1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub(crate) use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131 /// may overshoot this in either case)
132 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
135 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
136 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
139 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
140 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
141 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
142 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
145 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
146 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
147 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
148 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
149 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
152 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
153 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
155 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
156 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
157 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
160 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
161 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
163 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
164 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
167 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
168 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
171 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
175 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
176 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
178 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
179 short_channel_id: u64,
181 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
182 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
184 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
185 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
190 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
192 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
193 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
194 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
196 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
197 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
200 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
201 struct ClaimableHTLC {
202 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
204 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
206 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
207 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
208 sender_intended_value: u64,
209 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
211 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
212 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
213 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
214 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
216 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
217 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
220 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
222 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
223 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
224 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
226 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
227 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
232 impl Readable for PaymentId {
233 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
234 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
239 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
241 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
242 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
243 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
245 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
246 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
251 impl Readable for InterceptId {
252 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
253 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
258 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
259 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
260 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
261 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
262 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
265 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
267 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
268 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
269 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
271 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
272 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
276 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
277 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
278 (0, short_channel_id, required),
279 (2, htlc_id, required),
281 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
282 (0, session_priv, required),
287 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
288 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
289 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
290 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
291 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
294 session_priv: SecretKey,
295 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
296 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
297 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
298 payment_id: PaymentId,
301 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
302 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
303 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
305 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
307 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
309 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
312 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
313 payment_id.hash(hasher);
314 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
320 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
322 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
323 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
324 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
325 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
326 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
327 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
331 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
332 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
333 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
334 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
335 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
336 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
338 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
344 struct ReceiveError {
350 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
351 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
353 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
354 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
355 pub enum FailureCode {
356 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
357 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
358 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
359 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
360 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
361 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
362 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
363 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
364 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
365 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
366 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
369 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
370 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
371 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
372 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
373 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
375 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
376 err: msgs::LightningError,
377 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
378 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
380 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
382 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
384 err: LightningError {
386 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
387 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
394 shutdown_finish: None,
398 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
399 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
402 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
404 err: LightningError {
406 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
407 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
413 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
414 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
418 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
421 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
423 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
424 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
428 log_level: Level::Warn,
431 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
433 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
435 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
437 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
438 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
446 shutdown_finish: None,
451 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
452 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
453 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
454 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
455 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
457 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
458 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
459 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
460 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
461 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
462 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
463 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
465 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
469 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
470 struct ClaimingPayment {
472 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
473 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
475 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
476 (0, amount_msat, required),
477 (2, payment_purpose, required),
478 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
481 struct ClaimablePayment {
482 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
483 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
484 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
487 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
488 struct ClaimablePayments {
489 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
490 /// failed/claimed by the user.
492 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
493 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
495 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
496 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
497 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
499 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
500 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
501 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
502 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
505 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
506 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
507 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
508 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
509 enum BackgroundEvent {
510 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
511 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
512 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
513 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
515 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
516 /// are regenerated on startup.
517 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
518 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
519 /// channel to continue normal operation.
521 /// In general this should be used rather than
522 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
523 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
524 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
526 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
527 /// are regenerated on startup.
528 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
529 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
530 funding_txo: OutPoint,
531 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
533 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
534 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
536 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
537 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
538 channel_id: [u8; 32],
543 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
544 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
545 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
546 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
547 /// event can be generated.
548 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
549 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
550 /// operation of another channel.
552 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
553 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
554 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
555 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
557 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
558 event: events::Event,
559 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
563 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
564 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
565 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
566 (0, event, upgradable_required),
567 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
568 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
569 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
570 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
571 // downgrades to prior versions.
572 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
576 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
577 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
578 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
579 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
580 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
583 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
584 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
585 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
586 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
590 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
591 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
592 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
593 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
594 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
595 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
597 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
598 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
599 channel_id: [u8; 32],
600 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
605 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
607 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
608 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
609 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
610 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
615 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
616 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
620 /// State we hold per-peer.
621 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
622 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
624 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
625 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
626 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
628 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
629 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
631 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
632 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
634 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
635 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
637 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
638 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
639 latest_features: InitFeatures,
640 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
641 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
642 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
643 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
644 /// user but which have not yet completed.
646 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
647 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
648 /// for a missing channel.
649 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
650 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
651 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
653 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
654 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
655 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
656 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
658 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
659 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
660 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
661 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
662 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
663 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
664 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
665 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
666 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
667 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
668 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
669 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
670 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
671 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
672 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
676 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
677 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
678 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
679 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
680 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
681 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
684 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
685 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
688 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
689 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
690 self.channel_by_id.len() +
691 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
692 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
695 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
696 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
697 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
698 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
699 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
703 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
704 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
706 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
709 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
710 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
711 struct PendingInboundPayment {
712 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
713 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
714 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
715 /// this payment being removed.
717 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
718 user_payment_id: u64,
719 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
720 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
721 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
724 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
725 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
726 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
727 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
728 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
729 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
730 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
731 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
733 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages
734 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
735 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
743 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
745 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
746 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
747 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
752 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
753 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
754 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
755 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
756 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
757 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
758 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
759 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
760 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
762 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages
763 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
764 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
773 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
775 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
776 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
777 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
782 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
783 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
784 $vis trait AChannelManager {
785 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
786 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
787 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
788 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
789 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
790 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
791 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
792 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
793 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
794 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
795 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
796 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
797 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
798 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
799 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
800 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
801 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
802 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
805 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
806 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
807 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
808 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
809 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
810 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
812 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
813 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
814 ES::Target: EntropySource,
815 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
816 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
817 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
821 type Watch = M::Target;
823 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
825 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
827 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
829 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
830 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
832 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
834 type Router = R::Target;
836 type Logger = L::Target;
838 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
841 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
842 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
844 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
845 /// to individual Channels.
847 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
848 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
849 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
850 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
852 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
853 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
854 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
855 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
856 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
857 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
858 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
860 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
861 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
862 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
864 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
865 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
866 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
867 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
868 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
870 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
871 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
872 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
873 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
875 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
876 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
877 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
879 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
880 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
881 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
882 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
883 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
885 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
886 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
887 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
888 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
889 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
890 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
891 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
892 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
895 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
896 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
897 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
898 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
899 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
903 // `total_consistency_lock`
905 // |__`forward_htlcs`
907 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
909 // |__`per_peer_state`
911 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
913 // | |__`claimable_payments`
915 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
921 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
923 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
927 // | |__`pending_events`
929 // | |__`pending_background_events`
931 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
933 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
934 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
935 ES::Target: EntropySource,
936 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
937 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
938 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
942 default_configuration: UserConfig,
943 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
944 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
950 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
952 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
954 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
955 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
957 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
958 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
959 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
960 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
962 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
963 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
965 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
966 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
967 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
968 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
969 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
970 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
971 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
972 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
974 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
976 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
977 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
979 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
981 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
982 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
983 /// and via the classic SCID.
985 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
986 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
988 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
990 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
992 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
993 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
994 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
996 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
997 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
999 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1000 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1002 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1003 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1005 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1006 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1007 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1008 /// active channel list on load.
1010 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1011 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1013 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1015 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1016 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1017 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1019 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1020 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1021 /// the handling of the events.
1023 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1024 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1027 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1028 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1029 /// would break backwards compatability.
1030 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1031 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1032 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1034 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1035 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1037 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1039 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1040 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1041 /// confirmation depth.
1043 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1044 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1045 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1047 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1049 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1051 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1053 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1055 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1057 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1058 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1059 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1061 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1062 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1064 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1065 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1066 /// keeping additional state.
1067 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1069 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1070 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1071 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1072 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1074 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1075 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1077 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1078 /// are currently open with that peer.
1080 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1081 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1084 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1086 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1087 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1088 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1089 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1090 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1092 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1093 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1094 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1095 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1096 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1098 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1099 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1101 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1102 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1103 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1104 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1106 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1107 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1108 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1109 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1110 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1112 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1114 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1116 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1117 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1118 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1119 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1120 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1121 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1122 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1123 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1124 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1126 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1128 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1132 signer_provider: SP,
1137 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1139 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1140 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1141 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1142 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1143 pub struct ChainParameters {
1144 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1145 pub network: Network,
1147 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1149 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1150 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1153 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1160 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1161 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1162 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1163 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1164 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1165 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1167 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1168 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1169 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1170 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1171 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1173 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1174 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1177 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1178 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1179 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1180 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1182 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1183 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1184 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1185 _read_guard: read_guard,
1190 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1191 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1192 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1193 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1195 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1196 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1197 should_persist: persist_check,
1198 _read_guard: read_guard,
1203 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1204 fn drop(&mut self) {
1205 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1206 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1211 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1212 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1214 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1216 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1217 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1218 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1219 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1220 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1222 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1223 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1225 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1227 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1228 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1229 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1230 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1231 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1232 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1233 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1234 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1235 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1236 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1237 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1238 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1239 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1241 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1242 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1244 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1245 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1246 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1247 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1249 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1250 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1251 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1252 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1253 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1254 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1257 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1259 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1260 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1263 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1265 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1266 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1268 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1269 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1270 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1271 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1273 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1274 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1275 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1277 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1278 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1279 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1281 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1282 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1283 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1284 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1286 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1287 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1288 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1290 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1291 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1292 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1294 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1295 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1296 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1297 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1298 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1299 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1300 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1301 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1302 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1303 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1304 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1307 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1308 /// to better separate parameters.
1309 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1310 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1311 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1312 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1313 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1314 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1315 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1316 pub features: InitFeatures,
1317 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1318 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1319 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1321 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1323 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1324 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1325 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1326 /// payments to us through this channel.
1327 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1328 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1329 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1330 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1331 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1332 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1333 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1336 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1337 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1338 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1339 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1340 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1341 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1342 /// lifetime of the channel.
1343 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1344 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1345 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1346 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1347 /// our counterparty already.
1349 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1350 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1351 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1352 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1354 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1355 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1356 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1357 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1359 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1360 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1362 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1363 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1365 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1366 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1367 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1368 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1369 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1370 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1371 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1372 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1373 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1376 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1378 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1379 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1380 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1381 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1382 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1383 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1384 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1386 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1387 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1389 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1390 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1391 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1392 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1393 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1394 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1395 /// this value on chain.
1397 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1399 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1401 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1402 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1403 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1404 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1406 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1407 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1408 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1410 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1411 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1412 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1413 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1414 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1416 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1417 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1418 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1419 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1421 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1422 pub balance_msat: u64,
1423 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1424 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1425 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1426 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1428 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1430 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1431 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1432 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1433 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1434 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1435 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1436 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1437 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1439 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1440 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1441 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1442 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1443 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1444 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1445 /// route which is valid.
1446 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1447 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1448 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1449 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1450 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1451 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1453 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1454 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1455 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1456 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1457 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1458 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1459 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1460 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1461 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1463 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1465 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1466 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1467 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1468 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1469 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1471 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1472 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1473 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1474 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1475 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1476 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1477 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1479 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1480 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1481 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1482 pub is_outbound: bool,
1483 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1484 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1485 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1486 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1487 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1489 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1490 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1491 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1492 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1493 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1494 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1495 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1497 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1498 pub is_usable: bool,
1499 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1500 pub is_public: bool,
1501 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1502 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1503 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1504 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1505 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1506 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1508 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1509 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1512 impl ChannelDetails {
1513 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1514 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1515 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1517 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1518 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1519 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1520 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1523 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1524 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1525 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1527 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1528 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1529 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1530 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1533 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
1534 context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1535 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1537 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1539 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1540 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1541 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1543 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1544 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1545 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1546 features: latest_features,
1547 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1548 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1549 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1550 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1551 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1552 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1553 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1554 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1555 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1556 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1558 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1559 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1560 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1561 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1562 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1563 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1564 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1565 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1566 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1567 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1568 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1569 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1570 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1571 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1572 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1573 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1574 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1575 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1576 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1577 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1578 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1579 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1580 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1581 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1582 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1583 config: Some(context.config()),
1584 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1589 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1590 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1591 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1592 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1593 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1594 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1595 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1596 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1597 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1599 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1601 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1602 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1604 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1605 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1606 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1607 /// to drop the channel.
1611 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1612 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1613 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1614 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1615 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1617 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1619 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1620 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1621 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1624 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1625 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1626 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1628 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1629 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1630 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1632 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1633 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1634 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1636 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1637 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1641 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1643 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1645 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1646 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1647 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1648 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1650 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1651 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1652 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1655 macro_rules! handle_error {
1656 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1657 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1658 // entering the macro.
1659 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1660 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1664 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1665 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1667 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1668 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1669 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1670 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1674 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1675 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1676 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1677 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1682 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1683 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1685 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1686 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1687 action: err.action.clone()
1691 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1692 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1693 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1694 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1695 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1699 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1704 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1707 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1708 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1709 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1715 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1716 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1717 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1718 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1719 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1720 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1722 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1723 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1724 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1725 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1726 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1728 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1729 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1731 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1735 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1736 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1737 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1739 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1740 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1742 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1743 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1745 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1746 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1747 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1748 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1749 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1750 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1754 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1756 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1757 // In any case, just close the channel.
1758 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1759 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1760 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1761 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1762 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1763 shutdown_res, None))
1769 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1770 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1774 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1776 $entry.remove_entry();
1784 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1785 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1789 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1791 $entry.remove_entry();
1799 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1800 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1804 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1806 $entry.remove_entry();
1814 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1815 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1817 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1818 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1824 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1825 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1826 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1827 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1828 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1830 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1831 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1832 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1833 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1834 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1835 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1836 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1837 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1838 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1839 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1844 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1845 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1846 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1847 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1848 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1849 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1850 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1851 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1852 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1854 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1859 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1860 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1861 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1862 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1863 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1864 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1865 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1866 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1867 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1869 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1874 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1875 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1876 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1877 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1878 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1879 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1880 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1881 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1882 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1883 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1884 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1886 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1887 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1888 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1894 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1895 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1897 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1898 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1899 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1900 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1901 updates.announcement_sigs);
1902 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1903 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1906 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1907 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1908 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1910 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1912 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1913 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1915 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1916 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1917 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1918 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1923 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1924 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1925 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1926 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1927 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1928 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1930 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1931 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1932 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1935 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1936 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1937 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1938 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1939 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1940 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1941 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1942 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1946 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1952 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
1953 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1954 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1955 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
1957 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
1958 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1960 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1961 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
1962 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
1963 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
1964 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
1965 // filter for uniqueness here.
1966 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
1967 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
1968 in_flight_updates.push($update);
1969 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
1971 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
1972 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1973 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1975 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
1976 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
1977 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1981 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1982 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1986 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1987 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1988 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1989 while !processed_all_events {
1990 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1994 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1997 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1998 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1999 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2001 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2002 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2003 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2005 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2006 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2007 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2008 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2012 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2013 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2014 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2015 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2018 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2020 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2021 $event_to_handle = event;
2023 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2024 post_event_actions.push(action);
2029 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2030 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2031 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2032 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2033 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2034 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2037 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2038 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2039 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2040 processed_all_events = false;
2043 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2044 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2050 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2052 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2053 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2054 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2055 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2056 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2057 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2061 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2063 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2065 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2066 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2068 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2070 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2071 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2072 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2075 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2076 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2077 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2079 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2080 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2081 current_timestamp: u32,
2083 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2084 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2085 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2086 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2088 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2089 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2090 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2095 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2097 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2098 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2099 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2100 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2101 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2102 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2103 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2104 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2106 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2109 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2110 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2112 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2114 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2116 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2118 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2119 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2120 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2121 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2122 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2123 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2133 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2134 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2135 &self.default_configuration
2138 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2139 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2140 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2143 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2144 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2146 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2148 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2152 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2157 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2159 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2160 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2161 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2162 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2163 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2165 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2166 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2168 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2169 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2170 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2172 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2173 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2174 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2176 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2177 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2178 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2179 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2180 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2181 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2183 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2184 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2185 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2186 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2187 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2188 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2191 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2192 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2193 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2195 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2197 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2198 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2200 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2202 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2203 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2204 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2205 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2206 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2207 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2211 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2216 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2218 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2219 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2220 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2222 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2224 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2227 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2230 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2231 node_id: their_network_key,
2234 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2237 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2238 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2239 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2240 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2241 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2242 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2243 // the same channel.
2244 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2246 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2247 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2248 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2249 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2250 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2251 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2252 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2253 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2254 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2262 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2263 /// more information.
2264 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2265 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2266 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2267 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2268 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2269 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2270 // the same channel.
2271 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2273 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2274 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2275 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2276 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2277 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2278 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2279 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2280 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2283 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2284 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2285 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2288 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2289 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2290 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2298 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2299 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2301 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2302 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2304 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2305 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2306 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2307 // really wanted anyway.
2308 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2311 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2312 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2313 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2314 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2316 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2317 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2318 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2319 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2320 let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2321 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2323 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2325 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2326 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2327 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2328 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2334 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2335 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2337 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2338 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2339 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2341 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2342 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2343 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2344 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2345 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2346 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2347 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2348 total_msat: *total_msat,
2351 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2352 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2354 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2355 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2357 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2362 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2363 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2364 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2365 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2366 Some(transaction) => {
2367 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2368 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2373 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2374 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2375 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2376 reason: closure_reason
2380 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2381 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2383 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2384 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2386 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2388 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2389 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2391 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2392 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2394 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2395 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2396 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2397 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2398 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2399 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2400 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2402 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2403 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2404 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2405 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2406 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2410 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2411 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2412 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2413 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2416 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2417 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2418 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2419 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2423 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2427 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2430 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2431 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2433 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2434 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2435 // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2436 // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2439 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2440 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2441 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2442 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2445 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2449 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2450 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2451 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2453 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2454 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2456 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2457 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2458 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2459 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2461 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2463 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2464 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2465 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2468 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2469 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2470 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2471 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2472 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2473 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2476 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2477 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2478 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2480 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2481 /// the channel being closed or not:
2482 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2483 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2484 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2485 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2486 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2487 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2488 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2490 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2491 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2492 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2493 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2495 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2497 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2498 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2499 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2502 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2503 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2504 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2505 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2506 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2507 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2511 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2512 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2513 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2514 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2515 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2516 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2517 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2518 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2520 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2521 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2522 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2523 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2524 // ignore the result here.
2525 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2529 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2530 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2531 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2532 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2533 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2534 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2535 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2536 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2538 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2539 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2540 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2542 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2544 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2545 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2546 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2547 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2548 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2549 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2550 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2551 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2552 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2553 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2554 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2555 // Unfunded channel has no update
2556 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2557 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2558 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2559 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2560 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2561 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2562 // Unfunded channel has no update
2563 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2565 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2568 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2569 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2570 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2575 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2578 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2579 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2580 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2581 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2582 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2583 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2584 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2585 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2586 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2587 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2588 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2589 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2600 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2601 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2602 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2604 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2605 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2606 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2609 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2610 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2611 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2613 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2614 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2615 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2616 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2617 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2620 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2621 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2622 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2623 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2624 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2628 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2629 /// local transaction(s).
2630 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2631 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2632 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2636 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2637 &self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2638 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2639 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2640 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError> {
2641 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2642 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2643 return Err(ReceiveError {
2644 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2646 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2649 // final_expiry_too_soon
2650 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2651 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2653 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2654 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2655 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2656 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2657 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2658 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2659 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2660 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2661 return Err(ReceiveError {
2662 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2663 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2666 if (!allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat) ||
2667 (allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward >
2668 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2670 return Err(ReceiveError {
2672 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2673 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2677 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2678 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2679 return Err(ReceiveError {
2680 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2681 err_data: Vec::new(),
2682 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2685 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2686 if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2687 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2688 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2689 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2690 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2691 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2692 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2693 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2694 return Err(ReceiveError {
2695 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2696 err_data: Vec::new(),
2697 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2700 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2701 return Err(ReceiveError {
2702 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2703 err_data: Vec::new(),
2704 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2707 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2711 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2713 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2714 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2717 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2718 phantom_shared_secret,
2721 return Err(ReceiveError {
2722 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2723 err_data: Vec::new(),
2724 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2729 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2732 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2733 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2734 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2735 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2736 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2740 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2741 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2742 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2743 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2744 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2746 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2747 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2748 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2749 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2750 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2751 failure_code: $err_code,
2757 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2758 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2761 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2762 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2763 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2765 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2766 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2767 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2768 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2769 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2770 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2771 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2772 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2774 macro_rules! return_err {
2775 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2777 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2778 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2779 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2780 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2781 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2782 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2788 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2790 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2791 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2793 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2794 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2797 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2798 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2799 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
2800 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
2801 outgoing_cltv_value,
2804 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2805 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2806 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2808 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2809 // inbound channel's state.
2810 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2811 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2812 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
2814 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2818 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2819 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2820 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2821 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2822 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2823 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2824 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2825 // phantom or an intercept.
2826 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2827 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2828 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2832 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2835 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2837 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2838 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2839 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2840 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2841 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2843 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2844 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2845 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2847 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2848 // have no consistency guarantees.
2849 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2853 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2854 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2855 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2856 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2857 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2859 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2860 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2861 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2862 // we don't have the channel here.
2863 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2865 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2867 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2868 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2869 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2870 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2871 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2872 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2873 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2874 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2875 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2876 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2877 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2879 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2882 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2883 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2885 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2886 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2890 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2891 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2892 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2893 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2895 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2902 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2903 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2904 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2905 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2906 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2907 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2909 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2910 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2912 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2913 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2914 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2915 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2916 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2917 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2918 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2919 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2920 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2921 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2927 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2928 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2929 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2930 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2932 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2933 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2935 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2936 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2937 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2939 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2940 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2941 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2942 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2943 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2944 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2945 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2949 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2951 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
2954 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
2955 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
2956 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2957 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2958 macro_rules! return_err {
2959 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2961 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2962 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2963 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2964 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2965 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2966 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2972 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2974 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
2975 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
2978 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2979 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2980 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2981 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2982 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2984 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2987 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2988 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2989 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2991 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2992 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2993 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2996 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2997 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2998 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2999 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
3003 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
3004 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3005 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
3008 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
3009 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3010 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
3011 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
3012 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
3013 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3019 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3020 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3021 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3023 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3024 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3025 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3027 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3028 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3029 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3030 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3031 return Err(LightningError {
3032 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3033 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3036 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3037 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3039 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3040 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3043 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3044 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3045 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3046 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3048 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3049 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3050 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3052 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3053 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3054 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3055 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3056 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3057 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3061 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3064 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3065 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3066 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3068 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3069 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3070 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3071 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3072 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3075 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3076 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3078 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3079 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3080 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3081 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3082 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3083 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3084 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3085 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3087 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3088 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3089 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3091 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(unsigned.clone())).unwrap();
3093 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3100 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3101 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3102 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
3105 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3106 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3107 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3109 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3110 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3111 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3113 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3114 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3115 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3117 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3118 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3120 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3121 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3122 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3123 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3126 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3127 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3128 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3129 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3130 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3131 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3132 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3133 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3135 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3136 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3137 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3139 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3140 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3142 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3143 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3144 Some(monitor_update) => {
3145 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3146 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3148 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3149 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3150 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3151 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3152 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3153 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3154 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3162 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3163 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3164 // `channel_by_id` map.
3165 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3166 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3171 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3172 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3174 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3179 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3181 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3182 /// fields for more info.
3184 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3185 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3187 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3189 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3190 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3191 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3192 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3193 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3195 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3196 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3197 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3198 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3199 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3201 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3202 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3203 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3204 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3206 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3208 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3209 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3210 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3212 /// In general, a path may raise:
3213 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3214 /// node public key) is specified.
3215 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3216 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3218 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3219 /// relevant updates.
3221 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3222 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3223 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3225 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3226 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3227 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3228 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3229 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3230 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3231 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3232 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3233 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3234 self.pending_outbound_payments
3235 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3236 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3237 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3240 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3241 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3242 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3243 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3244 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3245 self.pending_outbound_payments
3246 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3247 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3248 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3249 &self.pending_events,
3250 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3251 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3255 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3256 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3258 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3259 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3260 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3264 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3265 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3266 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3270 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3271 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3275 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3276 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3277 /// retries are exhausted.
3279 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3280 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3282 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3283 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3284 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3286 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3287 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3289 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3290 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3291 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3292 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3293 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3296 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3297 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3298 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3299 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3300 /// never reach the recipient.
3302 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3303 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3305 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3306 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3308 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3309 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3310 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3311 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3312 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3313 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3314 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3315 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3316 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3319 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3320 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3322 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3325 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3326 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3327 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3328 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3329 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3330 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3331 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3332 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3333 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3334 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3337 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3338 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3339 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3340 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3341 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3342 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3343 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3344 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3345 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3348 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3351 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3352 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3355 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3356 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3357 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3358 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3359 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3360 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3361 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3362 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3364 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3365 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3366 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3368 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3370 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3371 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3372 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3373 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3374 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3375 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
3376 } else { unreachable!(); });
3378 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3379 Err((chan, err)) => {
3380 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3381 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3383 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3384 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3385 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3391 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3393 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3394 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3399 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3400 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3403 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3404 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3405 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3407 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3408 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3409 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3410 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3419 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3420 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3421 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3425 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3427 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3428 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3430 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3431 /// across the p2p network.
3433 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3434 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3436 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3437 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3438 /// keys per-channel).
3440 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3441 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3442 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3444 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3445 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3446 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3448 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3449 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3450 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3451 /// for more details.
3453 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3454 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3455 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3456 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3458 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3459 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3460 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3461 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3466 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3467 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3468 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3469 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3470 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3471 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3472 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3473 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3477 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3478 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3479 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3480 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3484 let mut output_index = None;
3485 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3486 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3487 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3488 if output_index.is_some() {
3489 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3490 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3493 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3496 if output_index.is_none() {
3497 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3498 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3501 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3505 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3507 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3508 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3509 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3510 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3512 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3513 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3515 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3516 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3518 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3520 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3521 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3522 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3523 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3524 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3525 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3526 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3527 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3528 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3529 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3530 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3531 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3532 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3536 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3537 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3538 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3539 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3540 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3541 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3542 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3543 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3544 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3545 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3549 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3550 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3551 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3552 config.apply(config_update);
3553 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3556 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3557 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3558 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3559 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3560 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3567 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3568 &mut channel.context
3569 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3570 &mut channel.context
3572 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3573 debug_assert!(false);
3574 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3576 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3577 log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3580 let mut config = context.config();
3581 config.apply(config_update);
3582 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3583 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3584 context.update_config(&config);
3589 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3591 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3592 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3593 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3594 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3596 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3597 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3599 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3600 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3602 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3604 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3605 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3606 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3607 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3608 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3609 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3610 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3611 pub fn update_channel_config(
3612 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3613 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3614 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3617 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3618 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3620 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3621 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3623 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3624 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3625 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3626 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3627 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3629 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3630 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3631 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3634 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3637 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3638 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3639 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3640 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3641 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3642 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3645 let next_hop_scid = {
3646 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3647 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3648 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3649 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3650 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3651 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3653 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3654 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3655 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3658 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3660 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3661 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3662 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3667 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3668 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3669 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3672 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3673 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3674 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3676 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3678 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3679 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3680 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3681 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3682 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3685 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3686 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3687 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3688 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3689 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3691 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3695 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3696 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3698 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3701 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3702 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3703 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3705 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3706 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3707 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3710 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3711 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3712 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3713 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3714 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3715 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3716 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3719 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3720 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3721 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3722 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3727 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3729 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3730 /// Will likely generate further events.
3731 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3732 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3734 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3735 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3736 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3738 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3739 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3741 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3742 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3743 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3745 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3746 match forward_info {
3747 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3748 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3749 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3750 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3751 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3754 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3755 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3756 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3758 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3759 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3760 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3761 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3762 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3763 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3766 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3767 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3769 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3772 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3773 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3779 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3780 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3782 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3786 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3787 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3789 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3793 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3794 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3795 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3796 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3797 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3799 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3800 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3801 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3802 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3803 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3805 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3807 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3808 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3812 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3813 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3814 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3815 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3817 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3818 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3824 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3827 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3830 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3831 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3832 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3833 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3834 // problem, not ours.
3840 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3841 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3843 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3847 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3848 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3849 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3850 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3853 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3854 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3855 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3856 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3857 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3860 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3861 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3862 match forward_info {
3863 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3864 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3865 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3866 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3867 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3870 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3871 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3872 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3873 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3874 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3875 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3876 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3877 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3879 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3880 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3881 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3884 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3885 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3887 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3889 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3890 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3891 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3892 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3897 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3898 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3900 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3901 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3902 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3903 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3905 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3906 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3908 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3910 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3911 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3912 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3921 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3922 match forward_info {
3923 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3924 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3925 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3926 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
3927 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3930 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3931 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3932 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3934 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3935 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3936 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3938 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3939 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3940 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3943 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3944 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3947 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3950 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3951 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3952 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3953 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3954 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3955 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3956 phantom_shared_secret,
3958 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3959 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3960 // if routing nodes overpay
3961 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3962 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3964 total_value_received: None,
3965 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3968 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
3971 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3973 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3974 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3975 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3976 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3977 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3978 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3980 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3981 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3982 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3983 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3984 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3985 phantom_shared_secret,
3987 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3988 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3990 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3993 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3994 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3995 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3996 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3997 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4000 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4001 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4002 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4003 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4004 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4005 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4007 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4008 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4009 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4011 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4012 .entry(payment_hash)
4013 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4014 .or_insert_with(|| {
4015 committed_to_claimable = true;
4017 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4020 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4021 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4022 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4023 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4025 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4026 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4027 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4029 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4030 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4031 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4034 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4036 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4037 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4038 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4039 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4040 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4041 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4042 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4043 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4044 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4045 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4047 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4049 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4050 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4051 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4052 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4053 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4054 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4055 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4056 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4057 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4058 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4059 committed_to_claimable = true;
4061 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4062 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4063 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4064 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4065 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4066 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4067 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4068 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4069 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4070 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4074 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4075 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4076 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4077 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4078 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4080 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4082 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4083 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4085 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4086 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4087 committed_to_claimable = true;
4090 payment_claimable_generated
4094 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4095 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4096 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4097 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4098 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4099 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4100 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4101 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4102 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4103 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4104 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4105 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4106 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4107 Ok(result) => result,
4109 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4110 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4113 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4114 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4115 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4116 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4117 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4118 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4121 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4122 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4123 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4125 check_total_value!(purpose);
4127 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4128 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4129 check_total_value!(purpose);
4133 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4134 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4135 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4136 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4138 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4139 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4140 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4141 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4142 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4143 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4144 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4145 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4147 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4148 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4149 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4151 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4152 if payment_claimable_generated {
4153 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4159 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4160 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4168 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4169 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4170 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4171 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
4172 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
4173 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
4175 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4176 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4178 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4180 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4181 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4182 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4184 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4186 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4187 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4188 events.append(&mut new_events);
4191 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4193 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4194 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4195 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4197 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4199 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4200 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4201 if background_events.is_empty() {
4202 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4205 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4207 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4208 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4209 // monitor updating completing.
4210 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4212 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4213 let mut updated_chan = false;
4215 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4216 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4217 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4218 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4219 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4220 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4221 updated_chan = true;
4222 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4223 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4225 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4230 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4231 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4233 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4234 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4235 // however, ensure that.
4237 log_error!(self.logger,
4238 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4240 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4242 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4243 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4244 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4245 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4246 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4247 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4248 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4250 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4251 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4252 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4253 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4254 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4260 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4263 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4264 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4265 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4266 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4267 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4270 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4271 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4272 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4273 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4274 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4275 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4276 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4278 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4279 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4280 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4281 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4283 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4284 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4286 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4287 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4291 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4292 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4293 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4294 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4295 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4296 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4297 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4299 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4300 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4302 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4303 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4304 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4305 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4306 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4307 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4312 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4313 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4321 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4323 /// This currently includes:
4324 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4325 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4326 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4328 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4329 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4330 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4331 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4333 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4334 /// estimate fetches.
4336 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4337 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4338 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4339 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4340 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4342 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4343 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4345 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4346 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4347 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4349 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4350 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4351 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4352 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4353 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4354 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4355 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4356 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4361 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4362 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4364 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4365 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4366 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4367 if needs_close { return false; }
4370 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4371 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4372 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4373 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4374 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4375 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4376 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4377 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4379 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4380 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4381 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4382 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4386 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4388 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4391 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4393 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4394 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4395 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4396 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4400 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4402 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4408 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4410 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4411 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4412 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4413 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4414 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4415 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4416 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4417 channel_id: *chan_id,
4418 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4427 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4429 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
4430 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4432 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4433 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4434 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing pending outbound channel {} for not establishing in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4435 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4436 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4437 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4443 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context));
4444 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context));
4446 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4447 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4452 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4453 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4454 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4455 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4456 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4457 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4458 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4459 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4460 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4461 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4462 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4463 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4464 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4465 // have no channels to the peer.
4466 let remove_entry = {
4467 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4468 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4471 entry.remove_entry();
4474 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4479 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4480 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4481 // This should be unreachable
4482 debug_assert!(false);
4485 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4486 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4487 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4488 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4489 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4490 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4491 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4494 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4495 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4496 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4498 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4499 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4506 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4507 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4508 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4509 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4510 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4513 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4514 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4517 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4519 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4520 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4521 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4522 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4523 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4530 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4531 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4532 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4534 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4535 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4536 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4537 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4539 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4540 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4541 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4542 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4543 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4544 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4547 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4548 /// reason for the failure.
4550 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4551 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4552 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4554 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4555 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4556 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4557 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4558 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4559 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4560 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4565 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4566 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4567 match failure_code {
4568 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4569 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4570 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4571 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4572 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4573 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4578 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4579 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4581 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4583 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4584 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4585 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4586 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4587 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4588 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4589 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4591 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4593 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4594 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4596 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4601 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4602 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4603 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4604 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4605 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4606 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4607 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4608 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4609 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4610 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4612 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4613 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4614 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4615 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4617 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4618 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4619 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4620 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4621 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4625 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4626 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4627 // be surfaced to the user.
4628 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4629 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4630 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4632 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4633 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4634 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4635 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4636 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4637 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4638 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4639 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4641 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4643 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4646 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4647 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4648 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4649 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4653 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4654 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4655 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4656 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4657 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4658 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4659 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4660 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4661 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4664 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4665 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4666 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4669 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4670 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4671 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4673 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4674 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4675 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4676 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4677 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4679 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4680 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4681 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4683 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4684 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4685 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4686 push_forward_ev = true;
4688 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4689 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4690 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4693 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4696 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4697 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4698 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4699 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4700 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4701 failed_next_destination: destination,
4707 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4708 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4710 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4711 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4712 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4713 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4715 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4716 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4717 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4718 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4720 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4721 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4722 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4723 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4724 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4725 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4726 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4727 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4729 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4732 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4733 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4734 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4735 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4736 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4737 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4738 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4739 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4744 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4745 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4746 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4748 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4749 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4750 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4751 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4756 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4758 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4759 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4760 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4761 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4762 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4763 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4764 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4765 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4766 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4768 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4769 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4770 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4771 debug_assert!(false);
4775 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4777 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4778 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4779 debug_assert!(false);
4783 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4784 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4786 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4787 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4788 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4789 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4792 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4793 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4794 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4795 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4799 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4800 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4801 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4802 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4804 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4805 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4806 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4807 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4808 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4813 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4814 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4815 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4816 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4817 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4818 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4819 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4821 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4824 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4825 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4826 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4827 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4831 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4832 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4833 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4834 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4836 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
4837 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
4838 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
4839 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4842 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4843 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4844 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4845 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4849 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4850 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4851 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4854 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4855 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4856 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4857 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4858 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4859 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4861 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4862 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4863 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4864 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4865 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4868 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
4869 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4870 if let Err(e) = res {
4871 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4872 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4873 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4874 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4875 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4878 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
4879 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
4880 // monitor update as a background event.
4881 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
4882 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
4883 counterparty_node_id,
4884 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
4885 update: monitor_update.clone(),
4893 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4894 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4895 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4901 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4902 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4903 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4904 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4905 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4906 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4907 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4908 // again on restart.
4909 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4910 payment_preimage, update_res);
4913 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
4914 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
4916 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
4917 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
4918 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
4919 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
4920 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
4921 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
4922 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
4923 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
4924 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
4925 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
4928 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4929 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4930 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4931 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4932 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4933 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4937 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4938 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4941 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4943 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4944 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
4945 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
4946 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4948 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4949 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4950 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4951 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4952 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4953 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4954 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4957 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4958 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4960 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4961 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4962 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4963 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4965 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4969 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4970 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4971 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4977 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4978 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4979 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4982 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4983 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4985 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4986 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4987 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4988 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4989 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4993 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4994 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4996 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4997 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4998 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5005 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5006 /// update completion.
5007 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5008 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5009 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5010 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5011 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5012 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5014 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
5015 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5016 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5017 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5018 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5019 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5021 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5023 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5024 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5025 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5026 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5029 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5030 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5032 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5033 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5034 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5039 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5040 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5041 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5042 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5047 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5048 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5049 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5050 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5051 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5056 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5060 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5066 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5067 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5068 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5072 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5073 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5074 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5080 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5081 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5083 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5084 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5086 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5087 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5088 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5089 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5090 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5095 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5096 let mut peer_state_lock;
5097 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5098 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5099 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5100 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5102 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5105 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5106 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5107 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5108 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5109 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5112 let remaining_in_flight =
5113 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5114 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5117 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5118 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5119 remaining_in_flight);
5120 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5123 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5126 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5128 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5129 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5132 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5133 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5134 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5136 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5137 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5138 /// used to accept such channels.
5140 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5141 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5142 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5143 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5146 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5147 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5149 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5150 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5151 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5153 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5154 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5156 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5157 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5159 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5160 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5162 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5163 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5164 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5165 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5168 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5169 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5171 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5172 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5173 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5174 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5175 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5176 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5177 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5178 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5179 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
5180 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
5181 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
5182 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
5185 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
5186 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5187 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5188 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5189 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5190 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5193 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5194 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5195 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5197 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5198 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5199 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5200 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5201 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5202 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5203 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5204 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5207 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5208 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5209 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5213 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5214 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5215 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5218 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5219 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
5225 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5226 /// or 0-conf channels.
5228 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5229 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5230 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5231 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5232 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5233 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5235 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5236 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5237 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5238 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5239 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5240 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5241 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5245 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5248 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5249 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5251 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5252 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5253 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5254 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5255 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5256 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5258 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5261 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5262 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5263 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5266 num_unfunded_channels
5269 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5270 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5271 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5274 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5275 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5278 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5279 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5280 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5281 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5283 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5284 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5285 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5286 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5287 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5289 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5290 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5292 debug_assert!(false);
5293 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5295 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5296 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5298 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5299 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5300 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5301 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5302 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5303 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5305 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5306 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5307 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5310 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5311 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5312 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5313 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5314 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5317 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5318 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5319 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5322 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5323 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5327 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5328 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5330 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5331 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5333 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5334 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5335 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5336 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5338 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5339 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5341 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5342 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5343 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5346 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5347 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5348 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5349 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5350 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5351 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5352 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5355 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5360 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5361 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5362 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5363 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5365 debug_assert!(false);
5366 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5368 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5369 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5370 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5371 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5372 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5373 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5378 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5379 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5380 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5381 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5382 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5384 user_channel_id: user_id,
5389 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5390 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5392 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5393 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5395 debug_assert!(false);
5396 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5401 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5402 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5403 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5404 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5406 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5407 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5408 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5409 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5410 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5411 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5412 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5413 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5414 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
5418 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5421 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5422 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5423 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5425 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5426 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5427 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5428 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5429 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5430 funding_msg.channel_id))
5432 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5433 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5437 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5438 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5439 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5440 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5441 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5442 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5443 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5447 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5449 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5450 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5451 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5452 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5454 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5455 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5456 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5457 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5458 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5459 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5460 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5461 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5469 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5470 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5471 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5472 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5474 debug_assert!(false);
5475 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5478 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5479 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5480 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5481 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5482 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5483 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5484 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5485 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5486 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5487 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5488 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5489 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5490 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5491 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5496 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5500 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5501 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5502 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5504 debug_assert!(false);
5505 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5507 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5508 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5509 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5511 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5512 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5513 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5514 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5515 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5516 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5517 msg: announcement_sigs,
5519 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5520 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5521 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5522 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5523 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5524 // announcement_signatures.
5525 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5526 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5527 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5528 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5535 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5536 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5541 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5545 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5546 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5547 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5548 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5549 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5551 debug_assert!(false);
5552 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5554 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5555 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5556 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5557 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5558 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5559 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5560 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5561 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5562 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5564 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5565 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5566 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5567 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5568 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5570 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5571 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5572 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5573 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5574 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5577 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5578 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5579 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5580 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5582 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5583 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5584 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5585 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5586 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5587 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5592 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5593 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5594 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5595 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5599 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5602 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5603 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5604 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5605 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5611 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5612 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5613 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5615 debug_assert!(false);
5616 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5618 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5619 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5620 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5621 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5622 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5623 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5624 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5625 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5626 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5631 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5632 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5633 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5634 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5635 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5636 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5637 } else { (tx, None) }
5639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5642 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5643 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5644 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5646 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5647 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5648 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5649 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5650 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5654 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5659 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5660 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5661 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5662 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5664 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5665 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5666 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5667 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5669 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5670 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5671 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5673 debug_assert!(false);
5674 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5676 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5677 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5678 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5679 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5681 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5682 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5683 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5684 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5685 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5687 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5688 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5689 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5690 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5691 match pending_forward_info {
5692 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5693 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5694 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5695 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5697 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5698 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5699 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5700 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5701 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5704 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5706 _ => pending_forward_info
5709 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5716 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5717 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5718 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5719 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5721 debug_assert!(false);
5722 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5726 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5728 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5730 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5733 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5737 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5738 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5739 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5741 debug_assert!(false);
5742 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5746 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5747 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5748 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5755 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5756 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5757 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5759 debug_assert!(false);
5760 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5762 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5763 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5764 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5765 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5766 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5767 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5768 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5770 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5773 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5777 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5778 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5779 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5781 debug_assert!(false);
5782 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5784 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5785 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5786 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5787 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5788 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5789 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5790 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5791 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5792 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5800 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5801 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5802 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5803 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5804 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5805 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5806 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5807 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5808 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5809 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5810 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5812 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5813 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5815 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5816 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5817 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5819 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5820 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5822 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5823 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5824 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5826 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5827 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5828 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5829 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5830 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5831 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5832 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5833 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5834 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5837 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5838 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5840 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5841 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5842 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5843 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5844 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5845 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5846 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5847 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5850 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5851 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5852 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5857 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5858 // payments are being processed.
5859 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5860 push_forward_event = true;
5862 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5863 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5870 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5871 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5874 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5875 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5876 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5878 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5882 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5883 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5884 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5885 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
5886 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
5888 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
5889 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
5890 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
5891 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
5892 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
5893 // real by taking more time.
5894 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
5895 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5896 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5901 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5902 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
5903 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5904 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5905 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5906 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5907 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5909 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5910 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5911 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5912 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5913 channel_funding_outpoint,
5914 counterparty_node_id,
5919 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5920 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5921 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5922 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5924 debug_assert!(false);
5925 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5926 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5927 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5928 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5929 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5930 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5931 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5932 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5933 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5934 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5936 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5941 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5945 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5946 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5947 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5949 debug_assert!(false);
5950 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5952 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5953 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5954 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5955 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5956 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5963 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5964 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5965 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5967 debug_assert!(false);
5968 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5970 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5971 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5972 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5973 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5974 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5975 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5978 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5979 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5980 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5981 msg, &self.default_configuration
5983 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5984 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5985 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5988 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5993 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5994 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5995 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5996 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5998 // It's not a local channel
5999 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6002 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6003 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6004 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6005 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6007 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6009 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6010 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6011 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6012 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6013 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6014 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6015 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6016 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6018 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6020 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6021 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6022 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6023 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6025 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
6026 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6031 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6034 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6036 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6039 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6041 debug_assert!(false);
6042 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6044 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6045 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6046 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6047 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6048 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6049 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6050 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6051 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6052 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6053 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6054 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6055 let mut channel_update = None;
6056 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6057 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6058 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6061 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6062 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6063 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6064 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6065 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6066 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6067 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6072 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6073 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6074 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6075 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6076 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6077 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6081 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6085 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6086 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6089 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6090 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6095 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6096 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6097 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6099 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6100 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6101 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6102 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6103 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6104 match monitor_event {
6105 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6106 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6107 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
6108 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6110 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
6111 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6112 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6113 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6116 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6117 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6118 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6119 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6121 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6122 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6123 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6124 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6127 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6128 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6129 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6130 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6131 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6132 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6133 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6134 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6135 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6136 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6137 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6141 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6142 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6144 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6146 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6147 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6148 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6149 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6150 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6157 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6158 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6164 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6165 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6168 has_pending_monitor_events
6171 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6172 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6173 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6175 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6176 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6177 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6180 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6181 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6182 /// update was applied.
6183 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6184 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6185 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6186 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6188 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6189 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6190 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6191 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6193 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6194 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6196 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6197 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6198 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6199 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6200 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6201 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6202 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6203 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6204 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6206 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6207 has_monitor_update = true;
6209 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6210 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6211 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6212 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6214 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6216 continue 'peer_loop;
6225 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6226 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6227 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6230 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6231 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6237 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6238 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6239 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6240 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6241 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6242 let mut has_update = false;
6244 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6246 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6247 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6248 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6249 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6250 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6251 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6252 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6253 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6255 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6256 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6259 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6260 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6261 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6262 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6263 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6268 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6270 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6271 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6272 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6278 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6279 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6287 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6288 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6294 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6295 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6297 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6298 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6299 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6300 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6301 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6302 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6303 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6304 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6305 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6306 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6307 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6308 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6309 assert!(should_broadcast);
6310 } else { unreachable!(); }
6311 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6312 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6313 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6316 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6320 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6323 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6324 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6326 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6327 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6328 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6329 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6331 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6333 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6334 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6338 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6339 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6341 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6343 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6344 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6346 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6347 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6348 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6349 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6350 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6351 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6352 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6353 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6354 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6355 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6356 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6359 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6360 /// stored external to LDK.
6362 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6363 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6364 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6366 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6367 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6370 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6371 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6372 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6373 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6375 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6376 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6377 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6378 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6379 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6381 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6382 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6383 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6384 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6385 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6387 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6388 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6390 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6391 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6395 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6396 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6398 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6400 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6401 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6403 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6404 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6405 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6406 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6407 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6408 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6409 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6412 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6413 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6415 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6416 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6417 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6420 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6421 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6423 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6424 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6425 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6426 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6428 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6429 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6430 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6431 Some(_) => continue,
6432 None => return scid_candidate
6437 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6439 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6440 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6442 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6443 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6444 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6448 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6449 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6450 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6452 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6453 /// times to get a unique scid.
6454 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6455 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6456 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6458 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6459 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6460 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6461 return scid_candidate
6465 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6466 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6467 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6468 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6470 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6471 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6472 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6473 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6474 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6475 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6476 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6477 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6486 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6487 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6488 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6489 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6490 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6494 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6495 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6496 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6497 events.push_back((event, None));
6501 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6502 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6503 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6507 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6508 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6512 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6513 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6516 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6517 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6518 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6519 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6520 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6521 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6523 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6524 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6525 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6526 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6528 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6529 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6530 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6531 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6533 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6537 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6538 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6539 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6540 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6541 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6542 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6543 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6547 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6548 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6549 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6550 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6551 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6552 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6553 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6555 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6557 if further_update_exists {
6558 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6563 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6564 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6568 log_debug!(self.logger,
6569 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6570 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6574 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6575 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6576 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6580 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6581 for action in actions {
6583 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6584 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6586 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6592 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6593 /// using the given event handler.
6595 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6596 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6600 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6604 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6606 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6607 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6608 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6609 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6610 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6611 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6615 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6616 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6617 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6618 /// is always placed next to each other.
6620 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6621 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6622 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6623 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6625 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6626 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6627 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6628 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6629 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6630 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6631 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6633 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6634 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6635 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6636 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6639 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6640 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6642 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6643 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6646 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6647 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6648 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6649 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6650 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6651 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6652 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6656 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6657 events.replace(pending_events);
6666 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6668 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6669 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6670 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6671 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6672 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6673 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6677 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6679 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6680 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6681 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6683 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6687 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6689 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6690 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6691 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6692 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6693 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6694 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6698 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6700 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6701 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6702 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6703 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6704 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6707 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6708 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6711 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6712 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6713 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6714 let new_height = height - 1;
6716 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6717 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6718 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6719 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6720 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6721 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6724 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6728 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6730 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6731 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6732 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6733 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6734 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6735 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6739 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6740 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6741 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6742 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6744 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6745 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6748 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6749 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6750 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6752 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6753 if height < last_best_block_height {
6754 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6755 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6759 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6760 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6761 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6762 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6764 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6765 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6767 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6768 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6769 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6771 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6773 macro_rules! max_time {
6774 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6776 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6777 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6778 // having an explicit local time source.
6779 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6780 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6781 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6782 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6783 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6789 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6790 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6791 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6792 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6796 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6797 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6798 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6799 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6800 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6801 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6802 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6803 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6810 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6811 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6812 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6813 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6814 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6815 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6816 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6817 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6818 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6823 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6825 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6826 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6827 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6828 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6829 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6830 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6834 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6835 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6837 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6838 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6839 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6840 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6841 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6843 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6844 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6846 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6847 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6848 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6849 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6850 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6851 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6852 let res = f(channel);
6853 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6854 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6855 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6856 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6857 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6859 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6860 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6861 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6862 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6863 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6864 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6865 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6870 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6875 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6876 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6879 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6880 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6881 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6882 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6883 msg: announcement_sigs,
6885 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6886 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6887 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6889 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6890 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6891 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6896 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6897 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6898 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6899 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6900 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6901 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6902 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6903 // is always consistent.
6904 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6905 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6906 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6907 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6908 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6911 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6912 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6913 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6914 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6915 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6916 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6917 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6921 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6922 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6923 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6924 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6925 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6926 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6927 data: reason_message,
6937 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6938 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6939 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6940 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6941 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6942 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6943 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6944 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6945 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6946 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6948 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6949 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6950 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6954 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6957 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6958 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6959 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6960 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6961 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6962 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6963 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6964 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6965 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6968 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6969 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6970 _ => unreachable!(),
6972 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6973 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6974 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6975 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6981 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6983 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6984 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6988 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6990 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6991 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6993 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6994 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6997 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6998 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6999 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7002 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7003 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7004 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7005 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7008 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7009 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7010 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7011 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7014 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7015 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7017 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7018 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7019 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7020 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7021 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7024 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7025 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7026 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7027 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7030 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7031 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7032 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7033 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7036 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7037 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7038 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7039 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7043 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7044 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7046 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7047 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7048 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7049 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7050 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7051 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7055 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7056 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7057 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7060 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7061 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7062 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7063 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7066 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7067 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7068 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7071 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7072 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7073 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7074 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7077 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7078 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7079 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7082 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7083 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7084 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7087 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7088 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7089 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7092 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7093 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7094 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7097 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7098 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7099 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7102 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7103 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7104 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7107 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7108 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7109 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7112 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7113 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7114 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7117 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7118 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7119 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7122 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7123 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7124 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7127 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7128 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7129 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7132 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7133 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7134 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7137 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7138 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7139 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7142 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7143 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7144 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7145 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7146 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7148 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7153 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7154 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7155 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7158 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7159 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7160 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7161 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7163 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7164 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7165 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7166 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7167 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7168 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7169 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7170 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7171 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7172 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7173 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7178 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7179 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7180 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7183 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7184 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7185 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7188 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7190 // V1 Channel Establishment
7191 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7192 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7193 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7194 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7195 // V2 Channel Establishment
7196 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7197 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7198 // Common Channel Establishment
7199 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7200 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7201 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7202 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7203 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7204 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7205 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7206 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7207 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7208 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7209 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7210 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7211 // Channel Operations
7212 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7213 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7214 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7215 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7216 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7217 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7219 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7220 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7221 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7222 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7223 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7224 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7225 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7226 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7227 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7230 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7231 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7232 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7233 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7236 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7238 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7240 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7241 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7245 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7246 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7247 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7251 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7253 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7254 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7255 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7256 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7257 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7258 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7261 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7262 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7263 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7264 if inbound_peer_limited {
7267 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7268 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7269 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7270 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7271 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7272 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7273 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7274 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7275 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7279 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7280 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7281 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7283 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7284 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7285 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7286 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7291 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7292 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7297 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7299 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7300 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7301 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7302 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7303 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7305 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7306 // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7307 // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7308 // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7309 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7310 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7311 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7312 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7316 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7320 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7321 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7323 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7324 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7326 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7327 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7328 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7329 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7330 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7331 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7332 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7334 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7335 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7336 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7340 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7341 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7342 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7343 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7344 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7345 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7346 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7347 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7348 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7349 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7357 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7358 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7362 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7363 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7366 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7367 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7370 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7371 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7374 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7375 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7376 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7377 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7380 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7381 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7382 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7383 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7386 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7387 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7388 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7389 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7392 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7393 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7394 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7395 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7398 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7399 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7400 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7401 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7404 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7405 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7406 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7407 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7410 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7411 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7412 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7413 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7416 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7417 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7418 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7419 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7422 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7423 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7424 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7425 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7429 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7430 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7431 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7432 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7435 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7436 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7438 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7439 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7440 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7441 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7442 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7445 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7446 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7447 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7448 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7451 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7452 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7453 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7454 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7457 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7458 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7459 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7460 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7461 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7462 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7463 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7464 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7465 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7466 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7467 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7468 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7469 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7470 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7471 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7472 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7473 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7474 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7475 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7476 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7481 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7482 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7484 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7485 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7486 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7487 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7490 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7491 (2, node_id, required),
7492 (4, features, required),
7493 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7494 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7495 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7496 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7499 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7500 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7501 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7502 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7503 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7504 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7505 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7506 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7507 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7508 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7509 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7510 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7511 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7512 (7, self.config, option),
7513 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7514 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7515 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7516 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7517 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7518 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7519 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7520 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7521 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7522 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7523 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7524 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7525 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7526 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7527 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7528 (32, self.is_public, required),
7529 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7530 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7531 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7532 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7533 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7539 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7540 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7541 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7542 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7543 (2, channel_id, required),
7544 (3, channel_type, option),
7545 (4, counterparty, required),
7546 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7547 (6, funding_txo, option),
7548 (7, config, option),
7549 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7550 (9, confirmations, option),
7551 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7552 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7553 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7554 (16, balance_msat, required),
7555 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7556 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7557 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7558 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7559 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7560 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7561 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7562 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7563 (26, is_outbound, required),
7564 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7565 (30, is_usable, required),
7566 (32, is_public, required),
7567 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7568 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7569 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7570 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7571 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7574 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7575 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7576 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7577 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7578 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7582 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7584 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7585 outbound_scid_alias,
7589 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7590 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7592 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7593 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7594 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7595 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7596 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7597 confirmations_required,
7599 force_close_spend_delay,
7600 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7601 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7602 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7603 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7604 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7605 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7606 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7607 channel_shutdown_state,
7612 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7613 (2, channels, required_vec),
7614 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7615 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7618 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7620 (0, onion_packet, required),
7621 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7624 (0, payment_data, required),
7625 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7626 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7627 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7629 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7630 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7631 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7632 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7633 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7637 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7638 (0, routing, required),
7639 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7640 (4, payment_hash, required),
7641 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7642 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7643 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7644 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7648 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7649 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7651 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7653 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7654 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7655 reason.write(writer)?;
7657 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7658 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7661 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7662 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7663 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7664 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7671 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7672 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7673 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7676 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7677 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7678 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7679 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7683 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7684 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7685 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7686 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7687 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7690 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7691 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7692 // messages contained in the variants.
7693 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7694 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7695 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7697 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7698 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7699 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7700 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7701 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7704 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7705 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7706 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7707 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7708 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7710 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7715 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7720 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7721 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7722 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7723 (2, outpoint, required),
7724 (4, htlc_id, required),
7725 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7728 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7729 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7730 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7731 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7732 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7734 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7735 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7736 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7737 (2, self.value, required),
7738 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7739 (4, payment_data, option),
7740 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7741 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7742 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7743 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7749 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7750 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7751 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7752 (0, prev_hop, required),
7753 (1, total_msat, option),
7754 (2, value_ser, required),
7755 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7756 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7757 (5, total_value_received, option),
7758 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7759 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7760 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7762 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7763 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7764 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7766 if payment_data.is_some() {
7767 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7769 if total_msat.is_none() {
7770 total_msat = Some(value);
7772 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7775 if total_msat.is_none() {
7776 if payment_data.is_none() {
7777 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7779 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7781 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7785 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7788 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7789 total_value_received,
7790 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7792 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7793 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7798 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7799 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7800 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7803 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7804 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7805 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
7806 let mut payment_id = None;
7807 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7808 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7809 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7810 (0, session_priv, required),
7811 (1, payment_id, option),
7812 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7813 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
7814 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7815 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7817 if payment_id.is_none() {
7818 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7820 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7822 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
7823 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7824 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7826 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7827 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7828 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7829 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7833 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7834 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7835 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7837 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7840 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7841 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7846 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7847 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7849 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7851 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7852 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7853 (0, session_priv, required),
7854 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7855 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7856 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7857 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
7858 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7859 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7862 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7864 field.write(writer)?;
7871 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7872 (0, forward_info, required),
7873 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7874 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7875 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7876 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7879 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7881 (0, htlc_id, required),
7882 (2, err_packet, required),
7887 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7888 (0, payment_secret, required),
7889 (2, expiry_time, required),
7890 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7891 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7892 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7895 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7897 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7898 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7899 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7900 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7901 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7902 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7906 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7907 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7909 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7911 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7913 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7914 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7915 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7918 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7920 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7921 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7922 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7923 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7924 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7925 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7926 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7927 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7929 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7930 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7931 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7932 unfunded_channels += 1;
7937 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7939 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7940 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7941 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7942 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7943 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7944 channel.write(writer)?;
7951 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7952 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7953 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7954 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7955 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7956 for forward in pending_forwards {
7957 forward.write(writer)?;
7962 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7964 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7965 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7966 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7968 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7969 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7970 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7971 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7972 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7973 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7974 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7975 htlc.write(writer)?;
7977 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7978 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7981 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7982 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7983 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7984 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7985 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7986 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7987 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7990 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7991 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7992 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7993 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7994 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7996 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7997 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7998 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7999 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8000 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8001 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8002 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8007 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8008 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8009 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8010 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8011 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8012 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8013 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8014 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8015 0u64.write(writer)?;
8017 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8018 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8019 event.write(writer)?;
8023 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8024 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8025 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8026 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8027 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8028 0u64.write(writer)?;
8030 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8031 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8032 // likely to be identical.
8033 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8034 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8036 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8037 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8038 hash.write(writer)?;
8039 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8042 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8043 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8044 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8045 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8046 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8049 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8050 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8052 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8053 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8054 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8055 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8058 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8059 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8063 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8064 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8065 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8067 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8068 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8069 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8075 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8076 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8077 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8078 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8081 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8082 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8083 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8084 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8085 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8088 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8089 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8090 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8091 if !updates.is_empty() {
8092 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8093 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8098 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8099 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8100 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8101 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8102 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8103 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8104 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8105 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8106 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8107 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8108 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8109 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8110 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8117 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8118 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8119 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8120 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8123 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8124 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8125 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8126 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8127 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8128 // check that the event is sane here.
8129 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8130 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8131 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8132 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8138 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8139 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8140 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8141 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8142 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8143 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8146 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8147 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8148 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8149 events.push_back((ev, action));
8150 } else if action.is_some() {
8151 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8158 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8159 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8160 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8161 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8162 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8163 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8166 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8168 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8170 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8171 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8172 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8173 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8174 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8175 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8176 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8177 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8178 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8179 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8180 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8181 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8182 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8184 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8185 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8187 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8188 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8190 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8191 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8192 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8193 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8194 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8195 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8197 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8198 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8200 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8201 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8202 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8203 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8204 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8205 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8209 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8210 pub entropy_source: ES,
8212 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8213 pub node_signer: NS,
8215 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8216 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8218 pub signer_provider: SP,
8220 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8222 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8223 pub fee_estimator: F,
8224 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8226 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8227 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8228 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8229 pub chain_monitor: M,
8231 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8232 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8233 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8234 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8235 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8236 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8238 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8240 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8241 /// deserialization.
8243 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8244 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8245 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8247 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8248 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8250 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8251 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8252 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8253 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8255 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8258 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8259 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8262 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8263 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8265 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8266 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8267 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8268 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8269 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8270 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8274 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8275 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8276 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8277 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8278 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8280 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8281 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8286 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8287 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8288 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8289 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8291 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8292 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8293 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8294 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8295 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8296 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8300 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8301 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8302 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8306 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8307 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8309 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8310 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8311 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8312 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8313 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8314 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8318 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8319 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8321 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8322 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8323 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8325 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8327 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8328 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8329 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8330 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8331 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8332 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8333 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8334 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8335 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8336 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8338 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8339 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8340 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8341 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8342 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8343 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8344 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8345 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8346 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8347 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8348 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8349 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8350 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8351 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8352 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8353 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8356 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8357 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8358 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8359 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8360 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8362 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8363 let mut found_htlc = false;
8364 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8365 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8368 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8369 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8370 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8371 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8372 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8373 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8374 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8375 log_info!(args.logger,
8376 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8377 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8378 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8382 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8383 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8384 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8385 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8386 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8388 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8389 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8391 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8392 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8393 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8394 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8396 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8397 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8398 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8399 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8403 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8404 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8405 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8406 // safely discard the channel.
8407 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8408 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8409 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8410 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8411 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8414 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8415 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8416 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8417 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8418 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8419 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8423 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8424 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8425 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8426 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8427 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8428 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8429 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8431 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8435 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8436 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8437 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8438 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8439 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8440 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8441 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8442 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8443 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8445 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8448 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8449 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8450 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8451 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8452 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8453 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8454 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8455 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8457 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8460 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8463 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8464 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8465 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8466 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8467 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8468 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8469 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8470 is_connected: false,
8474 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8475 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8476 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8477 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8478 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8479 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8480 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8481 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8484 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8485 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8486 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8487 for _ in 0..event_count {
8488 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8489 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8494 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8495 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8496 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8498 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8499 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8500 // on-startup monitor updates.
8501 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8502 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8504 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8508 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8509 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8511 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8512 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8513 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8514 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8515 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8519 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8520 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8521 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8522 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8523 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8524 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8525 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8527 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8528 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8532 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8533 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8534 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8535 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8536 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8537 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8538 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8539 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8540 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8541 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8542 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8543 let mut events_override = None;
8544 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8545 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8546 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8547 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8548 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8549 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8550 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8551 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8552 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8553 (8, events_override, option),
8554 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8555 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8556 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8557 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8559 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8560 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8563 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8564 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8567 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8568 pending_events_read = events;
8571 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8572 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8575 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8576 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8577 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8578 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8579 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8580 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8582 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8584 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8585 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8586 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8589 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8590 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8591 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8592 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8593 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8595 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8596 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8597 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8599 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8600 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8601 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8602 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8603 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8605 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8606 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8607 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8608 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8609 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8610 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8611 pending_background_events.push(
8612 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8613 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8614 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8615 update: update.clone(),
8618 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8619 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8620 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8621 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8622 pending_background_events.push(
8623 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8624 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8625 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8628 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8629 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8630 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8632 max_in_flight_update_id
8636 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8637 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8638 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8639 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8640 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8642 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8643 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8644 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8645 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8646 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8647 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8648 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8649 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8650 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8653 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8654 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8655 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8656 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8657 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8658 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8659 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8660 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8661 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8662 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8663 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8668 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8669 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8670 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8671 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8672 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8673 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8674 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8675 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8677 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8678 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8679 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8681 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8682 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8683 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8684 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8685 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8686 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8687 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8688 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8693 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8694 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8696 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8697 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8698 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8699 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8702 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8703 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8704 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8705 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8706 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8707 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8708 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8710 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8711 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
8712 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
8713 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8714 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8715 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8716 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8717 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8720 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8721 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8722 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8723 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8724 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8725 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8726 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8727 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8730 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8731 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8732 retry_strategy: None,
8733 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8734 payment_params: None,
8735 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8736 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8737 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8738 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8739 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8740 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8741 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8742 total_msat: path_amt,
8743 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8745 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8746 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8751 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8753 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8754 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8755 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8756 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8758 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8759 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8760 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8761 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8762 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8763 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8764 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8765 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8766 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8767 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8768 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8773 !forwards.is_empty()
8775 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8776 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8777 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8778 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8779 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8780 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8781 intercepted_id != ev_id
8788 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8789 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8790 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8791 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8792 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8793 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8794 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8795 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8796 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8797 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8798 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8799 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8800 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8807 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
8808 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
8810 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
8812 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
8813 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
8814 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
8815 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
8816 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
8817 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
8818 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
8819 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
8820 monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()))
8823 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
8824 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
8825 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
8826 // channel still live case here.
8830 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
8831 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
8836 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8837 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8838 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8839 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8840 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8841 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8842 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8843 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8847 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8848 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8850 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8851 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8852 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8853 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8855 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8856 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8857 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8859 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8860 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8862 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8863 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8865 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8868 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8869 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8870 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8872 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8876 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8877 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8878 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8879 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8880 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8882 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8883 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8884 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8885 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8886 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8887 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8888 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8889 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8891 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8892 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8896 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8898 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8900 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8901 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8903 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8904 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8909 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8910 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8912 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8914 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8916 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8917 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8918 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8919 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8923 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8924 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8925 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8926 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8927 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8928 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8929 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8931 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8932 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8933 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8935 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8936 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8937 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8938 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8939 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8940 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8942 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8943 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8944 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8945 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8946 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8947 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8953 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8955 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8956 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8957 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8958 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8959 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8960 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8961 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8962 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8963 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8964 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8965 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8967 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8968 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8970 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8971 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8972 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8973 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8975 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8976 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8977 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8978 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8980 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8981 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8982 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8983 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8985 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8986 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8987 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8988 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8989 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8990 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8991 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8994 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8995 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8998 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9001 purpose: payment.purpose,
9002 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9008 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9009 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9010 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9011 for action in actions.iter() {
9012 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9013 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9014 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9016 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9017 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9018 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9019 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9021 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9022 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9023 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9024 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9030 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9032 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9033 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9037 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9039 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9040 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9041 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9042 router: args.router,
9044 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9046 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9047 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9048 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9049 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9051 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9052 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9053 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9054 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9055 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9056 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9058 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9063 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9065 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9067 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9068 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9069 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9070 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9071 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9072 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9074 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9075 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9076 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9078 logger: args.logger,
9079 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9082 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9083 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9084 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9085 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9086 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9089 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9090 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9091 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9092 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9093 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9094 downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id);
9097 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9098 //connection or two.
9100 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9106 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9107 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9108 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9109 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9110 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9111 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9112 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9113 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9114 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9115 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9116 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9117 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9118 use crate::util::test_utils;
9119 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9120 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9123 fn test_notify_limits() {
9124 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9125 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9126 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9127 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9128 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9129 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9131 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9132 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9133 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9134 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9135 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9137 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9139 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9140 // to connect messages with new values
9141 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9142 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9143 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9144 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9145 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9146 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9148 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9149 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9151 // ... but the last node should not.
9152 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9153 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9154 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9155 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9157 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9158 // about the channel.
9159 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9160 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9161 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9163 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9165 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9166 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9167 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9168 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9169 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9170 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9172 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9173 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9174 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9176 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9177 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9178 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9179 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9180 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9181 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9183 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9184 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9185 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9186 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9187 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9188 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9189 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9190 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9192 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9193 // the channel info has updated.
9194 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9195 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9196 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9197 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9198 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9199 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9203 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9204 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9206 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9207 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9209 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9210 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9212 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9213 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9214 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9215 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9217 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9218 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9219 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9220 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9221 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9222 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9223 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9224 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9226 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9227 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9228 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9230 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9231 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9232 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9234 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9235 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9236 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9237 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9238 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9240 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9241 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9242 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9244 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9245 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9246 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9247 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9248 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9249 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9250 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9251 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9252 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9254 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9255 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9256 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9258 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9259 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9260 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9262 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9263 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9264 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9265 // lightning messages manually.
9266 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9267 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9270 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9271 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9272 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9274 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9275 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9277 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9278 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9280 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9281 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9282 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9284 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9285 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9286 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9290 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9292 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9293 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9296 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9297 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9298 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9299 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9301 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
9302 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
9303 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
9304 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
9306 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9309 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9310 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9311 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9312 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9317 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9318 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9319 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9320 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9327 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9328 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9329 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9332 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9333 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9334 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9335 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9336 // fails as expected.
9337 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9338 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9339 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9340 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9341 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9342 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9343 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9344 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9345 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9346 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9347 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9348 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9349 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9350 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9351 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9353 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9354 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9355 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9357 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9358 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9359 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9360 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9362 let route = find_route(
9363 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9364 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
9366 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9367 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9369 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9370 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9371 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9372 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9373 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9375 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9376 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9377 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9378 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9379 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9381 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9382 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9383 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9384 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9385 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9386 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9387 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9388 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9389 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9391 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9392 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9394 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9395 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9396 let route = find_route(
9397 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9398 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
9400 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9401 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9403 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9404 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9405 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9406 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9407 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9409 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9410 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9411 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9412 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9414 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9415 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9416 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9417 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9418 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9420 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9421 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9422 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9424 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9425 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9426 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9427 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9428 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9429 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9430 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9431 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9432 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9434 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9435 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9437 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9438 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9439 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9440 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9442 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9443 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9444 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9445 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9446 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9448 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9449 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9450 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9451 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9453 let route = find_route(
9454 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9455 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
9457 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9458 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9459 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9461 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9462 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9463 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9464 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9465 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9467 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9468 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9469 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9471 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9472 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9473 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9474 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9475 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9476 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9477 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9478 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9479 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9481 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9482 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9486 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9487 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9488 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9489 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9490 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9491 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9492 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9494 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9495 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9497 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9498 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9499 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9500 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9502 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9503 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9504 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9505 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9506 let route = find_route(
9507 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9508 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
9511 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9512 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9513 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9514 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9515 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9516 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9519 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9520 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9521 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9522 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9523 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9524 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9525 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9527 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9531 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9532 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9533 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9534 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9535 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9536 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9537 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9538 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9539 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9541 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9542 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9544 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9545 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9546 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9547 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9549 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9550 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9551 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9552 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9553 let route = find_route(
9554 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9555 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
9558 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9559 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9560 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9561 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9562 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9563 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9564 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9565 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9568 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9569 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9570 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9571 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9572 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9573 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9574 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9576 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9580 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9584 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9586 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9587 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9588 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9589 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9591 // Marshall an MPP route.
9592 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9593 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9594 route.paths.push(path);
9595 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9596 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9597 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9598 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9599 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9600 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9602 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9603 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9605 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9606 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9608 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9613 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9614 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9615 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9616 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9617 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9619 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9621 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9622 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9624 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9625 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9627 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9630 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9631 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9632 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9633 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9634 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9635 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9638 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9641 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9642 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9647 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9648 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9649 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9650 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9651 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9652 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9654 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9655 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9657 total_msat: 100_000,
9660 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9661 // payment verification fails as expected.
9662 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9663 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9664 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9665 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9667 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9671 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9672 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9676 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9677 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9678 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9679 // the channel is successfully closed.
9680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9683 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9685 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9686 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9687 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9688 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9689 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9691 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9692 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9694 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9695 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9696 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9697 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9700 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9702 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9703 // as it has the funding transaction.
9704 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9705 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9706 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9709 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9711 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9713 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9715 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9716 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9717 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9719 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9722 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9723 // as it has the funding transaction.
9724 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9725 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9726 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9729 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9730 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9732 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9733 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9734 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9735 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9737 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9738 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9739 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9740 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9742 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9743 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9745 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9746 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9747 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9748 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9749 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9750 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9751 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9755 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9756 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9757 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9758 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9759 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9760 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9761 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9764 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9766 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9767 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9768 // closing transaction).
9769 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9770 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9771 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9773 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9774 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9775 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9776 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9777 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9780 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9782 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9784 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9785 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9786 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9788 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9790 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9791 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9794 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9795 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9796 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9799 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9800 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9801 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9804 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9806 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9807 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9809 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9810 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9812 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9813 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9818 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9819 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9820 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9821 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9822 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9823 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9824 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9825 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9828 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9829 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9830 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9832 // Test the API functions.
9833 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9835 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9837 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9839 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9841 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9843 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9845 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9849 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9850 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9851 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9852 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9853 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9854 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9856 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9858 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9859 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9861 let mut funding_tx = None;
9862 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9863 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9864 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9867 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9868 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9869 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9870 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9871 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9873 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9875 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9877 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9879 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9881 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9883 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9886 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9887 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9888 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9889 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9890 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9892 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9893 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9895 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9896 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9897 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9898 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9899 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9900 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9901 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9904 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9905 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9906 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9907 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9908 }, true).unwrap_err();
9910 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9911 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9912 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9913 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9914 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9915 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9916 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9918 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9919 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9921 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9922 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9923 }, true).unwrap_err();
9925 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9926 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9927 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9929 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9931 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9932 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9934 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9935 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9936 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9937 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9938 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9940 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9941 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9942 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9944 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9945 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9946 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9948 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9949 // "protected" and can connect again.
9950 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9951 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9952 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9954 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9956 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9958 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9959 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9963 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9964 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9965 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9966 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9967 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9968 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9970 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9972 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9973 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9975 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9976 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9977 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9978 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9981 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9983 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9984 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9985 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9987 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9988 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9989 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9991 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9992 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9993 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9994 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9998 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9999 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10000 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10001 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10002 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10003 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10004 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10005 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10006 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10008 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10010 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10011 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10013 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10014 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10015 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10016 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10017 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10018 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10021 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10022 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10024 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10025 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10027 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10029 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10030 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10033 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10034 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10035 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10036 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10037 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10039 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10040 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10042 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10043 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10044 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10045 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10049 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10051 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10052 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10054 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10055 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10056 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10058 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10059 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10061 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10063 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10067 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10068 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10069 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10070 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10071 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10072 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10073 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10074 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData {
10075 amt_to_forward: 100,
10076 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10077 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
10078 keysend_preimage: None,
10079 payment_metadata: None,
10080 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10081 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10085 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10086 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10087 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::ReceiveError { err_code, .. }) =
10088 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10089 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10091 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10092 } else { panic!(); }
10094 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10095 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData { // This is the same hop_data as above, OnionHopData doesn't implement Clone
10096 amt_to_forward: 100,
10097 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10098 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
10099 keysend_preimage: None,
10100 payment_metadata: None,
10101 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10102 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10106 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10107 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10111 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10112 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10113 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10114 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10115 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10117 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10118 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10120 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10121 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10122 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10123 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10124 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10126 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10127 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10129 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10130 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10131 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10132 match &msg_events[0] {
10133 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10134 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10136 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10137 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10138 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10141 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10144 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10145 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10147 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10148 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10149 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10151 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10155 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10156 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10157 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10158 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10159 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10160 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10161 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10162 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10163 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10165 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10167 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10168 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10169 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10171 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10172 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10174 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10175 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10180 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10181 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10183 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10184 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10186 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
10190 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10191 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10192 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10193 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10194 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10195 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10196 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10197 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10199 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10200 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10201 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10203 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10204 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10205 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10206 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10207 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10209 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10210 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10213 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10214 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10215 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10217 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10218 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10219 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10220 ..Default::default()
10222 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10223 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10224 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10226 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10227 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10230 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10231 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10232 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10233 ..Default::default()
10235 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10236 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10237 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10238 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10240 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10241 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10244 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10245 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10246 let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
10247 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10248 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10251 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10252 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10253 ..Default::default()
10255 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10258 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10259 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10260 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10261 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10267 use crate::chain::Listen;
10268 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10269 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10270 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10271 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10272 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10273 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10274 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10275 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10276 use crate::util::test_utils;
10277 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10279 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10280 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10281 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10283 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10285 use criterion::Criterion;
10287 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10288 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10289 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10290 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10291 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10292 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10293 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10295 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10296 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10298 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10299 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10301 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10303 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10306 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10307 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10310 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10311 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10312 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10314 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10315 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10317 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10318 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10319 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10320 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10321 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10323 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10324 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10325 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10327 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10328 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10329 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10330 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10332 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10333 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10334 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10336 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10337 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10338 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10339 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10340 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10342 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10343 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10344 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10346 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10347 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10349 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10350 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10351 }, false).unwrap();
10352 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10353 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10354 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10357 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10358 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10359 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10361 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10362 } else { panic!(); }
10364 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10365 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10366 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10367 match events_b[0] {
10368 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10369 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10371 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10374 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10375 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10376 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10377 match events_a[0] {
10378 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10379 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10381 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10384 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10386 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10387 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10388 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10390 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10391 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10392 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10393 match msg_events[0] {
10394 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10395 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10396 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10400 match msg_events[1] {
10401 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10405 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10406 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10407 match events_a[0] {
10408 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10409 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10411 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10414 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10415 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10416 match events_b[0] {
10417 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10418 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10420 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10423 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10424 macro_rules! send_payment {
10425 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10426 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10427 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10428 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10429 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10430 payment_count += 1;
10431 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10432 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10434 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10435 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10436 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10437 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10438 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10439 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10440 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10441 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10442 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10443 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10444 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10446 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10447 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10448 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10449 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10451 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10452 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10453 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10454 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10455 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10457 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10460 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10461 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10462 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10463 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10465 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10469 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10470 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10471 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);