924 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5926 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5927 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5929 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5930 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5931 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5932 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5933 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5934 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5935 let res = f(channel);
5936 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5937 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5938 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5939 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5940 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5942 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5943 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5944 if channel.is_usable() {
5945 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5946 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5947 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5948 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5953 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5957 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5959 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5960 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5961 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5962 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5963 msg: announcement_sigs,
5965 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5966 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5967 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5969 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5970 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5971 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
5976 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5977 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5978 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5979 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5980 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5981 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5982 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5983 // is always consistent.
5984 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5985 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5986 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5987 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5988 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5991 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5992 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5993 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5994 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5995 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5996 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5997 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6001 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6002 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6003 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6004 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6005 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6006 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6007 data: reason_message,
6017 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6018 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6019 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6020 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6021 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6022 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6023 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6024 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6025 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6026 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6028 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6029 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6030 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6034 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6037 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6038 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6039 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6040 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6041 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6042 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6043 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6044 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6045 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6048 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6049 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6050 _ => unreachable!(),
6052 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6053 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6054 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6055 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6061 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6063 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6064 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6068 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6069 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6070 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6071 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6073 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6075 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6076 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6077 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6078 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6079 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6080 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6083 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6084 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6085 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6087 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6088 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6089 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6090 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6093 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6094 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6095 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6096 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6097 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6100 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6101 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6102 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6105 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6106 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6107 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6108 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6111 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6112 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6113 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6114 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6117 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6118 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6120 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6121 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6122 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6123 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6124 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6127 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6128 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6129 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6130 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6133 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6134 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6135 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6136 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6139 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6140 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6141 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6142 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6146 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6147 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6149 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6150 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6151 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6152 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6153 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6154 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6158 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6159 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6160 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6163 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6164 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6165 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6168 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6169 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6170 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6173 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6174 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6175 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6178 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6179 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6180 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6183 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6184 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6185 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6188 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6189 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6190 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6193 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6194 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6195 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6198 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6199 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6200 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6203 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6205 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6208 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6209 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6210 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6213 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6214 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6215 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6218 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6219 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6220 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6223 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6224 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6225 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6228 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6229 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6230 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6233 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6234 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6235 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6238 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6243 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6244 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6245 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6248 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6249 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6250 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6251 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6253 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6254 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6255 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6256 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6257 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6258 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6259 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6260 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6261 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6262 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6263 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6268 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6270 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6271 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6272 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6273 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6274 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6275 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6276 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6277 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6278 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6279 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6280 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6281 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6282 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6283 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6284 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6285 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6286 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6287 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6289 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6290 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6293 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6294 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6295 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6296 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6299 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6301 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6303 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6304 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6308 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6309 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6310 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6314 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6316 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6319 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6320 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6321 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6322 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6323 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6324 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6325 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6329 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6330 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6331 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6332 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6333 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6338 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6340 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6341 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6342 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6343 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6344 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6345 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6346 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6347 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6348 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6349 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6353 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6354 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6355 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6360 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6361 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6362 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6363 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6364 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6373 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6377 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6378 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6380 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6381 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6382 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6383 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6384 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6385 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6386 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6387 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6389 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6390 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6391 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6395 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6396 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6397 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6398 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6401 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6402 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6403 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6404 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6412 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6413 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6417 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6418 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6421 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6422 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6426 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6427 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6428 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6429 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6432 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6433 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6435 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6436 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6437 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6438 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6439 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6442 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6443 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6444 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6445 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6448 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6449 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6450 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6451 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6454 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6455 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6456 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6457 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6458 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6459 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6460 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6461 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6462 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6463 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6464 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6465 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6466 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6467 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6468 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6469 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6470 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6471 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6473 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6474 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6475 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6481 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6482 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6484 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6485 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6486 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6487 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6490 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6491 (2, node_id, required),
6492 (4, features, required),
6493 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6494 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6495 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6496 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6499 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6500 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6501 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6502 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6503 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6504 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6505 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6506 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6507 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6508 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6509 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6510 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6511 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6512 (7, self.config, option),
6513 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6514 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6515 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6516 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6517 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6518 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6519 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6520 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6521 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6522 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6523 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6524 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6525 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6526 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6527 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6528 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6529 (32, self.is_public, required),
6530 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6531 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6532 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6538 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6539 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6540 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6541 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6542 (2, channel_id, required),
6543 (3, channel_type, option),
6544 (4, counterparty, required),
6545 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6546 (6, funding_txo, option),
6547 (7, config, option),
6548 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6549 (9, confirmations, option),
6550 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6551 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6552 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6553 (16, balance_msat, required),
6554 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6555 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6556 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6557 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6558 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6559 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6560 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6561 (26, is_outbound, required),
6562 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6563 (30, is_usable, required),
6564 (32, is_public, required),
6565 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6566 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6567 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6570 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6571 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6572 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6573 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6574 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6578 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6580 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6581 outbound_scid_alias,
6585 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6586 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6588 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6589 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6590 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6591 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6592 confirmations_required,
6594 force_close_spend_delay,
6595 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6596 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6597 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6598 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6599 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6600 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6605 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6606 (2, channels, vec_type),
6607 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6608 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6611 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6613 (0, onion_packet, required),
6614 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6617 (0, payment_data, required),
6618 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6619 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6621 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6622 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6623 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6627 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6628 (0, routing, required),
6629 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6630 (4, payment_hash, required),
6631 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6632 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6633 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6637 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6638 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6640 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6642 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6643 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6644 reason.write(writer)?;
6646 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6647 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6650 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6651 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6652 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6653 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6660 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6661 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6662 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6665 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6666 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6667 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6668 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6672 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6673 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6674 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6675 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6676 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6679 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6680 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6681 // messages contained in the variants.
6682 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6683 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6684 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6686 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6687 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6688 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6689 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6690 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6693 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6694 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6695 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6696 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6697 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6699 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6704 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6709 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6710 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6711 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6712 (2, outpoint, required),
6713 (4, htlc_id, required),
6714 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6717 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6718 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6719 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6720 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6721 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6723 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6724 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6725 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6726 (2, self.value, required),
6727 (4, payment_data, option),
6728 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6729 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6735 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6736 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6737 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6739 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6740 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6741 let mut total_msat = None;
6742 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6743 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6744 (0, prev_hop, required),
6745 (1, total_msat, option),
6746 (2, value, required),
6747 (4, payment_data, option),
6748 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6749 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6751 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6753 if payment_data.is_some() {
6754 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6756 if total_msat.is_none() {
6757 total_msat = Some(value);
6759 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6762 if total_msat.is_none() {
6763 if payment_data.is_none() {
6764 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6766 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6768 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6772 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6775 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6782 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6783 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6784 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6787 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6788 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6789 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6790 let mut payment_id = None;
6791 let mut payment_secret = None;
6792 let mut payment_params = None;
6793 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6794 (0, session_priv, required),
6795 (1, payment_id, option),
6796 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6797 (3, payment_secret, option),
6798 (4, path, vec_type),
6799 (5, payment_params, option),
6801 if payment_id.is_none() {
6802 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6804 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6806 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6807 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6808 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6809 path: path.unwrap(),
6810 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6815 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6816 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6821 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6822 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6824 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6826 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6827 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6828 (0, session_priv, required),
6829 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6830 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6831 (3, payment_secret, option),
6832 (4, *path, vec_type),
6833 (5, payment_params, option),
6836 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6838 field.write(writer)?;
6845 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6846 (0, forward_info, required),
6847 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6848 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6849 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6850 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6855 (0, htlc_id, required),
6856 (2, err_packet, required),
6861 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6862 (0, payment_secret, required),
6863 (2, expiry_time, required),
6864 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6865 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6866 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6869 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6871 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6872 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6873 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6874 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6875 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6876 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6880 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6881 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6883 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6885 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6887 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6888 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6889 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6892 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6894 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6895 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6896 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6897 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6898 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6899 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6900 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6901 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6903 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6904 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6905 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6906 unfunded_channels += 1;
6911 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6913 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6914 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6915 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6916 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6917 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6918 channel.write(writer)?;
6925 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6926 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6927 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6928 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6929 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6930 for forward in pending_forwards {
6931 forward.write(writer)?;
6936 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6938 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6939 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6940 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6942 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6943 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6944 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6945 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6946 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6947 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6948 htlc.write(writer)?;
6950 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6953 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
6954 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6955 let peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6956 let peer_state = &*peer_state_lock;
6957 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
6958 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
6959 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
6961 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6962 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6963 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6967 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6968 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6969 for event in events.iter() {
6970 event.write(writer)?;
6973 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6974 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6975 for event in background_events.iter() {
6977 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6979 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6980 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6985 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6986 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6987 // likely to be identical.
6988 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6989 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6991 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6992 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6993 hash.write(writer)?;
6994 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6997 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6998 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6999 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7000 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7001 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7004 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7005 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7007 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7008 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7009 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7010 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7013 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7014 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7018 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7019 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7020 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7022 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7023 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7024 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7030 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7031 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7032 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7033 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7036 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7037 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7038 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7039 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7040 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7042 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
7045 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7046 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7047 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7048 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7049 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7050 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7051 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7052 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7053 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7060 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7062 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7064 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7065 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7066 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7067 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7068 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7069 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7070 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7071 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7072 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7073 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7074 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7075 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7076 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7078 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7079 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7081 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7082 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7084 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7085 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7086 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7087 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7088 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7089 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7091 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7092 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7094 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7095 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7096 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7097 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7098 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7099 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7103 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7104 pub entropy_source: ES,
7106 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7107 pub node_signer: NS,
7109 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7110 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7112 pub signer_provider: SP,
7114 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7116 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7117 pub fee_estimator: F,
7118 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7120 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7121 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7122 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7123 pub chain_monitor: M,
7125 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7126 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7127 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7128 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7129 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7130 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7132 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7134 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7135 /// deserialization.
7137 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7138 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7139 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7141 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7142 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7144 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7145 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7146 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7147 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7149 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7152 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7153 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7156 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7157 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7159 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7160 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7161 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7162 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7163 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7164 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7168 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7169 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7170 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7171 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7172 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7174 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7175 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7180 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7181 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7182 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7183 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7185 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7186 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7187 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7188 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7189 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7190 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7194 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7195 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7196 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7200 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7201 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7203 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7204 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7205 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7206 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7207 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7208 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7212 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7213 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7215 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7216 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7217 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7219 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7221 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7222 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7223 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7224 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7225 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7226 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7227 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7228 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7229 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7231 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7232 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7233 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7234 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7235 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7236 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7237 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7238 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7239 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7240 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7241 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7242 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7243 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7244 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7245 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7246 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7247 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7248 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7249 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7250 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7251 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7252 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7253 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7254 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7255 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7256 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7257 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7258 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7259 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7260 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7261 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7262 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7264 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7265 let mut found_htlc = false;
7266 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7267 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7270 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7271 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7272 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7273 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7274 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7275 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7276 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7277 log_info!(args.logger,
7278 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7279 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7280 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7284 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7285 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7286 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7288 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7289 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7291 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7292 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7293 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7294 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7296 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7297 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7298 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7299 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7303 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7304 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7305 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7306 // safely discard the channel.
7307 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7308 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7309 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7310 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7311 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7314 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7315 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7316 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7317 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7318 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7319 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7323 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7324 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7325 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7326 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7330 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7331 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7332 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7333 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7334 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7335 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7336 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7337 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7338 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7340 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7343 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7344 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7345 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7346 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7347 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7348 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7349 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7350 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7352 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7355 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7356 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7357 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7358 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7359 let peer_state = PeerState {
7360 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7361 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7362 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7363 is_connected: false,
7365 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7368 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7369 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7370 for _ in 0..event_count {
7371 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7372 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7377 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7378 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7379 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7380 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7381 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7382 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7386 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7387 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7389 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7390 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7391 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7392 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7393 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7397 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7398 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7399 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7400 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7401 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7402 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7403 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7405 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7406 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7410 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7411 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7412 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7413 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7414 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7415 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7416 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7417 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7418 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7419 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7420 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7421 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7422 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7423 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7424 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7425 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7426 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7427 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7429 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7430 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7433 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7434 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7437 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7438 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7439 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7440 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7441 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7442 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7444 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7446 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7447 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7448 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7449 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7450 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7451 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7452 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7454 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7455 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7456 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7457 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7458 if path.is_empty() {
7459 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7460 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7462 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7463 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7464 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7465 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7466 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7467 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7468 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7469 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7471 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7472 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7473 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7474 retry_strategy: None,
7475 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7476 payment_params: None,
7477 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7478 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7480 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7481 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7482 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7483 total_msat: path_amt,
7484 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7486 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7487 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7492 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7493 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7494 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7495 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7496 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7498 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7499 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7500 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7501 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7502 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7503 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7504 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7505 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7506 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7507 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7508 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7513 !forwards.is_empty()
7515 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7516 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7517 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7518 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7519 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7520 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7521 intercepted_id != ev_id
7533 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), retry_lock: Mutex::new(()) };
7534 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7535 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7536 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7537 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7538 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7539 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7540 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7541 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7545 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7546 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7548 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7549 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7550 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7551 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7553 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7554 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7557 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7558 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7559 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7560 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7561 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7563 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7564 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7565 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7566 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7567 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7568 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7569 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7570 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7572 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7573 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7577 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7579 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7581 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7582 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7584 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7588 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7589 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7591 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7592 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7595 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7597 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7599 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7600 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7601 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7602 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7606 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7607 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7610 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7611 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7612 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7614 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7615 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7616 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7618 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7619 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7620 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7621 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7622 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7623 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7625 if chan.is_usable() {
7626 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7627 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7628 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7629 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7630 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7636 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7638 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7639 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7640 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7641 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7642 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7643 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7644 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7645 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7646 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7647 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7648 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7650 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7651 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7653 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7654 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7655 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7656 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7658 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7659 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7660 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7661 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7663 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7664 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7665 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7666 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7668 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7669 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7670 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7671 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7672 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7673 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7674 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7677 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7678 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7681 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7684 purpose: payment_purpose,
7685 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7691 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7693 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7694 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7695 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7696 router: args.router,
7698 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7700 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7701 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7702 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7703 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7705 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7706 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7707 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7708 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7709 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7710 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7712 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7717 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7719 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7721 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7722 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7723 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7724 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7726 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7727 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7728 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7730 logger: args.logger,
7731 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7734 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7735 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7736 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7737 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7738 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7741 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7742 //connection or two.
7744 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7750 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7751 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7752 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7753 use core::time::Duration;
7754 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7755 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7756 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7757 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7758 use crate::ln::msgs;
7759 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7760 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7761 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7762 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7763 use crate::util::test_utils;
7764 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7765 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7768 fn test_notify_limits() {
7769 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7770 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7774 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7776 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7777 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7778 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7779 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7780 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7782 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7784 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7785 // to connect messages with new values
7786 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7787 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7788 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7789 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7791 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7792 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7793 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7794 // ... but the last node should not.
7795 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7796 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7797 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7798 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7800 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7801 // about the channel.
7802 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7803 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7804 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7806 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7808 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7809 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7810 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7811 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7812 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7813 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7815 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7816 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7817 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7819 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7820 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7821 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7822 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7823 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7824 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7826 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7827 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7828 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7829 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7830 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7831 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7832 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7833 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7835 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7836 // the channel info has updated.
7837 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7838 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7839 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7840 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7841 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7842 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7846 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7847 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7849 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7850 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7851 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7852 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7853 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7855 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7856 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7857 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7858 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7860 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7861 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7862 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7863 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7864 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7865 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7867 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7868 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7869 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7871 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7872 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7874 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7875 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7876 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7877 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7878 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7880 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7881 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7882 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7884 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7885 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7886 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7887 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7888 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7889 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7890 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7891 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7892 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7894 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7895 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7897 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7898 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7899 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7901 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7902 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7903 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7904 // lightning messages manually.
7905 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7906 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7909 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7910 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7911 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7913 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7914 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7916 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7917 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7919 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7920 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7921 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7923 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7924 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7925 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7927 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7929 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7931 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7932 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7935 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7936 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7937 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7938 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7940 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7941 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7942 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7943 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7948 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7949 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7950 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7951 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7956 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7957 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7958 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7959 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7961 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7966 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7967 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7968 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7969 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7970 // fails as expected.
7971 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7972 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7973 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7974 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7975 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7976 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7977 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7979 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7980 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7981 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7983 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7984 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7985 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
7986 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7987 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7989 let route = find_route(
7990 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7991 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7993 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7995 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7996 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7997 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7998 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7999 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8001 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8002 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8003 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8004 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8005 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8007 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8008 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8009 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8010 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8011 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8012 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8013 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8014 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8015 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8017 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8018 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8020 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8021 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8022 let route = find_route(
8023 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8024 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8026 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8028 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8029 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8030 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8031 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8032 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8034 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8035 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8036 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8038 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8039 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8040 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8041 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8042 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8044 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8045 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8046 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8048 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8049 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8050 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8051 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8052 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8053 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8054 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8055 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8056 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8058 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8059 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8063 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8064 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8065 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8068 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8069 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8071 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8072 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8074 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8075 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8076 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8077 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8078 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8080 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8081 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8082 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8083 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8084 let route = find_route(
8085 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8086 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8089 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8090 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8091 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8092 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8095 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8096 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8097 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8098 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8099 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8100 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8101 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8103 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8107 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8108 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8109 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8110 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8111 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8112 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8114 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8115 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8117 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8118 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8119 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8120 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8121 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8123 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8124 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8125 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8126 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8127 let route = find_route(
8128 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8129 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8132 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8133 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8134 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8135 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8136 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8139 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8140 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8141 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8142 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8143 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8144 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8145 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8147 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8151 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8152 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8153 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8154 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8155 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8157 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8158 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8159 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8160 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8162 // Marshall an MPP route.
8163 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8164 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8165 route.paths.push(path);
8166 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8167 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8168 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8169 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8170 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8171 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8173 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8174 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8175 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8176 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8181 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8182 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8183 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8184 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8185 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8187 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8189 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8190 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8192 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8193 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8195 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8198 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8199 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8200 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8201 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8202 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8203 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8206 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8209 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8210 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8215 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8216 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8217 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8218 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8219 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8220 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8222 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8223 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8225 total_msat: 100_000,
8228 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8229 // payment verification fails as expected.
8230 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8231 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8232 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8233 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8235 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8239 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8240 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8244 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8245 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8246 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8247 // the channel is successfully closed.
8248 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8249 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8251 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8253 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8254 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8255 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8256 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8257 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8259 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8260 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8262 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8263 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8264 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8265 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8268 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8270 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8271 // as it has the funding transaction.
8272 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8273 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8274 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8276 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8279 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8281 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8283 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8284 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8285 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8287 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8288 // as it has the funding transaction.
8289 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8290 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8291 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8294 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8295 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8297 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8298 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8299 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8301 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8302 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8303 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8304 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8306 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8307 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8309 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8310 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8311 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8312 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8313 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8314 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8315 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8317 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8318 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8319 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8320 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8321 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8322 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8323 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8326 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8328 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8329 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8330 // closing transaction).
8331 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8332 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8333 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8335 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8336 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8337 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8338 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8339 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8342 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8344 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8346 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8347 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8348 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8350 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8352 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8353 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8356 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8357 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8358 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8361 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8362 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8363 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8366 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8368 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8369 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8371 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8372 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8374 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8375 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8380 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8381 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8382 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8383 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8384 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8385 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8386 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8387 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8390 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8391 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8392 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8394 // Test the API functions.
8395 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8397 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8399 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8401 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8403 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8405 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8407 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8412 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8413 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8414 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8415 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8416 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8417 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8418 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8419 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8420 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8421 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8422 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8424 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8425 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8426 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8428 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8429 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8431 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8432 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8437 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8438 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8440 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8441 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8443 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8447 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8449 use crate::chain::Listen;
8450 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8451 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8452 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8453 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8454 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8455 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8456 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8457 use crate::util::test_utils;
8458 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8459 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8461 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8462 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8463 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8465 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8469 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8470 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8471 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8472 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8473 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8474 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8475 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8476 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8481 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8482 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8485 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8486 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8487 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8489 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8490 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8492 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8493 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8494 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8495 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8496 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8498 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8499 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8501 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8502 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8503 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8504 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8506 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8508 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8510 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8511 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8512 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8513 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8514 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8516 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8518 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8520 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8521 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8522 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8523 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8524 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8527 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8528 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8529 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8531 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8532 } else { panic!(); }
8534 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8535 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8537 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8540 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8543 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8544 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8546 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8547 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8548 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8549 match msg_events[0] {
8550 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8551 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8552 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8556 match msg_events[1] {
8557 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8561 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8562 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8564 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8565 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8570 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8571 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8573 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8574 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8576 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8579 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8581 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8582 macro_rules! send_payment {
8583 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8584 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8585 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8586 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8587 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8588 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8589 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8590 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8591 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8592 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8594 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8595 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8597 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8598 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8600 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8601 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8602 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8603 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8604 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8605 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8606 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8607 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8609 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8610 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8611 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8612 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8614 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8615 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8616 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8617 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8618 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8620 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8623 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8624 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8625 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8626 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8628 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8633 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8634 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);