1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
238 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
239 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
240 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
243 /// Number of bytes in the id.
244 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
247 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
248 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
253 impl Readable for PaymentId {
254 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
255 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
260 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
261 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
262 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
266 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
268 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
269 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
270 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
272 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
273 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
278 impl Readable for InterceptId {
279 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
280 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
285 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
286 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
287 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
288 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
289 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
292 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
294 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
295 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
296 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
298 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
299 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
303 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
304 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
305 (0, short_channel_id, required),
306 (2, htlc_id, required),
308 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
309 (0, session_priv, required),
314 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
315 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
316 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
317 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
318 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
321 session_priv: SecretKey,
322 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
323 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
324 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
325 payment_id: PaymentId,
328 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
329 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
330 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
332 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
334 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
336 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
339 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
340 payment_id.hash(hasher);
341 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
347 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
349 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
350 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
351 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
352 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
353 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
354 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
358 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
359 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
360 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
361 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
362 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
363 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
365 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
371 struct InboundOnionErr {
377 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
378 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
380 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
381 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
382 pub enum FailureCode {
383 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
384 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
385 TemporaryNodeFailure,
386 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
387 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
388 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
389 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
390 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
391 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
392 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
393 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
394 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
395 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
397 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
398 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
399 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
402 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
403 fn into(self) -> u16 {
405 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
406 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
407 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
408 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
413 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
414 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
415 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
416 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
417 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
419 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
420 err: msgs::LightningError,
421 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
422 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
423 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
425 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
427 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
429 err: LightningError {
431 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
432 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
439 shutdown_finish: None,
440 channel_capacity: None,
444 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
445 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
448 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
450 err: LightningError {
452 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
453 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
459 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
460 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
461 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
465 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
468 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
470 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
471 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
475 log_level: Level::Warn,
478 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
480 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
482 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
484 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
485 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
493 shutdown_finish: None,
494 channel_capacity: None,
498 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
499 self.chan_id.is_some()
503 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
504 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
505 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
506 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
507 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
509 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
510 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
511 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
512 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
513 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
514 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
515 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
517 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
521 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
522 struct ClaimingPayment {
524 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
525 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
526 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
527 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
529 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
530 (0, amount_msat, required),
531 (2, payment_purpose, required),
532 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
533 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
534 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
537 struct ClaimablePayment {
538 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
539 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
540 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
543 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
544 struct ClaimablePayments {
545 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
546 /// failed/claimed by the user.
548 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
549 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
551 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
552 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
553 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
555 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
556 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
557 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
558 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
561 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
562 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
563 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
564 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
565 enum BackgroundEvent {
566 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
567 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
568 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
569 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
571 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
572 /// are regenerated on startup.
573 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
574 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
575 /// channel to continue normal operation.
577 /// In general this should be used rather than
578 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
579 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
580 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
582 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
583 /// are regenerated on startup.
584 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
585 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
586 funding_txo: OutPoint,
587 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
589 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
590 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
592 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
593 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
594 channel_id: ChannelId,
599 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
600 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
601 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
602 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
603 /// event can be generated.
604 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
605 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
606 /// operation of another channel.
608 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
609 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
610 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
611 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
613 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
614 event: events::Event,
615 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
619 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
620 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
621 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
622 (0, event, upgradable_required),
623 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
624 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
625 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
626 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
627 // downgrades to prior versions.
628 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
632 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
633 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
634 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
635 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
636 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
639 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
640 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
641 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
642 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
646 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
647 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
648 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
649 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
650 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
651 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
653 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
654 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
655 channel_id: ChannelId,
656 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
661 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
663 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
664 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
665 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
666 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
671 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
672 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
676 /// State we hold per-peer.
677 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
678 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
680 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
681 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
682 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
684 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
685 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
686 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
687 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
688 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
689 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
690 latest_features: InitFeatures,
691 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
692 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
693 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
694 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
695 /// user but which have not yet completed.
697 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
698 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
699 /// for a missing channel.
700 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
701 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
702 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
704 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
705 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
706 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
707 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
709 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
710 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
711 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
712 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
713 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
714 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
715 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
716 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
717 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
718 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
719 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
720 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
721 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
722 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
723 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
727 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
728 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
729 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
730 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
731 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
732 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
735 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
736 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
737 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
740 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
741 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
742 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
745 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
746 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
747 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
748 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
752 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
753 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
754 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
755 /// The original OpenChannel message.
756 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
757 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
758 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
761 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
762 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
763 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
765 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
766 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
768 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
771 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
772 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
773 struct PendingInboundPayment {
774 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
775 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
776 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
777 /// this payment being removed.
779 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
780 user_payment_id: u64,
781 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
782 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
783 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
786 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
787 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
788 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
789 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
790 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
791 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
792 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
793 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
795 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
796 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
804 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
806 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
807 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
808 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
813 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
814 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
815 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
816 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
817 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
818 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
819 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
820 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
821 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
823 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
824 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
833 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
835 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
836 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
837 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
842 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
843 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
844 $vis trait AChannelManager {
845 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
846 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
847 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
848 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
849 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
850 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
851 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
852 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
853 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
854 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
855 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
856 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
857 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
858 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
859 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
860 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
861 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
862 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
865 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
866 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
867 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
868 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
869 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
870 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
872 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
873 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
874 ES::Target: EntropySource,
875 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
876 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
877 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
881 type Watch = M::Target;
883 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
885 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
887 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
889 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
890 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
892 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
894 type Router = R::Target;
896 type Logger = L::Target;
898 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
901 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
902 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
904 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
905 /// to individual Channels.
907 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
908 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
909 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
910 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
912 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
913 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
914 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
915 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
916 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
917 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
918 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
920 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
921 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
922 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
924 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
925 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
926 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
927 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
928 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
930 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
931 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
932 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
933 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
935 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
936 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
937 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
939 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
940 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
941 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
942 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
943 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
945 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
946 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
947 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
948 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
949 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
950 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
951 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
952 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
955 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
956 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
957 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
958 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
959 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
963 // `total_consistency_lock`
965 // |__`forward_htlcs`
967 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
969 // |__`per_peer_state`
971 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
973 // | |__`claimable_payments`
975 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
981 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
983 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
987 // | |__`pending_events`
989 // | |__`pending_background_events`
991 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
993 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
994 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
995 ES::Target: EntropySource,
996 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
997 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
998 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1002 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1003 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1004 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1010 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1012 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1014 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1015 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1017 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1018 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1019 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1020 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1022 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1023 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1025 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1026 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1027 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1028 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1029 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1030 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1031 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1032 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1034 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1036 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1037 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1039 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1041 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1042 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1043 /// and via the classic SCID.
1045 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1046 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1048 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1050 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1052 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1053 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1054 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1056 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1057 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1059 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1060 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1062 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1063 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1065 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1066 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1067 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1068 /// active channel list on load.
1070 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1071 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1073 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1075 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1076 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1077 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1079 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1080 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1081 /// the handling of the events.
1083 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1084 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1087 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1088 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1089 /// would break backwards compatability.
1090 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1091 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1092 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1094 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1095 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1097 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1099 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1100 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1101 /// confirmation depth.
1103 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1104 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1105 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1107 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1109 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1111 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1113 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1115 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1117 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1118 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1119 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1121 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1122 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1124 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1125 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1126 /// keeping additional state.
1127 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1129 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1130 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1131 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1132 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1134 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1135 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1137 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1138 /// are currently open with that peer.
1140 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1141 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1144 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1146 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1147 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1148 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1149 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1150 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1152 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1153 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1154 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1155 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1156 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1158 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1159 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1161 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1162 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1163 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1164 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1165 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1167 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1168 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1170 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1171 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1172 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1173 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1174 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1176 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1178 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1180 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1181 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1182 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1183 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1184 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1185 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1186 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1187 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1188 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1190 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1192 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1193 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1197 signer_provider: SP,
1202 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1204 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1205 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1206 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1207 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1208 pub struct ChainParameters {
1209 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1210 pub network: Network,
1212 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1214 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1215 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1218 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1222 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1223 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1226 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1227 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1228 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1229 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1230 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1231 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1233 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1234 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1235 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1236 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1237 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1238 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1240 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1241 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1244 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1245 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1246 /// events to handle.
1248 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1249 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1251 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1252 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1255 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, persist_check: F)
1256 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1257 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1258 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1260 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1261 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1262 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1263 should_persist: move || {
1264 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1265 // processing and return that.
1266 let notify = persist_check();
1267 match (notify, force_notify) {
1268 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1269 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1270 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1271 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1272 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1275 _read_guard: read_guard,
1279 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1280 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1281 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1282 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1283 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1284 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1286 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1287 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1288 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1289 should_persist: persist_check,
1290 _read_guard: read_guard,
1295 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1296 fn drop(&mut self) {
1297 match (self.should_persist)() {
1298 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1299 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1300 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1302 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1303 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1304 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1309 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1310 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1312 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1314 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1315 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1316 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1317 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1318 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1320 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1321 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1323 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1325 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1326 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1327 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1328 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1329 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1330 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1331 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1332 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1333 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1334 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1335 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1336 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1337 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1339 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1340 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1342 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1343 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1344 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1345 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1347 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1348 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1349 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1350 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1351 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1352 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1355 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1357 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1358 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1361 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1363 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1364 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1366 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1367 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1368 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1370 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1371 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1372 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1374 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1375 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1376 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1377 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1379 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1380 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1381 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1383 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1384 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1385 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1387 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1388 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1389 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1390 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1391 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1392 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1393 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1394 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1395 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1396 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1397 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1400 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1401 /// to better separate parameters.
1402 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1403 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1404 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1405 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1406 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1407 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1408 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1409 pub features: InitFeatures,
1410 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1411 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1412 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1414 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1416 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1417 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1418 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1419 /// payments to us through this channel.
1420 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1421 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1422 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1423 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1424 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1425 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1426 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1429 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1431 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1432 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1435 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1436 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1437 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1438 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1439 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1440 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1441 /// lifetime of the channel.
1442 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1443 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1444 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1445 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1446 /// our counterparty already.
1448 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1449 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1450 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1451 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1453 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1454 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1455 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1456 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1458 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1459 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1461 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1462 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1464 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1465 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1466 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1467 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1468 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1469 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1470 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1471 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1472 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1475 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1477 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1478 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1479 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1480 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1481 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1482 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1483 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1485 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1486 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1488 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1489 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1490 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1491 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1492 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1493 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1494 /// this value on chain.
1496 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1498 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1500 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1501 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1502 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1503 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1504 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1505 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1506 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1508 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1509 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1510 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1511 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1512 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1513 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1515 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1516 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1517 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1518 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1519 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1520 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1522 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1523 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1524 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1525 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1526 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1527 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1528 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1529 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1531 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1532 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1533 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1534 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1535 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1536 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1537 /// route which is valid.
1538 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1539 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1540 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1541 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1542 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1543 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1545 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1546 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1547 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1548 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1549 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1550 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1551 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1552 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1553 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1555 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1557 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1558 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1559 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1560 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1561 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1563 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1564 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1565 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1566 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1567 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1568 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1569 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1571 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1572 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1573 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1574 pub is_outbound: bool,
1575 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1576 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1577 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1578 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1579 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1581 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1582 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1583 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1584 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1585 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1586 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1587 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1589 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1590 pub is_usable: bool,
1591 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1592 pub is_public: bool,
1593 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1594 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1595 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1596 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1597 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1598 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1600 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1601 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1604 impl ChannelDetails {
1605 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1606 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1607 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1609 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1610 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1611 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1612 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1615 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1616 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1617 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1619 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1620 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1621 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1622 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1625 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1626 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1627 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1630 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1631 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1633 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1634 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1635 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1637 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1638 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1639 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1640 features: latest_features,
1641 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1642 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1643 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1644 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1645 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1646 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1647 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1648 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1649 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1650 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1652 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1653 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1654 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1655 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1656 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1657 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1658 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1659 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1660 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1661 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1662 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1663 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1664 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1665 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1666 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1667 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1668 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1669 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1670 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1671 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1672 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1673 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1674 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1675 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1676 config: Some(context.config()),
1677 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1682 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1683 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1684 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1685 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1686 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1687 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1688 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1689 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1690 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1692 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1694 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1695 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1697 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1698 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1699 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1700 /// to drop the channel.
1704 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1705 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1706 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1707 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1708 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1710 /// Identifier for the payment to ensure idempotency.
1711 payment_id: PaymentId,
1713 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1715 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1717 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1718 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1719 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1722 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1723 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1724 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1726 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1727 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1728 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1730 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1731 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1732 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1734 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1735 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1739 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1741 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1743 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1744 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1745 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1746 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1748 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1749 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1750 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1753 macro_rules! handle_error {
1754 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1755 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1756 // entering the macro.
1757 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1758 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1762 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1763 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1765 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1766 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1767 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1768 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1772 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1773 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1774 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1775 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1776 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1777 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1782 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1783 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1785 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1786 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1787 action: err.action.clone()
1791 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1792 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1793 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1794 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1795 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1799 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1804 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1807 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1808 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1809 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1815 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1816 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1817 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1818 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1819 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1820 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1822 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1823 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1824 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1825 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1826 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1828 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1829 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1831 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1835 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1836 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1837 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1839 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1840 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1842 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1843 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1845 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1846 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1847 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1848 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1849 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1850 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1852 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1853 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1857 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1858 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1860 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1861 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1863 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1864 match $channel_phase {
1865 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1866 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1868 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1869 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1871 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1872 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1878 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1879 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1883 let key = *$entry.key();
1884 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1886 $entry.remove_entry();
1894 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1895 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1899 let key = *$entry.key();
1900 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1902 $entry.remove_entry();
1910 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1911 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1913 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1914 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1920 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1921 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1922 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1923 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1924 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1926 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1927 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1928 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1929 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1930 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1931 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1932 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1933 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1934 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1935 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1940 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1941 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1942 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1943 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1944 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1945 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1946 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1947 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1948 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1950 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1955 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1956 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1957 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1958 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1959 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1960 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1961 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1962 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1963 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1965 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1970 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1971 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1972 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1973 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1974 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1975 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1976 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1977 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1978 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1979 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1980 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1982 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1983 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1984 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1990 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1991 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1993 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1994 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1995 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1996 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1997 updates.announcement_sigs);
1998 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1999 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2002 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2003 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2004 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2006 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2008 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2009 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2011 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2012 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2013 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2014 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2019 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2020 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
2021 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
2022 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
2023 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2024 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2026 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2027 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2028 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2031 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
2032 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
2033 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2034 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
2035 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
2036 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
2037 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
2038 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
2042 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2048 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2049 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2050 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2051 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2053 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2054 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2055 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2056 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2058 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2060 debug_assert!(false);
2061 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2062 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2063 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2064 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2065 $chan_entry.remove();
2069 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2070 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2071 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2072 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2073 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2074 // filter for uniqueness here.
2075 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2076 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2077 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2078 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2080 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2081 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2082 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2084 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2085 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2086 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2090 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2091 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2092 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2093 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2095 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2097 debug_assert!(false);
2098 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2099 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2100 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2101 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2102 $chan_entry.remove();
2108 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2109 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2110 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2111 while !processed_all_events {
2112 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2119 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2120 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2121 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2123 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2124 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2125 result = $self.process_background_events();
2127 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2128 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2129 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2130 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2134 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2135 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2136 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2137 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2140 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2142 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2143 $event_to_handle = event;
2145 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2146 post_event_actions.push(action);
2151 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2152 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2153 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2154 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2155 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2156 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2159 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2160 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2161 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2162 processed_all_events = false;
2166 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2167 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2168 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2170 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2171 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2172 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2178 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2180 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2181 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2182 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2183 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2184 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2185 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2189 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2191 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2193 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2194 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2196 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2198 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2199 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2200 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2203 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2204 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2205 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2207 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2208 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2209 current_timestamp: u32,
2211 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2212 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2213 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2214 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2216 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2217 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2218 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2223 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2225 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2226 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2227 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2228 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2229 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2230 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2231 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2232 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2234 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2237 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2238 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2240 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2242 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2244 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2246 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2247 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2248 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2249 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2250 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2252 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2253 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2263 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2264 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2265 &self.default_configuration
2268 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2269 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2270 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2273 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2274 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2276 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2278 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2282 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2287 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2289 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2290 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2291 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2292 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2293 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2295 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2296 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2298 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2299 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2300 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2302 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2303 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2304 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2306 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2307 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2308 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2309 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2310 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2311 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2313 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2314 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2315 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2316 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2317 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2318 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2321 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2322 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2323 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2327 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2328 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2330 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2332 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2333 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2334 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2335 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2336 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2337 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2341 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2346 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2348 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2349 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2352 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2354 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2357 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2360 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2361 node_id: their_network_key,
2364 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2367 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2368 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2369 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2370 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2371 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2372 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2373 // the same channel.
2374 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2376 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2377 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2378 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2379 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2380 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2381 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2382 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2383 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2384 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2388 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2389 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2390 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2398 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2399 /// more information.
2400 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2401 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2402 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2403 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2404 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2405 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2406 // the same channel.
2407 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2409 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2410 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2411 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2412 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2413 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2414 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2415 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2416 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2424 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2425 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2427 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2428 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2430 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2431 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2432 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2433 // really wanted anyway.
2434 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2437 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2438 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2439 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2440 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2442 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2443 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2444 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2445 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2446 let context_to_details = |context| {
2447 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2449 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2451 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2452 .map(context_to_details)
2458 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2459 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2461 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2462 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2463 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2465 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2466 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2467 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2468 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2469 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2470 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2472 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2473 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2474 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2476 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2477 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2478 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2479 total_msat: *total_msat,
2482 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2483 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2485 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2486 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2488 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2493 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2494 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2495 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2496 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2497 Some(transaction) => {
2498 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2499 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2504 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2505 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2506 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2507 reason: closure_reason,
2508 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2509 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2513 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2516 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2517 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2519 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2521 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2522 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2524 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2525 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2527 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2529 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2530 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2531 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2532 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2533 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2534 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2536 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2537 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2538 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2539 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2540 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2544 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2545 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2546 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2547 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
2550 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2551 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2552 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2553 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2557 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2566 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2567 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2569 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2570 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2573 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2574 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2575 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2576 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2579 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2583 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2584 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2585 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2587 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2588 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2590 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2591 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2592 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2593 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2595 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2597 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2598 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2599 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2602 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2603 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2604 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2605 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2606 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2607 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2610 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2611 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2612 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2614 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2615 /// the channel being closed or not:
2616 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2617 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2618 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2619 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2620 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2621 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2622 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2624 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2625 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2626 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2627 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2629 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2631 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2632 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2633 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2636 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2637 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2638 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2639 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2640 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2641 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2645 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2646 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2647 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2648 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2649 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2650 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2651 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2652 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2654 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2655 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2656 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2657 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2658 // ignore the result here.
2659 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2663 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2664 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2665 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2666 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2667 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2668 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2669 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2670 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2671 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2672 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2673 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2674 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2676 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2678 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2679 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2680 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2681 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2683 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2684 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2685 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2687 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2688 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2689 // Unfunded channel has no update
2690 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2693 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2694 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2695 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2696 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2698 (None, *peer_node_id)
2700 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2703 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2704 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2705 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2710 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2713 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2714 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2715 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2716 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2717 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2718 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2719 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2720 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2721 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2722 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2723 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2724 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2735 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2736 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2737 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2739 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2740 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2741 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2744 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2745 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2746 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2748 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2749 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2750 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2751 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2752 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2755 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2756 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2757 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2758 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2759 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2763 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2764 /// local transaction(s).
2765 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2766 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2767 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2771 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2772 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2773 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2774 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2775 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2776 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2777 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2779 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2780 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2784 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2785 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2786 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2787 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2788 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2789 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2790 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2791 err_data: Vec::new(),
2795 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2796 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2797 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2800 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2801 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2802 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2803 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2804 outgoing_cltv_value,
2805 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2809 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2810 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2811 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2812 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2813 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2814 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2815 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2816 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2818 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2820 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2821 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2822 err_data: Vec::new(),
2823 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2826 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2827 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2828 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2829 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2831 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2834 // final_expiry_too_soon
2835 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2836 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2838 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2839 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2840 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2841 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2842 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2843 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2844 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2845 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2846 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2847 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2848 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2851 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2852 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2853 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2855 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2857 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2858 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2862 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2863 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2864 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2865 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2866 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2867 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2868 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2869 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2870 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2871 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2872 err_data: Vec::new(),
2873 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2876 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2877 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2878 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2879 err_data: Vec::new(),
2880 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2883 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2887 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2890 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2891 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2894 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2895 phantom_shared_secret,
2899 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2900 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2901 err_data: Vec::new(),
2902 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2905 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2908 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2909 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2910 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2911 outgoing_cltv_value,
2912 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2916 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2917 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2918 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2919 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2920 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2922 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2923 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2924 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2925 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2926 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2927 failure_code: $err_code,
2933 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2934 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2937 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2938 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2939 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2941 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2942 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2943 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2944 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2945 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2946 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2947 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2948 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2950 macro_rules! return_err {
2951 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2953 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2954 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2955 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2956 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2957 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2958 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2964 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2966 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2967 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2969 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2970 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2973 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2974 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2975 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2976 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2979 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2980 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2981 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
2983 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2984 // inbound channel's state.
2985 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2986 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2987 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2991 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2992 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2993 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2994 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2995 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2996 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2997 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2998 // phantom or an intercept.
2999 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3000 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
3001 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
3005 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3008 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3010 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3011 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3012 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3013 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3014 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3016 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3017 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3018 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3019 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3022 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3023 // have no consistency guarantees.
3024 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3028 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3029 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3030 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3031 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3032 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3034 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3035 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3036 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3037 // we don't have the channel here.
3038 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3040 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3042 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3043 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3044 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3045 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3046 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3047 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3048 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3049 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3050 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3051 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3052 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3054 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3057 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3058 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3060 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3061 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3065 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3066 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3067 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3068 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3070 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3077 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3078 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3079 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3080 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3081 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3082 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3084 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3085 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3087 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3088 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3089 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3090 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3091 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3092 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3093 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3094 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3095 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3096 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3102 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3103 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3104 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3105 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3107 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3108 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3110 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3111 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3112 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3114 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3115 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3116 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3117 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3118 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3119 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3120 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3124 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3126 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3129 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3130 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3131 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3132 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3133 macro_rules! return_err {
3134 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3136 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3137 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3138 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3139 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3140 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3141 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3147 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3149 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3150 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3153 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3154 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3155 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3156 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3157 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3159 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3162 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3163 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3164 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3165 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3166 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3172 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3173 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3174 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3176 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3177 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3178 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3180 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3181 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3182 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3183 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3184 return Err(LightningError {
3185 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3186 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3189 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3190 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3192 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3193 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3196 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3197 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3198 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3199 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3201 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3202 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3203 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3205 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3206 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3207 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3208 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3209 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3210 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3214 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3217 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3218 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3219 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3221 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3222 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3223 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3224 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3225 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3228 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3229 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3231 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3232 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3233 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3234 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3235 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3236 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3237 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3238 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3240 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3241 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3242 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3244 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3246 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3253 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3254 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3255 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3256 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3261 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3262 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3263 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3266 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3267 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3269 log_trace!(self.logger,
3270 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3271 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3272 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3273 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3275 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3276 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3277 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3279 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3280 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3282 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3283 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3284 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3285 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3288 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3289 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3290 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3291 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3292 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3293 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3294 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3295 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3296 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3297 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3299 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3300 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3301 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3303 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3304 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3306 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3307 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3308 Some(monitor_update) => {
3309 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry) {
3310 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3312 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3313 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3314 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3315 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3316 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3317 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3318 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3326 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3329 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3330 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3331 // `channel_by_id` map.
3332 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3333 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3338 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3339 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3341 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3346 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3348 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3349 /// fields for more info.
3351 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3352 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3354 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3356 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3357 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3358 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3359 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3360 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3362 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3363 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3364 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3365 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3366 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3368 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3369 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3370 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3371 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3373 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3375 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3376 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3377 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3379 /// In general, a path may raise:
3380 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3381 /// node public key) is specified.
3382 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3383 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3385 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3386 /// relevant updates.
3388 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3389 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3390 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3392 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3393 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3394 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3395 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3396 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3397 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3398 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3399 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3400 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3401 self.pending_outbound_payments
3402 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3403 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3404 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3407 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3408 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3409 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3410 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3411 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3412 self.pending_outbound_payments
3413 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3414 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3415 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3416 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3420 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3421 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3422 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3423 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3424 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3425 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3429 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3430 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3431 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3435 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3436 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3440 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3441 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3442 /// retries are exhausted.
3444 /// # Event Generation
3446 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3447 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3449 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3450 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3451 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3453 /// # Requested Invoices
3455 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`], abandoning the payment prior to receiving the
3456 /// invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] and prevent any attempts at paying
3457 /// it once received. The other events may only be generated once the invoice has been received.
3459 /// # Restart Behavior
3461 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3462 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3463 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3465 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3466 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3467 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3468 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3471 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3472 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3473 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3474 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3475 /// never reach the recipient.
3477 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3478 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3480 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3481 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3483 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3484 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3485 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3486 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3487 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3488 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3489 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3492 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3493 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3495 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3498 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3499 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3500 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3501 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3502 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3503 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3504 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3505 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3508 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3509 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3510 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3511 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3512 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3513 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3514 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3515 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3516 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3519 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3522 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3523 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3526 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3527 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3528 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3529 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3530 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3532 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3533 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3535 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3536 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3537 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3538 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3539 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3541 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3542 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3543 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3544 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3545 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3546 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3547 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3548 } else { unreachable!(); });
3550 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3551 Err((chan, err)) => {
3552 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3553 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3555 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3556 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3557 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3563 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3564 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3566 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3567 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3570 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3571 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3572 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3576 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3577 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3580 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3582 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3584 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3585 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3586 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3587 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3589 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3596 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3597 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3598 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3602 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3604 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3605 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3607 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3608 /// across the p2p network.
3610 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3611 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3613 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3614 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3615 /// keys per-channel).
3617 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3618 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3619 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3621 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3622 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3623 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3625 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3626 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3627 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3628 /// for more details.
3630 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3631 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3632 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3635 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3636 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3637 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3638 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3639 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3645 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3646 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3647 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3648 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3649 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3650 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3651 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3652 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3656 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3657 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3658 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3659 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3663 let mut output_index = None;
3664 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3665 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3666 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3667 if output_index.is_some() {
3668 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3669 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3672 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3675 if output_index.is_none() {
3676 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3677 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3680 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3684 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3686 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3687 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3688 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3689 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3691 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3692 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3694 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3695 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3697 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3699 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3700 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3701 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3702 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3703 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3704 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3705 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3706 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3707 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3708 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3709 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3710 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3711 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3716 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3717 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3718 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3719 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3720 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3721 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3722 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3723 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3724 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3728 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3729 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3730 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3731 config.apply(config_update);
3732 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3735 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3736 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3737 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3738 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3739 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3740 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3747 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3748 debug_assert!(false);
3749 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3751 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3752 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3759 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3761 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3762 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3763 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3764 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3766 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3767 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3769 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3770 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3772 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3774 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3775 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3776 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3777 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3778 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3779 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3780 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3781 pub fn update_channel_config(
3782 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3783 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3784 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3787 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3788 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3790 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3791 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3793 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3794 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3795 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3796 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3797 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3799 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3800 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3801 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3804 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3807 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3808 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3809 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3810 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3811 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3812 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3815 let next_hop_scid = {
3816 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3817 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3818 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3819 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3820 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3821 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3822 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
3823 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3824 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3825 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3828 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3830 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3831 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
3832 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3834 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3835 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}.",
3836 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3841 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3842 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3843 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3846 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3847 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3848 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3850 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3852 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3853 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3854 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3855 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3856 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3859 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3860 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3861 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3862 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3863 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3865 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3869 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3870 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3872 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3875 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3876 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3877 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3879 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3880 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3881 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3884 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3885 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3886 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3887 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
3888 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3889 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3890 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3891 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3894 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3895 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3896 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3897 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3902 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3904 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3905 /// Will likely generate further events.
3906 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3909 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3910 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3911 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3913 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3914 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3916 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3917 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3918 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3920 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3921 match forward_info {
3922 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3923 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3924 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3925 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3926 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3929 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3930 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3931 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3933 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3934 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3935 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3936 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3937 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3938 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3939 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3942 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3943 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3945 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3948 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3949 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3955 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3956 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3958 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3962 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3963 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3965 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3969 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3970 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3971 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3972 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3973 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3975 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3976 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3977 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3978 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3979 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3981 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3983 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3984 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3988 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3989 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3990 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3991 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3993 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3994 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4000 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4003 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4006 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4007 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4008 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4009 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4010 // problem, not ours.
4016 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
4017 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4019 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4023 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4024 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4025 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4026 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4029 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4030 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4031 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4032 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4033 match forward_info {
4034 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4035 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4036 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4037 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4038 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4041 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4042 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4043 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4044 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4045 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4046 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4047 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4048 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4049 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4051 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4052 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4053 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4056 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4057 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4059 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4061 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4062 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4063 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4064 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4069 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4070 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4072 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4073 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4074 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4075 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4077 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4078 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4080 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4082 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4083 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4084 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4091 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4095 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4096 match forward_info {
4097 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4098 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4099 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4100 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4101 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4104 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4105 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4106 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4107 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4108 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4109 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4110 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4112 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4113 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4114 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4118 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4119 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4122 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4125 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4126 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4127 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4128 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4129 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4130 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4131 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4132 phantom_shared_secret,
4134 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4135 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4136 // if routing nodes overpay
4137 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4138 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4140 total_value_received: None,
4141 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4144 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4147 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4149 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4150 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4151 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4152 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4153 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4154 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4156 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4157 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4158 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4159 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4160 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4161 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4162 phantom_shared_secret,
4164 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4165 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4167 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4170 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4171 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4172 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4173 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4174 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4177 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4178 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4179 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4180 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4181 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4182 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4184 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4185 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4186 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4188 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4189 .entry(payment_hash)
4190 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4191 .or_insert_with(|| {
4192 committed_to_claimable = true;
4194 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4197 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4198 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4200 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4202 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4203 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4204 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4206 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4207 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4208 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4211 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4213 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4214 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4215 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4216 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4217 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4218 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4219 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4220 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4221 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4222 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4224 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4226 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4227 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4228 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4229 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4230 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4231 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4233 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4234 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4235 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4236 committed_to_claimable = true;
4238 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4239 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4240 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4241 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4242 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4243 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4244 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4245 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4246 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4247 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4251 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4252 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4253 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4254 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4255 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4257 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4259 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4260 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4262 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4263 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4264 committed_to_claimable = true;
4267 payment_claimable_generated
4271 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4272 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4273 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4274 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4275 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4276 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4277 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4278 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4279 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4280 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4281 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4282 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4283 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4284 Ok(result) => result,
4286 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4287 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4290 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4291 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4292 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4293 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4294 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4295 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4298 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4299 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4300 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4302 check_total_value!(purpose);
4304 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4305 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4306 check_total_value!(purpose);
4310 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4311 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4312 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4313 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4315 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4316 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4317 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4318 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4319 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4320 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4321 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4322 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4324 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4325 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4326 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4328 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4329 if payment_claimable_generated {
4330 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4336 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4337 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4345 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4346 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4347 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4348 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4350 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4351 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4353 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4355 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4356 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4357 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4359 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4361 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4362 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4363 events.append(&mut new_events);
4366 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4368 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4369 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4370 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4372 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4374 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4375 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4376 if background_events.is_empty() {
4377 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4380 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4382 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4383 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4384 // monitor updating completing.
4385 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4387 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4388 let mut updated_chan = false;
4390 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4391 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4392 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4393 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4394 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4395 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4396 updated_chan = true;
4397 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4398 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase).map(|_| ())
4400 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4405 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4406 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4408 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4409 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4410 // however, ensure that.
4412 log_error!(self.logger,
4413 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4415 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4417 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4418 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4419 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4420 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4421 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4422 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4423 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4425 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4426 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4427 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4428 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4429 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4435 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4438 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4439 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4440 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4441 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4442 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4445 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4446 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4447 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4448 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4449 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4450 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4451 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4453 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4454 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4455 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4456 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4458 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4459 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4461 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4462 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4466 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4467 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4468 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4469 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4470 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4471 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4472 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4474 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4475 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4477 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4478 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4479 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4480 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4481 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4482 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4484 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4489 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4490 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4498 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4500 /// This currently includes:
4501 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4502 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4503 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4505 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4506 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4507 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4508 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4510 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4511 /// estimate fetches.
4513 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4514 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4515 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4516 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4517 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4519 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4520 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4522 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4523 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4524 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4526 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4527 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4528 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4529 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4530 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4531 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4533 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4534 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4535 log_error!(self.logger,
4536 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4537 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4538 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4539 self.finish_force_close_channel(context.force_shutdown(false));
4540 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4541 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4542 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4543 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4544 channel_id: *chan_id,
4545 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4556 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4557 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4560 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4561 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4562 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4564 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4565 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4570 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4571 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4573 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4574 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4575 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4576 if needs_close { return false; }
4579 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4580 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4581 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4582 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4583 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4584 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4585 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4586 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4588 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4589 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4590 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4591 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4595 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4597 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4600 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4602 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4603 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4604 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4605 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4609 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4611 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4617 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4619 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4620 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4621 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4622 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4623 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4624 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4625 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4626 channel_id: *chan_id,
4627 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4635 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4636 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4637 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4639 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4640 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4641 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4646 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4647 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4648 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4649 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4650 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4651 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4652 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4653 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4659 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4661 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4662 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4667 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4668 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4669 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4670 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4671 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4672 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4673 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4674 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4675 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4676 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4677 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4678 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4679 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4680 // have no channels to the peer.
4681 let remove_entry = {
4682 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4683 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4686 entry.remove_entry();
4689 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4694 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4695 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4696 // This should be unreachable
4697 debug_assert!(false);
4700 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4701 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4702 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4703 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4704 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4705 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4706 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4709 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4710 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4711 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4713 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4714 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4721 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4722 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4723 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4724 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4725 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4728 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4729 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4732 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
4734 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4735 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4736 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4737 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4738 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4745 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4746 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4747 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4749 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4750 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4751 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4752 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4754 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4755 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4756 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4757 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4758 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4759 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4762 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4763 /// reason for the failure.
4765 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4766 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4767 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4769 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4770 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4771 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4772 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4773 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4774 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4775 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4780 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4781 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4782 match failure_code {
4783 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4784 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4785 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4786 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4787 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4788 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4790 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4791 let fail_data = match data {
4792 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4795 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4800 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4801 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4803 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4805 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4806 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4807 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4808 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4809 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4810 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4811 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4813 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4815 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4816 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4818 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4823 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4824 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4825 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4826 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4827 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4828 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4829 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4830 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4831 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4832 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4834 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4835 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4836 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4837 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4839 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4840 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4841 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4842 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4843 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4847 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4848 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4849 // be surfaced to the user.
4850 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4851 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
4852 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4854 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4856 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4857 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4858 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4859 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4860 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
4861 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
4862 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
4864 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
4865 debug_assert!(false);
4866 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4869 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4871 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4874 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4875 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4876 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4877 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4881 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4882 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4883 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4884 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4885 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4886 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4887 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4888 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4889 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4892 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4893 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4894 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4897 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4898 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4899 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4901 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4902 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4903 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4904 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4905 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4907 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
4908 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
4909 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4911 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4912 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4913 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4914 push_forward_ev = true;
4916 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4917 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4918 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4921 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4924 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4925 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4926 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4927 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4928 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4929 failed_next_destination: destination,
4935 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4936 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4938 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4939 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4940 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4941 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4943 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4944 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4945 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4946 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4948 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4949 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4950 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4952 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4953 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4954 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4955 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4956 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4957 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4958 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4959 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4960 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4963 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4964 /// even type numbers.
4968 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4969 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4971 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4972 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4973 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4976 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4977 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4979 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4982 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4983 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4984 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4985 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4986 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4987 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4988 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4989 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4994 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
4995 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
4996 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4997 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4998 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5000 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5001 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5002 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5006 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5007 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5008 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5009 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5010 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5011 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5012 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5013 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5014 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5015 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5016 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5025 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5027 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5028 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5029 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5030 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5031 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5032 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5033 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5034 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5035 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5036 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5037 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5038 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5039 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5040 debug_assert!(false);
5044 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5046 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5047 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5048 debug_assert!(false);
5052 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5053 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5055 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5056 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5057 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5058 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5061 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5062 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5063 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5064 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5068 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5069 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5070 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5071 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5073 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5074 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5075 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5076 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5077 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5082 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5083 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5084 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5085 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5086 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5087 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5088 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5090 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5093 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5094 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5095 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5096 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5100 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5101 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5102 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5103 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5105 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5106 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5107 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5108 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5111 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5112 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5113 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5114 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5118 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5119 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5120 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5123 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5124 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5125 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5126 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5127 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5128 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5129 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5131 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5132 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5133 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5135 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5138 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5139 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry);
5140 if let Err(e) = res {
5141 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5142 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5143 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5144 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5145 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5148 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5149 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5150 // monitor update as a background event.
5151 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5152 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5153 counterparty_node_id,
5154 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5155 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5164 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5165 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5166 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5172 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5173 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5174 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5175 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5176 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5177 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5178 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5179 // again on restart.
5180 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5181 payment_preimage, update_res);
5184 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5185 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5187 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5188 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5189 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5190 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5191 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5192 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5193 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5194 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5195 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5196 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5199 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5200 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5201 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5202 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5203 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5204 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5208 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5209 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5212 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5214 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5215 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5216 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5217 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5218 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5219 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5221 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5222 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5225 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5226 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5227 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5228 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5229 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5230 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5231 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5234 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5235 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5237 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5238 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5239 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5240 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5242 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5246 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5247 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5248 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5254 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5255 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5256 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5259 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5260 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5262 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5263 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5264 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5266 payment_purpose: purpose,
5269 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5271 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5275 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5277 sender_intended_total_msat,
5281 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5282 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5284 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5285 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5286 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5293 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5294 /// update completion.
5295 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5296 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5297 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5298 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5299 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5300 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5301 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5302 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5303 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5304 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5305 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5306 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5307 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5309 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5311 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5312 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5313 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5314 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5317 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5318 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5320 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5321 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5322 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5327 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5328 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5329 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5330 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5335 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5336 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5337 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5338 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5339 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5344 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5348 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5354 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5355 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5356 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5360 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5361 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5362 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5368 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5369 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5371 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5372 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5374 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5375 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5376 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5377 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5378 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5383 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5384 let mut peer_state_lock;
5385 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5386 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5387 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5388 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5390 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5393 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5394 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5395 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5396 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5397 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5400 let remaining_in_flight =
5401 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5402 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5405 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5406 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5407 remaining_in_flight);
5408 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5411 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5414 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5416 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5417 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5420 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5421 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5422 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5424 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5425 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5426 /// used to accept such channels.
5428 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5429 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5430 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5431 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5434 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5435 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5437 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5438 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5439 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5441 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5442 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5444 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5445 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5447 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5448 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5450 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5451 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5452 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5453 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5456 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5457 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5459 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5460 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5461 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5462 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5463 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5464 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5465 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5466 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5468 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5469 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5470 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5472 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5473 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5474 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5475 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5476 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5477 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5478 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5480 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5484 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5485 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5486 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5487 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5488 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5489 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5490 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5493 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5494 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5496 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5497 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5498 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5499 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5500 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5501 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5502 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5503 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5506 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5507 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5511 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5512 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5513 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5515 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5516 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5517 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5520 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5525 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5526 /// or 0-conf channels.
5528 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5529 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5530 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5531 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5532 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5533 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5535 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5536 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5537 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5538 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5539 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5540 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5541 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5545 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5548 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5549 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5551 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5552 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5554 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5555 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5556 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5557 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5558 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5560 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5563 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5564 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5565 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5568 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5569 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5574 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5577 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5578 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5579 // likely to be lost on restart!
5580 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5581 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5584 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5585 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5588 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5589 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5590 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5591 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5592 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5594 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5595 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5597 debug_assert!(false);
5598 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5600 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5601 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5603 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5604 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5605 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5606 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5607 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5608 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5610 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5611 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5612 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5615 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5616 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5617 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5618 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5619 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5622 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5623 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5625 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5628 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5629 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5630 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5631 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5632 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5633 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5634 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5635 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5636 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5638 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5639 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5640 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5645 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5646 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5647 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5648 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5649 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5650 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5651 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5654 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5659 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5660 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5661 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5663 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5664 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5667 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5668 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5670 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5671 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5672 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5674 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5678 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5679 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5680 // likely to be lost on restart!
5681 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5682 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5683 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5685 debug_assert!(false);
5686 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5688 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5689 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5690 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5691 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
5692 match phase.get_mut() {
5693 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5694 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
5695 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
5698 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5705 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5706 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5707 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5708 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5709 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5711 user_channel_id: user_id,
5716 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5717 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5719 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5720 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5722 debug_assert!(false);
5723 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5726 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5727 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5728 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5729 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5730 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
5731 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5733 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5734 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5735 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5736 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5737 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5738 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5739 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5740 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5741 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5745 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
5746 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5748 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5751 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5752 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5753 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5756 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5757 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5758 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5759 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5760 funding_msg.channel_id))
5762 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5763 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5767 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5768 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5769 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5770 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5771 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5772 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5773 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5777 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5779 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
5780 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5781 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5782 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5784 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5785 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5786 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5787 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5788 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5789 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5790 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5791 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5796 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
5802 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5803 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5804 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5805 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5807 debug_assert!(false);
5808 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5811 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5812 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5813 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5814 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5815 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5816 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
5817 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5818 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5819 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5820 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5821 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5822 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5823 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5824 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5825 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5826 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5832 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5836 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5840 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5841 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
5842 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
5843 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5844 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5846 debug_assert!(false);
5847 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5849 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5850 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5851 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5853 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5854 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5855 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5856 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5857 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5858 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5859 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5860 msg: announcement_sigs,
5862 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
5863 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5864 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5865 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5866 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5867 // announcement_signatures.
5868 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5869 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
5870 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5871 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5878 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5879 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
5884 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
5885 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
5888 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5889 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5894 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5895 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5896 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5897 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5898 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5900 debug_assert!(false);
5901 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5903 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5904 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5905 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5906 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
5908 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5909 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
5910 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5912 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5915 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
5916 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5917 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
5918 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5920 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5921 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5922 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5923 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5924 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5925 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5929 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5930 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5931 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5932 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
5936 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5937 let context = phase.context_mut();
5938 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
5939 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5940 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
5941 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
5946 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5949 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5950 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5951 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5952 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5958 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5959 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5960 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5962 debug_assert!(false);
5963 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5965 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5966 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5967 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5968 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5969 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5970 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5971 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
5972 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5973 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5974 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5979 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5980 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5981 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5982 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5983 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5984 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
5985 } else { (tx, None) }
5987 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
5988 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
5991 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5994 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5995 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5996 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5998 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
5999 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6000 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6001 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6002 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6006 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6011 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6012 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6013 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6014 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6016 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6017 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6018 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6019 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6021 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6022 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6024 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6026 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6028 debug_assert!(false);
6029 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6031 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6032 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6033 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6034 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6035 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6036 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6037 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6038 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6039 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6040 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6042 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6043 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6044 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6045 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6046 match pending_forward_info {
6047 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6048 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6049 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6050 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6052 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6053 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6054 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6055 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6056 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6059 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6061 _ => pending_forward_info
6064 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6066 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6067 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6070 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6075 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6077 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6078 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6079 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6081 debug_assert!(false);
6082 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6084 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6085 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6086 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6087 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6088 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6089 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6090 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6093 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6094 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6097 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6100 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, funding_txo);
6104 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6105 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6106 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6107 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6108 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6110 debug_assert!(false);
6111 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6113 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6114 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6115 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6116 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6117 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6118 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6120 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6121 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6129 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6130 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6131 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6132 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6133 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6135 debug_assert!(false);
6136 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6138 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6139 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6140 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6141 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6142 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6143 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6144 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6146 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6147 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6149 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6150 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6154 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6158 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6159 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6160 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6162 debug_assert!(false);
6163 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6165 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6166 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6167 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6168 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6169 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6170 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6171 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6172 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6173 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6174 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6177 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6178 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6181 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6186 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6187 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6188 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6189 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6190 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6191 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6192 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6193 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6194 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6195 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6196 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6198 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6199 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6201 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6202 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6203 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6204 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6205 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6206 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6208 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6209 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6210 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6212 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6213 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6214 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6215 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6216 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6217 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6218 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6219 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6220 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6223 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6224 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6226 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6227 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6228 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6229 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6230 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6231 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6232 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6233 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6234 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6237 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6238 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6239 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6244 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6245 // payments are being processed.
6246 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6247 push_forward_event = true;
6249 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6250 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6257 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6258 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6261 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6262 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6263 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6265 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6269 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6270 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6271 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6272 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6273 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6275 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6276 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6277 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6278 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6279 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6280 // real by taking more time.
6281 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6282 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6283 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6288 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6289 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6290 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6291 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6292 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6293 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6294 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6296 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6297 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6298 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6299 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6300 channel_funding_outpoint,
6301 counterparty_node_id,
6306 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6307 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6308 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6309 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6311 debug_assert!(false);
6312 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6313 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6314 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6315 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6317 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6318 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6319 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6320 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6321 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6322 *counterparty_node_id)
6324 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6325 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6326 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6327 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6328 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6329 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6330 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6332 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6334 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6335 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6338 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6341 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6345 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6346 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6347 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6349 debug_assert!(false);
6350 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6352 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6353 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6354 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6355 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6356 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6357 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6359 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6360 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6363 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6368 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6369 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6370 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6372 debug_assert!(false);
6373 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6375 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6376 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6377 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6378 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6379 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6380 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6381 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6384 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6385 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6386 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6387 msg, &self.default_configuration
6388 ), chan_phase_entry),
6389 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6390 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6391 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6394 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6395 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6398 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6403 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6404 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6405 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6406 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6408 // It's not a local channel
6409 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6412 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6413 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6414 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6415 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6418 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6419 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6420 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6421 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6422 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6423 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6424 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6425 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6426 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6427 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6429 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6431 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6432 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6433 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6434 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6436 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", chan_id);
6437 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6440 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6441 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6444 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6446 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6449 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6451 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6452 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6454 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6456 debug_assert!(false);
6457 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6459 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6460 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6461 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6462 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6463 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6464 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6465 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6466 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6467 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6468 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6469 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6470 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6471 let mut channel_update = None;
6472 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6473 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6474 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6477 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6478 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6479 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6480 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6481 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6482 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6483 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6488 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6489 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6490 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6491 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6492 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6493 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6497 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6498 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6501 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6505 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6506 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6509 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6510 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6515 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6516 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6517 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6519 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6520 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6521 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6522 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6523 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6524 match monitor_event {
6525 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6526 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6527 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", &preimage);
6528 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint);
6530 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6531 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6532 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6533 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6536 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6537 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6538 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6539 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6541 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6542 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6543 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6544 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6547 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6548 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6549 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6550 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6551 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6552 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6553 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6554 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6555 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6556 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6557 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6561 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6562 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6564 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6566 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6567 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6568 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6569 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6570 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6578 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6579 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6585 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6586 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6589 has_pending_monitor_events
6592 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6593 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6594 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6596 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6598 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6601 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6602 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6603 /// update was applied.
6604 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6605 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6606 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6607 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6609 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6610 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6611 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6612 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6614 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6615 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6617 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6618 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6619 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6620 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6622 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6623 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6624 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6625 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6626 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6627 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6629 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6630 has_monitor_update = true;
6632 let channel_id: ChannelId = *channel_id;
6633 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6634 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6635 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6637 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6639 continue 'peer_loop;
6648 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6649 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6650 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6653 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6654 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6660 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6661 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6662 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6663 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6664 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6665 let mut has_update = false;
6667 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6669 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6670 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6671 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6672 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6673 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
6675 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6676 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6677 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6678 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6680 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6681 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6684 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6685 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6686 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6687 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6688 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6693 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6695 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6696 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6697 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6703 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
6704 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6709 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
6715 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6716 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6722 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6723 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6725 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6726 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6727 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6728 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6729 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6730 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6731 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6732 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6733 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6734 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6735 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6736 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6737 assert!(should_broadcast);
6738 } else { unreachable!(); }
6739 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6740 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6741 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6744 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6748 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6751 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6752 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6754 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6755 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6756 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6757 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6759 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6761 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6762 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6766 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6767 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6769 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6771 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6772 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6774 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6775 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6776 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6777 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6778 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6779 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6780 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6781 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6782 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6783 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6784 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6787 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6788 /// stored external to LDK.
6790 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6791 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6792 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6794 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6795 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6798 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6799 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6800 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6801 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6803 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6804 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6805 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6806 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6807 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6809 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6810 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6811 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6812 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6813 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6815 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6816 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6818 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6819 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6823 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6824 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6826 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6828 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6829 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6831 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6832 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6833 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6834 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6835 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6836 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6837 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6840 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6841 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6843 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6844 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6845 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6848 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6849 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6851 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6852 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6853 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6854 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6856 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6857 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6858 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6859 Some(_) => continue,
6860 None => return scid_candidate
6865 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6867 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6868 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6870 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6871 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6872 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6876 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6877 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6878 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6880 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6881 /// times to get a unique scid.
6882 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6883 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6884 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6886 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6887 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6888 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6889 return scid_candidate
6893 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6894 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6895 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6896 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6898 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6899 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6900 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6901 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6902 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
6903 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
6905 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6906 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6907 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6916 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6917 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6918 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6919 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6920 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6924 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6925 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6926 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6927 events.push_back((event, None));
6931 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6932 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6933 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6937 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6938 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6942 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6943 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6946 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6947 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6948 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6949 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6950 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6951 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6953 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6954 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6955 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6956 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6958 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6959 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6960 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6961 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6963 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6967 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6968 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6969 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6970 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6971 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6972 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6973 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6977 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6978 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6979 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6980 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6981 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6982 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6983 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6984 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry)
6986 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6988 if further_update_exists {
6989 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6994 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6995 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7000 log_debug!(self.logger,
7001 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7002 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7006 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
7007 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
7008 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
7012 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7013 for action in actions {
7015 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7016 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7018 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7024 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7025 /// using the given event handler.
7027 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7028 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7032 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7036 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7038 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7039 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7040 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7041 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7042 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7043 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7047 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7048 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7049 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7050 /// is always placed next to each other.
7052 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7053 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7054 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7055 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7057 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7058 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7059 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7060 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7061 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7062 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7063 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7065 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7066 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7067 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7068 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7071 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7072 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7074 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7075 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7078 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7079 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7080 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7081 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7082 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7083 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7084 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7088 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7089 events.replace(pending_events);
7098 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7100 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7101 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7102 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7103 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7104 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7105 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7109 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7111 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7112 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7113 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7115 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7119 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7121 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7122 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7123 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7124 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7125 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7126 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7130 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7132 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7133 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7134 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7135 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7136 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7139 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7140 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7143 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7144 let _persistence_guard =
7145 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7146 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7147 let new_height = height - 1;
7149 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7150 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7151 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7152 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7153 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7154 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7157 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7161 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7163 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7164 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7165 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7166 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7167 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7168 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7172 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7173 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7174 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7175 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7177 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7178 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7180 let _persistence_guard =
7181 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7182 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7183 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7184 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7186 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7187 if height < last_best_block_height {
7188 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7189 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7193 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7194 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7195 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7196 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7198 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7199 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7201 let _persistence_guard =
7202 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7203 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7204 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7206 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7208 macro_rules! max_time {
7209 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7211 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7212 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7213 // having an explicit local time source.
7214 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7215 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7216 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7217 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7218 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7224 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7225 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7226 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7227 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7231 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7232 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7233 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7234 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7235 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7236 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7237 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7238 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7245 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7246 let _persistence_guard =
7247 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7248 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7249 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7250 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7251 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7252 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7253 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7254 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7259 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7261 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7262 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7263 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7264 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7265 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7266 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7270 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7271 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7273 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7274 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7275 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7276 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7277 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7279 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7280 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7282 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7283 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7284 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7285 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7286 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7287 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7289 // Retain unfunded channels.
7290 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7291 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7292 let res = f(channel);
7293 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7294 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7295 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7296 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7297 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7299 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7300 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7301 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7302 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7303 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7304 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7305 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7310 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7315 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7316 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7319 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7320 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7321 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7322 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7323 msg: announcement_sigs,
7325 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7326 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7327 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7329 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7330 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7331 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7336 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7337 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7338 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7339 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7340 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7341 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7342 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7343 // is always consistent.
7344 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7345 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7346 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7347 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7348 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7351 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7352 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7353 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7354 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7355 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7356 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7357 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7361 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7362 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7363 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7364 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7366 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7367 data: reason_message,
7379 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7380 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7381 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7382 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7383 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7384 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7385 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7386 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7387 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7388 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7390 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7391 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7392 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7396 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7399 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7400 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7401 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7402 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7403 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7404 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7405 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7406 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7407 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7408 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7411 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7412 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7413 _ => unreachable!(),
7415 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7416 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7417 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7418 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7424 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7426 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7427 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7431 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
7432 /// may have events that need processing.
7434 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
7435 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
7437 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7438 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7439 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
7440 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
7443 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7444 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
7445 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
7448 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7449 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7450 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
7453 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7454 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7455 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7456 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7459 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7460 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7461 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7462 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7465 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7466 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7468 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7469 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7470 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7471 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7472 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7475 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7476 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7477 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7478 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7481 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7482 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7483 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7484 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7487 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7488 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7489 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7490 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7494 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7495 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7497 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7498 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7499 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7500 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7501 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7502 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7506 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7507 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7508 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7509 // change to the contents.
7510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7511 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7512 let persist = match &res {
7513 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
7514 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
7515 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7517 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7519 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7524 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7525 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7526 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7527 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7530 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7531 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7532 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7533 // change to the contents.
7534 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7535 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7536 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
7540 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7541 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7542 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7543 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7546 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7547 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7548 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7551 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7552 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7553 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7556 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7557 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7558 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
7559 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
7560 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
7561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7562 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7563 let persist = match &res {
7564 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7565 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7567 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7572 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7573 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7574 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7577 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7579 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7582 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7583 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7584 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7585 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7587 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7588 let persist = match &res {
7589 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7590 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7591 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7593 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7598 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7599 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7600 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7603 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7604 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7605 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7606 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7607 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7608 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7609 let persist = match &res {
7610 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7611 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7612 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7614 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7619 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7620 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7621 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
7622 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7624 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7625 let persist = match &res {
7626 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7627 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7628 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7630 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7635 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7636 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7637 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7640 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7641 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7642 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7645 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7646 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7647 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7648 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7649 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7650 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7651 let persist = match &res {
7652 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7653 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7654 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7656 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7661 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7663 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7666 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7667 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7668 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7671 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
7676 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7677 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7678 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7681 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7682 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7683 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7684 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7686 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7687 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7688 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7689 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7690 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7691 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7692 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7693 let context = match phase {
7694 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7695 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7696 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
7697 if !chan.is_shutdown() {
7702 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
7703 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7706 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7710 // Clean up for removal.
7711 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
7712 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7715 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7716 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7717 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7718 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7720 // V1 Channel Establishment
7721 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7722 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7723 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7724 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7725 // V2 Channel Establishment
7726 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7727 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7728 // Common Channel Establishment
7729 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7730 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7731 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7732 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7733 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7734 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7735 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7736 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7737 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7738 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7739 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7740 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7741 // Channel Operations
7742 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7743 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7744 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7745 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7746 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7747 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7749 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7750 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7751 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7752 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7753 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7754 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7755 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7756 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7757 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7760 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7761 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7762 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7763 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7766 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7768 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7770 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7771 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7775 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7776 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7777 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7783 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7784 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7785 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7786 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7787 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7788 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7791 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7792 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7793 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7794 if inbound_peer_limited {
7797 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7798 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7799 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7800 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7801 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7802 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7803 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7804 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7808 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7809 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7810 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7812 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7813 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7814 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7815 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7820 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7821 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7826 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7828 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7829 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7830 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7831 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7832 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7834 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
7835 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
7836 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7837 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
7838 // worry about closing and removing them.
7839 debug_assert!(false);
7843 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7844 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7845 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7849 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7853 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7854 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7856 match &msg.data as &str {
7857 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
7858 "link failed to shutdown" =>
7860 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
7861 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
7862 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
7863 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
7864 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
7865 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
7866 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
7867 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7868 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7869 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7870 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7871 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7872 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
7873 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
7874 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7875 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7879 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7880 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7881 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
7882 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
7883 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7884 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
7886 log_level: Level::Trace,
7896 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7897 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
7898 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7899 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7900 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7901 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7902 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7903 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7904 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7905 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7906 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
7908 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7909 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7910 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7914 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7915 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7916 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7917 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7918 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7919 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7920 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7921 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7922 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7923 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7931 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7932 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7936 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7937 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7940 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7941 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7944 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7945 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7948 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7949 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7950 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7951 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7954 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7955 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7956 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7957 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7960 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7961 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7962 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7963 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7966 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7967 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7968 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7969 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7972 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7973 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7974 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7975 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7978 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7979 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7980 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7981 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7984 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7985 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7986 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7987 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7990 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7991 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7992 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7993 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7996 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7997 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7998 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7999 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8003 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8004 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8005 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8006 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8007 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8011 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8012 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8014 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8015 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8016 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8017 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8018 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8021 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8022 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8023 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8024 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8027 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8028 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8029 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8030 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8033 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8034 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8035 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8036 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8037 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8038 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8039 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8040 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8041 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8042 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8043 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8044 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8045 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8046 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8047 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8048 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8049 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8050 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8051 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8052 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8057 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8058 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8060 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8061 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8062 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8063 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8066 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8067 (2, node_id, required),
8068 (4, features, required),
8069 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8070 (8, forwarding_info, option),
8071 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8072 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8075 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8076 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8077 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8078 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8079 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8080 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8081 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8082 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8083 (2, self.channel_id, required),
8084 (3, self.channel_type, option),
8085 (4, self.counterparty, required),
8086 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8087 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8088 (7, self.config, option),
8089 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8090 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8091 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8092 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8093 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8094 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8095 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8096 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8097 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8098 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8099 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8100 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8101 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8102 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8103 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8104 (32, self.is_public, required),
8105 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8106 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8107 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8108 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8109 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8115 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8116 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8117 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8118 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8119 (2, channel_id, required),
8120 (3, channel_type, option),
8121 (4, counterparty, required),
8122 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8123 (6, funding_txo, option),
8124 (7, config, option),
8125 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8126 (9, confirmations, option),
8127 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8128 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8129 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8130 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8131 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8132 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8133 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8134 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8135 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8136 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8137 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8138 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8139 (26, is_outbound, required),
8140 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8141 (30, is_usable, required),
8142 (32, is_public, required),
8143 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8144 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8145 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8146 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8147 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8150 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8151 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8152 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8153 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8154 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8156 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
8160 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8162 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8163 outbound_scid_alias,
8167 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8168 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8170 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8171 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8172 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8173 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8174 confirmations_required,
8176 force_close_spend_delay,
8177 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8178 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8179 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8180 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8181 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8182 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8183 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8184 channel_shutdown_state,
8189 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8190 (2, channels, required_vec),
8191 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8192 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8195 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8197 (0, onion_packet, required),
8198 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8201 (0, payment_data, required),
8202 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8203 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8204 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8205 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8207 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8208 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8209 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8210 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8211 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8212 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8216 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8217 (0, routing, required),
8218 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8219 (4, payment_hash, required),
8220 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8221 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8222 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8223 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8227 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8228 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8230 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8232 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8233 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8234 reason.write(writer)?;
8236 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8237 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8240 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8241 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8242 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8243 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8250 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8251 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8252 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8255 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8256 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8257 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8258 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8262 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8263 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8264 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8265 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8266 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8269 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8270 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8271 // messages contained in the variants.
8272 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8273 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8274 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8276 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8277 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8278 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8279 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8280 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8283 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8284 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8285 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8286 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8287 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8289 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8294 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8299 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8300 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8301 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8302 (2, outpoint, required),
8303 (4, htlc_id, required),
8304 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8305 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8308 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8309 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8310 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8311 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8312 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8314 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8315 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8316 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8317 (2, self.value, required),
8318 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8319 (4, payment_data, option),
8320 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8321 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8322 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8323 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8329 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8330 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8331 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8332 (0, prev_hop, required),
8333 (1, total_msat, option),
8334 (2, value_ser, required),
8335 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8336 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8337 (5, total_value_received, option),
8338 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8339 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8340 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8342 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8343 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8344 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8346 if payment_data.is_some() {
8347 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8349 if total_msat.is_none() {
8350 total_msat = Some(value);
8352 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8355 if total_msat.is_none() {
8356 if payment_data.is_none() {
8357 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8359 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8361 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8365 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8368 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8369 total_value_received,
8370 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8372 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8373 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8378 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8379 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8380 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8383 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8384 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8385 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8386 let mut payment_id = None;
8387 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8388 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8389 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8390 (0, session_priv, required),
8391 (1, payment_id, option),
8392 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8393 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8394 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8395 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8397 if payment_id.is_none() {
8398 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8400 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8402 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8403 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8404 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8406 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8407 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8408 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8409 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8413 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8414 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8415 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8417 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8420 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8421 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8426 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8427 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8429 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8431 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8432 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8433 (0, session_priv, required),
8434 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8435 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8436 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8437 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8438 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8439 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8442 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8444 field.write(writer)?;
8451 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8452 (0, forward_info, required),
8453 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8454 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8455 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8456 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8459 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8461 (0, htlc_id, required),
8462 (2, err_packet, required),
8467 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8468 (0, payment_secret, required),
8469 (2, expiry_time, required),
8470 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8471 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8472 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8475 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8477 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8478 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8479 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8480 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8481 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8482 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8486 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8487 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8489 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8491 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8493 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8494 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8495 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8498 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8500 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8501 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8502 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8503 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8504 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8505 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8506 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8509 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8510 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_initiated() } else { false }
8514 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8516 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8517 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8518 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8519 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8520 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8521 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8524 channel.write(writer)?;
8530 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8531 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8532 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8533 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8534 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8535 for forward in pending_forwards {
8536 forward.write(writer)?;
8541 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8543 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8544 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8545 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8547 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8548 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8549 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8550 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8551 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8552 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8553 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8554 htlc.write(writer)?;
8556 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8557 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8560 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8561 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8562 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8563 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8564 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8565 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8566 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8569 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8570 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8571 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8572 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8573 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8575 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8576 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8577 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8578 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8579 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8580 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8581 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8586 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8587 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8588 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8589 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8590 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8591 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8592 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8593 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8594 0u64.write(writer)?;
8596 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8597 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8598 event.write(writer)?;
8602 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8603 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8604 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8605 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8606 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8607 0u64.write(writer)?;
8609 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8610 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8611 // likely to be identical.
8612 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8613 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8615 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8616 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8617 hash.write(writer)?;
8618 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8621 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8622 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8623 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8624 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8625 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8628 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8629 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8631 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8632 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8633 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8634 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8637 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
8638 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
8639 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8640 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8644 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8645 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8646 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8648 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8649 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8650 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8656 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8657 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8658 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8659 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8662 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8663 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8664 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8665 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8666 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8669 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8670 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8671 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8672 if !updates.is_empty() {
8673 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8674 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8679 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8680 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8681 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8682 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8683 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8684 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8685 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8686 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8687 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8688 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8689 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8690 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8691 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8698 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8699 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8700 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8701 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8704 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8705 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8706 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8707 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8708 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8709 // check that the event is sane here.
8710 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8711 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8712 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8713 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8719 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8720 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8721 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8722 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8723 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8724 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8727 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8728 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8729 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8730 events.push_back((ev, action));
8731 } else if action.is_some() {
8732 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8739 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8740 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8741 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8742 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8743 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8744 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8747 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8749 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8751 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8752 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8753 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8754 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8755 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8756 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8757 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8758 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8759 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8760 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8761 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8762 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8763 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8765 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8766 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8768 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8769 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8771 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8772 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8773 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8774 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8775 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8776 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8778 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8779 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8781 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8782 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8783 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8784 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8785 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8786 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8790 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8791 pub entropy_source: ES,
8793 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8794 pub node_signer: NS,
8796 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8797 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8799 pub signer_provider: SP,
8801 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8803 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8804 pub fee_estimator: F,
8805 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8807 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8808 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8809 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8810 pub chain_monitor: M,
8812 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8813 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8814 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8815 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8816 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8817 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8819 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8821 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8822 /// deserialization.
8824 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8825 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8826 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8828 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8829 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8831 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8832 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8833 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8834 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8836 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8839 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8840 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8843 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8844 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8846 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8847 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8848 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8849 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8850 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8851 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8855 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8856 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8857 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8858 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8859 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8861 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8862 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8867 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8868 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8869 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8870 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8872 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8873 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8874 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8875 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8876 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8877 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8881 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8882 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8883 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8887 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8888 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8890 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8891 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8892 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8893 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8894 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8895 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8899 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8900 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8902 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8903 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8904 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8906 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8908 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8909 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8910 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8911 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8912 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8913 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8914 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8915 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8916 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
8917 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8919 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8920 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8921 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8922 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8923 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8924 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8925 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8926 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8927 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8928 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8929 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8930 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8931 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8933 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
8934 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
8935 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
8937 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
8938 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
8939 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
8941 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
8942 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
8943 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
8945 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8946 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8947 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8948 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8951 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8952 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8953 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8954 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8955 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8956 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8957 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8959 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8960 let mut found_htlc = false;
8961 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8962 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8965 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8966 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8967 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8968 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8969 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8970 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8971 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8972 log_info!(args.logger,
8973 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8974 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
8975 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8979 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8980 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8981 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8982 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8983 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8985 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8986 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8988 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8989 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8990 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8991 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
8993 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8994 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8995 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
8996 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9000 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9001 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9002 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9003 // safely discard the channel.
9004 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9005 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9006 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9007 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9008 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9009 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9010 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9013 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9014 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9015 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9016 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9017 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9018 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9022 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9023 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9024 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9025 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9026 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9027 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9028 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9030 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9034 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9035 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9036 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9037 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9038 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9039 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9040 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9041 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9042 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9044 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9047 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9048 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9049 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9050 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9051 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9052 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9053 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9054 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9056 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9059 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9062 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9063 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9064 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9065 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9066 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9067 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9068 is_connected: false,
9072 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9073 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9074 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9075 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9076 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9077 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9078 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9079 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9082 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9083 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9084 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9085 for _ in 0..event_count {
9086 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9087 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9092 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9093 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9094 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9096 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9097 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9098 // on-startup monitor updates.
9099 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9100 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9102 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9106 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9107 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9109 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9110 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9111 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9112 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9113 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9117 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9118 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9119 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9120 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9121 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9122 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9123 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9125 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9126 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9130 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9131 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9132 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9133 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9134 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9135 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9136 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9137 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9138 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9139 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9140 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9141 let mut events_override = None;
9142 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9143 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9144 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9145 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9146 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9147 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9148 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9149 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9150 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9151 (8, events_override, option),
9152 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9153 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9154 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9155 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9157 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9158 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9161 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9162 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9165 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9166 pending_events_read = events;
9169 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9170 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9173 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9174 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9175 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9176 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9177 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9178 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9180 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9182 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9183 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9184 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9187 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9188 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9189 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9190 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9191 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9193 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9194 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9195 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9197 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9198 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9199 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9200 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9201 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9203 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9204 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9205 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9206 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9207 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9208 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9209 pending_background_events.push(
9210 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9211 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9212 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9213 update: update.clone(),
9216 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9217 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9218 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9219 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9220 pending_background_events.push(
9221 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9222 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9223 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9226 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9227 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9228 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9230 max_in_flight_update_id
9234 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9235 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9236 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9237 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9238 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9239 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9241 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9242 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9243 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9244 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9245 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9246 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9247 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9248 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9249 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9252 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9253 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9254 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9255 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9256 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9257 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9258 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9259 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9260 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9261 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9262 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9265 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9266 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9267 debug_assert!(false);
9268 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9273 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9274 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9275 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9276 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9277 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9278 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9279 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9280 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9282 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9283 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9284 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9286 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9287 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9288 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9289 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9290 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9291 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9292 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9293 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9298 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9299 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9301 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9302 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9303 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9304 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9307 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9308 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9309 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9310 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9311 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9312 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9313 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9315 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9316 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9317 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9318 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9319 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9320 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9321 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9322 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9325 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9326 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9327 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9328 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9329 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9330 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9331 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9332 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9335 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9336 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9337 retry_strategy: None,
9338 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9339 payment_params: None,
9340 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9341 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9342 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9343 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9344 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9345 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9346 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9347 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9348 total_msat: path_amt,
9349 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9351 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9352 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9357 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9359 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9360 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9361 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9362 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9364 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9365 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9366 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9367 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9368 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9369 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9370 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9371 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9372 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9373 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9374 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9379 !forwards.is_empty()
9381 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9382 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9383 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9384 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9385 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9386 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9387 intercepted_id != ev_id
9394 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9395 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9396 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9397 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9398 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9399 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9400 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9401 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9402 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9403 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9404 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9406 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9407 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9408 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9410 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9411 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9412 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9419 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9420 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9422 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9424 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9425 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9426 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9427 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9428 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9429 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9430 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9431 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9432 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9435 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9436 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9437 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9438 // channel still live case here.
9442 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9443 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9448 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9449 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9450 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9451 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9452 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9453 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9454 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9455 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9459 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9460 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9462 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9463 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9464 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9465 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9467 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9468 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9469 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9471 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9472 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9474 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9475 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9477 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9480 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9481 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9482 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9484 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9488 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9489 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9490 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9491 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9492 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9494 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9495 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9496 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9497 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9498 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9499 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9500 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9501 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9503 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9504 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9508 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9510 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9512 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9513 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9515 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9516 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9521 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9522 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9524 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9526 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9528 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9529 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9530 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9531 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9535 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9536 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9538 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9539 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9540 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9541 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9542 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9544 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9545 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9546 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9548 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9549 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9550 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9551 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9552 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9553 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9555 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9556 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9557 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9558 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9559 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9560 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9564 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9565 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9566 debug_assert!(false);
9567 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9572 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9574 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9575 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9576 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9577 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9578 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9579 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9580 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9581 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9582 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9583 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9584 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9586 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9587 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9589 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9590 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9591 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9592 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9594 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9595 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9596 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9597 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9599 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9600 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9601 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9602 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9604 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9605 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9606 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9607 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9608 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9609 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9610 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9613 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9614 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9617 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9620 purpose: payment.purpose,
9621 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9622 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9623 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9629 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9630 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9631 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9632 for action in actions.iter() {
9633 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9634 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9635 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9637 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9638 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9639 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9640 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9642 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9643 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9644 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9645 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9651 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9653 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9654 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9658 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9660 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9661 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9662 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9663 router: args.router,
9665 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9667 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9668 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9669 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9670 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9672 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9673 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9674 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9675 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9676 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9677 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9679 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9684 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9686 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9688 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9689 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9690 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9691 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9692 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9694 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9695 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
9697 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9698 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9699 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9701 logger: args.logger,
9702 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9705 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9706 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9707 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9708 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9709 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9712 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9713 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9714 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9715 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9716 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9717 downstream_closed, downstream_funding);
9720 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9721 //connection or two.
9723 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9729 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9730 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9731 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9732 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9733 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9734 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9735 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
9736 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9737 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9738 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9739 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9740 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9741 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9742 use crate::util::test_utils;
9743 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9744 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9747 fn test_notify_limits() {
9748 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9749 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9750 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9751 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9752 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9753 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9755 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9756 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9757 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9758 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9759 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9761 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9763 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9764 // to connect messages with new values
9765 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9766 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9767 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9768 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9769 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9770 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9772 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9773 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9774 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9775 // ... but the last node should not.
9776 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9777 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9778 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9779 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9781 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9782 // about the channel.
9783 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9784 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9785 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9787 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9789 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9790 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9791 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9792 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9793 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9794 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9796 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9797 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9798 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9800 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9801 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9802 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9803 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9804 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9805 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9807 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9808 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9809 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9810 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9811 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9812 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9813 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9814 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9816 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9817 // the channel info has updated.
9818 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9819 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9820 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9821 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9822 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9823 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9827 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9828 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9830 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9831 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9832 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9833 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9834 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9836 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9837 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9838 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9839 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9841 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9842 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9843 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9844 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9845 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9846 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9847 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9848 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9850 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9851 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9852 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9854 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9855 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9856 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9858 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9859 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9860 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9861 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9862 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9863 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9864 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9865 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9866 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9868 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9869 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9870 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9871 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9872 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9873 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9874 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9875 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9876 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9878 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9879 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9880 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9882 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9883 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9884 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9886 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9887 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9888 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9889 // lightning messages manually.
9890 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9891 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9894 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9895 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9896 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
9897 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9899 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9900 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9902 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9903 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9905 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9906 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9907 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9909 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9910 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9911 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9913 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9915 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9917 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9918 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9921 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9922 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9923 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9924 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9926 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9927 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9928 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9929 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9934 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9935 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9936 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9937 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9939 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9944 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9945 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9946 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9949 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9950 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9951 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9952 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9953 // fails as expected.
9954 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9955 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9956 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9957 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9958 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9959 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9960 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9961 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9962 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9963 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9964 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9965 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9966 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9967 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9968 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9970 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9971 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9972 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9974 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9975 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
9976 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
9977 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
9978 let route = find_route(
9979 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9980 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9982 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9983 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9985 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9986 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9987 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9988 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9989 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9991 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9992 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9993 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9994 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9995 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9997 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9998 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9999 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10000 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10001 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10002 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10003 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10004 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10005 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10007 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10008 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10010 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10011 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10012 let route = find_route(
10013 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10014 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10016 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10017 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10019 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10020 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10021 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10022 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10023 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10025 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10026 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10027 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10028 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10030 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10031 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10032 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10033 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10034 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10036 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10037 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10038 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10040 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10041 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10042 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10043 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10044 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10045 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10046 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10047 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10048 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10050 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10051 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10053 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10054 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10055 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10056 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10058 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10059 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10060 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10061 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10062 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10064 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10065 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10066 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10069 let route = find_route(
10070 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10071 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10073 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10074 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10075 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10077 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10078 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10079 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10080 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10081 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10083 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10084 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10085 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10087 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10088 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10089 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10090 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10091 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10092 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10093 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10094 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10095 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10097 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10098 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10102 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10103 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10104 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10108 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10110 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10111 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10113 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10114 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10115 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10116 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10117 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10118 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10119 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10120 let route = find_route(
10121 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10122 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10125 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10126 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10127 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10128 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10129 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10130 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10133 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10134 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10135 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10136 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10137 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10138 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10139 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10141 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10145 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10146 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10147 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10148 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10149 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10150 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10151 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10152 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10153 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10155 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10156 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10158 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10159 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10160 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10161 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10162 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10163 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10164 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10165 let route = find_route(
10166 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10167 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10170 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10171 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10172 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10173 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10174 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10175 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10176 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10177 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10180 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10181 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10182 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10183 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10184 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10185 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10186 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10188 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10192 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10193 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10194 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10195 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10196 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10198 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10199 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10200 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10201 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10203 // Marshall an MPP route.
10204 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10205 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10206 route.paths.push(path);
10207 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10208 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10209 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10210 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10211 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10212 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10214 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10215 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10217 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10218 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10220 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10225 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10226 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10227 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10229 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10231 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10233 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10234 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10236 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10237 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10239 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10242 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10243 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10244 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10245 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10246 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10247 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10250 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10253 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10254 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10259 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10260 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10263 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10264 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10266 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10267 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10269 total_msat: 100_000,
10272 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10273 // payment verification fails as expected.
10274 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10275 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10276 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10277 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10279 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10283 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10284 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10288 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10289 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10290 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10291 // the channel is successfully closed.
10292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10297 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10298 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10299 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10300 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10301 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10303 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10304 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10306 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10307 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10308 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10309 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10312 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10314 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10315 // as it has the funding transaction.
10316 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10317 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10318 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10321 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10323 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10325 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10327 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10328 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10329 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10331 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10334 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10335 // as it has the funding transaction.
10336 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10337 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10338 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10341 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10342 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10344 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10345 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10346 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10347 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10349 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10350 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10351 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10352 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10354 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10355 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10357 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10358 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10359 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10360 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10361 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10362 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10363 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10367 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10368 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10369 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10370 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10371 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10372 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10373 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10376 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10378 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10379 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10380 // closing transaction).
10381 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10382 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10383 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10385 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10386 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10387 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10388 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10389 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10392 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10394 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10396 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10397 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10398 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10400 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10402 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10403 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10406 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10407 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10408 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10411 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10412 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10413 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10416 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10418 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10419 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10421 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10422 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10424 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10425 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10430 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10431 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10432 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10433 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10434 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10435 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10436 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10437 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10440 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10441 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10442 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10444 // Test the API functions.
10445 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10447 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10449 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10451 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10453 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10455 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10457 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10461 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10462 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10463 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10464 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10465 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10466 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10468 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10470 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10471 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10473 let mut funding_tx = None;
10474 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10475 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10476 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10479 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10480 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10481 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10482 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10483 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10485 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10487 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10489 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10491 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10493 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10495 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10498 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10499 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10500 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10501 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10502 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10504 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10505 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10507 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10508 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10509 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10510 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10511 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10512 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10513 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10516 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10517 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10518 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10519 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10520 }, true).unwrap_err();
10522 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10523 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10524 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10525 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10526 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10527 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10528 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10530 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10531 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10533 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10534 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10535 }, true).unwrap_err();
10537 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10538 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10539 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10540 }, false).unwrap();
10541 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10543 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10544 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10546 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10547 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10548 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10549 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10550 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10552 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10553 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10554 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10556 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10557 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10558 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10560 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10561 // "protected" and can connect again.
10562 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10563 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10564 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10566 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10568 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10570 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10571 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10575 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10576 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10577 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10578 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10579 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10580 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10582 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10584 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10585 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10587 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10588 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10589 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10590 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10593 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10595 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10596 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10597 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10599 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10600 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10601 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10603 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10604 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10605 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10606 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10610 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10611 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10612 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10613 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10614 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10615 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10616 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10617 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10618 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10620 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10622 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10623 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10625 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10626 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10627 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10628 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10629 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10630 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10633 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10634 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10636 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10637 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10639 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10641 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10642 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10645 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10646 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10647 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10648 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10649 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10651 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10652 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10654 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10655 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10656 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10657 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10661 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10663 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10664 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10666 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10667 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10668 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10670 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10671 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10673 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10675 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10679 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10680 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10681 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10682 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10683 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10684 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10685 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10686 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10688 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10689 payment_metadata: None,
10690 keysend_preimage: None,
10691 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10692 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10694 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10696 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10697 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10698 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10699 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10700 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10702 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10703 } else { panic!(); }
10705 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10706 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10708 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10709 payment_metadata: None,
10710 keysend_preimage: None,
10711 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10712 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10714 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10716 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10717 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10721 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10722 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10723 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10724 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10725 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10727 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10728 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10730 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10731 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10732 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10733 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10734 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10736 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10737 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10739 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10740 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10741 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10742 match &msg_events[0] {
10743 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10744 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10746 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10747 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10748 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10754 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10755 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10757 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10758 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10761 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10765 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10766 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10767 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10768 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10771 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10772 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10773 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10774 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10775 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10777 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10778 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10779 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10781 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10782 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10784 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10785 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10790 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10791 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10793 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10794 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10796 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10797 // not have generated any events.
10798 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10802 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10803 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10804 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10805 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10806 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10807 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10808 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10809 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10811 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10812 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10813 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10815 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10816 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10817 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10818 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10819 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10821 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10822 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10825 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10826 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10827 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10829 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10830 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10831 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10832 ..Default::default()
10834 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10835 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10836 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10838 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10839 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10842 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10843 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10844 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10845 ..Default::default()
10847 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10848 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10849 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10850 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10852 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10853 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10856 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10857 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10858 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
10859 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10860 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10863 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10864 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10865 ..Default::default()
10867 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10870 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10871 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10872 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10873 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10877 fn test_payment_display() {
10878 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10879 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10880 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
10881 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10882 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10883 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10889 use crate::chain::Listen;
10890 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10891 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10892 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10893 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10894 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10895 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10896 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10897 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10898 use crate::util::test_utils;
10899 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10901 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10902 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10903 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10905 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
10907 use criterion::Criterion;
10909 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10910 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10911 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10912 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10913 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10914 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10915 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10917 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10918 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
10920 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
10921 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
10923 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
10925 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10928 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10929 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10932 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10933 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10934 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10936 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10937 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10939 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10940 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10941 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10942 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10943 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10945 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10946 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10947 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10949 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10950 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10951 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10952 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10954 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10955 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10956 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10958 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10959 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10960 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10961 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10962 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10964 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10965 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10966 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10968 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10969 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10971 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10972 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10973 }, false).unwrap();
10974 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10975 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10976 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10979 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10980 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10981 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10983 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10984 } else { panic!(); }
10986 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10987 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10988 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10989 match events_b[0] {
10990 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10991 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10993 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10996 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10997 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10998 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10999 match events_a[0] {
11000 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11001 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11003 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11006 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11008 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11009 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11010 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11012 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11013 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11014 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11015 match msg_events[0] {
11016 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11017 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11018 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11022 match msg_events[1] {
11023 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11027 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11028 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11029 match events_a[0] {
11030 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11031 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11033 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11036 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11037 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11038 match events_b[0] {
11039 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11040 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11045 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11046 macro_rules! send_payment {
11047 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11048 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11049 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11050 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11051 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11052 payment_count += 1;
11053 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11054 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11056 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11057 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11058 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11059 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11060 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11061 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11062 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11063 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11064 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11065 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11066 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11068 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11069 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11070 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11071 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11073 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11074 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11075 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11076 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11077 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11079 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11082 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11083 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11084 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11085 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11087 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11091 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11092 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11093 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);