1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
177 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
178 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
180 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
181 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
186 impl Readable for PaymentId {
187 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
188 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
192 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
193 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
194 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
195 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
196 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
199 session_priv: SecretKey,
200 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
201 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
202 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
203 payment_id: PaymentId,
204 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
205 payee: Option<Payee>,
208 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
209 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
210 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
212 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
214 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
216 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
219 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
220 payment_id.hash(hasher);
221 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
222 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
230 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
231 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
233 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
234 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
235 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
236 payment_secret: None,
242 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
243 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
245 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
253 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
254 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
256 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
261 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
263 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
264 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
265 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
266 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
267 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
269 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
270 err: msgs::LightningError,
271 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
272 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
274 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
276 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
278 err: LightningError {
280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
288 shutdown_finish: None,
292 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
294 err: LightningError {
296 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
299 shutdown_finish: None,
303 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
304 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
307 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
309 err: LightningError {
311 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
312 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
318 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
319 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
323 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
326 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
330 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
334 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
343 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
345 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
346 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
354 shutdown_finish: None,
359 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
360 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
361 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
362 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
363 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
365 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
366 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
367 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
368 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
369 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
370 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
371 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
373 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
377 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
378 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
379 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
380 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
381 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
382 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
383 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
384 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
385 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
386 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
387 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
388 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
390 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
391 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
392 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
393 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
396 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
397 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
398 /// quite some time lag.
399 enum BackgroundEvent {
400 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
401 /// commitment transaction.
402 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
405 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
406 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
408 latest_features: InitFeatures,
411 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
412 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
414 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
416 struct PendingInboundPayment {
417 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
418 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
419 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
420 /// this payment being removed.
422 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
423 user_payment_id: u64,
424 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
425 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
426 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
429 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
430 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
431 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
433 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
436 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
437 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
438 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
439 pending_amt_msat: u64,
440 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
441 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
442 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
444 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
445 starting_block_height: u32,
447 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
448 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
449 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
451 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
455 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
456 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
458 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
462 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
464 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
468 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
470 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
475 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
476 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
477 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
478 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
479 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
480 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs }
483 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs };
486 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
487 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
488 let remove_res = match self {
489 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
490 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
491 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
492 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
496 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
497 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
498 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
499 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
500 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
501 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
508 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
509 let insert_res = match self {
510 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
512 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
514 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
517 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
518 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
519 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
520 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
521 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
528 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
532 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
539 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
540 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
541 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
542 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
543 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
544 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
545 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
546 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
548 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
549 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
550 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
551 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
552 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
553 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
554 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
555 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
556 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
558 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
559 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
561 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
562 /// to individual Channels.
564 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
565 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
566 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
567 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
569 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
570 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
571 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
572 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
573 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
574 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
575 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
577 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
578 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
579 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
580 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
583 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
584 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
585 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
586 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
587 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
589 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
590 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
591 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
592 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
593 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
594 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
595 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
596 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
597 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
598 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
601 default_configuration: UserConfig,
602 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
608 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
610 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
611 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
613 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
614 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
615 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
616 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
618 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
619 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
620 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
621 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
622 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
623 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
625 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
626 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
627 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
628 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
629 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
630 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
631 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
632 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
634 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
636 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
637 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
639 our_network_key: SecretKey,
640 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
642 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
643 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
644 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
646 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
647 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
648 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
649 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
651 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
652 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
653 /// are currently open with that peer.
654 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
655 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
658 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
659 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
661 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
662 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
663 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
664 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
665 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
666 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
667 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
668 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
669 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
671 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
678 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
680 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
681 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
682 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
683 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
684 pub struct ChainParameters {
685 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
686 pub network: Network,
688 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
690 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
691 pub best_block: BestBlock,
694 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
700 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
701 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
702 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
703 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
704 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
705 /// updates are ready for persistence).
707 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
708 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
709 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
710 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
711 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
713 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
714 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
717 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
718 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
719 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
722 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
723 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
725 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
726 persistence_notifier: notifier,
727 should_persist: persist_check,
728 _read_guard: read_guard,
733 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
735 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
736 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
741 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
742 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
744 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
746 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
747 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
748 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
749 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
750 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
752 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
753 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
755 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
757 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
758 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
759 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
760 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
761 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
762 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
763 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
765 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
766 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
768 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
769 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
770 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
771 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
773 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
774 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
775 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
776 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
777 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
778 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
781 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
783 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
784 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
787 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
789 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
790 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
791 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
792 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
793 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
794 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
795 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
796 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
797 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
798 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
799 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
802 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
803 /// to better separate parameters.
804 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
805 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
806 /// The node_id of our counterparty
807 pub node_id: PublicKey,
808 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
809 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
810 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
811 pub features: InitFeatures,
812 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
813 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
814 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
816 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
818 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
819 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
820 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
821 /// payments to us through this channel.
822 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
825 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
826 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
827 pub struct ChannelDetails {
828 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
829 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
830 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
831 /// lifetime of the channel.
832 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
833 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
834 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
835 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
836 /// our counterparty already.
838 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
839 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
840 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
841 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
842 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
843 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
844 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
845 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
846 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
847 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
848 /// this value on chain.
850 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
852 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
854 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
855 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
856 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
857 pub user_channel_id: u64,
858 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
859 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
860 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
861 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
863 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
864 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
865 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
866 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
867 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
868 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
869 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
870 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
871 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
873 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
874 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
875 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
876 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
877 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
878 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
879 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
880 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
881 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
883 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
885 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
886 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
887 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
888 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
889 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
890 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
891 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
892 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
893 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
895 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
896 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
897 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
898 pub is_outbound: bool,
899 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
900 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
901 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
902 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
903 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
905 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
906 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
907 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
908 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
910 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
912 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
916 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
917 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
919 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
920 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
921 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
922 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
923 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
924 ParameterError(APIError),
925 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
926 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
927 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
930 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
932 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
933 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
934 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
935 /// paths than the ones selected).
936 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
937 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
938 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
939 /// in over-/re-payment.
941 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
942 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
943 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
945 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
946 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
947 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
948 /// with the latest update_id.
950 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
951 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
952 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
953 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
954 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
955 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
956 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
957 payment_id: PaymentId,
961 macro_rules! handle_error {
962 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
965 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
966 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
968 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
969 // entering the macro.
970 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
971 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
974 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
976 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
977 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
978 if let Some(update) = update_option {
979 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
983 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
984 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
985 channel_id, user_channel_id,
986 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
991 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
992 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
994 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
995 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
996 action: err.action.clone()
1000 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1001 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1004 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1011 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1012 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1013 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1015 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1016 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1018 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1020 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1021 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1023 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1024 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1025 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1026 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1028 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1029 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1030 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1032 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1033 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1034 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1035 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1037 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1038 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1039 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1045 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1046 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1050 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1052 $entry.remove_entry();
1060 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1061 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1065 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1067 $entry.remove_entry();
1075 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1076 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1078 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1079 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1080 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1087 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1088 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1089 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1091 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1093 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1094 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1095 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1096 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1098 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1099 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1100 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1101 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1102 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1103 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1104 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1105 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1106 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1107 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1108 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1111 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1112 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1113 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1114 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1115 match $action_type {
1116 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1117 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1119 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1120 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1122 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1123 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1124 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1125 if !$resend_commitment {
1126 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1129 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1131 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1132 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1136 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1137 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1139 $entry.remove_entry();
1143 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1144 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1148 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1149 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1150 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1152 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1153 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1157 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1158 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1159 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1160 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1161 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1164 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1169 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1170 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1171 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1172 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1173 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1174 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1176 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1177 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1179 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1180 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1181 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1182 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1185 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1186 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1187 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1188 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1189 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1190 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1191 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1192 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1193 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1194 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1195 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1196 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1199 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1200 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1201 // before it should be allowed to.
1202 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1203 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1204 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1207 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1208 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1209 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1210 msg: announcement_sigs,
1213 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1216 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1217 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1218 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1219 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1220 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1221 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1222 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1223 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1224 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1225 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1226 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1227 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1228 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1229 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1230 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1231 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1232 let mut order = $order;
1234 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1236 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1240 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1241 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1242 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1243 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1248 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1249 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1250 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1251 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1252 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1257 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1261 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1266 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1267 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1268 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1273 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1274 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1275 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1276 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1277 assert!(res.is_ok());
1280 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1284 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1285 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1286 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1288 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1290 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1291 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1296 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1297 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1298 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1299 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1300 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1303 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1305 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1306 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1308 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1310 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1312 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1313 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1314 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1315 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1316 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1317 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1320 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1321 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1322 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1326 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1328 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1329 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1330 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1331 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1332 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1333 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1335 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1336 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1338 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1339 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1342 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1343 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1345 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1347 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1348 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1349 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1350 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1358 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1359 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1360 &self.default_configuration
1363 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1365 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1366 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1367 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1368 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1369 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1372 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1373 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1375 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1376 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1377 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1379 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1380 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1381 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1382 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1383 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1384 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1386 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1387 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1388 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1389 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1390 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1391 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1395 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1396 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1397 Some(peer_state) => {
1398 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1399 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1400 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1401 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1402 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1404 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1407 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1409 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1410 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1411 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1413 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1414 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1415 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1416 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1417 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1418 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1420 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1423 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1425 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1426 node_id: their_network_key,
1429 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1432 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1433 let mut res = Vec::new();
1435 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1436 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1437 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1438 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1439 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1440 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1441 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1442 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1443 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1444 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1445 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1446 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1447 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1449 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1450 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1451 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1452 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1453 inbound_capacity_msat,
1454 outbound_capacity_msat,
1455 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1456 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1457 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1458 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1459 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1460 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1461 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1466 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1467 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1468 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1474 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1475 /// more information.
1476 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1477 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1480 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1481 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1483 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1484 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1486 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1487 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1488 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1489 // really wanted anyway.
1490 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1493 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1494 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1495 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1496 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1497 Some(transaction) => {
1498 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1502 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1503 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1504 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1505 reason: closure_reason
1509 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1512 let counterparty_node_id;
1513 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1514 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1515 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1516 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1517 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1518 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1519 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1520 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1521 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1522 Some(peer_state) => {
1523 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1524 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1525 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1527 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1529 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1531 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1532 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1533 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1534 let (result, is_permanent) =
1535 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1537 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1543 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1544 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1548 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1549 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1550 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1551 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1555 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1563 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1564 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1567 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1571 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1572 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1573 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1575 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1576 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1578 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1579 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1580 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1581 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1583 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1585 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1586 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1587 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1588 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1589 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1592 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1593 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1594 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1596 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1597 /// the channel being closed or not:
1598 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1599 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1600 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1601 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1602 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1603 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1604 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1606 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1608 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1609 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1610 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1611 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1612 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1616 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1617 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1618 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1619 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1620 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1622 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1623 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1624 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1625 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1626 // ignore the result here.
1627 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1631 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1632 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1633 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1635 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1636 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1637 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1638 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1639 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1640 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1643 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1644 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1646 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1647 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1648 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1651 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1653 chan.remove_entry().1
1655 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1658 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1659 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1660 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1661 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1662 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1667 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1670 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1671 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1672 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1674 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1675 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1676 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1677 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1678 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1679 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1680 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1690 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1691 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1692 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1693 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1694 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1698 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1699 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1700 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1702 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1703 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1704 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1705 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1706 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1707 failure_code: $err_code,
1708 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1713 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1714 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1717 let shared_secret = {
1718 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1719 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1722 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1724 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1725 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1726 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1727 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1728 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1729 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1730 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1731 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1734 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1735 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1736 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1737 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1738 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1741 let mut channel_state = None;
1742 macro_rules! return_err {
1743 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1745 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1746 if channel_state.is_none() {
1747 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1749 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1750 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1751 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1752 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1753 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1758 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1759 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1760 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1761 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1763 let error_code = match err {
1764 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1765 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1766 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1767 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1768 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1770 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1773 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1774 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1775 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1782 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1785 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1786 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1787 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1788 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1789 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1790 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1791 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1792 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1793 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1794 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1795 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1796 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1800 // final_expiry_too_soon
1801 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1802 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1803 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1804 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1805 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1806 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1807 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1809 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1810 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1811 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1813 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1814 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1815 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1818 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1819 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1820 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1821 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1822 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1823 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1824 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1825 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1827 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1829 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1830 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1831 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1832 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1833 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1834 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1835 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1836 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1837 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1840 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1842 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1845 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1850 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1851 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1852 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1853 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1855 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1857 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1858 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1859 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1860 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1863 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1864 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1865 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1867 // Check two things:
1868 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1869 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1870 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1872 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1874 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1875 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1876 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1878 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1880 let blinding_factor = {
1881 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1882 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1883 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1884 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1887 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1889 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1891 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1894 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1895 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1898 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1899 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1900 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1901 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1902 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1906 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1907 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1908 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1911 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1912 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1913 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1914 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1918 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1919 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1920 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1921 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1922 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1923 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1924 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1925 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1926 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1927 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1928 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1930 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1933 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1935 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1936 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1937 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1938 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1939 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1942 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1943 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1944 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1945 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1946 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1947 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1948 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1950 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1951 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1953 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1954 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1955 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1956 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1957 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1959 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1960 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1962 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1963 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
1964 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
1965 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1966 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1967 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1969 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1970 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1972 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
1973 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
1974 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
1975 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
1976 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
1977 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
1978 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
1979 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
1980 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1981 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1987 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1988 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1989 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1990 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1992 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1993 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1995 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1996 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1997 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1999 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2001 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2006 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2009 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2010 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2011 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2013 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2014 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2015 if !chan.should_announce() {
2016 return Err(LightningError {
2017 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2018 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2021 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2022 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2025 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2026 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2027 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2028 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2029 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2030 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2031 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2032 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2033 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2037 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2039 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2040 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2042 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2043 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2044 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2045 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2046 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2047 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2048 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2049 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2052 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2053 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2055 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2061 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2062 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2063 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2064 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2065 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2066 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2068 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2069 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2070 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2071 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2072 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2074 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2076 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2078 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2079 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2081 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2082 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2083 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2084 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2085 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2086 err: "Payment already completed"
2091 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2092 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2093 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2096 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2098 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2099 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2100 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2101 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2102 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2103 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2104 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2105 total_msat: total_value,
2107 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2111 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2112 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2114 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2115 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2117 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2118 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2120 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2121 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2123 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2124 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2126 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2127 payee: payee.clone(),
2128 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2129 channel_state, chan)
2131 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2132 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2133 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2134 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2135 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2136 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2137 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2138 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2139 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2140 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2142 insert_outbound_payment!();
2144 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2145 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2146 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2147 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2148 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2149 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2150 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2151 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2157 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2159 } else { unreachable!(); }
2163 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2164 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2166 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2171 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2173 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2174 /// fields for more info.
2176 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2177 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2178 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2179 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2180 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2181 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2183 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2185 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2186 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2187 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2189 /// In general, a path may raise:
2190 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2191 /// node public key) is specified.
2192 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2193 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2195 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2196 /// relevant updates.
2198 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2199 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2200 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2202 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2203 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2204 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2205 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2207 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2208 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2209 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2210 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2211 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2214 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2215 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2216 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2218 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2219 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2220 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2221 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2222 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2224 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2225 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2227 let mut total_value = 0;
2228 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2229 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2230 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2231 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2232 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2233 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2234 continue 'path_check;
2236 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2237 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2238 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2239 continue 'path_check;
2242 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2243 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2245 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2246 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2248 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2249 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2250 total_value = amt_msat;
2253 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2254 let mut results = Vec::new();
2255 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2256 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2258 let mut has_ok = false;
2259 let mut has_err = false;
2260 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2261 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2262 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2263 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2264 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2265 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2266 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2270 } else if res.is_err() {
2271 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2272 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2275 if has_err && has_ok {
2276 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2279 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2280 if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
2281 Some(RouteParameters {
2282 payee: payee.clone(),
2283 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2284 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2290 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2291 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2292 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2293 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2299 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2301 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2302 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2303 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2304 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2306 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2307 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2308 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2309 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2310 if path.len() == 0 {
2311 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2312 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2317 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2318 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2319 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2321 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2322 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2324 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2325 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2326 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2327 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2330 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2332 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2333 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2334 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2337 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2338 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2339 err: "Payment already completed"
2344 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2345 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2349 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2352 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2353 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2354 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2355 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2356 /// never reach the recipient.
2358 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2360 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2361 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2363 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2365 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2366 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2367 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2369 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2371 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2372 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2373 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2378 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2379 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2380 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2381 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2383 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2385 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2387 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2388 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2389 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2390 } else { unreachable!(); })
2393 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2395 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2396 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2399 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2400 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2405 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2406 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2407 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2410 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2411 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2412 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2414 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2422 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2423 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2424 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2428 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2430 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2431 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2433 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2435 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2436 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2437 /// keys per-channel).
2439 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2440 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2441 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2443 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2444 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2445 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2447 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2448 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2449 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2451 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2452 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2453 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2454 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2458 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2459 let mut output_index = None;
2460 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2461 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2462 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2463 if output_index.is_some() {
2464 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2465 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2468 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2469 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2470 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2473 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2476 if output_index.is_none() {
2477 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2478 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2481 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2485 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2486 if !chan.should_announce() {
2487 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2491 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2493 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2495 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2496 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2498 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2499 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2500 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2501 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2502 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2507 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2508 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2509 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2511 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2514 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2515 // smaller than 500:
2516 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2518 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2519 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2520 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2521 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2522 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2523 /// our network addresses.
2525 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2526 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2528 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2529 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2530 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2531 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2533 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2535 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2536 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2539 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2540 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2543 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2544 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2545 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2547 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2548 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2549 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2550 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2551 rgb, alias, addresses,
2552 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2553 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2555 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2556 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2558 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2559 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2561 let mut announced_chans = false;
2562 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2563 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2564 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2566 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2571 announced_chans = true;
2573 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2574 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2575 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2579 if announced_chans {
2580 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2581 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2582 signature: node_announce_sig,
2583 contents: announcement
2589 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2591 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2592 /// Will likely generate further events.
2593 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2594 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2596 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2597 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2598 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2600 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2601 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2603 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2604 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2605 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2606 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2608 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2609 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2610 match forward_info {
2611 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2612 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2613 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2614 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2615 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2616 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2617 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2619 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2620 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2623 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2624 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2625 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2626 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2627 // problem, not ours.
2634 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2635 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2636 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2637 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2638 match forward_info {
2639 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2640 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2642 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2643 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2644 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2645 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2646 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2647 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2648 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2649 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2651 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2653 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2654 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2656 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2658 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2659 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2660 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2666 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2668 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2669 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2670 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2671 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2672 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2673 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2674 // this channel currently :/.
2680 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2681 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2683 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2684 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2685 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2687 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2688 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2690 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2692 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2693 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2694 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2697 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2699 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2700 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2701 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2702 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2703 // messages when we can.
2704 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2705 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2706 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2713 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2714 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2717 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2718 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2719 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2720 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2721 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2722 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2724 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2725 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2726 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2727 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2728 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2730 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2731 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2733 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2735 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2739 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2740 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2743 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2744 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2745 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2746 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2747 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2748 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2749 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2750 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2751 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2753 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2761 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2762 match forward_info {
2763 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2764 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2765 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2766 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2767 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2768 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2769 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2770 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2772 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2775 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2776 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2777 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2778 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2779 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2780 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2782 value: amt_to_forward,
2787 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2789 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2790 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2791 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2793 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2794 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2795 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2796 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2797 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2799 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2804 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2805 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2806 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2807 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2808 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2809 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2810 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2811 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2812 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2813 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2814 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2815 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2816 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2818 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2819 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2821 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2822 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2824 amt: amt_to_forward,
2825 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2829 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2830 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2836 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2838 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2841 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2842 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2845 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2846 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2847 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2848 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2849 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2850 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2851 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2853 let mut total_value = 0;
2854 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2855 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2856 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2857 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2858 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2859 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2863 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2864 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2865 total_value += htlc.value;
2866 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2867 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2868 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2869 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2870 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2871 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2873 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2875 _ => unreachable!(),
2878 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2879 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2880 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2881 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2884 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2885 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2887 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2888 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2889 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2890 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2894 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2895 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2897 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2899 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2900 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2907 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2908 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2916 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2917 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2920 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2921 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2924 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2925 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2926 events.append(&mut new_events);
2929 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2931 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2932 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2934 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2935 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2936 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2937 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2938 if background_events.is_empty() {
2942 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2944 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2945 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2946 // monitor updating completing.
2947 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2954 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2955 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2956 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2957 self.process_background_events();
2960 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2961 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2962 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2963 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2964 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2965 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2966 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2968 if !chan.is_live() {
2969 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2970 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2971 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2973 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2974 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2976 let mut retain_channel = true;
2977 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2980 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2981 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2985 let ret_err = match res {
2986 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2987 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2988 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2989 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2992 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2993 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2994 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2995 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2996 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2997 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2998 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2999 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3009 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3013 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3014 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3015 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3016 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3017 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3018 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3019 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3021 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3023 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3025 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3026 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3027 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3028 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3029 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3030 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3031 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3033 handle_errors.push(err);
3043 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3045 /// This currently includes:
3046 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3047 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3048 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3051 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3052 /// estimate fetches.
3053 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3054 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3055 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3056 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3058 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3060 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3062 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3063 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3064 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3065 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3066 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3067 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3068 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3069 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3071 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3073 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3075 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3076 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3077 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3078 if needs_close { return false; }
3081 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3082 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3083 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3084 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3085 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3086 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3087 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3088 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3092 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3093 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3095 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3096 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3097 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3101 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3102 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3111 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3112 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3118 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3119 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3120 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3121 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3122 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3123 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3124 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3126 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3127 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3128 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3129 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3130 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3131 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3132 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3133 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3134 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3135 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3136 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3142 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3143 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3144 // be surfaced to the user.
3145 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3146 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3148 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3149 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3150 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3151 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3152 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3153 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3155 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3158 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3160 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3161 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3162 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3164 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3165 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3166 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3167 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3168 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3169 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3170 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3171 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3172 Some(RouteParameters {
3174 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3175 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3178 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3179 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3180 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3182 rejected_by_dest: false,
3183 network_update: None,
3184 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3186 short_channel_id: None,
3196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3203 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3204 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3205 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3206 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3207 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3208 /// still-available channels.
3209 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3210 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3211 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3212 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3215 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3216 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3217 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3219 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3220 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3221 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3222 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3223 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3224 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3225 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3226 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3229 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3230 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3233 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3234 all_paths_failed = true;
3237 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3240 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3241 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3242 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3243 Some(RouteParameters {
3244 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3245 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3246 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3249 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3250 match &onion_error {
3251 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3253 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3255 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3256 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3257 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3258 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3259 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3260 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3261 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3262 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3263 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3270 error_code: onion_error_code,
3272 error_data: onion_error_data
3276 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3282 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3283 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3284 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3285 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3287 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3288 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3289 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3290 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3291 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3292 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3293 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3294 network_update: None,
3297 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3300 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3302 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3308 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3309 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3310 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3311 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3312 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3313 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3315 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3316 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3317 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3321 let mut forward_event = None;
3322 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3323 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3325 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3326 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3327 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3330 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3333 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3334 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3335 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3336 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3337 time_forwardable: time
3344 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3345 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3346 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3348 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3349 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3350 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3351 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3353 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3355 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3356 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3357 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3358 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3360 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3362 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3363 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3364 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3365 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3367 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3368 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3369 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3370 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3372 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3373 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3374 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3375 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3376 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3378 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3379 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3380 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3386 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3387 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3388 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3390 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3391 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3392 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3393 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3394 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3395 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3396 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3398 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3399 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3400 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3401 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3402 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3403 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3404 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3405 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3407 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3408 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3409 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3410 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3411 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3412 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3414 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3419 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3420 // which were generated.
3421 channel_state.take();
3423 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3424 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3425 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3432 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3433 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3434 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3435 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3436 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3438 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3442 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3443 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3444 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3445 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3446 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3447 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3448 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3449 payment_preimage, e);
3450 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3451 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3452 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3453 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3456 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3457 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3458 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3459 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3460 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3461 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3462 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3463 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3464 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3465 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3471 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3473 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3476 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3477 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3478 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3479 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3480 payment_preimage, e);
3482 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3483 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3485 chan.remove_entry();
3487 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3490 } else { unreachable!(); }
3493 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3494 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3495 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } = source {
3496 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3497 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3498 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3499 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3500 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3501 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None);
3502 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3510 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3512 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3513 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3514 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3515 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3516 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3517 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3518 let found_payment = !payment.get().is_fulfilled();
3519 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3520 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3522 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3523 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3524 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3526 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3527 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3528 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path));
3529 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3534 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3535 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3536 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3537 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3539 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3545 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3548 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3549 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3550 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3551 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3552 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3553 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3554 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3557 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3558 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3559 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3560 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3561 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3564 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3565 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3566 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3567 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3568 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3569 payment_preimage, e);
3571 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3572 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3573 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3574 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3577 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3578 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3579 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3580 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3584 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3585 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3586 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3589 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3590 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3592 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3600 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3601 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3602 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3605 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3606 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3608 let chan_restoration_res;
3609 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3610 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3611 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3612 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3613 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3614 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3616 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3620 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3621 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3622 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3623 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3624 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3625 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3626 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3627 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3628 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3631 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3632 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3633 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3635 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3637 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3638 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3639 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3640 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3644 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3645 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3646 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3649 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
3650 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3653 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3654 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())
3655 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3656 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3657 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3658 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3659 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3660 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3661 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3662 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3663 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3665 entry.insert(channel);
3671 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3672 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3673 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3674 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3675 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3676 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3677 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3678 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3680 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3681 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3683 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3686 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3687 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3688 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3689 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3691 user_channel_id: user_id,
3696 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3697 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3698 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3699 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3700 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3701 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3702 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3703 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3704 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3706 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3708 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3711 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3712 // lock before watch_channel
3713 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3715 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3716 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3717 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3718 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3719 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3720 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3721 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3722 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3723 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3724 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3725 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3727 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3728 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3729 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3730 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3731 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3732 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3736 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3737 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3738 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3739 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3740 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3743 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3744 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3753 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3755 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3756 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3757 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3758 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3759 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3760 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3761 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3763 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3764 Ok(update) => update,
3765 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3767 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3768 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3769 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3770 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3771 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3772 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3773 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3774 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3784 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3785 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3789 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3790 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3791 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3792 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3794 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3795 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3797 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3798 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3799 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3800 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3801 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3802 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3803 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3804 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3805 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3806 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3807 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3808 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3809 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3810 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3811 msg: announcement_sigs,
3813 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3814 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3815 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3816 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3821 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3825 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3826 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3827 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3828 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3829 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3831 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3833 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3834 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3837 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3838 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3839 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3840 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3843 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3844 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3846 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3847 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3848 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3849 let (result, is_permanent) =
3850 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3852 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3858 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3859 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3860 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3867 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3870 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3871 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3874 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3878 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3879 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3880 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3881 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3882 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3884 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3885 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3887 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3888 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3889 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3890 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3895 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3896 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3897 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3898 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3899 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3900 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3901 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3903 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3904 } else { (tx, None) }
3906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3909 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3910 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3911 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3913 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3914 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3915 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3916 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3920 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3925 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3926 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3927 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3928 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3930 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3931 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3932 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3933 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3935 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3936 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3938 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3939 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3940 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3941 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3944 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3945 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3946 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3947 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3948 match pending_forward_info {
3949 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3950 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3951 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3952 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3953 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3954 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3955 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3956 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3960 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3961 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3962 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3963 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3964 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3965 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3966 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3967 // no problem just calling this
3968 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3969 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3972 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3974 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3975 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3976 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3979 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3981 _ => pending_forward_info
3984 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3986 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3991 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3992 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3993 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3994 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3995 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3997 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3998 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4000 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4002 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4005 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4009 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4010 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4011 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4012 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4013 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4014 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4015 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4017 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4024 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4025 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4026 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4027 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4029 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4030 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4032 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4033 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4034 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4036 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4039 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4043 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4044 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4045 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4046 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4047 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4048 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4049 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4051 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4052 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4053 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4054 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4055 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4056 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4057 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4062 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4063 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4065 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4066 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4067 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4069 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4070 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4071 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4072 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4073 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4074 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4075 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4076 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4078 commitment_signed: msg,
4084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4089 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4090 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4091 let mut forward_event = None;
4092 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4093 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4094 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4095 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4097 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4098 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4099 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4100 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4101 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4103 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4104 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4105 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4107 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4108 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4109 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4114 match forward_event {
4116 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4117 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4118 time_forwardable: time
4126 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4127 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4129 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4130 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4131 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4132 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4133 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4134 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4136 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4137 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4138 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4139 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4140 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4141 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4142 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4143 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4144 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4145 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4146 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4148 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4149 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4150 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4151 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4152 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4154 } else { unreachable!(); }
4157 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4158 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4159 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4163 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4164 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4165 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4166 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4167 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4169 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4172 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4174 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4175 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4177 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4178 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4180 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4181 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4188 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4189 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4190 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4191 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4192 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4193 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4194 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4196 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4198 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4203 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4204 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4205 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4207 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4208 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4209 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4210 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4212 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4213 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4216 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4217 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4218 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4219 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4220 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4223 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4228 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4229 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4230 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4231 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4232 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4233 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4235 // It's not a local channel
4236 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4239 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4240 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4241 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4242 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4243 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4244 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4245 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4246 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4248 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4250 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4251 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4252 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4253 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4255 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4258 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4260 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4263 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4264 let chan_restoration_res;
4265 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4266 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4267 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4269 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4270 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4271 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4272 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4274 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4275 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4276 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4277 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4278 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4279 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4280 let mut channel_update = None;
4281 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4282 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4283 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4286 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4287 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4288 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4289 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4290 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4291 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4292 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4295 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4296 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4297 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4298 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4300 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4302 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4305 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4306 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4308 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4309 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4314 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4315 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4316 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4317 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4318 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4319 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4320 match monitor_event {
4321 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4322 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4324 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4326 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4327 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4330 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4331 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4332 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4333 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4334 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4335 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4336 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4337 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4338 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4339 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4341 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4342 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4343 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4347 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4348 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4350 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4352 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4353 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4354 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4355 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4356 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4361 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4362 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4367 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4368 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4371 has_pending_monitor_events
4374 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4375 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4376 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4377 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4378 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4379 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4382 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4383 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4384 /// update was applied.
4386 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4387 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4388 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4389 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4390 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4391 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4392 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4393 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4395 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4396 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4397 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4398 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4399 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4401 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4402 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4403 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4404 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4405 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4407 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4408 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4409 has_monitor_update = true;
4410 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4411 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4412 if close_channel { return false; }
4414 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4415 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4416 updates: commitment_update,
4423 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4424 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4425 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4432 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4433 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4434 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4437 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4438 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4444 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4445 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4446 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4447 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4448 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4449 let mut has_update = false;
4451 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4452 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4453 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4454 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4455 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4457 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4458 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4459 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4460 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4462 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4463 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4466 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4467 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4468 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4469 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4470 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4473 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4474 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4479 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4481 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4482 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4488 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4489 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4496 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4497 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4503 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4504 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4506 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4507 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4508 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4509 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4510 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4511 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4512 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4513 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4514 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4515 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4516 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4517 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4518 assert!(should_broadcast);
4519 } else { unreachable!(); }
4520 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4522 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4526 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4527 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4529 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4531 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4532 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4533 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4535 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4536 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4537 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4538 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4539 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4540 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4541 // never fail a payment too early.
4542 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4544 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4547 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4552 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4555 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4556 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4558 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4559 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4560 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4562 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4564 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4565 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4566 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4567 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4568 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4569 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4570 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4573 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4574 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4577 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4578 /// stored external to LDK.
4580 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4581 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4582 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4584 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4585 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4587 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4588 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4589 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4590 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4591 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4593 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4594 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4595 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4596 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4598 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4599 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4600 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4601 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4602 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4604 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4605 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4606 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4607 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4608 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4610 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4611 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4612 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4614 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4616 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4617 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4619 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4620 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4621 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4622 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4623 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4626 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4627 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4628 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4629 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4630 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4635 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4636 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4640 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4641 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4642 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4643 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4644 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4647 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4648 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4649 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4650 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4652 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4653 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4654 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4655 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4658 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4659 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4661 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4662 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4665 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4666 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4667 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4669 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4670 events.replace(pending_events);
4679 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4681 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4682 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4683 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4684 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4687 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4689 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4690 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4692 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4693 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4694 /// restarting from an old state.
4695 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4696 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4697 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4699 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4700 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4701 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4702 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4705 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4706 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4707 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4710 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4711 handler.handle_event(&event);
4719 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4721 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4722 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4723 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4724 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4727 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4729 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4730 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4731 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4732 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4733 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4736 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4737 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4738 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4741 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4742 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4743 let new_height = height - 1;
4745 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4746 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4747 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4748 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4749 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4750 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4753 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4757 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4759 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4760 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4761 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4762 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4765 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4766 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4767 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4768 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4770 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4771 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4773 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4774 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4777 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4778 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4779 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4780 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4782 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4783 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4785 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4787 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4789 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4791 macro_rules! max_time {
4792 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4794 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4795 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4796 // having an explicit local time source.
4797 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4798 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4799 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4800 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4801 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4807 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4808 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4809 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4810 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4811 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4814 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4815 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4816 const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4817 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4818 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4819 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4825 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4826 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4827 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4828 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4829 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4830 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4836 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4837 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4838 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4839 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4840 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4841 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4842 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4843 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4848 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4850 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4851 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4852 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4853 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4856 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4857 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4859 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
4860 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4861 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4862 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4863 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4865 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4866 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4868 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4869 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4870 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4871 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4872 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4873 let res = f(channel);
4874 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4875 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4876 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4877 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4878 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4882 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4883 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4884 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4885 msg: funding_locked,
4887 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4888 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4889 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4890 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4891 msg: announcement_sigs,
4893 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4894 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4895 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4896 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4897 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4900 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4902 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4904 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
4905 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4906 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4908 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4909 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4910 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4911 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4912 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4916 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
4917 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
4918 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4919 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4920 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4921 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
4922 data: reason_message,
4930 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4931 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4932 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4933 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4934 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4935 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4936 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4937 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4938 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4939 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4940 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4941 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4942 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4947 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4952 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4954 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4955 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4959 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4960 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4961 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4963 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4964 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4965 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4966 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4969 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4970 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4972 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4973 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4976 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4977 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4978 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4979 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4980 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4984 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4985 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4986 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4987 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4991 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4992 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4993 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4994 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4995 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4996 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4999 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5000 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5001 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5004 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5005 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5006 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5009 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5010 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5011 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5014 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5015 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5016 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5019 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5020 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5021 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5024 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5025 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5026 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5029 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5030 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5031 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5034 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5035 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5036 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5039 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5040 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5041 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5044 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5045 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5046 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5049 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5050 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5051 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5054 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5055 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5056 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5059 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5060 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5061 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5064 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5066 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5069 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5071 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5074 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5075 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5076 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5079 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5084 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5086 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5089 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5091 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5092 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5094 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5095 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5096 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5097 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5098 if no_connection_possible {
5099 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5100 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5101 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5102 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5103 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5105 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5106 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5107 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5111 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5118 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5119 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5120 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5121 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5122 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5123 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5124 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5126 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5129 no_channels_remain = false;
5135 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5137 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5138 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5139 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5140 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5141 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5142 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5143 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5144 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5145 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5146 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5147 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5148 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5149 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5150 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5151 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5152 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5153 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5154 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5155 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5159 if no_channels_remain {
5160 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5163 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5164 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5168 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5169 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5171 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5174 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5175 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5176 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5177 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5178 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5181 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5182 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5187 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5188 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5189 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5190 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5191 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5192 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5193 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5194 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5195 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5199 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5200 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5201 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5207 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5210 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5211 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5213 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5214 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5215 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5216 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5217 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5221 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5222 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5227 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5228 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5229 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5230 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5231 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5232 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5235 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5238 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5244 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5245 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5250 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5251 let result = *guard;
5259 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5260 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5261 let current_time = Instant::now();
5263 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5264 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5269 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5270 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5271 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5272 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5273 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5275 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5276 let result = *guard;
5277 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5281 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5282 None => return result,
5288 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5290 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5291 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5292 *persistence_lock = true;
5293 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5298 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5299 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5301 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5303 (0, onion_packet, required),
5304 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5307 (0, payment_data, required),
5308 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5310 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5311 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5312 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5316 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5317 (0, routing, required),
5318 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5319 (4, payment_hash, required),
5320 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5321 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5325 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5326 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5328 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5330 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5331 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5332 reason.write(writer)?;
5334 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5335 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5338 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5339 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5340 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5341 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5348 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5349 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5350 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5353 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5354 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5355 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5356 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5360 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5361 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5362 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5363 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5364 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5367 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5368 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5369 // messages contained in the variants.
5370 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5371 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5372 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5374 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5375 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5376 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5377 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5378 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5381 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5382 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5383 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5384 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5385 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5387 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5392 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5397 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5398 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5399 (2, outpoint, required),
5400 (4, htlc_id, required),
5401 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5404 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5405 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5406 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5407 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5410 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5411 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5412 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5417 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5418 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5419 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5425 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5426 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5427 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5429 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5430 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5431 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5435 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5436 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5437 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5439 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5441 if payment_data.is_some() {
5442 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5444 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5447 if payment_data.is_none() {
5448 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5450 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5454 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5462 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5463 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5464 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5467 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5468 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5469 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5470 let mut payment_id = None;
5471 let mut payment_secret = None;
5472 let mut payee = None;
5473 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5474 (0, session_priv, required),
5475 (1, payment_id, option),
5476 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5477 (3, payment_secret, option),
5478 (4, path, vec_type),
5481 if payment_id.is_none() {
5482 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5484 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5486 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5487 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5488 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5489 path: path.unwrap(),
5490 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5495 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5496 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5501 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5502 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5504 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5506 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5507 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5508 (0, session_priv, required),
5509 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5510 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5511 (3, payment_secret, option),
5512 (4, path, vec_type),
5516 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5518 field.write(writer)?;
5525 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5526 (0, LightningError) => {
5530 (0, failure_code, required),
5531 (2, data, vec_type),
5535 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5537 (0, forward_info, required),
5538 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5539 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5540 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5543 (0, htlc_id, required),
5544 (2, err_packet, required),
5548 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5549 (0, payment_secret, required),
5550 (2, expiry_time, required),
5551 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5552 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5553 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5556 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5558 (0, session_privs, required),
5561 (0, session_privs, required),
5564 (0, session_privs, required),
5565 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
5566 (2, payment_hash, required),
5567 (4, payment_secret, option),
5568 (6, total_msat, required),
5569 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5570 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5574 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5575 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5576 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5577 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5578 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5581 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5582 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5584 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5586 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5588 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5589 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5590 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5593 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5594 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5595 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5596 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5597 unfunded_channels += 1;
5600 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5601 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5602 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5603 channel.write(writer)?;
5607 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5608 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5609 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5610 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5611 for forward in pending_forwards {
5612 forward.write(writer)?;
5616 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5617 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5618 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5619 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5620 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5621 htlc.write(writer)?;
5625 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5626 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5627 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5628 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5629 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5630 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5633 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5634 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5635 for event in events.iter() {
5636 event.write(writer)?;
5639 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5640 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5641 for event in background_events.iter() {
5643 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5645 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5646 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5651 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5652 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5654 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5655 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5656 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5657 hash.write(writer)?;
5658 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5661 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5662 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5663 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5664 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5665 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
5666 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5669 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5670 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5672 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5673 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5674 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5675 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5678 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5682 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5683 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5684 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5686 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5687 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5688 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5693 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5694 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5695 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5702 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5704 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5706 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5707 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5708 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5709 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5710 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5711 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5712 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5713 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5714 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5715 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5716 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5717 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5718 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5720 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5721 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5723 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5724 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5726 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5727 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5728 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5729 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5730 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5731 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5733 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5734 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5735 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5736 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5737 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5738 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5741 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5742 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5744 pub keys_manager: K,
5746 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5748 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5749 pub fee_estimator: F,
5750 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5752 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5753 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5754 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5755 pub chain_monitor: M,
5757 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5758 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5759 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5760 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5761 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5762 /// deserialization.
5764 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5765 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5766 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5768 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5769 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5771 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5772 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5773 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5774 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5776 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5779 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5780 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5783 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5784 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5785 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5786 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5787 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5788 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5791 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5792 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5793 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5794 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5795 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5797 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5798 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5803 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5804 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5805 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5806 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5807 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5808 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5809 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5810 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5813 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5814 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5815 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5819 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5820 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5821 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5822 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5823 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5824 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5827 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5828 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5830 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5831 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5832 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5834 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5836 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5837 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5838 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5839 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5840 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5841 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5842 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
5843 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5844 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5845 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5846 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5847 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5848 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5849 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5850 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5851 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5852 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5853 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5854 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5855 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5856 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5857 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5858 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5859 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5860 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5861 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5862 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5863 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5864 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5865 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5866 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5867 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5868 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5869 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5870 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5871 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5872 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5873 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5874 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5877 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5878 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5879 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5881 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5884 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5885 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5886 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5887 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5888 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5889 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5893 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5894 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5895 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
5896 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5900 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5901 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5902 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5903 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5904 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5905 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5906 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5907 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5908 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5910 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5913 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5914 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5915 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5916 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5917 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5918 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5919 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5920 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5922 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5925 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5926 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5927 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5928 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5929 let peer_state = PeerState {
5930 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5932 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5935 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5936 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5937 for _ in 0..event_count {
5938 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5939 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5943 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5944 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5945 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5946 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5947 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5948 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5949 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5950 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
5954 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5955 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5956 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5957 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5958 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5959 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5963 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5964 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5966 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5967 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5968 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5969 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5970 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5974 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5975 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
5976 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5977 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5978 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5979 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
5980 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
5982 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
5983 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5987 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
5988 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
5989 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5990 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5991 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
5992 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5994 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
5995 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5996 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5997 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
5998 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
5999 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6001 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6003 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6004 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6005 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6006 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6007 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6008 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6009 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6011 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6012 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6013 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6014 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6015 if path.is_empty() {
6016 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6017 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6019 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6020 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6021 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6022 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6024 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6025 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6026 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6028 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6029 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6030 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6031 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6032 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6034 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6035 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6036 total_msat: path_amt,
6037 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6039 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6040 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6049 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6050 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6052 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6053 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6056 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6058 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6059 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6060 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6062 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6064 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6069 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6071 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6072 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6074 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6075 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6078 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6079 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6081 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6083 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6084 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6085 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6086 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6088 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6089 logger: args.logger,
6090 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6093 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6094 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6097 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6098 //connection or two.
6100 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6106 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6107 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6108 use core::time::Duration;
6109 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6110 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6111 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6112 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6114 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6115 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6116 use util::errors::APIError;
6117 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6118 use util::test_utils;
6120 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6122 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6123 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6125 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6128 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6129 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6131 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6132 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6133 thread::spawn(move || {
6135 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6136 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6137 *persistence_lock = true;
6140 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6146 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6147 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6149 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6152 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6157 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6159 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6162 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6169 fn test_notify_limits() {
6170 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6171 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6172 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6173 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6174 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6175 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6177 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6178 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6179 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6180 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6181 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6183 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6185 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6186 // to connect messages with new values
6187 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6188 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6189 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6190 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6192 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6193 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6194 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6195 // ... but the last node should not.
6196 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6197 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6198 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6199 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6201 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6202 // about the channel.
6203 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6204 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6205 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6207 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6209 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6210 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6211 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6212 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6213 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6214 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6216 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6217 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6218 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6220 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6221 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6222 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6223 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6224 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6225 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6227 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6228 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6229 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6230 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6231 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6232 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6233 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6234 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6236 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6237 // the channel info has updated.
6238 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6239 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6240 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6241 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6242 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6243 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6247 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6248 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6250 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6251 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6252 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6253 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6254 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6256 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6257 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6258 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6259 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6260 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6261 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6262 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6264 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6265 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6266 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6268 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6269 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6271 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6272 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6273 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6274 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6275 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6277 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6278 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6279 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6281 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6282 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6283 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6284 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6285 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6286 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6287 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6288 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6289 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6291 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6292 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6294 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6295 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6296 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6298 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6299 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6300 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6301 // lightning messages manually.
6302 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6304 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6305 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6306 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6308 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6309 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6311 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6312 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6314 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6315 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6316 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6318 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6319 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6320 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6322 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6324 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6326 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6327 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6330 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
6331 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
6332 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6334 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6335 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6336 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6337 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6339 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6344 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6345 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6346 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6347 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6348 // fails as expected.
6349 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6350 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6351 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6352 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6353 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6354 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6356 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6357 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6358 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6360 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6361 let params = RouteParameters {
6362 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6363 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6364 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6366 let route = find_route(
6367 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6368 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6370 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6372 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6373 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6374 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6375 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6376 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6378 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6379 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6380 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6382 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6383 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6384 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6385 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6386 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6387 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6388 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6389 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6390 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6392 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6393 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6395 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6396 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6397 let route = find_route(
6398 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6399 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6401 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6403 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6404 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6405 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6406 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6407 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6409 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6410 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6411 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6413 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6414 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6415 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6416 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6417 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6419 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6420 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6421 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6423 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6424 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6425 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6426 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6427 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6428 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6429 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6430 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6431 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6433 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6434 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6438 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6439 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6440 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6441 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6442 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6443 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6444 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6446 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6447 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6448 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6449 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6451 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6452 let params = RouteParameters {
6453 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6454 final_value_msat: 10000,
6455 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6457 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6458 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6459 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6460 let route = find_route(
6461 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6462 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6465 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6466 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6467 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6470 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6471 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6472 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6473 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6474 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6475 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6476 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6478 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6482 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6483 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6484 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6485 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6486 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6487 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6489 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6490 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6491 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6492 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6494 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6495 let params = RouteParameters {
6496 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6497 final_value_msat: 10000,
6498 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6500 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6501 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6502 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6503 let route = find_route(
6504 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6505 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6508 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6509 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6510 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6511 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6514 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6515 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6516 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6517 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6518 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6519 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6520 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6522 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6526 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6527 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6528 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6529 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6530 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6532 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6533 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6534 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6535 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6537 // Marshall an MPP route.
6538 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6539 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6540 route.paths.push(path);
6541 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6542 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6543 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6544 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6545 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6546 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6548 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6549 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6550 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6551 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6556 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6559 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6560 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6561 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6562 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6563 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6564 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6565 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6566 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6567 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
6568 use util::test_utils;
6569 use util::config::UserConfig;
6570 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6572 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6573 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6574 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6576 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6580 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6581 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6582 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6583 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6584 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6585 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6586 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6591 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6592 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6595 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6596 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6597 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6599 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6600 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6602 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6603 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6605 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6606 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6608 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6609 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6610 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6611 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6612 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6614 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6616 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6618 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6619 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6620 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6621 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6622 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6624 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6626 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6628 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6629 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6630 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6631 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6632 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6635 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6636 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6637 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6639 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6640 } else { panic!(); }
6642 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6643 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6645 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6648 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6651 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6652 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6654 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6655 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6656 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6657 match msg_events[0] {
6658 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6659 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6660 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6664 match msg_events[1] {
6665 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6669 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6671 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6672 macro_rules! send_payment {
6673 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6674 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6675 let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6676 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6677 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6678 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6679 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6681 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6682 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6684 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6685 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6687 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6688 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6689 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6690 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6691 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6692 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6693 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6694 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6696 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6697 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6698 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6700 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6701 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6702 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6703 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6704 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6706 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6709 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6710 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6711 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6712 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6714 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6719 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6720 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);