1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
61 use util::errors::APIError;
66 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use io::{Cursor, Read};
68 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
69 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
70 use core::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
104 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
110 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
111 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
112 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
113 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
114 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
119 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
120 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
123 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
126 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
127 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
130 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
132 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
134 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
135 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
136 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
138 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
140 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
144 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
149 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
150 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
151 short_channel_id: u64,
153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
155 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
156 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
161 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
162 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
163 /// are part of the same payment.
164 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
165 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
166 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
169 struct ClaimableHTLC {
170 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
173 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
176 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
177 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
178 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
179 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
182 session_priv: SecretKey,
183 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
184 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
185 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
190 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
191 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
193 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
194 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
199 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
200 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
202 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
210 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
211 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
213 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
218 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
220 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
221 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
222 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
223 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
224 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
226 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
227 err: msgs::LightningError,
228 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
230 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
232 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
234 err: LightningError {
236 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
237 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
243 shutdown_finish: None,
247 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
249 err: LightningError {
251 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
253 shutdown_finish: None,
257 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
258 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
261 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
263 err: LightningError {
265 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
266 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
272 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
276 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
279 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
281 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
283 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
287 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
289 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
290 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
296 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
298 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
299 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
306 shutdown_finish: None,
311 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
312 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
313 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
314 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
315 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
317 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
318 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
319 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
320 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
321 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
322 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
323 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
325 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
329 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
330 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
331 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
332 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
333 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
334 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
335 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
336 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
337 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
338 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
339 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
340 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
342 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
343 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
344 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
345 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
348 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
349 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
350 /// quite some time lag.
351 enum BackgroundEvent {
352 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
353 /// commitment transaction.
354 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
357 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
358 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
360 latest_features: InitFeatures,
363 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
364 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
366 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
368 struct PendingInboundPayment {
369 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
370 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
371 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
372 /// this payment being removed.
374 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
375 user_payment_id: u64,
376 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
377 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
378 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
381 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
382 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
383 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
384 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
385 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
386 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
387 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
388 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
390 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
391 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
392 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
393 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
394 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
395 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
396 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
397 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
398 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
400 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
401 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
403 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
404 /// to individual Channels.
406 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
407 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
408 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
409 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
411 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
412 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
413 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
414 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
415 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
416 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
417 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
419 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
420 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
421 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
422 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
425 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
426 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
427 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
428 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
429 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
431 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
432 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
433 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
434 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
435 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
436 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
437 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
438 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
439 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
440 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
443 default_configuration: UserConfig,
444 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
450 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
452 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
453 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
455 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
456 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
457 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
458 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
460 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
461 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
462 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
463 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
464 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
465 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
467 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
468 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
469 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
470 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
471 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
472 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
473 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
474 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
476 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
477 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
479 our_network_key: SecretKey,
480 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
482 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
483 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
484 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
486 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
487 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
488 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
489 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
491 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
492 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
493 /// are currently open with that peer.
494 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
495 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
498 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
499 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
501 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
502 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
503 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
504 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
505 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
506 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
507 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
508 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
509 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
511 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
518 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
520 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
521 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
522 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
523 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
524 pub struct ChainParameters {
525 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
526 pub network: Network,
528 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
530 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
531 pub best_block: BestBlock,
534 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
540 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
541 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
542 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
543 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
544 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
545 /// updates are ready for persistence).
547 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
548 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
549 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
550 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
551 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
553 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
554 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
557 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
558 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
559 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
562 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
563 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
565 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
566 persistence_notifier: notifier,
567 should_persist: persist_check,
568 _read_guard: read_guard,
573 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
575 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
576 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
581 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
582 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
584 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
586 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
587 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
588 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
589 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
590 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
592 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
593 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
595 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
597 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
598 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
599 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
600 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
601 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
602 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
603 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
605 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
606 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
608 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
609 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
610 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
611 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
613 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
614 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
615 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
616 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
617 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
618 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
621 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
623 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
624 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
627 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
629 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
630 /// to better separate parameters.
631 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
632 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
633 /// The node_id of our counterparty
634 pub node_id: PublicKey,
635 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
636 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
637 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
638 pub features: InitFeatures,
639 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
640 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
641 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
643 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
645 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
646 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
647 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
648 /// payments to us through this channel.
649 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
652 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
653 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
654 pub struct ChannelDetails {
655 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
656 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
657 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
658 /// lifetime of the channel.
659 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
660 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
661 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
662 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
663 /// our counterparty already.
665 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
666 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
667 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
668 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
669 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
670 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
671 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
672 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
673 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
674 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
675 /// this value on chain.
677 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
679 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
681 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
682 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
683 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
685 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
686 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
687 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
688 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
690 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
691 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
692 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
693 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
694 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
695 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
696 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
697 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
698 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
700 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
701 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
702 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
703 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
704 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
705 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
706 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
707 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
708 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
710 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
712 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
713 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
714 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
715 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
716 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
717 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
718 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
719 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
720 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
722 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
723 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
724 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
725 pub is_outbound: bool,
726 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
727 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
728 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
729 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
730 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
732 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
733 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
734 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
735 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
737 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
739 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
743 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
744 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
746 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
747 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
748 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
749 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
750 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
751 ParameterError(APIError),
752 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
753 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
754 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
757 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
759 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
760 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
761 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
762 /// paths than the ones selected).
763 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
764 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
765 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
766 /// in over-/re-payment.
768 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
769 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
770 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
772 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
773 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
774 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
775 /// with the latest update_id.
776 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
779 macro_rules! handle_error {
780 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
783 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
784 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
786 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
787 // entering the macro.
788 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
791 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
793 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
794 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
795 if let Some(update) = update_option {
796 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
802 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
803 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
805 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
806 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
807 action: err.action.clone()
811 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
812 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
815 // Return error in case higher-API need one
822 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
823 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
824 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
826 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
827 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
829 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
831 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
832 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
834 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
835 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
836 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
837 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
839 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
840 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
842 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
843 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
844 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
845 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
847 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
848 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
854 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
855 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
859 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
861 $entry.remove_entry();
869 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
870 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
874 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
876 $entry.remove_entry();
884 macro_rules! remove_channel {
885 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
887 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
888 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
889 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
896 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
897 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
898 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
900 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
902 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
903 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
904 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
905 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
907 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
908 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
909 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
910 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
911 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
912 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
913 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
914 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
915 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
916 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
917 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
920 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
921 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
922 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
923 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
925 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
926 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
928 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
929 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
931 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
932 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
933 if !$resend_commitment {
934 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
937 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
939 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
940 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
944 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
945 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
947 $entry.remove_entry();
953 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
954 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
955 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
957 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
958 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
962 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
963 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
964 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
965 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
966 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
969 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
974 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
975 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
976 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
977 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
978 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
979 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
981 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
982 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
984 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
985 if !forwards.is_empty() {
986 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
987 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
990 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
991 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
992 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
993 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
994 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
995 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
996 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
997 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
998 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
999 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1000 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1001 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1004 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1005 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1006 // before it should be allowed to.
1007 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1008 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1009 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1012 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1013 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1014 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1015 msg: announcement_sigs,
1018 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1021 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1022 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1023 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1024 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1025 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1026 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1027 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1028 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1029 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1030 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1031 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1032 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1033 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1034 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1035 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1036 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1037 let mut order = $order;
1039 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1041 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1045 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1046 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1047 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1048 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1053 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1054 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1055 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1056 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1057 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1062 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1066 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1071 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1072 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1073 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1078 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1079 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1080 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1081 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1082 assert!(res.is_ok());
1085 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1089 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1090 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1091 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1093 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1095 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1096 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1101 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1102 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1103 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1104 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1105 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1108 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1110 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1111 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1113 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1115 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1117 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1118 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1119 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1120 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1121 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1122 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1125 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1126 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1127 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1131 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1133 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1134 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1135 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1136 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1137 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1138 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1140 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1141 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1143 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1144 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1147 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1148 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1150 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1152 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1153 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1154 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1155 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1163 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1164 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1165 &self.default_configuration
1168 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1170 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1171 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1172 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1173 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1174 /// otherwise ignored.
1176 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1177 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1179 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1180 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1182 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1183 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1184 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1185 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1186 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1187 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1191 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1192 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1193 Some(peer_state) => {
1194 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1195 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1196 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1197 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
1199 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1202 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1205 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1206 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1208 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1209 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1210 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1211 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1212 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1214 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1217 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1219 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1220 node_id: their_network_key,
1226 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1227 let mut res = Vec::new();
1229 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1230 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1231 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1232 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1233 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1234 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1235 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1236 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1237 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1238 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1239 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1240 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1241 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1243 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1244 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1245 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1246 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1247 inbound_capacity_msat,
1248 outbound_capacity_msat,
1249 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1250 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1251 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1252 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1253 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1254 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1255 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1259 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1260 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1261 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1262 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1268 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1269 /// more information.
1270 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1271 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1274 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1275 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1277 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1278 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1280 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1281 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1282 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1283 // really wanted anyway.
1284 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1287 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1288 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1290 let counterparty_node_id;
1291 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1292 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1293 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1294 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1295 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1296 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1297 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1298 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1299 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1300 Some(peer_state) => {
1301 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1302 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1303 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1305 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1307 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1309 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1310 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1311 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1312 let (result, is_permanent) =
1313 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1315 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1321 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1322 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1326 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1327 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1328 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1329 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1336 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1340 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1341 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1344 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1348 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1349 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1350 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1352 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1353 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1355 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1356 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1357 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1358 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1360 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1362 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1363 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1364 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1365 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1366 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1369 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1370 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1371 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1373 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1374 /// the channel being closed or not:
1375 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1376 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1377 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1378 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1379 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1380 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1381 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1383 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1385 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1386 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1387 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1388 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1389 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1393 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1394 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1395 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1396 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1397 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1399 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1400 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1401 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1402 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1403 // ignore the result here.
1404 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1408 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1410 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1411 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1412 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1413 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1414 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1415 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1418 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1419 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1421 chan.remove_entry().1
1423 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1426 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1427 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1428 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1429 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1430 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1435 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1438 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1439 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1440 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1441 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1442 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1443 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1444 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1445 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1446 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1447 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1448 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1458 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1459 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1460 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1461 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1462 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1466 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1467 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1468 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1470 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1471 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1472 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1473 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1474 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1475 failure_code: $err_code,
1476 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1481 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1482 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1485 let shared_secret = {
1486 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1487 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1490 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1492 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1493 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1494 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1495 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1496 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1497 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1498 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1499 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1502 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1503 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1504 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1505 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1506 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1509 let mut channel_state = None;
1510 macro_rules! return_err {
1511 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1513 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1514 if channel_state.is_none() {
1515 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1517 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1518 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1519 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1520 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1521 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1526 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1527 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1528 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1529 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1531 let error_code = match err {
1532 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1533 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1534 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1535 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1536 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1538 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1541 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1542 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1543 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1550 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1553 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1554 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1555 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1556 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1557 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1558 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1559 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1560 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1561 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1562 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1563 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1564 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1568 // final_expiry_too_soon
1569 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1570 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1571 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1572 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1573 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1574 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1575 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1577 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1578 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1579 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1581 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1582 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1583 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1586 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1587 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1588 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1589 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1590 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1591 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1592 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1593 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1595 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1597 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1598 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1599 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1600 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1601 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1602 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1603 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1604 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1605 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1608 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1610 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1613 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1618 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1619 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1620 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1621 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1623 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1625 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1626 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1627 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1628 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1631 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1632 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1633 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1635 // Check two things:
1636 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1637 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1638 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1640 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1642 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1643 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1644 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1646 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1648 let blinding_factor = {
1649 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1650 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1651 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1652 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1655 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1657 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1659 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1662 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1663 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1666 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1667 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1668 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1669 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1670 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1674 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1675 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1676 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1679 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1680 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1681 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1682 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1686 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1687 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1688 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1689 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1690 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1691 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1692 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1693 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1694 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1695 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1696 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1698 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1701 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1703 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1704 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1705 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1706 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1707 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1710 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1711 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1712 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1713 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1714 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1715 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1716 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1718 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1719 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1721 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1722 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1723 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1724 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1725 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1727 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1728 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1730 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1731 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1732 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1733 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1734 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1736 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1737 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1739 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1740 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1741 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1742 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1748 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1749 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1750 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1751 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1753 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1754 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1756 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1757 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1758 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1760 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1762 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1767 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1770 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1771 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1772 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1774 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1775 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1776 if !chan.should_announce() {
1777 return Err(LightningError {
1778 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1779 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1782 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1783 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1786 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1787 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1788 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1789 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1790 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1791 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1792 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1793 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1794 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1798 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1800 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1801 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1803 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1804 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1805 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1806 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1807 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1808 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1809 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1810 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1813 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1814 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1816 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1822 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1823 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1824 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1825 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1826 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1827 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1829 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1830 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1831 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1832 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1833 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1835 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1837 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1838 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1840 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1841 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1842 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1843 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1844 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1847 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1848 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1850 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1851 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1853 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1854 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1856 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1858 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1859 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1860 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1862 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1863 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1864 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1865 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1866 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1867 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1868 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1869 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1870 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1873 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1874 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1875 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1876 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1877 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1878 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1879 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1880 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1888 } else { unreachable!(); }
1892 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1893 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1895 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1900 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1902 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1903 /// fields for more info.
1905 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1906 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1907 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1908 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1909 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1910 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1912 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1914 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1915 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1916 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1918 /// In general, a path may raise:
1919 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1920 /// node public key) is specified.
1921 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1922 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1924 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1925 /// relevant updates.
1927 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1928 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1929 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1931 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1932 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1933 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1934 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1936 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1937 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1938 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1939 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1940 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1943 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1944 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1945 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1947 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1948 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1949 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1950 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1951 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1953 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
1954 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
1956 let mut total_value = 0;
1957 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1958 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1959 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1960 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1961 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1962 continue 'path_check;
1964 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1965 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1966 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1967 continue 'path_check;
1970 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1971 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1973 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1974 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1977 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1978 let mut results = Vec::new();
1979 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1980 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, &keysend_preimage));
1982 let mut has_ok = false;
1983 let mut has_err = false;
1984 for res in results.iter() {
1985 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1986 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1987 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1988 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1995 if has_err && has_ok {
1996 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1998 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2004 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2005 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2006 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2007 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2008 /// never reach the recipient.
2010 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2012 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2013 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2015 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2017 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2018 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2019 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2021 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2023 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2024 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
2025 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2030 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2031 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2032 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2033 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2035 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2037 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2039 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2040 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2041 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2042 } else { unreachable!(); })
2045 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2047 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2048 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2051 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2052 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2057 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2058 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2059 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2062 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2063 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2064 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2066 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2074 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2075 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2076 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2080 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2082 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2083 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2085 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2087 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2088 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2089 /// keys per-channel).
2091 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2092 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2093 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2095 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2096 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2097 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2099 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2100 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2101 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2103 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2104 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2105 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2106 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2110 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2111 let mut output_index = None;
2112 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2113 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2114 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2115 if output_index.is_some() {
2116 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2117 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2120 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2121 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2122 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2125 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2128 if output_index.is_none() {
2129 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2130 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2133 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2137 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2138 if !chan.should_announce() {
2139 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2143 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2145 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2147 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2148 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2150 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2151 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2152 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2153 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2154 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2159 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2160 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2161 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2163 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2166 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2167 // smaller than 500:
2168 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2170 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2171 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2172 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2173 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2174 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2175 /// our network addresses.
2177 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2178 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2180 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2181 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2182 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2183 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2185 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2187 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2188 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2189 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2191 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2192 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2195 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2196 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2197 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2199 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2200 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2201 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2202 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2203 rgb, alias, addresses,
2204 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2205 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2207 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2208 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2210 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2211 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2213 let mut announced_chans = false;
2214 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2215 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2216 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2218 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2223 announced_chans = true;
2225 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2226 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2227 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2231 if announced_chans {
2232 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2233 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2234 signature: node_announce_sig,
2235 contents: announcement
2241 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2243 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2244 /// Will likely generate further events.
2245 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2246 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2248 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2249 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2250 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2252 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2253 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2255 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2256 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2257 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2258 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2260 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2261 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2262 match forward_info {
2263 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2264 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2265 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2266 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2267 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2268 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2269 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2271 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2272 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2275 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2276 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2277 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2278 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2279 // problem, not ours.
2286 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2287 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2288 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2289 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2290 match forward_info {
2291 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2292 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2294 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2295 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2296 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2297 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2298 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2299 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2300 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2301 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2303 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2305 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2306 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2308 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2310 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2311 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2312 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2318 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2320 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2321 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2322 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2323 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2324 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2325 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2326 // this channel currently :/.
2332 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2333 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2335 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2336 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2337 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2339 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2340 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2342 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2344 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2345 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2346 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2349 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2351 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2352 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2353 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2354 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2355 // messages when we can.
2356 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2357 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2358 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2365 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2366 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2369 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2370 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2371 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2372 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2373 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2374 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2376 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2377 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2378 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2379 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2380 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2382 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2384 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2386 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2390 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2391 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2394 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2395 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2396 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2397 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2398 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2399 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2400 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2401 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2402 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2404 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2412 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2413 match forward_info {
2414 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2415 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2416 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2417 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2418 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2419 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2420 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2421 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2423 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2426 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2427 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2428 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2429 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2430 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2431 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2433 value: amt_to_forward,
2438 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2440 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2441 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2442 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2444 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2445 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2446 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2447 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2448 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2450 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2455 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2456 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2457 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2458 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2459 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2460 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2461 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2462 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2463 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2464 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2465 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2467 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2469 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2470 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2471 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2472 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2473 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2475 amt: amt_to_forward,
2476 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2480 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2481 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2487 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2489 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2492 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2493 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2496 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2497 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2498 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2499 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2500 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2501 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2502 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2504 let mut total_value = 0;
2505 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2506 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2507 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2508 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2509 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2510 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2514 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2515 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2516 total_value += htlc.value;
2517 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2518 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2519 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2520 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2521 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2522 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2524 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2526 _ => unreachable!(),
2529 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2530 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2531 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2532 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2535 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2536 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2538 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2539 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2540 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2541 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2545 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2546 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2548 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2550 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2551 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2558 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2559 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2567 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2568 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2571 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2572 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2575 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2576 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2577 events.append(&mut new_events);
2580 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2582 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2583 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2585 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2586 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2587 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2588 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2589 if background_events.is_empty() {
2593 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2595 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2596 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2597 // monitor updating completing.
2598 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2605 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2606 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2607 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2608 self.process_background_events();
2611 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2612 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2613 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2614 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2615 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2616 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2617 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2619 if !chan.is_live() {
2620 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2621 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2622 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2624 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2625 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2627 let mut retain_channel = true;
2628 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2631 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2632 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2636 let ret_err = match res {
2637 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2638 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2639 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2640 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2643 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2644 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2645 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2646 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2647 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2648 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2649 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2650 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2660 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2664 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2665 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2666 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2667 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2668 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2669 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2670 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2672 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2674 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2676 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2677 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2678 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2679 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2680 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2681 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2682 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2684 handle_errors.push(err);
2694 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2696 /// This currently includes:
2697 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2698 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2699 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2702 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2703 /// estimate fetches.
2704 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2705 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2706 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2707 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2709 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2711 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2713 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2714 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2715 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2716 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2717 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2718 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
2719 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2720 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2722 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
2724 if !retain_channel { return false; }
2726 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
2727 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2728 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
2729 if needs_close { return false; }
2732 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2733 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2734 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2735 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2736 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2737 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2738 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2739 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2743 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2744 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2746 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2747 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2748 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2752 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2753 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2762 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2763 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2769 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2770 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2771 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2772 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2773 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2774 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2775 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2777 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2778 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2779 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2780 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2781 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2782 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2783 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2784 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2785 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2786 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2787 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2793 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2794 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2795 // be surfaced to the user.
2796 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2797 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2799 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2800 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2801 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2802 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2803 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2804 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2806 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2809 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2811 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2812 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2813 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2815 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2817 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2818 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2819 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2821 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2822 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2824 rejected_by_dest: false,
2832 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2839 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2840 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2841 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2842 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2843 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2844 /// still-available channels.
2845 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2846 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2847 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2848 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2851 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2852 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2853 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2855 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2857 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2858 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2859 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2861 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2864 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2865 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2866 match &onion_error {
2867 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2869 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2871 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2872 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2873 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2874 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2875 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2876 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2877 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2882 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2883 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2884 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2885 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2887 error_code: onion_error_code,
2889 error_data: onion_error_data
2893 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2899 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2900 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2901 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2902 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2904 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2905 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2906 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2907 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2908 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2909 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2911 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2913 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2919 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2920 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2921 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2922 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2923 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2924 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2926 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2927 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2928 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2932 let mut forward_event = None;
2933 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2934 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2936 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2937 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2938 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2940 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2941 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2944 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2945 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2946 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2947 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2948 time_forwardable: time
2955 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2956 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2957 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2959 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2960 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2961 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2962 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2964 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2966 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2967 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2968 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2969 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2973 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2974 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2975 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2976 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2978 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2979 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2980 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2981 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2983 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2984 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2985 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2986 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2987 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2989 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2990 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2991 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2997 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2998 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2999 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3001 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3002 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3003 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3004 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3005 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3006 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3007 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3009 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3010 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3011 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3012 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3013 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3014 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3015 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3016 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3018 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3019 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3020 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3021 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3022 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3023 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3025 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3030 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3031 // which were generated.
3032 channel_state.take();
3034 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3035 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3036 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3043 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3044 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3045 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3046 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3047 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3049 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3053 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3054 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3055 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3056 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3057 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3058 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3059 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3060 payment_preimage, e);
3061 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3062 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3063 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3064 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3067 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3068 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3069 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3070 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3071 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3072 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3073 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3074 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3075 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3076 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3082 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3084 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3087 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3088 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3089 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3090 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3091 payment_preimage, e);
3093 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3094 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3096 chan.remove_entry();
3098 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3101 } else { unreachable!(); }
3104 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3106 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
3107 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3109 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3110 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3111 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
3113 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3114 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
3118 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3121 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3122 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3123 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3124 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3125 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3126 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3127 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3130 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3131 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3132 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3133 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3134 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3137 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3138 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3139 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3140 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3141 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3142 payment_preimage, e);
3144 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3145 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3146 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3147 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3150 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3151 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3152 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3153 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3157 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3158 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3159 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3162 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3163 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3165 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3173 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3174 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3175 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3178 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
3179 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
3182 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
3183 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
3185 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
3186 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
3187 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
3188 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
3190 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
3191 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
3192 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
3193 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
3194 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
3195 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
3196 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
3197 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
3198 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3199 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3201 let chan_restoration_res;
3202 let mut pending_failures = {
3203 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3204 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3205 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3206 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3207 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3209 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3213 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3214 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3215 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3216 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3217 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3218 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3219 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3220 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3221 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3224 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3225 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3226 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3230 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3231 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3232 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3236 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3237 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3238 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3241 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3242 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3243 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3244 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3245 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3247 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3248 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3249 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3250 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3252 entry.insert(channel);
3258 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3259 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3260 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3261 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3262 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3263 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3264 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3265 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3267 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3268 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3270 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3273 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3274 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3275 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3276 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3278 user_channel_id: user_id,
3283 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3284 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3285 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3286 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3287 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3288 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3289 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3290 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3291 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3293 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3298 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3299 // lock before watch_channel
3300 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3302 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3303 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3304 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3305 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3306 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3307 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3308 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3309 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3310 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3311 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3312 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3314 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3315 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3316 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3317 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3318 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3319 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3323 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3324 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3325 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3326 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3327 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3330 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3331 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3340 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3342 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3343 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3344 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3345 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3346 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3347 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3348 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3350 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3351 Ok(update) => update,
3352 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3354 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3355 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3356 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3357 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3358 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3359 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3360 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3361 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3371 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3372 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3376 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3377 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3378 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3379 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3381 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3382 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3384 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3385 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3387 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3388 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3389 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3390 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3391 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3392 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3393 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3394 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3395 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3396 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3397 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3398 msg: announcement_sigs,
3400 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3401 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3402 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3403 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3408 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3412 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3413 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3414 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3415 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3416 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3418 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3420 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3421 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3424 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3425 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3426 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3427 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3430 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3431 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3433 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3434 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3435 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3436 let (result, is_permanent) =
3437 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3439 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3445 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3446 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3447 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3457 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3458 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3461 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3465 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3466 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3467 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3468 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3469 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3471 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3472 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3474 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3475 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3476 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3477 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3482 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3483 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3484 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3485 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3486 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3487 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3488 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3490 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3491 } else { (tx, None) }
3493 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3496 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3497 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3498 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3500 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3501 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3502 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3503 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3511 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3512 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3513 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3514 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3516 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3517 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3518 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3519 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3521 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3522 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3524 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3525 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3526 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3527 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3530 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3531 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3532 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3533 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3534 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3535 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3536 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3537 match pending_forward_info {
3538 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3539 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3540 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3541 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3542 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3543 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3544 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3548 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3549 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3550 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3551 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3552 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3553 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3554 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3555 // no problem just calling this
3556 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3557 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3559 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3560 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3561 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3564 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3566 _ => pending_forward_info
3569 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3571 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3576 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3577 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3578 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3579 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3580 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3582 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3583 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3585 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3587 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3590 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3594 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3595 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3596 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3597 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3599 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3600 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3602 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3604 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3609 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3610 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3611 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3612 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3613 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3614 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3615 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3617 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3618 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3619 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3621 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3624 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3628 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3629 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3630 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3631 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3632 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3633 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3634 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3636 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3637 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3638 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3639 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3640 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3641 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3642 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3647 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3648 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3650 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3651 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3652 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3654 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3655 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3656 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3657 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3658 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3659 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3660 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3661 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3663 commitment_signed: msg,
3669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3674 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3675 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3676 let mut forward_event = None;
3677 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3678 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3679 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3680 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3682 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3683 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3684 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3685 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3686 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3688 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3689 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3690 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3693 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3694 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3699 match forward_event {
3701 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3702 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3703 time_forwardable: time
3711 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3712 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3714 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3715 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3716 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3718 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3719 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3721 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3722 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3723 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3724 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3725 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3726 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3727 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3728 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3730 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3732 } else { unreachable!(); }
3735 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3736 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3737 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3741 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3743 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3746 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3748 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3749 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3750 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3752 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3759 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3760 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3761 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3762 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3763 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3764 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3765 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3767 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3769 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3774 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3775 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3776 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3778 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3779 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3780 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3781 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3783 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3784 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3787 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3788 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3789 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3790 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3791 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3794 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3799 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3800 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3801 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3802 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3803 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3804 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3806 // It's not a local channel
3807 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3810 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3811 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3812 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3813 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3814 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3815 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3816 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3817 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3819 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3821 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3822 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3823 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3824 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3826 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3829 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3831 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3834 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3835 let chan_restoration_res;
3836 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3837 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3838 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3840 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3841 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3842 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3843 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3845 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3846 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3847 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3848 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3849 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3850 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3851 let mut channel_update = None;
3852 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3853 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3854 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3857 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3858 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3859 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3860 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3861 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3862 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3863 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3866 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3867 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3868 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3869 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3871 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3873 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3876 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3877 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3879 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3880 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3885 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3886 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3887 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3888 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3889 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3890 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
3891 match monitor_event {
3892 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3893 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3894 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3895 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
3897 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3898 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3901 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3902 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3903 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3904 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3905 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3906 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3907 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3908 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3909 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3911 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3912 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3913 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3917 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3918 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3919 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3920 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3928 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3929 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3932 has_pending_monitor_events
3935 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3936 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3937 /// update was applied.
3939 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3940 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3941 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3942 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3943 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3944 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3945 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3946 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3948 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3949 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3950 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3951 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3952 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3954 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3955 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3956 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3957 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3958 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3960 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3961 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3962 has_monitor_update = true;
3963 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3964 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3965 if close_channel { return false; }
3967 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3968 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3969 updates: commitment_update,
3976 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3977 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3984 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
3985 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3986 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3989 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3990 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3996 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
3997 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
3998 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
3999 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4000 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4001 let mut has_update = false;
4003 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4005 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4006 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4007 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4009 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4010 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4011 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4012 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4014 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4015 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4018 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4019 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4020 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4021 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4022 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4025 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4026 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4031 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4032 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4038 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4039 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4046 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4047 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4053 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4054 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4056 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4057 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4058 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4059 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4060 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4061 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4062 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4063 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4064 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4065 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4066 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4067 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4068 assert!(should_broadcast);
4069 } else { unreachable!(); }
4070 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4072 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4076 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4077 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4079 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4081 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4082 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4083 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4085 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4086 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4087 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4088 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4089 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4090 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4091 // never fail a payment too early.
4092 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4094 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4097 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4102 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4105 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4106 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4108 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4109 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4110 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4112 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4114 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4115 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4116 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4117 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4118 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4119 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4120 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4123 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4124 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4127 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4128 /// stored external to LDK.
4130 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4131 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4132 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4134 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4135 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4137 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4138 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4139 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4140 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4141 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4143 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4144 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4145 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4146 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4148 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4149 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4150 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4151 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4152 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4154 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4155 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4156 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4157 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4158 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4160 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4161 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4162 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4164 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4166 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4167 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4169 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4170 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4171 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4172 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4173 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4176 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4177 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4178 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4179 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
4180 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4185 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4186 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4187 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4188 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4189 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4192 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4193 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4194 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4195 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4197 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4198 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4199 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4200 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4203 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4204 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4206 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4207 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4210 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4211 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4212 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4214 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4215 events.replace(pending_events);
4224 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4226 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4227 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4228 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4229 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4232 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4234 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4235 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4237 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4238 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4239 /// restarting from an old state.
4240 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4241 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4242 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4244 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4245 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4246 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4247 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4250 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4251 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4252 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4255 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4256 handler.handle_event(event);
4264 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4266 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4267 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4268 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4269 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4272 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4274 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4275 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4276 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4277 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4278 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4281 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4282 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4283 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4286 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4287 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4288 let new_height = height - 1;
4290 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4291 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4292 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4293 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4294 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4295 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4298 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4302 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4304 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4305 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4306 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4307 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4310 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4311 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4312 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4313 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4315 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4316 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4318 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4319 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4322 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4323 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4324 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4325 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4327 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4328 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4330 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4332 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4334 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4336 macro_rules! max_time {
4337 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4339 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4340 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4341 // having an explicit local time source.
4342 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4343 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4344 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4345 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4346 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4352 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4353 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4354 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4355 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4356 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4360 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4361 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4362 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4363 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4364 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4365 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4371 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4372 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4373 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4374 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4375 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4376 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4377 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4378 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4383 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4385 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4386 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4387 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4388 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4391 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4392 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4394 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4395 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4396 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4397 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4398 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4400 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4401 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4403 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4404 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4405 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4406 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4407 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4408 let res = f(channel);
4409 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4410 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4411 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4412 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4413 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4417 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4418 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4419 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4420 msg: funding_locked,
4422 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4423 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4424 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4425 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4426 msg: announcement_sigs,
4428 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4429 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4430 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4431 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4432 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4435 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4437 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4439 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4440 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4441 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4443 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4444 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4445 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4446 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4447 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4451 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4452 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4453 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4460 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4461 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4462 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4463 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4464 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4465 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4466 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4467 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4468 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4469 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4470 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4471 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4472 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4477 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4482 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4484 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4485 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4489 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4490 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4491 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4493 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4494 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4495 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4496 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4499 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4500 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4502 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4503 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4506 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4507 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4508 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4509 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4510 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4514 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4515 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4516 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4517 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4521 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4522 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4523 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4524 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4525 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4526 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4529 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4530 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4531 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4534 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4535 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4536 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4539 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4541 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4544 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4545 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4546 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4549 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4550 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4551 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4554 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4556 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4559 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4560 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4561 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4564 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4565 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4566 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4569 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4571 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4574 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4576 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4579 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4580 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4581 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4584 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4585 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4586 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4589 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4590 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4591 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4594 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4596 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4599 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4601 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4604 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4605 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4606 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4609 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4614 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4615 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4616 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4619 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4620 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4621 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4622 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4624 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4625 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4626 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4627 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4628 if no_connection_possible {
4629 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4630 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4631 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4632 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4633 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4635 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4636 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4637 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4647 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4648 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4649 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4650 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4651 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4652 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4653 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4657 no_channels_remain = false;
4663 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4665 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4666 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4667 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4668 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4669 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4670 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4671 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4672 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4673 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4674 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4675 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4676 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4677 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4678 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4679 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4680 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4681 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4682 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4683 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4684 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4688 if no_channels_remain {
4689 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4692 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4693 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4697 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4698 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4700 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4703 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4704 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4706 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4707 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4710 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4711 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4716 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4717 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4718 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4719 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4720 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4721 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4722 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4723 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4724 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4728 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4729 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4730 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4736 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4739 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4742 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4743 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4744 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4745 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4746 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4750 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4751 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4756 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4757 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4758 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4759 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4760 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4761 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4764 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4767 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4773 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4774 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4779 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4780 let result = *guard;
4788 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4789 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4790 let current_time = Instant::now();
4792 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4793 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4798 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4799 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4800 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4801 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4802 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4804 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4805 let result = *guard;
4806 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4810 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4811 None => return result,
4817 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4819 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4820 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4821 *persistence_lock = true;
4822 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4827 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4828 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4830 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4832 (0, onion_packet, required),
4833 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4836 (0, payment_data, required),
4837 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4839 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4840 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4841 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4845 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4846 (0, routing, required),
4847 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4848 (4, payment_hash, required),
4849 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4850 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4857 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4862 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4863 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4864 (2, outpoint, required),
4865 (4, htlc_id, required),
4866 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4869 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4870 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4871 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4872 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4875 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4876 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4877 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4882 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4883 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4884 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4890 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4891 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4892 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4894 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4895 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4896 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4900 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4901 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4902 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4904 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4906 if payment_data.is_some() {
4907 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4909 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4912 if payment_data.is_none() {
4913 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4915 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4919 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4927 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4928 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4929 (0, session_priv, required),
4930 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4931 (4, path, vec_type),
4933 (1, PreviousHopData)
4936 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4937 (0, LightningError) => {
4941 (0, failure_code, required),
4942 (2, data, vec_type),
4946 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4948 (0, forward_info, required),
4949 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4950 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4951 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4954 (0, htlc_id, required),
4955 (2, err_packet, required),
4959 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4960 (0, payment_secret, required),
4961 (2, expiry_time, required),
4962 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4963 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4964 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4967 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4968 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4969 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4970 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4971 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4974 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4975 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4977 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4979 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4981 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4982 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4983 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4986 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4987 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4988 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4989 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4990 unfunded_channels += 1;
4993 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4994 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4995 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4996 channel.write(writer)?;
5000 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5001 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5002 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5003 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5004 for forward in pending_forwards {
5005 forward.write(writer)?;
5009 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5010 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5011 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5012 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5013 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5014 htlc.write(writer)?;
5018 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5019 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5020 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5021 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5022 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5023 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5026 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5027 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5028 for event in events.iter() {
5029 event.write(writer)?;
5032 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5033 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5034 for event in background_events.iter() {
5036 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5038 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5039 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5044 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5045 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5047 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5048 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5049 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5050 hash.write(writer)?;
5051 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5054 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5055 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5056 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5057 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5060 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
5066 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5068 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5070 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
5071 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
5072 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
5073 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
5074 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5075 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
5076 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
5077 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
5078 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
5079 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
5080 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
5082 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
5083 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
5085 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5086 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5087 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5088 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5089 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5090 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5091 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5092 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5093 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5094 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5095 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5098 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5099 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5101 pub keys_manager: K,
5103 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5105 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5106 pub fee_estimator: F,
5107 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5109 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5110 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5111 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5112 pub chain_monitor: M,
5114 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5115 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5116 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5117 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5118 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5119 /// deserialization.
5121 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5122 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5123 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5125 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5126 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5128 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5129 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5130 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5131 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5133 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5136 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5137 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5140 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5141 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5142 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5143 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5144 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5145 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5148 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5149 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5150 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5151 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5152 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5154 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5155 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5160 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5161 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5162 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5163 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5164 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5165 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5166 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5167 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5170 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5171 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5172 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5176 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5177 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5178 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5179 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5180 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5181 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5184 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5185 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5187 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5188 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5189 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5191 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5193 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5194 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5195 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5196 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5197 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5198 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5199 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5200 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5201 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5202 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5203 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5204 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5205 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5206 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5207 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5208 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5209 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5210 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5211 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5212 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5213 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5214 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5215 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5216 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5217 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5218 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5219 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5220 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5221 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5222 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5223 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5224 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5225 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5226 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5228 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5229 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5231 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5234 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5235 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5236 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5237 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5238 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5239 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5243 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5244 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5245 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5249 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5250 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5251 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5252 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5253 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5254 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5255 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5256 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5257 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5259 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5262 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5263 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5264 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5265 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5266 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5267 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5268 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5269 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5271 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5274 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5275 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5276 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5277 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5278 let peer_state = PeerState {
5279 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5281 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5284 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5285 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5286 for _ in 0..event_count {
5287 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5288 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5293 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5294 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5295 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5296 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5297 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5298 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5302 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5303 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5305 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5306 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5307 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5308 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5309 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5313 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5314 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5315 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
5316 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
5317 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5321 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
5323 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5324 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5326 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5328 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5329 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5330 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5332 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5334 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5339 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5341 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5342 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
5344 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5345 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5348 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5349 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5351 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5353 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5354 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5355 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5356 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5358 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5359 logger: args.logger,
5360 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5363 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5364 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5367 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5368 //connection or two.
5370 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5376 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5377 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5378 use core::time::Duration;
5379 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5380 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
5381 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5382 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5384 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5385 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5386 use util::errors::APIError;
5387 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5388 use util::test_utils;
5390 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5392 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5393 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5395 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5398 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5399 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5401 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5402 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5403 thread::spawn(move || {
5405 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5406 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5407 *persistence_lock = true;
5410 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5416 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5417 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5419 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5422 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5427 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5429 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5432 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5439 fn test_notify_limits() {
5440 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5441 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5442 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5443 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5444 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5445 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5447 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5448 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5449 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5450 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5451 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5453 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5455 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5456 // to connect messages with new values
5457 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5458 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5459 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5460 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5462 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5463 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5464 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5465 // ... but the last node should not.
5466 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5467 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5468 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5469 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5471 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5472 // about the channel.
5473 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5474 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5475 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5477 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5479 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5480 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5481 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5482 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5483 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5484 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5486 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5487 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5488 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5490 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5491 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5492 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5493 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5494 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5495 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5497 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5498 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5499 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5500 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5501 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5502 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5503 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5504 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5506 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5507 // the channel info has updated.
5508 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5509 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5510 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5511 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5512 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5513 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5517 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5518 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5520 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5521 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5522 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5523 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5524 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5525 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5527 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5528 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5529 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5530 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5531 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5532 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5533 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5534 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5536 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5537 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5538 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5540 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5541 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5543 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5544 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5545 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5546 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5547 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5549 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5550 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5551 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5553 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5554 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5555 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5556 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5557 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5558 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5559 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5560 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5561 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5563 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5564 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5566 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5567 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5568 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5570 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5571 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5572 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5573 // lightning messages manually.
5574 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5576 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5577 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5578 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5580 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5581 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5583 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5584 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5586 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5587 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5588 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5590 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5591 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5592 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5594 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5596 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5598 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5599 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5602 // There's an existing bug that generates a PaymentSent event for each MPP path, so handle that here.
5603 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5605 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5606 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5608 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5611 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5612 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5614 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5619 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5620 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5621 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5622 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5623 // fails as expected.
5624 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5627 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5628 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5629 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5631 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5632 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5633 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5635 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5636 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5637 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5639 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5640 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5641 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5642 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5643 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5645 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5646 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5647 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5649 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5650 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5651 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5652 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5653 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5654 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5655 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5656 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5657 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5659 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5660 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5662 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5663 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5664 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5665 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5667 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5668 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5669 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5670 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5671 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5673 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5674 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5675 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5677 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5678 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5679 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5680 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5681 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5683 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5684 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5685 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5687 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5688 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5689 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5690 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5691 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5692 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5693 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5694 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5695 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5697 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5698 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5702 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5703 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5704 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5705 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5706 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5707 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5708 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5710 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5711 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5712 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5713 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5715 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5716 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5717 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5718 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5719 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5720 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5722 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5723 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5724 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5727 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5728 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5729 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5730 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5731 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5732 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5733 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5735 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5739 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5740 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5741 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5742 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5743 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5744 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5746 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5747 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5748 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5749 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5751 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5752 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5753 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5754 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5755 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5756 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5758 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5759 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5760 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5761 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5764 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5765 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5766 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5767 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5768 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5769 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5770 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5772 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5776 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
5777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
5780 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5782 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5783 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5784 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5785 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5786 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5788 // Marshall an MPP route.
5789 let (_, payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
5790 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5791 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5792 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
5793 route.paths.push(path);
5794 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5795 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
5796 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
5797 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
5798 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
5799 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
5801 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
5802 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
5803 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
5804 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
5809 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5812 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5813 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5814 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5815 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5816 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5817 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5818 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
5819 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5820 use routing::router::get_route;
5821 use util::test_utils;
5822 use util::config::UserConfig;
5823 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5825 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5826 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5827 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5829 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5833 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5834 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5835 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5836 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5837 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5838 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5839 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5844 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5845 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5848 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5849 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5850 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5852 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5853 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5855 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5856 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5858 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5859 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5861 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5862 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5863 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5864 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5865 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5867 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5869 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5871 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5872 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5873 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5874 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5875 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5877 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5879 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5881 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5882 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5883 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5884 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5885 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5888 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5889 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5890 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5892 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5893 } else { panic!(); }
5895 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5896 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5898 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5901 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5904 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5905 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5907 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5908 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5909 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5910 match msg_events[0] {
5911 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
5912 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
5913 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
5917 match msg_events[1] {
5918 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5922 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5924 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5925 macro_rules! send_payment {
5926 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5927 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5928 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5929 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5931 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5932 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5934 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5935 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5937 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5938 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5939 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5940 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5941 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5942 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5943 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5944 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5946 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5947 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5948 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5950 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5951 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5952 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5953 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5954 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5956 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5959 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5960 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5961 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5962 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5964 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5969 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5970 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);