1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::events;
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
96 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
116 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
148 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
149 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
152 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
157 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
158 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
159 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
160 short_channel_id: u64,
162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
163 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
165 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
166 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
171 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
173 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
174 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
175 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
177 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
178 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
181 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
182 struct ClaimableHTLC {
183 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
185 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
187 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
189 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
193 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
194 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
195 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
196 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
198 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
199 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
204 impl Readable for PaymentId {
205 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
206 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
211 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
212 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for InterceptId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
228 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
229 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
230 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
231 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
232 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
235 session_priv: SecretKey,
236 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
237 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
238 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
239 payment_id: PaymentId,
240 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
241 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
244 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
245 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
246 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
248 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
250 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
252 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
255 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
256 payment_id.hash(hasher);
257 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
258 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
259 payment_params.hash(hasher);
264 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
267 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
268 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
270 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
271 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
272 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
273 payment_secret: None,
274 payment_params: None,
279 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
280 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
282 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
290 impl HTLCFailReason {
291 pub(super) fn reason(failure_code: u16, data: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
292 Self::Reason { failure_code, data }
295 pub(super) fn from_failure_code(failure_code: u16) -> Self {
296 Self::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }
300 struct ReceiveError {
306 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
307 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
309 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
314 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
316 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
317 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
318 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
319 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
320 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
322 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
323 err: msgs::LightningError,
324 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
325 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
327 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
329 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
331 err: LightningError {
333 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
334 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
341 shutdown_finish: None,
345 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
347 err: LightningError {
349 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
352 shutdown_finish: None,
356 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
357 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
360 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
362 err: LightningError {
364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
365 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
371 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
372 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
376 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
379 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
382 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
386 log_level: Level::Warn,
389 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
391 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
393 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
395 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
396 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
404 shutdown_finish: None,
409 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
410 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
411 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
412 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
413 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
415 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
416 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
417 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
418 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
419 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
420 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
421 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
423 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
427 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
428 struct ClaimingPayment {
430 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
431 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
433 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
434 (0, amount_msat, required),
435 (2, payment_purpose, required),
436 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
439 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
440 struct ClaimablePayments {
441 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
442 /// failed/claimed by the user.
444 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
445 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
447 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
448 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
449 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
451 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
452 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
453 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
454 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
457 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
458 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
459 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
460 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
461 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
462 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
465 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
466 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
467 /// quite some time lag.
468 enum BackgroundEvent {
469 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
470 /// commitment transaction.
471 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
474 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
475 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
476 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
477 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
478 /// event can be generated.
479 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
480 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
481 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
484 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
485 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
487 latest_features: InitFeatures,
490 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
491 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
493 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
496 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
497 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
498 struct PendingInboundPayment {
499 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
500 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
501 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
502 /// this payment being removed.
504 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
505 user_payment_id: u64,
506 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
507 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
508 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
511 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
512 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
513 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
515 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
518 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
519 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
520 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
521 pending_amt_msat: u64,
522 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
523 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
524 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
526 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
527 starting_block_height: u32,
529 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
530 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
531 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
533 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
534 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
535 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
537 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
538 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
539 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
540 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
541 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
543 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
545 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
546 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
550 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
551 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
553 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
557 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
559 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
563 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
570 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
572 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
573 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
574 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
575 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
579 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
580 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
581 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
582 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
583 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
584 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
585 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
588 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
589 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
592 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
593 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
594 let our_payment_hash;
595 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
596 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
597 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
599 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
600 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
601 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
605 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
609 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
610 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
611 let remove_res = match self {
612 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
613 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
614 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
615 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
616 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
620 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
621 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
622 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
623 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
624 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
625 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
632 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
633 let insert_res = match self {
634 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
635 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
636 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
638 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
639 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
642 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
643 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
644 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
645 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
646 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
653 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
655 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
656 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
657 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
658 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
665 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
666 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
667 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
668 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
669 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
670 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
671 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
673 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
674 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
676 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
677 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
678 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
679 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
680 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
681 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
682 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
683 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
685 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
686 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
688 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
689 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
691 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
692 /// to individual Channels.
694 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
695 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
696 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
697 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
699 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
700 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
701 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
702 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
703 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
704 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
705 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
707 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
708 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
709 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
710 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
713 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
714 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
715 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
716 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
717 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
719 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
720 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
721 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
722 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
723 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
726 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
727 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
728 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
729 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
730 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
734 // `total_consistency_lock`
736 // |__`forward_htlcs`
738 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
740 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
742 // | |__`claimable_payments`
744 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
746 // | |__`channel_state`
750 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
752 // | |__`per_peer_state`
754 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
758 // | |__`pending_events`
760 // | |__`pending_background_events`
762 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
763 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
764 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
765 K::Target: KeysInterface,
766 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
769 default_configuration: UserConfig,
770 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
771 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
775 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
777 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
779 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
780 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
782 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
783 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
784 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
785 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
786 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
788 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
789 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
790 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
791 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
793 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
794 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
796 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
797 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
798 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
799 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
800 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
801 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
802 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
803 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
805 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
807 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
808 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
810 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
812 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
813 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
814 /// and via the classic SCID.
816 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
817 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
819 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
821 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
823 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
824 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
825 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
827 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
828 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
830 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
831 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
833 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
834 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
836 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
837 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
838 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
839 /// active channel list on load.
841 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
842 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
844 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
846 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
847 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
848 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
850 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
851 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
852 /// the handling of the events.
855 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
856 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
857 /// would break backwards compatability.
858 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
859 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
860 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
862 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
863 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
865 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
867 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
868 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
869 /// confirmation depth.
871 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
872 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
873 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
875 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
877 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
879 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
881 our_network_key: SecretKey,
882 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
884 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
886 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
887 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
888 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
890 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
891 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
893 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
894 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
895 /// keeping additional state.
896 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
898 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
899 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
900 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
901 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
903 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
904 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
905 /// are currently open with that peer.
906 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
907 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
910 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
911 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
913 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
914 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
915 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
916 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
917 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
918 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
919 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
920 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
921 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
922 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
923 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
925 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
932 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
934 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
935 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
936 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
937 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
938 pub struct ChainParameters {
939 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
940 pub network: Network,
942 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
944 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
945 pub best_block: BestBlock,
948 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
954 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
955 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
956 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
957 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
958 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
959 /// updates are ready for persistence).
961 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
962 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
963 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
964 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
965 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
967 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
968 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
971 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
972 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
973 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
976 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
977 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
979 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
980 persistence_notifier: notifier,
981 should_persist: persist_check,
982 _read_guard: read_guard,
987 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
989 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
990 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
995 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
996 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
998 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1000 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1001 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1002 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1003 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1004 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1006 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1007 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1009 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1011 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1012 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1013 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1014 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1015 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1016 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1017 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1018 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1019 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1020 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1021 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1022 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1023 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1025 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1026 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1028 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1029 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1030 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1031 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1033 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1034 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1035 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1036 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1037 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1038 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1041 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1043 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1044 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1047 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1049 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1050 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1052 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1053 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1054 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1055 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1057 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1058 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1059 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1060 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1061 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1062 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1063 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1064 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1065 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1066 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1067 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1070 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1071 /// to better separate parameters.
1072 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1073 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1074 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1075 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1076 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1077 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1078 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1079 pub features: InitFeatures,
1080 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1081 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1082 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1084 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1086 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1087 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1088 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1089 /// payments to us through this channel.
1090 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1091 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1092 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1093 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1094 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1095 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1096 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1099 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1100 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1101 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1102 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1103 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1104 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1105 /// lifetime of the channel.
1106 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1107 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1108 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1109 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1110 /// our counterparty already.
1112 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1113 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1114 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1115 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1117 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1118 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1119 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1120 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1122 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1123 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1125 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1126 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1128 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1129 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1130 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1131 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1132 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1133 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1134 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1135 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1136 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1139 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1141 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1142 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1143 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1144 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1145 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1146 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1147 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1149 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1150 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1152 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1153 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1154 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1155 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1156 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1157 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1158 /// this value on chain.
1160 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1162 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1164 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1165 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1166 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1167 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1169 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1170 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1171 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1172 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1174 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1175 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1176 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1177 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1179 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1180 pub balance_msat: u64,
1181 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1182 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1183 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1184 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1186 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1188 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1189 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1190 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1191 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1192 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1193 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1194 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1195 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1197 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1198 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1199 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1200 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1201 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1202 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1203 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1205 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1206 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1207 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1208 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1209 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1210 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1211 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1212 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1213 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1215 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1217 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1218 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1219 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1220 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1221 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1223 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1224 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1225 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1226 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1227 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1228 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1229 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1231 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1232 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1233 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1234 pub is_outbound: bool,
1235 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1236 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1237 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1238 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1239 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1241 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1242 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1243 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1244 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1246 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1247 pub is_usable: bool,
1248 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1249 pub is_public: bool,
1250 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1251 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1252 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1253 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1254 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1255 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1257 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1258 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1261 impl ChannelDetails {
1262 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1263 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1264 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1266 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1267 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1268 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1269 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1272 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1273 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1274 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1276 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1277 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1278 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1279 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1283 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1284 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1285 /// states for more.
1286 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1287 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1288 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1289 /// send the payment at all.
1291 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1293 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1294 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1295 /// for this payment.
1296 ParameterError(APIError),
1297 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1298 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1300 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1302 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1305 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1306 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1307 /// for this payment.
1308 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1309 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1310 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1311 /// paths than the ones selected).
1313 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1314 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1315 /// for this payment.
1316 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1317 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1318 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1319 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1321 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1323 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1324 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1325 /// in over-/re-payment.
1327 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1328 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1329 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1331 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1332 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1333 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1334 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1336 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1337 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1338 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1339 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1340 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1341 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1342 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1343 payment_id: PaymentId,
1347 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1349 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1351 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1352 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1353 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1354 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1356 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1357 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1358 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1361 macro_rules! handle_error {
1362 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1365 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1366 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1368 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1369 // entering the macro.
1370 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1371 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1374 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1376 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1377 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1378 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1379 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1383 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1384 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1385 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1386 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1391 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1392 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1394 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1395 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1396 action: err.action.clone()
1400 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1401 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1404 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1411 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1412 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1413 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1414 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1415 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1416 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1418 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1419 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1420 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1421 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1422 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1424 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1425 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1427 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1431 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1432 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1433 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1435 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1436 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1438 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1439 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1441 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1442 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1443 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1444 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1445 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1446 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1452 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1453 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1457 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1459 $entry.remove_entry();
1467 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1468 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1472 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1474 $entry.remove_entry();
1482 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1483 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1485 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1486 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1492 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1493 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1495 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1496 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1497 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1498 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1499 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1500 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1501 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1502 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1503 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1504 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1505 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1506 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1507 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1508 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1511 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1512 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1513 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1514 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1515 match $action_type {
1516 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1517 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1519 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1520 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1522 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1523 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1524 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1525 if !$resend_commitment {
1526 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1529 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1531 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1532 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1534 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1539 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1540 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1542 $entry.remove_entry();
1546 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1547 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1548 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1550 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1551 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1553 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1554 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1556 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1557 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1559 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1560 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1564 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1565 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1566 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1567 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1568 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1570 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1571 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1572 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1573 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1574 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1575 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1576 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1577 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1578 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1579 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1584 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1585 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1586 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1588 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1589 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1590 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1591 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1592 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1593 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1596 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1601 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1602 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1603 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1604 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1605 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1608 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1610 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1611 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1613 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1615 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1616 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1617 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1618 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1619 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1620 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1621 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1622 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1624 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1625 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1626 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1630 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1632 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1633 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1634 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1636 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1637 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1638 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1639 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1640 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1641 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1642 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1643 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1645 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1646 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1649 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1650 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1652 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1654 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1656 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1658 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1659 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1660 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1661 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1669 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1670 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1671 &self.default_configuration
1674 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1675 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1676 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1679 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1680 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1682 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1684 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1688 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1693 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1695 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1696 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1697 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1698 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1699 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1701 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1702 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1704 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1705 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1706 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1708 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1709 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1710 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1711 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1712 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1713 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1715 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1716 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1717 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1718 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1719 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1720 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1724 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1725 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1726 Some(peer_state) => {
1727 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1728 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1729 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1730 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1731 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1732 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1733 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1737 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1742 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1745 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1748 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1749 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1751 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1752 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1753 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1754 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1756 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1758 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1761 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1763 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1764 node_id: their_network_key,
1767 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1770 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1771 let mut res = Vec::new();
1773 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1774 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1775 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1776 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1777 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1778 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1779 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1780 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1781 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1782 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1783 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1784 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1785 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1786 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1787 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1788 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1789 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1790 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1791 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1792 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1793 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1794 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1796 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1797 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1798 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1799 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1800 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1801 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1802 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1803 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1804 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1805 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1806 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1807 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1808 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1809 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1810 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1811 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1812 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1813 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1814 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1815 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1816 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1817 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1818 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1819 config: Some(channel.config()),
1823 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1824 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1825 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1826 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1832 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1833 /// more information.
1834 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1835 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1838 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1839 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1841 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1842 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1845 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1846 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1847 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1848 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1849 // really wanted anyway.
1850 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1853 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1854 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1855 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1856 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1857 Some(transaction) => {
1858 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1862 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1863 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1864 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1865 reason: closure_reason
1869 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1870 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1872 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1873 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1874 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1875 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1876 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1877 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1878 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1879 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1881 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1883 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1884 Some(peer_state) => {
1885 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1886 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1887 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1889 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1892 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1894 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1895 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1896 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1897 let (result, is_permanent) =
1898 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1900 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1905 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1906 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1910 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1911 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1912 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1913 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1917 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1921 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1925 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1926 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1927 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1928 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1931 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1935 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1936 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1937 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1939 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1940 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1942 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1943 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1944 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1945 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1947 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1949 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1950 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1951 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1952 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1953 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1956 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1957 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1958 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1960 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1961 /// the channel being closed or not:
1962 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1963 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1964 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1965 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1966 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1967 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1968 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1970 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1972 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1973 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1974 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1975 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1976 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1980 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1981 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1982 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1983 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1984 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1985 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1986 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1987 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1989 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1990 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1991 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1992 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1993 // ignore the result here.
1994 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1998 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1999 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2000 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2001 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2003 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2005 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2006 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
2007 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2009 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2010 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2012 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2014 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2016 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2019 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2020 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2021 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2022 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2023 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2028 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2031 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2033 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2034 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2035 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2036 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2037 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2038 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2039 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2049 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2050 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2051 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2053 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2054 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2055 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2058 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2059 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2060 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2062 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2063 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2064 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2065 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2066 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2069 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2070 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2071 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2072 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2073 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2077 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2078 /// local transaction(s).
2079 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2080 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2081 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2085 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2086 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2088 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2089 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2090 return Err(ReceiveError {
2091 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2093 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2096 // final_expiry_too_soon
2097 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2098 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2099 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2100 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2101 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2102 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2103 return Err(ReceiveError {
2105 err_data: Vec::new(),
2106 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2109 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2110 return Err(ReceiveError {
2112 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2113 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2117 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2118 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2119 return Err(ReceiveError {
2120 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2121 err_data: Vec::new(),
2122 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2125 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2126 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2127 return Err(ReceiveError {
2128 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2129 err_data: Vec::new(),
2130 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2132 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2133 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2135 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2136 phantom_shared_secret,
2138 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2139 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2140 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2141 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2142 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2143 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2144 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2145 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2146 return Err(ReceiveError {
2147 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2148 err_data: Vec::new(),
2149 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2153 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2155 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2158 return Err(ReceiveError {
2159 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2160 err_data: Vec::new(),
2161 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2166 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2169 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2170 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2171 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2172 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2176 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2177 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2178 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2180 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2181 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2182 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2183 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2184 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2185 failure_code: $err_code,
2191 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2192 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2195 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2197 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2198 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2199 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2200 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2201 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2202 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2203 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2204 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2206 macro_rules! return_err {
2207 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2209 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2210 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2211 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2212 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2213 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2219 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2221 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2222 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2224 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2225 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2229 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2230 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2232 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2234 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2235 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2236 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2237 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2238 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2240 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2243 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2244 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2245 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2247 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2248 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2249 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2252 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2253 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2254 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2255 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2259 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2260 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2261 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2264 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2265 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2266 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2267 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2268 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2273 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2274 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2275 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2276 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2277 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2278 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2279 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2280 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2281 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2282 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2283 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2284 // phantom or an intercept.
2285 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2286 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2287 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2291 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2294 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2296 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2297 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2299 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2300 // no consistency guarantees.
2301 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2305 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2306 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2307 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2308 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2309 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2311 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2312 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2313 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2314 // we don't have the channel here.
2315 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2317 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2319 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2320 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2321 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2322 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2323 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2324 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2325 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2327 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2328 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2330 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2331 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2335 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2337 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2344 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2345 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2346 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2347 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2348 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2349 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2351 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2352 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2354 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2355 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2356 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2357 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2358 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2359 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2360 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2361 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2362 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2363 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2369 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2370 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2371 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2372 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2374 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2375 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2377 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2378 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2379 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2381 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2382 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2383 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2385 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2390 pending_forward_info
2393 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2394 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2395 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2397 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2398 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2399 if !chan.should_announce() {
2400 return Err(LightningError {
2401 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2402 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2405 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2406 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2408 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2409 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2412 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2413 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2414 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2415 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2416 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2417 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2418 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2419 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2420 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2424 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2426 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2427 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2428 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2430 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2431 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2433 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2434 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2435 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2436 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2437 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2438 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2439 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2440 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2443 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2444 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2446 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2452 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2453 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2454 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2455 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2456 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2458 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2459 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2460 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2461 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2462 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2464 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2466 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2468 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2469 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2470 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2471 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2474 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2475 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2476 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2478 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2479 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2481 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2482 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2484 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2485 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2487 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2488 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2490 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2491 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2492 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2495 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2496 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2497 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2499 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2500 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2502 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2503 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2504 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2505 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2506 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2507 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2508 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2509 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2510 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2511 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2513 _ => unreachable!(),
2516 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2517 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2518 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2519 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2520 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2521 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2522 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2523 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2532 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2533 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2534 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2535 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2540 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2541 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2543 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2548 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2550 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2551 /// fields for more info.
2553 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2554 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2555 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2556 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2559 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2560 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2561 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2562 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2563 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2565 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2566 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2568 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2569 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2570 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2572 /// In general, a path may raise:
2573 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2574 /// node public key) is specified.
2575 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2576 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2578 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2579 /// relevant updates.
2581 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2582 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2583 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2585 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2586 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2587 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2588 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2591 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2592 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2593 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2595 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2596 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2597 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2598 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2599 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2603 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2604 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2607 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2608 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2609 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2610 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2613 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2614 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2615 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2616 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2617 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2618 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2619 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2620 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2623 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2624 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2627 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2628 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2631 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2636 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2637 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2638 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2640 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2641 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2643 let mut total_value = 0;
2644 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2645 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2646 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2647 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2648 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2649 continue 'path_check;
2651 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2652 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2653 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2654 continue 'path_check;
2657 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2658 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2660 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2661 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2663 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2664 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2665 total_value = amt_msat;
2668 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2669 let mut results = Vec::new();
2670 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2671 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2672 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2675 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2676 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2677 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2678 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2681 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2682 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2683 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2684 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2686 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2687 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2691 results.push(path_res);
2693 let mut has_ok = false;
2694 let mut has_err = false;
2695 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2696 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2697 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2698 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2699 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2700 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2701 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2705 } else if res.is_err() {
2706 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2707 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2710 if has_err && has_ok {
2711 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2714 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2715 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2716 Some(RouteParameters {
2717 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2718 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2719 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2725 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2726 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2727 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2728 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2729 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2735 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2737 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2738 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2739 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2740 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2741 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2743 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2744 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2745 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2746 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2747 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2748 if path.len() == 0 {
2749 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2750 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2755 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2756 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2757 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2760 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2761 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2762 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2764 let res = match payment {
2765 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2766 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2768 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2769 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2770 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2771 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2774 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2776 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2777 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2778 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2781 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2782 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2783 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2786 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2787 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2788 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2792 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2793 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2798 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2799 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2803 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2806 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2808 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2809 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2810 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2811 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2813 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2814 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2815 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2817 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2818 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2819 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2820 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2821 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2823 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2824 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2825 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2826 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2827 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2829 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2837 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2838 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2839 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2840 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2841 /// never reach the recipient.
2843 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2844 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2846 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2847 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2849 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2851 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2852 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2853 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2855 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2857 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2858 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2860 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2861 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2866 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2867 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2868 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2869 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2870 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2872 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2875 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2876 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2880 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2881 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2883 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2884 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2889 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2891 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2892 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2893 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2896 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2897 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2898 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2899 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2900 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2901 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2904 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2905 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2906 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2907 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2908 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2910 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2912 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2914 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2915 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2916 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2917 } else { unreachable!(); })
2920 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2922 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2923 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2926 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2927 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2932 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2933 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2934 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2937 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2939 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2941 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2942 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2943 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2944 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2953 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2954 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2955 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2959 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2961 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2962 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2964 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2965 /// across the p2p network.
2967 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2968 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2970 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2971 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2972 /// keys per-channel).
2974 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2975 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2976 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2978 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2979 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2980 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2982 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2983 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2984 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2985 /// for more details.
2987 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2988 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2989 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2990 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2992 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2993 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2994 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2995 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3000 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3001 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
3002 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
3003 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
3004 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
3005 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3006 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3010 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3011 let mut output_index = None;
3012 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3013 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3014 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3015 if output_index.is_some() {
3016 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3017 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3020 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3021 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3022 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3025 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3028 if output_index.is_none() {
3029 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3030 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3033 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3037 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3039 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3040 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3041 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3042 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3044 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3045 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3047 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3048 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3050 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3052 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3053 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3054 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3055 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3056 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3057 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3058 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3059 pub fn update_channel_config(
3060 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3061 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3062 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3063 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3064 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3068 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3069 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3072 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3073 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3074 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3075 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3076 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3077 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3079 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3080 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3081 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3082 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3086 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3087 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3088 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3091 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3092 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3093 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3094 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3095 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3104 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3105 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3107 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3108 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3110 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3111 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3112 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3113 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3114 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3116 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3117 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3119 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3122 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3123 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3124 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3125 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3126 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3127 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3129 let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3131 if !chan.is_usable() {
3132 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3133 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3136 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3138 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3139 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3143 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3144 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3145 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3148 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3149 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3150 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3152 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3154 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3155 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3158 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3159 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3160 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3161 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3162 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3164 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3168 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3169 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3171 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3174 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3175 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3176 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3178 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3179 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3180 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3183 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3184 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3185 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3186 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3187 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3188 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3189 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3192 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3193 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3194 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3195 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3200 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3202 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3203 /// Will likely generate further events.
3204 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3205 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3207 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3208 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3209 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3210 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3212 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3213 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3215 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3216 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3217 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3219 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3220 match forward_info {
3221 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3222 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3223 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3224 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3225 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3228 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3229 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3230 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3232 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3233 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3234 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3235 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3236 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3237 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3240 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3241 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3243 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3246 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3247 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3253 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3254 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3256 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3260 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3261 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3263 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3267 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3268 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3269 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3270 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3271 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3273 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3274 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3275 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3276 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3277 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3279 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3281 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3282 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3286 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3287 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3288 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3289 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3295 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3298 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3301 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3302 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3303 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3304 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3305 // problem, not ours.
3311 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3312 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3314 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3318 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3319 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3320 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3321 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3322 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3325 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3326 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3327 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3328 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3329 match forward_info {
3330 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3331 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3332 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3333 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3334 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3337 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3338 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3339 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3340 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3341 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3342 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3343 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3344 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3346 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3348 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3349 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3351 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3353 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3354 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3355 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3356 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3362 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3364 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3365 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3366 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3367 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3368 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3369 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3370 // this channel currently :/.
3376 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3377 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3379 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3380 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3381 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3383 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3384 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3386 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3388 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3389 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3390 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3393 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3395 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3396 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3397 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3398 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3399 // messages when we can.
3400 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3401 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3402 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3409 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3410 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3413 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3414 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3415 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3416 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3417 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3418 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3420 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3422 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3423 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3424 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3427 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3431 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3432 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3434 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3438 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3439 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3440 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3441 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3442 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3443 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3444 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3445 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3446 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3448 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3455 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3456 match forward_info {
3457 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3458 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3459 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3460 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3463 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3464 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3465 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3466 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3468 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3469 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3471 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3474 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3475 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3476 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3477 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3478 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3479 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3480 phantom_shared_secret,
3482 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3484 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3489 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3490 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3491 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3492 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3493 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3495 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3496 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3497 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3498 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3499 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3500 phantom_shared_secret,
3502 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3503 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3507 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3508 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3509 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3510 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3511 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3514 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3515 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3516 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3518 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3519 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3520 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3523 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3524 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3525 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3528 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3529 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3530 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3531 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3532 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3533 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3537 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3538 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3539 total_value += htlc.value;
3540 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3541 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3542 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3543 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3544 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3545 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3547 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3549 _ => unreachable!(),
3552 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3553 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3554 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3555 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3556 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3557 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3558 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3559 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3560 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3563 amount_msat: total_value,
3564 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3565 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3567 payment_received_generated = true;
3569 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3570 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3572 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3574 payment_received_generated
3578 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3579 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3580 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3581 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3582 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3583 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3584 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3585 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3586 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3587 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3588 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3589 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3590 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3591 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3593 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3597 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3599 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3600 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3601 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3602 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3605 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3606 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3607 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3608 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3609 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3610 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3611 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3613 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3615 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3616 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3619 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3620 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3621 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3627 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3628 if payment_data.is_none() {
3629 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3630 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3633 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3634 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3635 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3636 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3637 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3638 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3639 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3640 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3642 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3643 if payment_received_generated {
3644 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3650 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3651 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3659 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3660 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3662 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3664 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3665 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3668 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3669 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3670 events.append(&mut new_events);
3673 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3675 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3676 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3678 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3679 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3680 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3681 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3682 if background_events.is_empty() {
3686 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3688 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3689 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3690 // monitor updating completing.
3691 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3698 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3699 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3700 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3701 self.process_background_events();
3704 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3705 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3706 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3707 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3708 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3709 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3710 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3712 if !chan.is_live() {
3713 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3714 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3715 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3717 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3718 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3720 let mut retain_channel = true;
3721 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3724 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3725 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3729 let ret_err = match res {
3730 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3731 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3732 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3733 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3734 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3735 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3736 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3737 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3738 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3739 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3740 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3747 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3748 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3756 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3760 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3761 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3762 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3763 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3764 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3765 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3766 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3768 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3770 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3772 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3773 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3774 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3775 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3776 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3777 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3779 handle_errors.push(err);
3789 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3790 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3791 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3792 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3793 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3794 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3795 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3797 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3798 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3799 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3800 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3801 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3802 if no_remaining_entries {
3803 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3805 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3806 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3807 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3808 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3809 no_remaining_entries = false;
3817 if no_remaining_entries {
3818 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3819 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3821 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3828 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3830 /// This currently includes:
3831 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3832 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3833 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3835 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3836 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3838 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3839 /// estimate fetches.
3840 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3841 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3842 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3843 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3845 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3847 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3848 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3850 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3851 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3852 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3853 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3854 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3855 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3856 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3858 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3860 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3862 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3863 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3864 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3865 if needs_close { return false; }
3868 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3869 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3870 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3871 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3872 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3873 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3874 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3875 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3879 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3880 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3882 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3883 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3884 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3888 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3889 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3894 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3900 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3901 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3902 // This should be unreachable
3903 debug_assert!(false);
3906 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3907 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3908 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3909 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3911 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3912 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3913 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3915 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3922 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3923 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3924 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3925 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3926 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3929 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3930 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3933 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3939 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3940 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3941 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3943 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3944 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3945 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3946 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3948 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3949 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3950 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3951 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3952 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3955 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3956 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3957 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3958 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3959 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3960 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3961 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3962 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3963 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3968 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3969 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3971 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3973 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3974 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3975 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3976 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3977 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3978 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3979 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3981 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3983 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3984 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3986 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3991 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3992 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3993 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3994 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3995 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3996 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3997 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3998 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3999 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4000 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4002 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4003 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4004 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4005 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4007 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4008 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4009 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4010 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4011 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4015 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4016 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4017 // be surfaced to the user.
4018 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4019 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4020 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4022 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
4023 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4024 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4025 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4027 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4030 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4031 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4032 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4033 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4037 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4038 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4039 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4040 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4042 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
4043 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
4044 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
4045 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
4046 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
4049 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4050 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4051 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4054 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4055 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4056 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4058 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
4059 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4060 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4061 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4062 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
4063 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
4064 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(*payment_id) {
4065 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4066 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4069 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4070 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4073 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4074 all_paths_failed = true;
4075 if payment.get().abandoned() {
4076 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
4077 payment_id: *payment_id,
4078 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
4084 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4087 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
4088 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
4089 Some(RouteParameters {
4090 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
4091 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
4092 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
4095 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4097 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
4098 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4100 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4102 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4104 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4105 if !payment_retryable {
4106 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
4107 payment_id: *payment_id,
4108 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4112 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4113 payment_id: *payment_id,
4114 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4120 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
4121 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
4122 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
4123 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
4124 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4126 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4127 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
4128 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4129 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4136 error_code: onion_error_code,
4138 error_data: onion_error_data
4142 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4148 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
4149 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
4150 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
4151 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
4153 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
4154 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
4155 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
4156 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4158 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4159 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4160 payment_id: *payment_id,
4161 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4163 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4166 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4167 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
4168 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4169 payment_failed_permanently: false,
4170 network_update: None,
4173 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4176 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4178 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4183 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4184 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4185 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4187 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4188 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4189 HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4190 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4191 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4192 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(phantom_ss, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4193 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4194 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4196 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4197 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4200 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4201 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4202 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4206 let mut forward_event = None;
4207 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4208 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4209 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4211 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4212 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4213 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4215 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4216 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4219 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4220 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4221 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4222 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4223 time_forwardable: time
4226 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4227 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4228 failed_next_destination: destination,
4234 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4235 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4237 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4238 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4239 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4241 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4242 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4243 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4244 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4246 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4247 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4248 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4249 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4250 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4251 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4252 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4253 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4255 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4258 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4259 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
4260 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4261 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4262 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4263 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4264 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4265 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4270 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4271 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4272 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
4274 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4275 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4276 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4277 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4282 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4284 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
4285 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
4286 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
4287 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
4288 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
4290 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
4291 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
4293 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4294 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4295 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4296 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4297 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4299 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4300 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4301 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4302 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4303 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
4304 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4305 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4306 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4313 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4318 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4319 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4320 debug_assert!(false);
4324 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4325 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4326 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4327 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4328 if sources.len() != 1 {
4329 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4330 debug_assert!(false);
4336 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4338 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4339 mem::drop(channel_state);
4340 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4341 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4344 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4345 mem::drop(channel_state);
4346 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4347 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4348 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4352 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4353 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4354 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.take().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4355 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4357 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4358 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4359 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4360 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4361 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4362 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4364 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => {
4365 // This should be incredibly rare - we checked that all the channels were
4366 // open above, though as we release the lock at each loop iteration it's
4367 // still possible. We should still claim the HTLC on-chain through the
4368 // closed-channel-update generated in claim_funds_from_hop.
4370 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4371 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4372 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4373 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4374 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4376 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => {},
4380 mem::drop(channel_state);
4382 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4383 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4384 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4385 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4386 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4387 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4388 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4390 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4393 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4394 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4395 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4396 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4400 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4401 mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
4402 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4403 -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4404 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4406 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4407 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4408 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4409 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4410 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4411 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4412 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4413 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4414 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4416 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4417 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4418 payment_preimage, e);
4419 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
4420 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4421 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4422 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4423 counterparty_node_id, err, Some(htlc_value_msat)
4427 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4428 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4429 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4430 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4431 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4432 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4433 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4434 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4435 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4436 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4442 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4443 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4444 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4446 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4449 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4450 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4451 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4453 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4454 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4455 payment_preimage, e);
4458 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4460 chan.remove_entry();
4462 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4463 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4464 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4468 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4469 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4470 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4474 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4475 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4476 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update);
4477 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4478 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4479 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4480 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4481 // again on restart.
4482 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4483 payment_preimage, update_res);
4485 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4486 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4487 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4488 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4489 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4490 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4491 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4492 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4496 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4497 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4498 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4499 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4500 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4501 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4502 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4503 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4504 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4505 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4506 pending_events.push(
4507 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4509 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4519 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4521 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4522 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4523 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4524 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4525 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4526 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4527 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4528 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4529 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4530 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4531 pending_events.push(
4532 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4533 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4539 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4543 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4544 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4545 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4547 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4548 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4549 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4550 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4551 pending_events.push(
4552 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4561 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4564 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4565 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4566 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage,
4567 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4568 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4569 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4570 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4573 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4574 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4576 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4578 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4584 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4585 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4586 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4592 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4593 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4594 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4597 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4598 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4600 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4601 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4602 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4603 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4604 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4608 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4609 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4615 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4616 /// update completion.
4617 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4618 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4619 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4620 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4621 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4622 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4623 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4625 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4626 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4627 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4628 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4631 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4632 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4634 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4635 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4636 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4641 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4643 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4644 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4645 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4646 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4651 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4652 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4653 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4654 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4655 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4660 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4664 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4670 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4671 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4672 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4678 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4682 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4683 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4684 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4685 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4686 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4687 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4689 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4693 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4694 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4695 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4696 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4697 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4698 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4699 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4701 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4702 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4703 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4708 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4709 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4710 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4713 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4715 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4716 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4718 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4719 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4720 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4721 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4725 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4727 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4728 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4731 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4732 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4733 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4735 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4736 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4737 /// used to accept such channels.
4739 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4740 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4741 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4742 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4745 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4746 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4748 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4749 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4750 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4752 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4753 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4755 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4756 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4758 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4759 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4761 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4762 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4763 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4764 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4767 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4770 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4771 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4772 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4774 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4775 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4777 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4778 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4781 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4782 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4783 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4784 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4785 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4786 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4789 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4790 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4791 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4794 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4795 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4796 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4799 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4800 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4806 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4807 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4808 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4811 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4812 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4815 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4816 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4817 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4819 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4820 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4821 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4822 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4825 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4826 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4830 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4831 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4832 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4833 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4834 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4835 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4838 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4839 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4840 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4842 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4843 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4844 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4847 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4848 pending_events.push(
4849 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4850 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4851 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4852 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4853 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4854 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4859 entry.insert(channel);
4865 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4866 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4867 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4868 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4869 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4870 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4871 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4872 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4874 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4875 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4877 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4880 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4881 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4882 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4883 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4884 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4886 user_channel_id: user_id,
4891 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4892 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4893 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4894 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4895 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4896 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4897 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4898 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4899 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4901 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4903 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4906 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4907 // lock before watch_channel
4908 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4909 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4910 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4911 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4912 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4913 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4914 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4915 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4916 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4917 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4918 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4919 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4920 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4922 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4923 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4924 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4925 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4926 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4927 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4928 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4931 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4932 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4933 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4934 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4935 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4937 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4938 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4939 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4940 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4941 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4942 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4943 funding_msg.channel_id))
4945 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4946 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4949 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4950 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4953 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4954 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4962 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4964 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4965 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4966 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4967 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4968 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4969 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4970 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4972 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
4973 Ok(update) => update,
4974 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4976 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4977 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4979 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4980 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4981 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4982 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4983 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4984 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4985 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4991 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4992 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4996 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4999 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
5000 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
5004 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5005 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5006 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5007 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5008 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5009 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5010 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5012 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
5013 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5014 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5015 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
5016 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5017 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5018 msg: announcement_sigs,
5020 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5021 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5022 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5023 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5024 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5025 // announcement_signatures.
5026 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
5027 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5028 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5029 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5035 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
5039 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5043 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5044 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5045 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5046 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5047 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5049 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5050 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5051 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5052 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5055 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5056 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5057 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5058 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5061 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5062 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5064 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5065 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
5066 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5067 let (result, is_permanent) =
5068 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
5070 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5075 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5076 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5077 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5087 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5088 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5089 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5090 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5093 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
5097 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5098 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5099 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5100 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5101 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5102 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5103 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5104 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5106 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5107 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5108 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5109 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5114 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5115 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5116 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5117 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5118 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5119 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5120 } else { (tx, None) }
5122 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5125 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5126 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5127 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5129 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5130 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5131 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5132 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5136 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5141 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5142 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5143 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5144 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5146 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5147 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5148 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5149 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5151 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5152 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5153 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5155 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5156 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5157 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5158 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5161 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5162 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5163 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5164 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5165 match pending_forward_info {
5166 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5167 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5168 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5169 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
5171 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
5173 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5174 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5175 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5178 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5180 _ => pending_forward_info
5183 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5190 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5191 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5192 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5193 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5194 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5195 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5196 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5197 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5199 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5204 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5208 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5209 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5210 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5211 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5212 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5213 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5214 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5216 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
5218 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5223 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5224 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5225 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5226 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5228 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5229 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5231 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5232 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5233 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5235 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(msg.failure_code)), chan);
5238 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5242 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5243 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5244 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5245 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5247 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5248 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5250 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5251 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5252 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5253 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5254 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5255 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5256 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5261 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5262 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5266 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5267 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5268 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5270 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5271 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5272 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5273 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5274 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5275 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5276 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5277 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5279 commitment_signed: msg,
5285 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5290 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5291 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5292 let mut forward_event = None;
5293 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5294 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5295 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5296 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5297 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5298 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5299 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5300 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5302 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5303 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5305 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5306 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5307 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5309 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5310 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5312 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5313 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5314 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5316 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5317 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5318 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5319 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5320 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5321 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5322 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5323 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5324 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5327 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5328 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5330 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5331 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5332 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5333 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5334 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5335 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5336 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5337 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5340 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5341 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5342 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5347 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5348 // payments are being processed.
5349 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5350 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
5352 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5353 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5360 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5361 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5364 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5365 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5366 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5369 match forward_event {
5371 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5372 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5373 time_forwardable: time
5381 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5382 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5384 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5385 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5386 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5387 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5388 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5389 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5391 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5392 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5393 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5394 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5395 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5396 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5397 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5398 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5399 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5400 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5401 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5402 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5404 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5405 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5406 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5407 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5408 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5409 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5411 } else { unreachable!(); }
5413 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5414 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5415 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5419 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5420 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5421 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5422 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5423 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5424 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5429 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5431 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5432 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5434 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5435 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5436 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5438 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5439 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5446 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5447 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5448 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5449 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5450 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5451 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5452 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5454 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5456 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5461 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5462 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5463 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5465 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5466 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5467 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5468 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5470 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5471 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5474 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5475 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5476 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5477 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5478 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5479 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5487 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5488 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5489 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5490 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5492 // It's not a local channel
5493 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5496 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5497 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5498 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5500 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5501 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5502 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5503 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5504 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5505 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5507 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5509 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5510 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5511 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5512 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5514 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5515 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5518 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5520 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5523 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5525 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5526 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5527 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5529 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5530 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5531 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5532 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5534 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5535 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5536 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5537 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5538 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5539 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5540 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5541 let mut channel_update = None;
5542 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5543 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5544 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5547 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5548 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5549 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5550 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5551 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5552 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5553 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5558 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5559 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5560 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5561 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5562 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5563 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5567 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5571 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5572 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5575 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5576 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5581 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5582 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5583 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5584 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5585 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5586 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5587 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5588 match monitor_event {
5589 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5590 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5591 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5592 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5594 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5595 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5596 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5597 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5600 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5601 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5602 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5603 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5604 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5605 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5606 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5607 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5608 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5609 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5610 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5614 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5615 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5617 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5619 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5620 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5621 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5622 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5623 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5628 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5629 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5635 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5636 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5639 has_pending_monitor_events
5642 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5643 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5644 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5646 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5647 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5650 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5651 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5652 /// update was applied.
5654 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5655 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5656 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5657 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5658 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5659 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5660 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5661 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5663 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5664 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5665 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5666 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5668 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5669 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5670 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5671 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5673 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5675 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5678 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5679 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5680 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5681 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5682 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5683 updates: commitment_update,
5687 has_monitor_update = true;
5688 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5689 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5690 if close_channel { return false; }
5697 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5698 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5699 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5706 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5707 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5708 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5711 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5712 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5718 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5719 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5720 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5721 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5722 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5723 let mut has_update = false;
5725 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5726 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5727 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5728 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5730 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5731 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5732 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5733 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5735 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5736 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5739 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5740 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5741 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5742 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5743 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5748 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5750 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5751 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5752 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5758 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5759 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5766 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5767 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5773 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5774 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5776 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5777 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5778 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5779 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5780 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5781 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5782 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5783 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5784 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5785 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5786 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5787 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5788 assert!(should_broadcast);
5789 } else { unreachable!(); }
5790 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5792 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5796 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5797 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5799 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5800 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5803 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5805 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5806 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5807 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5808 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5809 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5810 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5811 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5812 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5813 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5814 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5815 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5816 // never fail a payment too early.
5817 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5819 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5827 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5830 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5831 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5833 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5834 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5835 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5837 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5839 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5840 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5844 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5845 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5847 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5849 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5850 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5851 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5852 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5853 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5854 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5857 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5858 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5860 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5863 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5865 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5867 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5868 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5869 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5870 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5871 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5874 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5875 /// stored external to LDK.
5877 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5878 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5879 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5881 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5882 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5885 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5886 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5887 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5888 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5890 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5891 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5892 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5893 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5894 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5896 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5897 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5898 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5899 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5900 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5902 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5903 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5905 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5906 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5910 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5911 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5913 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5915 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5916 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5917 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5918 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5921 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5922 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5924 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5927 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5929 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5931 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5932 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5935 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5936 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5938 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5939 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5940 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5943 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5944 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5946 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5947 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5948 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5949 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5951 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5952 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5953 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5954 Some(_) => continue,
5955 None => return scid_candidate
5960 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5962 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5963 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5965 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5966 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5967 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5971 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5972 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5973 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5975 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5976 /// times to get a unique scid.
5977 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5978 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5979 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5981 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5982 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5983 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5984 return scid_candidate
5988 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5989 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5990 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5991 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5993 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5994 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5995 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5996 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6004 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6005 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6006 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6007 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6008 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6013 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6014 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6015 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
6019 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6020 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
6024 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6025 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
6028 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6029 /// using the given event handler.
6031 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6032 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6035 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
6036 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
6037 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
6039 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6041 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6042 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6043 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6044 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6047 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
6048 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6049 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6052 for event in pending_events {
6053 handler(event).await;
6056 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
6057 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
6062 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6063 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6064 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6065 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6066 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6069 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6070 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6071 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6072 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6074 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6075 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6076 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6077 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6080 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6081 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6083 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6084 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6087 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6088 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6089 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
6091 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6092 events.replace(pending_events);
6101 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6103 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6104 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6105 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6106 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6109 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6111 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6112 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6113 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6114 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6115 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6117 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6118 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6119 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6120 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6123 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
6124 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6125 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6128 for event in pending_events {
6129 handler.handle_event(event);
6137 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6139 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6140 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6141 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6142 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6145 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6147 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6148 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6149 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6150 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6151 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6154 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6155 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6158 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6159 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6160 let new_height = height - 1;
6162 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6163 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6164 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6165 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6166 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6167 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6170 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6174 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6176 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6177 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6178 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6179 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6182 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6183 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6184 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6185 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6187 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6188 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6190 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6191 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
6192 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6194 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6195 if height < last_best_block_height {
6196 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6197 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6201 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6202 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6203 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6204 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6206 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6207 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6209 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6211 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6213 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6215 macro_rules! max_time {
6216 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6218 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6219 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6220 // having an explicit local time source.
6221 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6222 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6223 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6224 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6225 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6231 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6232 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6233 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6234 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6238 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6239 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6240 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
6241 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
6242 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6243 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
6249 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6251 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6252 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6253 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6254 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6255 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6256 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6261 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6263 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6264 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6265 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6266 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6269 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6270 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6272 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6273 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6274 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6275 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6276 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6278 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6279 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6281 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6282 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
6283 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6284 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6285 let res = f(channel);
6286 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6287 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6288 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6289 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6290 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6292 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6293 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6294 if channel.is_usable() {
6295 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6296 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6297 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6298 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6303 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6307 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6309 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6310 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6311 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6312 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6313 msg: announcement_sigs,
6315 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6316 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
6317 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6319 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6320 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6321 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6326 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6327 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6328 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6329 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6330 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6331 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6332 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6333 // is always consistent.
6334 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6335 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6336 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6337 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6338 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6341 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6342 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6343 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6344 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6345 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6346 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6347 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6351 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6352 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6353 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6354 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6355 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6356 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6357 data: reason_message,
6366 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6367 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6368 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6369 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6370 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6371 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6372 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6373 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6374 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6375 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6377 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6378 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6379 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6383 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6386 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6387 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6388 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6389 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6390 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6391 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6392 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6393 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6394 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6397 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6398 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6399 _ => unreachable!(),
6401 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6402 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6403 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6404 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6410 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6412 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6413 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6417 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6418 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6419 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6420 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6422 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6424 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6425 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6426 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6427 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6428 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6429 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6432 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6433 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6434 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6436 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6437 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6438 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6439 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6442 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6443 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6444 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6445 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6446 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6449 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6450 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6451 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6454 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6455 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6456 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6457 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6461 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6462 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6463 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6464 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6465 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6466 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6469 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6470 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6471 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6474 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6475 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6476 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6479 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6481 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6484 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6485 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6486 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6489 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6490 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6491 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6494 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6495 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6496 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6499 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6500 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6501 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6504 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6505 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6506 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6509 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6511 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6514 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6515 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6516 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6519 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6520 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6521 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6524 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6526 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6529 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6530 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6531 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6534 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6535 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6536 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6539 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6541 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6544 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6545 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6546 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6549 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6554 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6556 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6559 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6560 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6561 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6562 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6564 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6565 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6566 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6567 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6568 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6569 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6570 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6571 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6572 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6573 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6574 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6577 no_channels_remain = false;
6582 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6584 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6585 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6586 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6587 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6588 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6589 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6590 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6591 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6592 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6593 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6594 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6595 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6596 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6597 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6598 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6599 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6600 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6601 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6602 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6603 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6607 if no_channels_remain {
6608 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6611 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6612 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6616 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6617 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6618 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6622 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6624 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6627 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6628 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6630 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6631 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6634 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6635 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6640 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6641 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6642 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6643 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6644 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6645 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6646 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6647 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6648 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6652 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6653 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6654 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6659 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6660 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6661 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6662 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6663 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6671 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6675 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6678 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6679 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6680 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6681 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6682 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6687 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6688 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6689 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6690 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6693 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6694 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6695 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6703 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6704 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6708 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6709 provided_node_features()
6712 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6713 provided_init_features()
6717 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6718 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6719 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6720 provided_init_features().to_context()
6723 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6724 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6726 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6727 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6728 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6729 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6730 provided_init_features().to_context()
6733 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6734 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6735 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6736 provided_init_features().to_context()
6739 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6740 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6741 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6742 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6743 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6744 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6745 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6746 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6747 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6748 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6749 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6750 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6751 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6752 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6753 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6754 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6755 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6756 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6760 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6761 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6763 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6764 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6765 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6766 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6769 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6770 (2, node_id, required),
6771 (4, features, required),
6772 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6773 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6774 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6775 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6778 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6779 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6780 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6781 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6782 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6783 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6784 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6785 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6786 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6787 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6788 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6789 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6790 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6791 (7, self.config, option),
6792 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6793 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6794 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6795 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6796 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6797 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6798 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6799 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6800 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6801 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6802 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6803 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6804 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6805 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6806 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6807 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6808 (32, self.is_public, required),
6809 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6810 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6811 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6817 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6818 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6819 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6820 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6821 (2, channel_id, required),
6822 (3, channel_type, option),
6823 (4, counterparty, required),
6824 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6825 (6, funding_txo, option),
6826 (7, config, option),
6827 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6828 (9, confirmations, option),
6829 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6830 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6831 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6832 (16, balance_msat, required),
6833 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6834 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6835 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6836 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6837 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6838 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6839 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6840 (26, is_outbound, required),
6841 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6842 (30, is_usable, required),
6843 (32, is_public, required),
6844 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6845 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6846 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6849 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6850 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6851 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6852 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6853 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6857 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6859 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6860 outbound_scid_alias,
6864 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6865 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6867 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6868 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6869 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6870 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6871 confirmations_required,
6873 force_close_spend_delay,
6874 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6875 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6876 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6877 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6878 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6879 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6884 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6885 (2, channels, vec_type),
6886 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6887 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6890 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6892 (0, onion_packet, required),
6893 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6896 (0, payment_data, required),
6897 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6898 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6900 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6901 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6902 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6906 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6907 (0, routing, required),
6908 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6909 (4, payment_hash, required),
6910 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6911 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6912 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6916 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6917 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6919 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6921 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6922 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6923 reason.write(writer)?;
6925 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6926 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6929 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6930 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6931 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6932 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6939 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6940 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6941 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6944 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6945 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6946 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6947 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6951 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6952 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6953 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6954 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6955 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6958 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6959 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6960 // messages contained in the variants.
6961 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6962 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6963 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6965 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6966 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6967 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6968 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6969 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6972 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6973 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6974 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6975 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6976 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6978 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6983 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6988 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6989 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6990 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6991 (2, outpoint, required),
6992 (4, htlc_id, required),
6993 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6996 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6997 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6998 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6999 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7000 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7002 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7003 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7004 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7005 (2, self.value, required),
7006 (4, payment_data, option),
7007 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7008 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7014 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7015 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7016 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
7018 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7019 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7020 let mut total_msat = None;
7021 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7022 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7023 (0, prev_hop, required),
7024 (1, total_msat, option),
7025 (2, value, required),
7026 (4, payment_data, option),
7027 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7028 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7030 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7032 if payment_data.is_some() {
7033 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7035 if total_msat.is_none() {
7036 total_msat = Some(value);
7038 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7041 if total_msat.is_none() {
7042 if payment_data.is_none() {
7043 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7045 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7047 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7051 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7054 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7061 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7062 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7063 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7066 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
7067 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7068 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
7069 let mut payment_id = None;
7070 let mut payment_secret = None;
7071 let mut payment_params = None;
7072 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7073 (0, session_priv, required),
7074 (1, payment_id, option),
7075 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7076 (3, payment_secret, option),
7077 (4, path, vec_type),
7078 (5, payment_params, option),
7080 if payment_id.is_none() {
7081 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7083 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7085 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7086 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7087 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7088 path: path.unwrap(),
7089 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7094 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7095 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7100 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7101 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7103 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
7105 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7106 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7107 (0, session_priv, required),
7108 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7109 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7110 (3, payment_secret, option),
7111 (4, *path, vec_type),
7112 (5, payment_params, option),
7115 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7117 field.write(writer)?;
7124 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
7125 (0, LightningError) => {
7129 (0, failure_code, required),
7130 (2, data, vec_type),
7134 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7135 (0, forward_info, required),
7136 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7137 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7138 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7139 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7142 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7144 (0, htlc_id, required),
7145 (2, err_packet, required),
7150 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7151 (0, payment_secret, required),
7152 (2, expiry_time, required),
7153 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7154 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7155 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7158 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
7160 (0, session_privs, required),
7163 (0, session_privs, required),
7164 (1, payment_hash, option),
7165 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
7168 (0, session_privs, required),
7169 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
7170 (2, payment_hash, required),
7171 (4, payment_secret, option),
7172 (6, total_msat, required),
7173 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
7174 (10, starting_block_height, required),
7177 (0, session_privs, required),
7178 (2, payment_hash, required),
7182 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
7183 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7184 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7185 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7186 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7189 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7190 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7192 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7194 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7196 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7197 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7198 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7202 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
7203 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
7204 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7205 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7206 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7207 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7208 unfunded_channels += 1;
7211 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7212 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7213 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7214 channel.write(writer)?;
7220 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7221 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7222 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7223 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7224 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7225 for forward in pending_forwards {
7226 forward.write(writer)?;
7231 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7232 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7233 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7235 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7236 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7237 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7238 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7239 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7240 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7241 htlc.write(writer)?;
7243 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7246 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7247 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7248 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7249 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7250 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7251 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7254 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7255 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7256 for event in events.iter() {
7257 event.write(writer)?;
7260 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7261 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7262 for event in background_events.iter() {
7264 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7266 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7267 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7272 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7273 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7274 // likely to be identical.
7275 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7276 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7278 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7279 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7280 hash.write(writer)?;
7281 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7284 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7285 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7286 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7287 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7288 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7291 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7292 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7294 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7295 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7296 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7297 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7300 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7301 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7305 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7306 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7307 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7309 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7310 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7311 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7317 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7318 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7319 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7320 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7323 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7324 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7325 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7326 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7327 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7329 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
7332 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7333 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7334 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7335 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7336 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7337 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7338 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7339 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7340 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7347 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7349 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7351 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7352 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7353 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7354 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7355 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7356 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7357 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7358 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7359 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7360 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7361 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7362 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7363 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7365 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7366 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7368 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7369 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7371 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7372 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7373 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7374 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7375 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7376 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7378 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7379 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7380 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7381 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7382 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7383 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7386 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7387 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7389 pub keys_manager: K,
7391 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7393 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7394 pub fee_estimator: F,
7395 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7397 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7398 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7399 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7400 pub chain_monitor: M,
7402 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7403 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7404 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7405 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7406 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7407 /// deserialization.
7409 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7410 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7411 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7413 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7414 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7416 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7417 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7418 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7419 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7421 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7424 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7425 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7428 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7429 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7430 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7431 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7432 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7433 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7436 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7437 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7438 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7439 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7440 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7442 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7443 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7448 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7449 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7450 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7451 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7452 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7453 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7454 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7455 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7458 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7459 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7460 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7464 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7465 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7466 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7467 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7468 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7469 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7472 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7473 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7475 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7476 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7479 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7481 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7482 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7483 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7484 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7485 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7486 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7487 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7488 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7489 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7490 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7491 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7492 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7493 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7494 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7495 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7496 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7497 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7498 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7499 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7500 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7501 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7502 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7503 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7504 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7505 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7506 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7507 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7508 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7509 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7510 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7511 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7512 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7513 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7514 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7515 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7516 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7517 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7518 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7519 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7520 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7522 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7523 let mut found_htlc = false;
7524 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7525 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7528 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7529 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7530 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7531 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7532 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7533 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7534 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7535 log_info!(args.logger,
7536 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7537 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7538 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7542 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7543 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7544 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7546 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7547 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7549 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7551 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7552 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7553 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7554 // safely discard the channel.
7555 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7556 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7557 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7558 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7559 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7562 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7563 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7564 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7565 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7566 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7567 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7571 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7572 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7573 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7574 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7578 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7579 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7580 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7581 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7582 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7583 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7584 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7585 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7586 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7588 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7591 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7592 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7593 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7594 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7595 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7596 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7597 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7598 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7600 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7603 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7604 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7605 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7606 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7607 let peer_state = PeerState {
7608 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7610 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7613 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7614 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7615 for _ in 0..event_count {
7616 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7617 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7622 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7623 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7624 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7625 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7626 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7627 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7631 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7632 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7634 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7635 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7636 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7637 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7638 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7642 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7643 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7644 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7645 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7646 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7647 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7648 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7650 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7651 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7655 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7656 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7657 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7658 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7659 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7660 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7661 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7662 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7663 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7664 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7665 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7666 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7667 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7668 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7669 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7670 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7671 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7672 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7674 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7675 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7678 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7679 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7682 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7683 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7684 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7685 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7686 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7687 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7689 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7691 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7692 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7693 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7694 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7695 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7696 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7697 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7699 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7700 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7701 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7702 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7703 if path.is_empty() {
7704 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7705 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7707 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7708 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7709 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7710 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7711 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7712 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7713 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7714 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7716 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7717 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7718 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7719 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7720 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7722 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7723 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7724 total_msat: path_amt,
7725 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7727 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7728 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7733 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7734 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7735 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7736 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7737 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs`, we were
7738 // apparently not persisted after the monitor was when forwarding
7740 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7741 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7742 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7743 if htlc_info.prev_short_channel_id == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
7744 htlc_info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7746 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7747 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7752 !forwards.is_empty()
7760 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7761 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7762 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7763 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7764 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7765 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7766 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7767 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7771 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7772 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7774 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7775 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7776 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7777 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7779 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7780 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7783 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7784 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7785 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7786 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7787 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7789 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7790 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7791 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7792 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7793 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7794 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7795 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7796 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7798 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7799 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7803 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7805 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7807 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7808 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7810 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7814 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7815 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7817 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7818 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7821 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7823 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7825 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7826 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7827 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7828 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7829 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7833 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7834 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7835 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7836 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7838 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7839 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7840 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7842 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7843 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7844 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7845 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7846 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7847 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7849 if chan.is_usable() {
7850 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7851 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7852 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7853 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7854 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7859 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7861 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7862 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7863 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7864 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7865 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7866 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7867 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7868 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7869 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7870 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7871 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7873 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7874 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7876 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7877 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7878 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7879 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7881 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7882 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7883 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7884 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7886 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7887 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7888 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7889 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7891 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7892 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7893 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7895 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7896 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7899 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7902 purpose: payment_purpose,
7903 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7909 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7911 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7912 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7913 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7915 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7917 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7919 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7921 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7922 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7923 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7924 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7926 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7927 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7928 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7929 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7930 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7931 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7933 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7939 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7941 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7943 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7944 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7945 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7946 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7948 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7949 logger: args.logger,
7950 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7953 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7954 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7955 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7956 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7957 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7960 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7961 //connection or two.
7963 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7969 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7970 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7971 use core::time::Duration;
7972 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7973 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7974 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7975 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7976 use crate::ln::msgs;
7977 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7978 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7979 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7980 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7981 use crate::util::test_utils;
7982 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7985 fn test_notify_limits() {
7986 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7987 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7988 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7989 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7990 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7991 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7993 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7994 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7995 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7996 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7997 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7999 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8001 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8002 // to connect messages with new values
8003 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8004 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8005 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
8006 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
8008 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8009 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8010 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8011 // ... but the last node should not.
8012 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8013 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8014 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8015 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8017 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8018 // about the channel.
8019 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8020 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8021 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8023 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8025 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8026 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8027 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8028 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8029 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8030 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8032 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8033 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8034 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8036 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8037 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8038 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8039 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8040 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8041 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8043 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8044 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8045 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8046 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8047 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8048 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8049 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8050 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8052 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8053 // the channel info has updated.
8054 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8055 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8056 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8057 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8058 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8059 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8063 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8064 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8068 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8069 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8070 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8072 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8073 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8074 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8075 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8077 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8078 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8079 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8080 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8081 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8082 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8084 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8086 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8088 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8089 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8091 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8092 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8093 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8094 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8095 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8097 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8098 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8099 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8101 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8102 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8103 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8104 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8105 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8106 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8107 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8108 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8109 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8111 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8112 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8114 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8115 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8116 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8118 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8119 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8120 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8121 // lightning messages manually.
8122 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8123 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8126 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8127 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8128 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8130 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8131 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8133 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8134 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8136 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8137 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8138 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8140 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8141 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8142 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8144 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8146 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8148 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8149 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8152 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8153 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8154 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8155 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8157 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8158 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8159 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8160 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8165 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8166 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8167 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8168 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8173 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8174 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8175 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8176 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8183 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8184 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8185 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8186 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8187 // fails as expected.
8188 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8189 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8190 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8191 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8192 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8193 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8194 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8196 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8197 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8198 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8200 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8201 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8202 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
8203 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8204 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
8206 let route = find_route(
8207 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8208 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8210 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8212 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8213 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8214 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8215 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8216 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8218 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8219 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8220 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8221 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8222 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8224 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8225 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8226 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8227 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8228 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8229 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8230 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8231 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8232 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8234 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8235 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8237 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8238 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8239 let route = find_route(
8240 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8241 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8243 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8245 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8246 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8247 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8248 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8249 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8251 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8252 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8253 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8255 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8256 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8257 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8258 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8259 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8261 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8262 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8263 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8265 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8266 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8267 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8268 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8269 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8270 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8271 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8272 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8273 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8275 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8276 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8280 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8281 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8282 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8283 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8284 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8285 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8286 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8288 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8289 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8290 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8291 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8293 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8294 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8295 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8296 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8297 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8299 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8300 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8301 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8302 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8303 let route = find_route(
8304 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8305 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8308 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8309 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8310 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8311 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8314 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8315 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8316 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8317 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8318 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8319 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8320 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8322 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8326 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8327 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8331 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8333 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8334 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8335 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8336 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8338 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8339 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8340 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8341 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8342 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8344 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8345 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8346 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8347 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8348 let route = find_route(
8349 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8350 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8353 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8354 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8355 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8356 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8357 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8360 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8361 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8362 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8363 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8364 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8365 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8366 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8368 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8372 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8373 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8374 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8375 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8376 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8378 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8379 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8380 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8381 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8383 // Marshall an MPP route.
8384 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8385 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8386 route.paths.push(path);
8387 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8388 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8389 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8390 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8391 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8392 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8394 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8395 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8396 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8397 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8402 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8403 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8404 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8405 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8406 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8407 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8409 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8410 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8412 total_msat: 100_000,
8415 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8416 // payment verification fails as expected.
8417 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8418 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8419 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8420 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8422 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8426 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8427 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8431 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8432 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8433 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8434 // the channel is successfully closed.
8435 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8436 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8437 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8438 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8440 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8441 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8442 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8443 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8444 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8446 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8447 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8449 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8450 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8451 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8452 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8455 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8457 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8458 // as it has the funding transaction.
8459 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8460 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8461 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8463 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8466 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8468 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8470 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8471 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8472 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8474 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8475 // as it has the funding transaction.
8476 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8477 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8478 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8481 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8482 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8484 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8485 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8486 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8488 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8489 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8490 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8491 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8493 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8494 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8496 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8497 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8498 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8499 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8500 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8501 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8502 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8504 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8505 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8506 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8507 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8508 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8509 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8510 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8513 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8515 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8516 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8517 // closing transaction).
8518 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8519 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8520 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8522 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8523 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8524 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8525 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8526 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8529 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8531 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8533 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8534 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8535 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8537 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8539 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8540 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8544 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8546 use crate::chain::Listen;
8547 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8548 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8549 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8550 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8551 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8552 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8553 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8554 use crate::util::test_utils;
8555 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8556 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8558 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8559 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8560 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8562 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8566 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8567 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8568 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8569 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8570 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8571 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8572 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8577 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8578 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8581 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8582 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8583 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8585 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8586 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8588 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8589 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8591 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8592 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8594 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8595 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8596 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8597 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8598 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8600 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8602 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8604 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8605 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8606 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8607 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8608 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8610 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8612 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8614 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8615 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8616 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8617 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8618 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8621 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8622 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8623 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8625 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8626 } else { panic!(); }
8628 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8629 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8631 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8634 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8637 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8638 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8640 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8641 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8642 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8643 match msg_events[0] {
8644 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8645 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8646 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8650 match msg_events[1] {
8651 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8655 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8656 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8658 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8659 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8661 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8664 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8665 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8667 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8668 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8670 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8673 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8675 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8676 macro_rules! send_payment {
8677 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8678 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8679 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8680 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8681 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8682 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8683 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8684 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8685 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8686 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8688 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8689 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8691 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8692 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8694 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8695 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8696 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8697 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8698 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8699 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8700 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8701 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8703 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8704 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8705 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8706 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8708 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8709 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8710 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8711 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8712 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8714 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8717 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8718 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8719 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8720 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8722 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8727 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8728 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);