1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
54 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::PendingOutboundPayment;
55 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
56 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
57 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
58 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
59 use crate::util::events;
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
63 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
64 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use crate::prelude::*;
69 use core::cell::RefCell;
71 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
72 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
73 use core::time::Duration;
76 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
77 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::PaymentSendFailure;
79 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
81 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
82 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
83 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
85 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
86 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
87 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
88 // before we forward it.
90 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
91 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
92 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
93 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
94 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
96 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
97 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
99 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
100 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
101 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
102 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
105 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
110 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
115 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
116 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
117 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
118 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
119 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
120 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
121 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
122 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
127 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
128 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
131 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
132 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
133 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
134 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
135 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
138 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
139 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
141 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
142 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
143 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
146 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
147 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
149 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
150 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
153 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
154 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
157 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
161 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
162 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
163 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 short_channel_id: u64,
167 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
168 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
170 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
171 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
176 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
178 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
179 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
180 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
182 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
183 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
186 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
187 struct ClaimableHTLC {
188 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
190 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
192 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
194 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
198 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
199 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
200 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
201 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
203 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
204 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
209 impl Readable for PaymentId {
210 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
211 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
216 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
217 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
218 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
219 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
221 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
222 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
227 impl Readable for InterceptId {
228 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
229 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
233 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
234 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
235 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
236 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
237 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
240 session_priv: SecretKey,
241 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
242 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
243 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
244 payment_id: PaymentId,
245 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
246 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
249 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
250 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
251 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
253 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
255 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
257 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
260 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
261 payment_id.hash(hasher);
262 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
263 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
264 payment_params.hash(hasher);
269 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
272 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
273 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
275 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
276 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
277 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
278 payment_secret: None,
279 payment_params: None,
284 struct ReceiveError {
290 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
292 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
293 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
294 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
295 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
296 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
298 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
299 err: msgs::LightningError,
300 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
301 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
303 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
305 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
307 err: LightningError {
309 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
310 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
317 shutdown_finish: None,
321 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
323 err: LightningError {
325 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
328 shutdown_finish: None,
332 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
333 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
336 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
338 err: LightningError {
340 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
341 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
347 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
348 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
352 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
355 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
357 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
358 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
362 log_level: Level::Warn,
365 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
367 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
369 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
371 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
372 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
380 shutdown_finish: None,
385 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
386 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
387 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
388 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
389 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
391 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
392 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
393 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
394 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
395 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
396 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
397 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
399 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
403 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
404 struct ClaimingPayment {
406 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
407 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
409 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
410 (0, amount_msat, required),
411 (2, payment_purpose, required),
412 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
415 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
416 struct ClaimablePayments {
417 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
418 /// failed/claimed by the user.
420 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
421 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
423 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
424 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
425 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
427 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
428 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
429 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
430 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
433 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
434 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
435 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
436 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
437 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
438 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
441 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
442 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
443 /// quite some time lag.
444 enum BackgroundEvent {
445 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
446 /// commitment transaction.
447 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
450 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
451 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
452 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
453 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
454 /// event can be generated.
455 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
456 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
457 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
460 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
461 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
463 latest_features: InitFeatures,
466 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
467 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
469 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
472 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
473 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
474 struct PendingInboundPayment {
475 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
476 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
477 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
478 /// this payment being removed.
480 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
481 user_payment_id: u64,
482 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
483 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
484 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
487 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
488 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
489 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
490 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
491 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
492 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
493 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
495 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
496 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
498 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
499 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
500 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
501 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
502 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
503 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
504 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
505 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
507 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
508 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
510 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
511 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
513 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
514 /// to individual Channels.
516 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
517 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
518 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
519 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
521 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
522 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
523 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
524 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
525 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
526 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
527 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
529 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
530 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
531 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
532 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
535 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
536 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
537 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
538 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
539 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
541 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
542 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
543 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
544 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
545 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
548 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
549 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
550 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
551 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
552 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
556 // `total_consistency_lock`
558 // |__`forward_htlcs`
560 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
562 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
564 // | |__`claimable_payments`
566 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
568 // | |__`channel_state`
572 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
574 // | |__`per_peer_state`
576 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
580 // | |__`pending_events`
582 // | |__`pending_background_events`
584 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
585 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
586 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
587 K::Target: KeysInterface,
588 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
591 default_configuration: UserConfig,
592 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
593 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
597 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
599 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
601 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
602 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
604 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
605 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
606 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
607 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
608 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
610 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
611 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
612 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
613 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
615 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
616 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
618 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
619 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
620 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
621 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
622 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
623 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
624 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
625 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
627 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
629 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
630 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
632 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
634 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
635 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
636 /// and via the classic SCID.
638 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
639 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
641 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
643 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
645 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
646 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
647 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
649 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
650 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
652 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
653 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
655 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
656 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
658 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
659 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
660 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
661 /// active channel list on load.
663 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
664 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
666 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
668 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
669 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
670 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
672 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
673 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
674 /// the handling of the events.
677 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
678 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
679 /// would break backwards compatability.
680 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
681 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
682 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
684 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
685 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
687 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
689 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
690 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
691 /// confirmation depth.
693 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
694 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
695 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
697 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
699 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
701 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
703 our_network_key: SecretKey,
704 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
706 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
708 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
709 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
710 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
712 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
713 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
715 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
716 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
717 /// keeping additional state.
718 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
720 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
721 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
722 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
723 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
725 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
726 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
727 /// are currently open with that peer.
728 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
729 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
732 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
733 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
735 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
736 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
737 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
738 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
739 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
740 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
741 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
742 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
743 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
744 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
745 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
747 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
754 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
756 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
757 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
758 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
759 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
760 pub struct ChainParameters {
761 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
762 pub network: Network,
764 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
766 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
767 pub best_block: BestBlock,
770 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
776 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
777 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
778 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
779 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
780 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
781 /// updates are ready for persistence).
783 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
784 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
785 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
786 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
787 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
789 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
790 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
793 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
794 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
795 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
798 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
799 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
801 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
802 persistence_notifier: notifier,
803 should_persist: persist_check,
804 _read_guard: read_guard,
809 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
811 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
812 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
817 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
818 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
820 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
822 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
823 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
824 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
825 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
826 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
828 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
829 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
831 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
833 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
834 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
835 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
836 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
837 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
838 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
839 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
840 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
841 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
842 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
843 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
844 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
845 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
847 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
848 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
850 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
851 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
852 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
853 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
855 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
856 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
857 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
858 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
859 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
860 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
863 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
865 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
866 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
869 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
871 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
872 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
874 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
875 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
876 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
877 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
879 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
880 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
881 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
882 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
883 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
884 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
885 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
886 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
887 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
888 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
889 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
892 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
893 /// to better separate parameters.
894 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
895 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
896 /// The node_id of our counterparty
897 pub node_id: PublicKey,
898 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
899 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
900 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
901 pub features: InitFeatures,
902 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
903 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
904 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
906 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
908 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
909 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
910 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
911 /// payments to us through this channel.
912 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
913 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
914 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
915 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
916 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
917 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
918 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
921 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
922 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
923 pub struct ChannelDetails {
924 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
925 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
926 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
927 /// lifetime of the channel.
928 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
929 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
930 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
931 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
932 /// our counterparty already.
934 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
935 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
936 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
937 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
939 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
940 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
941 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
942 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
944 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
945 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
947 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
948 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
950 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
951 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
952 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
953 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
954 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
955 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
956 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
957 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
958 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
961 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
963 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
964 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
965 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
966 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
967 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
968 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
969 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
971 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
972 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
974 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
975 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
976 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
977 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
978 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
979 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
980 /// this value on chain.
982 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
984 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
986 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
987 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
988 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
989 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
991 pub user_channel_id: u128,
992 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
993 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
994 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
996 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
997 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
998 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
999 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1001 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1002 pub balance_msat: u64,
1003 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1004 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1005 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1006 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1008 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1010 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1011 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1012 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1013 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1014 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1015 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1016 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1017 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1019 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1020 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1021 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1022 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1023 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1024 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1025 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1027 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1028 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1029 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1030 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1031 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1032 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1033 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1034 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1035 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1037 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1039 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1040 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1041 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1042 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1043 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1045 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1046 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1047 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1048 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1049 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1050 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1051 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1053 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1054 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1055 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1056 pub is_outbound: bool,
1057 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1058 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1059 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1060 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1061 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1063 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1064 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1065 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1066 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1068 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1069 pub is_usable: bool,
1070 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1071 pub is_public: bool,
1072 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1073 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1074 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1075 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1076 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1077 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1079 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1080 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1083 impl ChannelDetails {
1084 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1085 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1086 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1088 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1089 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1090 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1091 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1094 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1095 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1096 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1098 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1099 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1100 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1101 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1105 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1107 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1109 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1110 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1111 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1112 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1114 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1115 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1116 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1119 macro_rules! handle_error {
1120 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1123 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1124 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1126 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1127 // entering the macro.
1128 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1129 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1132 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1134 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1135 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1136 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1137 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1141 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1142 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1143 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1144 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1149 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1150 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1152 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1153 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1154 action: err.action.clone()
1158 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1159 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1162 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1169 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1170 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1171 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1172 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1173 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1174 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1176 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1177 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1178 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1179 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1180 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1182 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1183 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1185 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1189 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1190 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1191 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1193 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1194 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1196 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1197 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1199 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1200 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1201 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1202 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1203 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1204 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1210 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1211 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1215 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1217 $entry.remove_entry();
1225 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1226 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1230 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1232 $entry.remove_entry();
1240 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1241 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1243 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1244 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1250 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1251 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1253 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1254 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1255 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1256 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1257 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1258 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1259 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1260 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1261 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1262 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1263 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1264 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1265 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1266 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1269 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1270 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1271 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1272 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1273 match $action_type {
1274 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1275 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1277 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1278 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1280 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1281 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1282 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1283 if !$resend_commitment {
1284 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1287 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1289 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1290 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1292 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1297 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1298 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1300 $entry.remove_entry();
1304 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1305 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1306 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1308 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1309 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1311 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1312 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1314 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1315 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1317 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1318 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1322 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1323 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1324 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1325 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1326 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1328 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1329 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1330 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1331 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1332 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1333 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1334 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1335 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1336 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1337 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1342 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1343 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1344 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1346 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1347 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1348 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1349 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1350 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1351 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1354 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1359 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1360 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1361 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1362 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1363 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1366 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1368 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1369 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1371 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1373 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1374 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1375 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1376 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1377 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1378 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1379 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1380 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1382 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1383 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1384 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1388 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1390 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1391 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1392 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1394 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1395 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1396 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1397 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1398 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1399 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1400 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1401 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1403 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1404 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1407 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1408 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1410 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1412 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1414 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1416 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1417 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1418 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1419 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1427 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1428 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1429 &self.default_configuration
1432 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1433 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1434 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1437 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1438 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1440 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1442 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1446 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1451 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1453 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1454 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1455 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1456 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1457 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1459 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1460 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1462 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1463 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1464 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1466 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1467 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1468 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1469 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1470 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1471 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1473 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1474 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1475 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1476 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1477 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1478 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1482 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1483 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1484 Some(peer_state) => {
1485 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1486 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1487 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1488 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1489 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1490 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1491 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1495 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1500 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1503 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1505 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1506 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1507 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1509 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1510 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1511 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1512 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1514 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1516 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1519 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1521 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1522 node_id: their_network_key,
1525 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1528 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1529 let mut res = Vec::new();
1531 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1532 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1533 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1534 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1535 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1536 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1537 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1538 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1539 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1540 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1541 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1542 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1543 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1544 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1545 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1546 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1547 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1548 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1549 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1550 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1551 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1552 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1554 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1555 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1556 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1557 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1558 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1559 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1560 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1561 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1562 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1563 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1564 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1565 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1566 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1567 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1568 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1569 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1570 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1571 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1572 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1573 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1574 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1575 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1576 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1577 config: Some(channel.config()),
1581 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1582 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1583 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1584 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1590 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1591 /// more information.
1592 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1593 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1596 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1597 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1599 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1600 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1603 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1604 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1605 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1606 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1607 // really wanted anyway.
1608 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1611 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1612 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1613 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1614 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1615 Some(transaction) => {
1616 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1620 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1621 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1622 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1623 reason: closure_reason
1627 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1630 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1631 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1632 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1633 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1634 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1636 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1637 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1639 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1640 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1641 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1642 Some(peer_state) => {
1643 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1644 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1645 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1647 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1650 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1652 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1653 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1654 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1655 let (result, is_permanent) =
1656 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1658 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1663 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1664 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1668 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1669 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1670 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1671 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1675 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1683 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1684 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1685 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1686 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1689 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1693 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1694 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1695 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1697 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1698 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1700 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1701 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1702 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1703 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1705 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1707 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1708 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1709 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1710 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1711 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1714 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1715 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1716 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1718 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1719 /// the channel being closed or not:
1720 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1721 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1722 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1723 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1724 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1725 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1726 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1728 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1730 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1731 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1732 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1733 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1734 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1738 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1739 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1740 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1741 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1742 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1743 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1744 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1745 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1747 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1748 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1749 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1750 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1751 // ignore the result here.
1752 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1756 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1757 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1758 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1759 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1761 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1762 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1763 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1764 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1765 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1767 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1768 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1770 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1772 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1774 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1777 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1778 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1779 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1780 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1781 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1786 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1789 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1790 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1791 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1792 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1793 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1794 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1795 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1796 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1797 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1807 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1808 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1809 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1811 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1812 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1813 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1816 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1817 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1818 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1820 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1821 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1822 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1823 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1824 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1827 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1828 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1829 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1830 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1831 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1835 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1836 /// local transaction(s).
1837 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1838 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1839 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1843 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1844 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1846 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1847 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1848 return Err(ReceiveError {
1849 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1851 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1854 // final_expiry_too_soon
1855 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1856 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1857 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1858 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1859 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1860 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1861 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1862 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
1863 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
1864 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
1865 return Err(ReceiveError {
1866 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
1867 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1870 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1871 return Err(ReceiveError {
1873 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
1874 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1878 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1879 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1880 return Err(ReceiveError {
1881 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1882 err_data: Vec::new(),
1883 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
1886 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1887 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1888 return Err(ReceiveError {
1889 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1890 err_data: Vec::new(),
1891 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
1893 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1894 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1896 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1897 phantom_shared_secret,
1899 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1900 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1901 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1902 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1903 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1904 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1905 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1906 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
1907 return Err(ReceiveError {
1908 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1909 err_data: Vec::new(),
1910 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
1914 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1916 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1919 return Err(ReceiveError {
1920 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1921 err_data: Vec::new(),
1922 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1927 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
1930 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1931 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
1932 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
1933 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1937 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
1938 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1939 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1941 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1942 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1943 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1944 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1945 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1946 failure_code: $err_code,
1952 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1953 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1956 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
1958 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1959 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1960 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1961 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1962 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1963 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1964 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1965 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1967 macro_rules! return_err {
1968 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1970 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1971 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1972 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1973 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1974 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
1975 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
1981 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
1983 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
1984 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
1986 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
1987 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
1991 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
1992 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
1994 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
1996 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1997 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1998 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1999 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2000 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2002 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2005 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2006 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2007 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2009 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2010 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2011 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2014 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2015 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2016 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2017 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2021 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2022 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2023 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2026 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2027 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2028 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2029 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2030 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2035 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2036 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2037 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2038 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2039 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2040 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2041 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2042 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2043 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2044 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2045 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2046 // phantom or an intercept.
2047 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2048 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2049 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2053 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2056 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2058 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2059 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2061 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2062 // no consistency guarantees.
2063 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2067 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2068 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2069 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2070 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2071 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2073 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2074 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2075 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2076 // we don't have the channel here.
2077 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2079 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2081 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2082 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2083 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2084 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2085 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2086 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2087 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2089 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2090 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2092 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2093 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2097 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2098 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2099 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2100 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2102 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2109 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2110 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2111 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2112 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2113 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2114 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2116 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2117 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2119 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2120 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2121 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2122 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2123 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2124 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2125 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2126 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2127 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2128 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2134 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2135 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2136 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2137 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2139 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2140 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2142 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2143 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2144 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2146 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2147 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2148 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2149 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2150 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2151 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2152 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2156 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2161 pending_forward_info
2164 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2165 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2166 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2168 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2169 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2170 if !chan.should_announce() {
2171 return Err(LightningError {
2172 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2173 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2176 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2177 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2179 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2180 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2183 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2184 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2185 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2186 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2187 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2188 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2189 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2190 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2191 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2195 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2197 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2198 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2199 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2201 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2202 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2204 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2205 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2206 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2207 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2208 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2209 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2210 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2211 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2214 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2215 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2217 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2223 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2224 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2225 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2226 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2227 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2229 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2230 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2231 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2232 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2233 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2235 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2239 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2240 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2241 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2242 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2245 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2246 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2247 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2249 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2250 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2252 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2253 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2255 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2256 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2258 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2259 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2261 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2262 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2263 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2266 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2267 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2268 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2270 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2271 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2273 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2274 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2275 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2276 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2277 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2278 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2279 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2280 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2281 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2282 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2284 _ => unreachable!(),
2287 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2288 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2289 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2290 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2291 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2292 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2293 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2294 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2303 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2304 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2305 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2306 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2311 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2312 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2314 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2319 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2321 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2322 /// fields for more info.
2324 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2325 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2326 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2327 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2330 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2331 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2332 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2333 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2334 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2336 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2337 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2339 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2340 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2341 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2343 /// In general, a path may raise:
2344 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2345 /// node public key) is specified.
2346 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2347 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2349 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2350 /// relevant updates.
2352 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2353 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2354 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2356 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2357 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2358 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2359 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2362 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2363 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2364 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2366 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2367 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2368 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2369 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2370 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2374 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2375 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2378 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2379 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2380 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2381 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2384 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2385 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2387 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2388 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2389 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2390 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2391 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2394 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2395 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2398 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2399 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2402 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2407 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2408 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2409 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2411 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2412 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2414 let mut total_value = 0;
2415 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2416 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2417 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2418 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2419 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2420 continue 'path_check;
2422 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2423 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2424 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2425 continue 'path_check;
2428 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2429 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2431 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2432 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2434 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2435 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2436 total_value = amt_msat;
2439 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2440 let mut results = Vec::new();
2441 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2442 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2443 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2446 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2447 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2448 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2449 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2452 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2453 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2454 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2455 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2457 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2458 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2462 results.push(path_res);
2464 let mut has_ok = false;
2465 let mut has_err = false;
2466 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2467 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2468 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2469 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2470 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2471 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2472 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2476 } else if res.is_err() {
2477 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2478 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2481 if has_err && has_ok {
2482 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2485 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2486 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2487 Some(RouteParameters {
2488 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2489 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2490 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2496 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2497 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2498 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2499 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2500 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2506 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2508 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2509 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2510 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2511 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2512 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2514 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2515 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2516 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2517 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2518 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2519 if path.len() == 0 {
2520 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2521 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2526 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2527 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2528 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2531 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2532 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2533 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2535 let res = match payment {
2536 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2537 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2539 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2540 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2541 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2542 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2545 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2547 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2548 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2549 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2552 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2553 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2554 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2557 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2558 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2559 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2563 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2564 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2569 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2570 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2574 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2577 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2579 /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2580 /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
2581 /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2583 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2584 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2585 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2587 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2588 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
2589 /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
2590 /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
2591 /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2593 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
2594 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2595 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2596 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2597 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2600 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2601 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2602 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2603 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2604 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2606 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2614 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2615 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2616 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2617 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2618 /// never reach the recipient.
2620 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2621 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2623 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2624 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2626 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2628 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2629 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2630 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2632 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2634 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2635 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2637 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2638 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2643 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2644 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2645 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2646 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2647 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2649 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2652 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2653 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2657 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2658 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2660 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2661 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2666 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2668 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2669 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2670 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2673 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2674 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2675 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2676 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2677 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2678 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2681 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2682 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2683 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2684 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2685 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2687 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2689 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2691 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2692 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2693 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2694 } else { unreachable!(); })
2697 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2699 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2700 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2703 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2704 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2709 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2710 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2711 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2714 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2715 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2716 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2718 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2719 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2720 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2721 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2730 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2731 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2732 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2736 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2738 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2739 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2741 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2742 /// across the p2p network.
2744 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2745 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2747 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2748 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2749 /// keys per-channel).
2751 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2752 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2753 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2755 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2756 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2757 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2759 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2760 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2761 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2762 /// for more details.
2764 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2765 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2766 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2767 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2769 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2770 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2771 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2772 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2777 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2778 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2779 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2780 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2781 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2782 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2783 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2787 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2788 let mut output_index = None;
2789 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2790 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2791 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2792 if output_index.is_some() {
2793 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2794 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2797 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2798 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2799 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2802 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2805 if output_index.is_none() {
2806 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2807 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2810 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2814 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2816 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2817 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2818 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2819 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2821 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2822 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2824 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2825 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2827 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2829 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2830 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2831 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2832 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2833 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2834 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2835 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2836 pub fn update_channel_config(
2837 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2838 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2839 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2840 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2841 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2845 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2846 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2849 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2850 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2851 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2852 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
2853 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2854 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
2856 .get_counterparty_node_id();
2857 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
2858 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2859 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
2863 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2864 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2865 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2868 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2869 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2870 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2871 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2872 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2881 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2882 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2884 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2885 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2887 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2888 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2889 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2890 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2891 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2893 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2894 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2896 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2899 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2900 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2901 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2902 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2903 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2904 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2906 let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2908 if !chan.is_usable() {
2909 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2910 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2913 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2915 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2916 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2920 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2921 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2922 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2925 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2926 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2927 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2929 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2931 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2932 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2935 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2936 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2937 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2938 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2939 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2941 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2945 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2946 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2948 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2951 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2952 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2955 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2956 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2957 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2960 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2961 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2962 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2963 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2964 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2965 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2966 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2969 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2970 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2971 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2972 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2977 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2979 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2980 /// Will likely generate further events.
2981 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2984 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2985 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2986 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2988 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2989 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2991 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2992 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2993 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2995 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2996 match forward_info {
2997 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2998 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2999 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3000 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3001 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3004 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3005 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3006 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3008 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3009 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3010 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3011 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3012 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3013 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3016 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3017 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3019 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3022 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3023 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3029 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3030 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3032 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3036 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3037 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3039 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3043 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3044 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3045 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3046 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3047 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3049 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3050 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3051 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3052 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3053 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3055 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3057 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3058 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3062 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3063 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3064 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3065 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3071 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3074 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3077 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3078 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3079 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3080 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3081 // problem, not ours.
3087 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3088 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3090 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3094 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3095 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3096 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3097 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3098 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3101 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3102 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3103 match forward_info {
3104 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3105 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3106 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3107 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3108 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3111 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3112 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3113 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3114 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3115 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3116 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3117 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3118 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3120 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3121 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3122 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3124 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3125 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3127 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3129 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3130 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3131 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3132 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3137 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3138 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3140 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3141 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3142 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3143 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3145 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3146 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3148 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3150 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3151 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3152 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3161 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3162 match forward_info {
3163 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3164 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3165 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3166 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3169 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3170 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3171 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3172 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3174 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3175 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3177 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3180 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3181 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3182 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3183 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3184 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3185 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3186 phantom_shared_secret,
3188 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3190 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3195 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3196 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3197 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3198 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3199 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3201 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3202 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3203 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3204 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3205 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3206 phantom_shared_secret,
3208 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3209 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3213 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3214 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3215 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3216 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3217 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3220 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3221 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3222 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3224 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3225 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3226 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3229 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3230 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3231 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3234 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3235 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3236 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3237 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3238 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3239 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3243 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3244 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3245 total_value += htlc.value;
3246 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3247 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3248 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3249 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3250 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3251 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3253 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3255 _ => unreachable!(),
3258 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3260 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3261 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3262 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3263 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3264 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3265 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3266 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3269 amount_msat: total_value,
3270 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3271 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3273 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3275 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3276 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3278 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3280 payment_claimable_generated
3284 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3285 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3286 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3287 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3288 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3289 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3290 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3291 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3292 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3293 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3294 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3295 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3296 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3297 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3299 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3303 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3305 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3306 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3307 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3308 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3311 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3312 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3313 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3314 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3315 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3316 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3317 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3319 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3321 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3322 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3325 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3326 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3327 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3333 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3334 if payment_data.is_none() {
3335 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3336 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3339 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3340 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3341 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3342 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3343 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3344 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3345 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3346 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3348 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3349 if payment_claimable_generated {
3350 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3356 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3357 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3365 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3366 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3368 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3370 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3371 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3372 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3374 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3376 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3377 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3378 events.append(&mut new_events);
3381 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3383 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3384 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3386 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3387 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3388 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3389 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3390 if background_events.is_empty() {
3394 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3396 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3397 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3398 // monitor updating completing.
3399 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3406 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3407 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3408 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3409 self.process_background_events();
3412 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3413 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3414 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3415 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3416 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3417 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3418 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3420 if !chan.is_live() {
3421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3422 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3423 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3425 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3426 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3428 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3429 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3433 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3434 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3435 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3436 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3437 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3438 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3439 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3441 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3443 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3444 for (chan_id, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
3445 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3446 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3453 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3454 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3455 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3456 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3457 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3458 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3459 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3461 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3462 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3463 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3464 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3465 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3466 if no_remaining_entries {
3467 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3469 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3470 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3471 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3472 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3473 no_remaining_entries = false;
3481 if no_remaining_entries {
3482 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3483 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3485 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3492 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3494 /// This currently includes:
3495 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3496 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3497 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3499 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3500 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3502 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3503 /// estimate fetches.
3504 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3505 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3506 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3507 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3509 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3511 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3512 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3514 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3515 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3516 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3517 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3518 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3519 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3521 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3522 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3523 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3524 if needs_close { return false; }
3527 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3528 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3529 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3530 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3531 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3532 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3533 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3534 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3538 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3539 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3541 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3542 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3543 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3547 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3548 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3553 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3559 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3560 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3561 // This should be unreachable
3562 debug_assert!(false);
3565 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3566 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3567 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3568 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3570 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3571 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3572 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3574 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3581 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3582 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3583 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3584 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3585 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3588 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3589 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3592 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3594 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3595 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3596 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3597 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3598 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3605 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3606 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3607 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3609 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3610 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3611 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3612 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3614 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3615 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3616 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3617 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3618 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3619 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3621 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3622 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3623 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3624 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3625 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3626 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3627 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3628 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3629 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3634 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3635 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3637 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3639 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3640 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3641 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3642 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3643 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3644 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3645 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3647 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3649 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3650 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3652 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3657 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3658 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3659 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3660 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3661 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3662 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3663 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3664 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3665 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3666 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3668 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3669 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3670 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3671 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3673 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3674 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3675 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3676 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3677 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3681 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3682 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3683 // be surfaced to the user.
3684 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3685 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3686 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3688 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3689 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3691 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3693 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3696 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3697 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3698 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3699 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3703 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3704 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3705 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3706 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3708 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3709 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3710 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3711 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3712 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3715 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3716 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3717 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3720 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3721 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3722 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3724 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3725 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3726 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3727 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3728 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3729 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3730 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(*payment_id) {
3731 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3732 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3735 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3736 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3739 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3740 all_paths_failed = true;
3741 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3742 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3743 payment_id: *payment_id,
3744 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3750 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3753 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3754 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3755 Some(RouteParameters {
3756 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3757 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3758 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3761 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3763 let path_failure = {
3765 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_error.decode_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source);
3767 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_error.decode_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source);
3769 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3770 if !payment_retryable {
3771 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3772 payment_id: *payment_id,
3773 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3777 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3778 payment_id: *payment_id,
3779 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3785 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3786 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3787 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3788 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3789 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3791 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3792 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
3793 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3794 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
3801 error_code: onion_error_code,
3803 error_data: onion_error_data
3807 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3808 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3809 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3811 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3812 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3813 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3815 let mut forward_event = None;
3816 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3817 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3818 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3820 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3821 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3822 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3824 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3825 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3828 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3829 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3830 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3831 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3832 time_forwardable: time
3835 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3836 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3837 failed_next_destination: destination,
3843 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3844 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3846 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3847 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3848 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3850 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3851 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3852 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3853 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3855 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3856 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3857 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3858 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3859 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3860 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3861 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3863 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3866 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3867 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3868 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3869 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3870 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3871 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3872 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3873 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3878 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3879 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3880 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3882 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3883 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3884 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3885 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3890 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3892 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3893 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3894 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3895 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3896 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3898 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3899 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3901 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3902 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3903 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3904 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3905 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3907 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3908 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3909 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3910 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3911 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3912 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3913 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3914 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3921 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_id) {
3926 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3927 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3928 debug_assert!(false);
3932 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3933 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3934 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3935 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3936 if sources.len() != 1 {
3937 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3938 debug_assert!(false);
3944 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3946 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3947 mem::drop(channel_state);
3948 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3949 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3952 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3953 mem::drop(channel_state);
3954 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3955 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3956 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3960 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3961 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3962 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.take().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop,
3964 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3966 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3967 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3968 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3969 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3970 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3974 mem::drop(channel_state);
3976 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3977 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3978 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3979 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3980 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3981 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3982 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3984 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3987 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3988 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3989 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3990 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3994 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3995 mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
3996 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3997 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3998 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4000 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4001 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4002 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4003 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4004 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4005 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4006 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4007 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4008 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4010 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4011 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4012 payment_preimage, e);
4013 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
4014 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4015 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4016 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
4019 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4020 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4021 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4022 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4023 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4024 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4025 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4026 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4027 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4028 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4034 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4035 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4041 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4042 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4043 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4045 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4046 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4047 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
4048 // again on restart.
4049 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4050 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4051 payment_preimage, e);
4054 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4056 chan.remove_entry();
4058 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4059 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4060 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
4064 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4065 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4066 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4070 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4071 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4072 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update);
4073 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4074 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4075 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4076 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4077 // again on restart.
4078 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4079 payment_preimage, update_res);
4081 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4082 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4083 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4084 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4085 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4086 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4087 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4092 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4093 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4094 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4095 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4096 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4097 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4098 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4099 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4100 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4101 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4102 pending_events.push(
4103 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4105 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4115 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4117 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4118 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4119 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4120 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4121 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4122 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4123 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4124 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4125 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4126 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4127 pending_events.push(
4128 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4129 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4135 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4139 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4140 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4141 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4143 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4144 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4145 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4146 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4147 pending_events.push(
4148 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4157 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4160 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4161 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4162 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage,
4163 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4164 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4165 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4166 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4169 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4170 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4172 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4174 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4180 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4181 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4182 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4188 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4189 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4190 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4193 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4194 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4196 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4197 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4198 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4199 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4200 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4204 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4205 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4211 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4212 /// update completion.
4213 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4214 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4215 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4216 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4217 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4218 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4219 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4221 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4222 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4223 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4224 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4227 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4228 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4230 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4231 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4232 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4237 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4239 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4240 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4241 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4242 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4247 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4248 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4249 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4250 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4251 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4256 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4260 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4266 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4267 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4268 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4274 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4275 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4278 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4279 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4280 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4281 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4282 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4283 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4285 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4289 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4290 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4291 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4292 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4293 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4294 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4295 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4297 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4298 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4299 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4304 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4305 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4306 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4309 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4311 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4312 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4314 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4315 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4316 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4317 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4321 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4323 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4324 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4327 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4328 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4329 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4331 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4332 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4333 /// used to accept such channels.
4335 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4336 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4337 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4338 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4341 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4342 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4344 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4345 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4346 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4348 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4349 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4351 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4352 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4354 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4355 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4357 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4358 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4359 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4360 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4363 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4364 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4366 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4367 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4368 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4369 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4370 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4371 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4373 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4374 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4377 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4378 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4379 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4380 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4382 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4385 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4386 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4387 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4390 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4391 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4392 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4395 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4396 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4402 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4403 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4404 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4407 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4408 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4411 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4412 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4413 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4415 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4416 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4417 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4418 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4421 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4422 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4426 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4427 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4428 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4429 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4430 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4431 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4433 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4434 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4435 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4436 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4438 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4439 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4440 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4443 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4444 pending_events.push(
4445 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4446 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4447 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4448 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4449 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4450 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4455 entry.insert(channel);
4461 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4462 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4463 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4464 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4465 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4466 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4467 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4468 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4470 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4471 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4473 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4476 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4477 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4478 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4479 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4480 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4482 user_channel_id: user_id,
4487 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4488 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4489 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4490 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4491 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4492 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4493 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4494 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4495 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4497 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4499 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4502 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4503 // lock before watch_channel
4504 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4505 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4506 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4507 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4508 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4509 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4510 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4511 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4512 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4513 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4514 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4515 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4516 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4518 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4519 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4520 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4521 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4522 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4523 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4524 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4527 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4528 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4529 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4530 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4531 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4533 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4534 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4535 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4536 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4537 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4538 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4539 funding_msg.channel_id))
4541 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4542 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4545 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4546 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4549 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4550 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4558 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4560 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4561 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4562 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4563 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4564 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4565 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4566 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4568 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
4569 Ok(update) => update,
4570 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4572 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4573 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4575 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4576 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4577 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4578 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4579 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4580 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4581 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4587 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4588 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4592 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4595 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4596 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4600 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4601 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4602 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4603 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4604 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4605 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4606 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4608 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4609 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4610 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4611 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4612 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4613 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4614 msg: announcement_sigs,
4616 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4617 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4618 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4619 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4620 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4621 // announcement_signatures.
4622 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4623 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4624 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4625 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4631 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4639 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4640 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4641 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4642 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4643 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4645 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4646 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4647 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4648 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4651 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4652 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4653 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4654 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4657 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4658 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4660 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4661 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4662 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4663 let (result, is_permanent) =
4664 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4666 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4671 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4672 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4673 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4680 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4683 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4684 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4685 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4686 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4689 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4693 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4694 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4695 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4696 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4697 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4698 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4699 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4700 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4702 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4703 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4704 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4705 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4710 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4711 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4712 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4713 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4714 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4715 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4716 } else { (tx, None) }
4718 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4721 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4722 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4723 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4725 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4726 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4727 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4728 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4732 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4737 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4738 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4739 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4740 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4742 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4743 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4744 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4745 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4747 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4748 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4749 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4751 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4752 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4753 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4754 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4757 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4758 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4759 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4760 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4761 match pending_forward_info {
4762 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4763 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4764 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4765 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4767 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4768 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4769 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4770 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4771 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4774 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4776 _ => pending_forward_info
4779 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4786 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4787 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4788 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4789 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4790 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4792 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4793 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4795 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4797 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4800 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4804 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4805 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4806 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4807 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4808 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4809 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4810 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4812 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4814 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4819 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4820 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4821 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4822 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4823 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4824 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4825 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4827 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4828 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4829 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4831 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4838 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4839 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4840 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4841 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4843 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4844 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4846 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4847 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4848 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4849 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4850 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4851 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4852 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4857 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4858 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4862 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4863 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4864 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4866 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4867 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4868 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4869 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4870 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4871 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4872 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4873 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4875 commitment_signed: msg,
4881 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4886 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4887 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4888 let mut forward_event = None;
4889 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4890 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4891 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4892 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4893 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4894 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4895 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4896 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4898 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4899 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4901 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4902 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4903 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4904 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4905 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4906 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4908 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4909 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4910 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4912 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4913 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4914 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4916 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4917 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4918 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4919 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4920 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4923 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4924 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4926 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4927 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4928 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4929 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4930 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4931 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4932 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4933 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4936 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4937 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4938 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4943 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4944 // payments are being processed.
4945 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4946 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4948 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4949 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4956 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4957 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4960 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4961 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4962 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4965 match forward_event {
4967 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4968 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4969 time_forwardable: time
4977 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4978 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4980 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4981 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4982 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4983 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4984 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4985 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4987 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4988 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4989 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4990 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4991 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
4992 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4993 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4994 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4995 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4996 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4997 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4998 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5000 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5001 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5002 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5003 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5004 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5005 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5007 } else { unreachable!(); }
5009 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5010 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5011 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5015 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5016 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5017 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5018 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5019 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5020 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5025 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5027 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5028 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5030 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5031 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5032 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5034 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5035 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5042 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5043 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5044 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5045 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5046 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5047 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5048 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5050 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5052 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5057 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5058 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5059 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5061 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5062 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5063 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5064 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5066 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5067 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5070 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5071 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5072 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5073 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5074 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5075 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5078 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5083 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5084 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5085 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5086 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5088 // It's not a local channel
5089 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5092 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5093 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5094 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5095 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5096 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5097 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5098 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5099 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5100 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5101 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5103 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5105 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5106 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5107 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5108 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5110 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5111 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5114 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5116 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5119 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5121 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5122 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5123 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5125 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5127 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5128 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5130 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5131 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5132 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5133 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5134 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5135 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5136 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5137 let mut channel_update = None;
5138 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5139 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5140 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5143 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5144 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5145 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5146 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5147 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5148 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5149 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5154 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5155 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5156 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5157 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5158 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5159 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5167 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5168 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5171 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5172 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5177 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5178 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5179 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5180 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5181 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5182 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5183 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5184 match monitor_event {
5185 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5186 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5187 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5188 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5190 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5191 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5192 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5193 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5196 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5197 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5198 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5199 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5200 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5201 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5202 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5203 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5204 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5205 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5206 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5210 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5211 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5213 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5215 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5216 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5217 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5219 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5224 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5225 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5231 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5232 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5235 has_pending_monitor_events
5238 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5239 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5240 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5242 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5243 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5246 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5247 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5248 /// update was applied.
5249 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5250 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5251 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5252 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5254 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5255 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5256 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5257 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5259 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5260 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5261 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5262 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5264 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5266 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5269 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5270 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5271 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5272 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5273 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5274 updates: commitment_update,
5278 has_monitor_update = true;
5279 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5280 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5281 if close_channel { return false; }
5288 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5289 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5290 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5297 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5298 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5299 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5302 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5303 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5309 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5310 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5311 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5312 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5313 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5314 let mut has_update = false;
5316 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5317 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5318 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5319 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5321 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5322 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5323 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5324 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5326 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5327 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5330 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5331 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5332 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5333 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5334 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5339 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5341 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5342 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5343 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5349 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5350 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5357 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5358 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5364 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5365 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5367 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5368 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5369 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5370 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5371 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5372 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5373 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5374 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5375 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5376 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5377 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5378 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5379 assert!(should_broadcast);
5380 } else { unreachable!(); }
5381 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5383 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5387 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5388 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5390 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5391 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5394 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5396 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5397 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5398 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5399 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5400 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5401 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5402 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5403 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5404 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5405 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5406 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5407 // never fail a payment too early.
5408 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5410 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5413 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5418 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5421 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5422 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5424 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5425 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5426 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5428 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5430 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5431 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5435 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5436 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5438 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5440 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5441 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5442 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5443 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5444 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5445 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5448 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5449 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5451 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5454 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5456 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5458 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5459 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5460 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5461 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5462 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5465 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5466 /// stored external to LDK.
5468 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5469 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5470 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5472 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5473 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5476 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5477 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5478 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5479 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5481 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5482 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5483 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5484 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5485 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5487 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5488 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5489 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5490 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5491 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5493 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5494 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5496 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5497 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5501 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5502 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5504 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5506 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5507 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5508 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5509 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5512 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5513 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5515 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5518 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5520 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5522 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5523 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5526 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5527 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5529 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5530 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5531 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5534 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5535 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5537 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5538 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5539 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5540 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5542 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5543 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5544 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5545 Some(_) => continue,
5546 None => return scid_candidate
5551 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5553 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5554 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5556 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5557 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5558 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5562 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5563 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5564 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5566 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5567 /// times to get a unique scid.
5568 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5569 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5570 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5572 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5573 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5574 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5575 return scid_candidate
5579 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5580 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5581 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5582 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5584 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5585 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5586 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5587 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5595 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5596 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5597 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5598 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5599 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5604 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5605 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5606 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5610 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5611 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5615 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5616 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5619 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5620 /// using the given event handler.
5622 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5623 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5626 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5627 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5628 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5630 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5632 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5633 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5634 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5635 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5638 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5639 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5640 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5643 for event in pending_events {
5644 handler(event).await;
5647 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5648 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5653 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5654 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5655 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5656 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5657 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5660 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5661 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5662 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5663 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5665 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5666 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5667 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5668 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5671 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5672 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5674 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5675 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5678 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5679 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5680 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5682 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5683 events.replace(pending_events);
5692 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5694 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5695 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5696 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5697 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5700 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5702 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5703 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5704 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5705 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5706 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5708 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5709 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5710 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5711 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5714 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5715 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5716 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5719 for event in pending_events {
5720 handler.handle_event(event);
5728 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5730 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5731 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5732 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5733 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5736 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5738 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5739 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5740 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5741 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5742 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5745 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5746 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5749 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5750 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5751 let new_height = height - 1;
5753 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5754 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5755 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5756 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5757 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5758 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5761 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5765 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5767 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5768 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5769 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5770 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5773 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5774 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5775 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5776 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5778 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5779 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5782 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5783 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5785 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5786 if height < last_best_block_height {
5787 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5788 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5792 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5793 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5794 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5795 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5797 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5798 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5800 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5802 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5804 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5806 macro_rules! max_time {
5807 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5809 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5810 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5811 // having an explicit local time source.
5812 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5813 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5814 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5815 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5816 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5822 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5823 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5824 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5825 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5829 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5830 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5831 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
5832 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5833 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5834 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5840 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5841 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5842 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5843 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5844 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5845 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5846 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5847 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5852 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5854 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5855 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5856 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5857 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5860 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5861 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5863 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5864 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5865 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5866 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5867 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5869 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5870 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5872 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5873 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5874 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5875 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5876 let res = f(channel);
5877 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5878 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5879 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5880 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5881 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5883 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5884 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5885 if channel.is_usable() {
5886 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5887 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5888 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5889 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5894 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5898 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5900 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5901 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5902 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5903 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5904 msg: announcement_sigs,
5906 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5907 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5908 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5910 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5911 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5912 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5917 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5918 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5919 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5920 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5921 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5922 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5923 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5924 // is always consistent.
5925 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5926 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5927 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5928 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5929 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5932 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5933 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5934 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5935 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5936 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5937 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5938 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5942 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5943 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5944 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5945 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5946 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5947 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5948 data: reason_message,
5957 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5958 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5959 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5960 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5961 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5962 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5963 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5964 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5965 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5966 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
5968 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
5969 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5970 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5974 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5977 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5978 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
5979 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5980 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5981 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
5982 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
5983 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5984 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5985 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
5988 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
5989 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5990 _ => unreachable!(),
5992 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
5993 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
5994 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
5995 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6001 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6003 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6004 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6008 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6009 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6010 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6011 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6013 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6015 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6016 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6017 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6018 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6019 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6020 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6023 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6024 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6025 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6027 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6028 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6029 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6030 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6033 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6034 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6035 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6036 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6037 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6040 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6041 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6042 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6045 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6046 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6047 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6048 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6052 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6053 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6054 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6055 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6056 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6057 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6060 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6061 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6062 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6065 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6067 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6070 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6071 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6072 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6075 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6076 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6077 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6080 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6081 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6082 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6085 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6086 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6087 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6090 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6091 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6092 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6095 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6096 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6097 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6100 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6101 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6102 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6105 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6106 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6107 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6110 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6111 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6112 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6115 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6116 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6117 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6120 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6121 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6122 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6125 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6127 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6130 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6131 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6132 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6135 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6136 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6137 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6140 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6145 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6146 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6147 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6150 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6151 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6152 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6153 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6155 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6156 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6157 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6158 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6159 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6160 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6161 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6162 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6163 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6164 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6165 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6168 no_channels_remain = false;
6173 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6175 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6176 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6177 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6178 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6179 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6180 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6181 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6182 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6183 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6184 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6185 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6186 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6187 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6188 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6189 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6190 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6191 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6192 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6193 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6194 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6198 if no_channels_remain {
6199 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6202 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6203 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6207 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6208 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6209 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6213 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6215 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6218 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6219 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6220 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6221 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6222 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6225 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6226 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6231 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6232 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6233 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6234 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6235 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6236 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6237 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6238 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6239 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6243 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6244 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6245 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6250 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6251 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6252 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6253 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6254 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6262 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6266 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6269 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6270 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6271 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6272 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6273 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6278 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6279 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6280 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6281 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6284 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6285 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6286 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6294 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6295 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6299 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6300 provided_node_features()
6303 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6304 provided_init_features()
6308 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6309 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6310 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6311 provided_init_features().to_context()
6314 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6315 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6317 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6318 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6319 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6320 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6321 provided_init_features().to_context()
6324 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6325 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6326 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6327 provided_init_features().to_context()
6330 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6331 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6332 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6333 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6334 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6335 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6336 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6337 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6338 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6339 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6340 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6341 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6342 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6343 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6344 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6345 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6346 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6347 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6351 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6352 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6354 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6355 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6356 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6357 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6360 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6361 (2, node_id, required),
6362 (4, features, required),
6363 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6364 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6365 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6366 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6369 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6370 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6371 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6372 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6373 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6374 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6375 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6376 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6377 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6378 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6379 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6380 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6381 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6382 (7, self.config, option),
6383 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6384 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6385 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6386 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6387 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6388 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6389 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6390 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6391 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6392 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6393 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6394 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6395 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6396 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6397 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6398 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6399 (32, self.is_public, required),
6400 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6401 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6402 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6408 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6409 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6410 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6411 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6412 (2, channel_id, required),
6413 (3, channel_type, option),
6414 (4, counterparty, required),
6415 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6416 (6, funding_txo, option),
6417 (7, config, option),
6418 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6419 (9, confirmations, option),
6420 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6421 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6422 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6423 (16, balance_msat, required),
6424 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6425 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6426 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6427 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6428 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6429 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6430 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6431 (26, is_outbound, required),
6432 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6433 (30, is_usable, required),
6434 (32, is_public, required),
6435 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6436 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6437 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6440 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6441 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6442 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6443 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6444 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6448 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6450 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6451 outbound_scid_alias,
6455 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6456 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6458 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6459 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6460 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6461 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6462 confirmations_required,
6464 force_close_spend_delay,
6465 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6466 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6467 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6468 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6469 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6470 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6475 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6476 (2, channels, vec_type),
6477 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6478 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6481 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6483 (0, onion_packet, required),
6484 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6487 (0, payment_data, required),
6488 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6489 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6491 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6492 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6493 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6497 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6498 (0, routing, required),
6499 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6500 (4, payment_hash, required),
6501 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6502 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6503 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6507 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6508 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6510 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6512 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6513 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6514 reason.write(writer)?;
6516 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6517 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6520 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6521 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6522 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6523 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6530 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6531 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6532 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6535 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6536 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6537 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6538 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6542 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6543 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6544 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6545 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6546 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6549 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6550 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6551 // messages contained in the variants.
6552 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6553 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6554 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6556 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6557 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6558 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6559 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6560 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6563 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6564 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6565 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6566 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6567 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6569 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6574 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6579 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6580 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6581 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6582 (2, outpoint, required),
6583 (4, htlc_id, required),
6584 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6587 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6588 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6589 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6590 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6591 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6593 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6594 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6595 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6596 (2, self.value, required),
6597 (4, payment_data, option),
6598 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6599 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6605 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6606 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6607 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6609 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6610 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6611 let mut total_msat = None;
6612 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6613 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6614 (0, prev_hop, required),
6615 (1, total_msat, option),
6616 (2, value, required),
6617 (4, payment_data, option),
6618 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6619 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6621 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6623 if payment_data.is_some() {
6624 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6626 if total_msat.is_none() {
6627 total_msat = Some(value);
6629 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6632 if total_msat.is_none() {
6633 if payment_data.is_none() {
6634 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6636 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6638 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6642 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6645 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6652 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6653 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6654 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6657 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6658 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6659 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6660 let mut payment_id = None;
6661 let mut payment_secret = None;
6662 let mut payment_params = None;
6663 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6664 (0, session_priv, required),
6665 (1, payment_id, option),
6666 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6667 (3, payment_secret, option),
6668 (4, path, vec_type),
6669 (5, payment_params, option),
6671 if payment_id.is_none() {
6672 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6674 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6676 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6677 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6678 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6679 path: path.unwrap(),
6680 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6685 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6686 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6691 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6692 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6694 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6696 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6697 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6698 (0, session_priv, required),
6699 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6700 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6701 (3, payment_secret, option),
6702 (4, *path, vec_type),
6703 (5, payment_params, option),
6706 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6708 field.write(writer)?;
6715 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6716 (0, forward_info, required),
6717 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6718 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6719 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6720 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6723 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6725 (0, htlc_id, required),
6726 (2, err_packet, required),
6731 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6732 (0, payment_secret, required),
6733 (2, expiry_time, required),
6734 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6735 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6736 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6739 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6740 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6741 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6742 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6743 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6746 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6747 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6749 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6751 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6753 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6754 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6755 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6759 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6760 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6761 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6762 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6763 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6764 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6765 unfunded_channels += 1;
6768 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6769 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6770 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6771 channel.write(writer)?;
6777 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6778 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6779 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6780 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6781 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6782 for forward in pending_forwards {
6783 forward.write(writer)?;
6788 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6789 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6790 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6792 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6793 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6794 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6795 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6796 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6797 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6798 htlc.write(writer)?;
6800 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6803 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6804 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6805 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6806 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6807 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6808 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6811 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6812 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6813 for event in events.iter() {
6814 event.write(writer)?;
6817 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6818 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6819 for event in background_events.iter() {
6821 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6823 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6824 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6829 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6830 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6831 // likely to be identical.
6832 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6833 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6835 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6836 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6837 hash.write(writer)?;
6838 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6841 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6842 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6843 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6844 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6845 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6848 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6849 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6851 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6852 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6853 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6854 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6857 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6858 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6862 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6863 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6864 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6866 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6867 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6868 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6874 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
6875 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6876 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
6877 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
6880 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
6881 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6882 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
6883 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
6884 pending_claiming_payments = None;
6886 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
6889 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6890 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6891 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6892 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6893 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6894 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6895 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6896 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6897 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6904 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6906 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6908 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6909 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6910 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6911 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6912 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6913 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6914 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6915 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6916 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6917 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6918 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6919 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6920 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6922 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6923 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6925 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6926 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6928 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6929 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6930 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6931 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6932 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6933 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6935 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6936 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6937 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6938 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6939 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6940 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6943 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6944 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6946 pub keys_manager: K,
6948 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6950 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6951 pub fee_estimator: F,
6952 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6954 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6955 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6956 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6957 pub chain_monitor: M,
6959 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6960 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6961 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6962 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6963 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6964 /// deserialization.
6966 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6967 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6968 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6970 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6971 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6973 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6974 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6975 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6976 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6978 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6981 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6982 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
6985 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6986 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
6987 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6988 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6989 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6990 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6993 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6994 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6995 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6996 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6997 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
6999 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7000 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7005 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7006 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7007 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7008 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7009 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7010 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7011 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7012 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7015 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7016 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7017 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7021 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7022 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7023 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7024 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7025 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7026 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7029 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7030 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7032 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7033 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7034 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7036 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7038 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7039 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7040 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7041 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7042 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7043 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7044 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7045 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7046 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7047 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7048 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7049 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7050 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7051 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7052 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7053 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7054 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7055 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7056 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7057 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7058 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7059 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7060 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7061 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7062 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7063 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7064 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7065 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7066 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7067 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7068 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7069 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7070 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7071 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7072 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7073 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7074 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7075 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7076 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7077 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7079 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7080 let mut found_htlc = false;
7081 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7082 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7085 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7086 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7087 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7088 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7089 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7090 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7091 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7092 log_info!(args.logger,
7093 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7094 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7095 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7099 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7100 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7101 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7103 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7104 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7106 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7108 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7109 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7110 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7111 // safely discard the channel.
7112 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7113 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7114 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7115 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7116 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7119 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7120 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7121 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7122 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7123 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7124 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7128 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7129 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7130 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7131 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7135 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7136 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7137 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7138 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7139 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7140 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7141 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7142 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7143 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7145 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7148 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7149 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7150 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7151 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7152 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7153 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7154 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7155 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7157 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7160 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7161 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7162 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7163 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7164 let peer_state = PeerState {
7165 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7167 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7170 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7171 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7172 for _ in 0..event_count {
7173 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7174 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7179 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7180 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7181 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7182 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7183 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7184 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7188 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7189 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7191 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7192 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7193 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7194 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7195 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7199 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7200 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7201 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7202 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7203 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7204 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7205 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7207 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7208 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7212 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7213 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7214 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7215 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7216 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7217 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7218 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7219 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7220 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7221 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7222 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7223 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7224 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7225 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7226 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7227 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7228 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7229 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7231 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7232 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7235 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7236 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7239 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7240 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7241 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7242 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7243 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7244 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7246 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7248 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7249 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7250 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7251 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7252 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7253 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7254 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7256 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7257 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7258 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7259 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7260 if path.is_empty() {
7261 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7262 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7264 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7265 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7266 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7267 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7268 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7269 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7270 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7271 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7274 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7275 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7276 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7277 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7279 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7280 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7281 total_msat: path_amt,
7282 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7284 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7285 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7290 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7291 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7292 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7293 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7294 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7296 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7297 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7298 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7299 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7300 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7301 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7302 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7303 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7304 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7305 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7306 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7311 !forwards.is_empty()
7313 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7314 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7315 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7316 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7317 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7318 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7319 intercepted_id != ev_id
7331 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7332 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7333 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7334 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7335 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7336 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7337 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7338 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7342 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7343 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7345 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7346 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7347 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7348 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7350 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7351 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7354 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7355 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7356 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7357 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7358 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7360 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7361 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7362 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7363 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7364 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7365 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7366 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7367 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7369 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7370 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7374 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7376 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7378 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7379 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7381 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7385 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7386 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7388 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7389 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7392 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7394 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7396 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7397 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7398 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7399 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7400 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7404 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7405 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7406 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7407 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7409 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7410 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7411 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7413 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7414 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7415 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7416 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7417 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7418 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7420 if chan.is_usable() {
7421 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7422 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7423 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7424 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7425 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7430 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7432 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7433 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7434 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7435 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7436 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7437 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7438 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7439 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7440 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7441 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7442 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7444 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7445 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7447 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7448 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7449 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7450 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7452 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7453 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7454 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7455 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7457 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7458 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7459 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7460 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7462 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7463 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7464 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7466 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7467 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7470 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7473 purpose: payment_purpose,
7474 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7480 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7482 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7483 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7484 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7486 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7488 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7490 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7492 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7493 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7494 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7495 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7497 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7498 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7499 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7500 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7501 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7502 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7504 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7510 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7512 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7514 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7515 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7516 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7517 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7519 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7520 logger: args.logger,
7521 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7524 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7525 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7526 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7527 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7528 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7531 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7532 //connection or two.
7534 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7540 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7541 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7542 use core::time::Duration;
7543 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7544 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7545 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7546 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7547 use crate::ln::msgs;
7548 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7549 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7550 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7551 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7552 use crate::util::test_utils;
7553 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7556 fn test_notify_limits() {
7557 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7558 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7559 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7560 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7561 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7562 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7564 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7565 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7566 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7567 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7568 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7570 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7572 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7573 // to connect messages with new values
7574 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7575 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7576 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7577 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7579 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7580 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7581 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7582 // ... but the last node should not.
7583 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7584 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7585 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7586 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7588 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7589 // about the channel.
7590 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7591 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7592 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7594 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7596 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7597 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7598 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7599 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7600 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7601 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7603 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7604 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7605 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7607 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7608 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7609 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7610 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7611 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7612 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7614 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7615 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7616 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7617 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7618 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7619 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7620 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7621 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7623 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7624 // the channel info has updated.
7625 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7626 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7627 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7628 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7629 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7630 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7634 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7635 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7637 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7638 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7639 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7640 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7641 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7643 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7644 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7645 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7646 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7648 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7649 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7650 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7651 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7652 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7653 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7655 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7656 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7657 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7659 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7660 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7662 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7663 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7664 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7665 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7666 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7668 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7669 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7670 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7672 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7673 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7674 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7675 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7676 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7677 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7678 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7679 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7680 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7682 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7683 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7685 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7686 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7687 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7689 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7690 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7691 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7692 // lightning messages manually.
7693 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7694 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7697 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7698 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7699 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7701 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7702 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7704 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7705 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7707 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7708 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7709 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7711 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7712 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7713 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7715 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7717 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7719 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7720 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7723 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7724 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7725 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7726 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7728 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7729 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7730 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7731 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7736 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7737 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7738 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7739 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7741 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7744 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7745 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7746 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7747 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7749 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7754 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7755 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7756 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7757 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7758 // fails as expected.
7759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7760 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7761 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7762 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7763 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7764 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7765 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7767 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7768 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7769 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7771 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7772 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7773 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7774 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7775 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7777 let route = find_route(
7778 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7779 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7781 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7783 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7784 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7785 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7786 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7787 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7789 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7790 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7791 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7792 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7793 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7795 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7796 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7797 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7798 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7799 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7800 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7801 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7802 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7803 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7805 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7806 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7808 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7809 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7810 let route = find_route(
7811 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7812 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7814 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7816 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7817 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7818 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7819 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7820 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7822 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7823 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7824 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7826 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7827 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7828 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7829 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7830 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7832 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7833 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7834 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7836 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7837 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7838 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7839 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7840 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7841 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7842 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7843 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7844 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7846 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7847 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7851 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7852 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7853 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7854 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7855 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7856 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7857 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7859 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7860 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7861 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7862 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7864 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7865 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7866 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7867 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7868 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7870 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7871 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7872 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7873 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7874 let route = find_route(
7875 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7876 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7879 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7880 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7881 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7882 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7885 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7886 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7887 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7888 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7889 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7890 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7891 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7893 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7897 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7898 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7899 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7900 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7901 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7902 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7904 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7905 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7906 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7907 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7909 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7910 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7911 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7912 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7913 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7915 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7916 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7917 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7918 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7919 let route = find_route(
7920 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7921 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7924 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7925 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7926 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7927 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7928 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7931 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7932 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7933 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7934 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7935 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7936 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7937 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7939 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7943 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7944 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7945 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7946 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7947 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7949 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7950 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7951 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7952 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7954 // Marshall an MPP route.
7955 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7956 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7957 route.paths.push(path);
7958 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7959 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7960 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7961 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7962 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7963 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7965 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
7966 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7967 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7968 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7973 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7974 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7975 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7976 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7977 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7978 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7980 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7981 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7983 total_msat: 100_000,
7986 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7987 // payment verification fails as expected.
7988 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7989 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7990 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7991 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7993 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7997 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7998 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8002 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8003 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8004 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8005 // the channel is successfully closed.
8006 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8007 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8008 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8009 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8011 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8012 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8013 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8014 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8015 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8017 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8018 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8020 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8021 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8022 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8023 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8026 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8028 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8029 // as it has the funding transaction.
8030 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8031 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8032 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8034 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8037 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8039 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8041 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8042 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8043 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8045 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8046 // as it has the funding transaction.
8047 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8048 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8049 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8052 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8053 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8055 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8056 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8057 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8059 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8060 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8061 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8062 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8064 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8065 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8067 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8068 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8069 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8070 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8071 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8072 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8073 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8075 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8076 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8077 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8078 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8079 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8080 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8081 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8084 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8086 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8087 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8088 // closing transaction).
8089 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8090 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8091 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8093 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8094 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8095 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8096 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8097 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8100 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8102 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8104 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8105 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8106 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8108 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8110 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8111 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8115 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8117 use crate::chain::Listen;
8118 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8119 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8120 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8121 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8122 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8123 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8124 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8125 use crate::util::test_utils;
8126 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8127 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8129 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8130 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8131 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8133 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8137 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8138 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8139 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8140 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8141 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8142 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8143 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8148 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8149 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8152 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8153 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8154 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8156 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8157 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8159 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8160 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8162 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8163 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8165 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8166 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8167 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8168 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8169 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8171 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8173 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8175 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8176 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8177 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8178 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8179 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8181 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8183 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8185 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8186 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8187 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8188 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8189 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8192 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8193 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8194 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8196 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8197 } else { panic!(); }
8199 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8200 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8202 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8205 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8208 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8209 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8211 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8212 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8213 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8214 match msg_events[0] {
8215 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8216 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8217 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8221 match msg_events[1] {
8222 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8226 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8227 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8229 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8230 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8235 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8236 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8238 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8239 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8241 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8244 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8246 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8247 macro_rules! send_payment {
8248 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8249 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8250 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8251 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8252 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8253 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8254 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8255 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8256 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8257 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8259 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8260 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8262 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8263 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8265 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8266 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8267 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8268 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8269 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8270 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8271 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8272 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8274 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8275 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8276 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8277 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8279 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8280 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8281 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8282 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8283 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8285 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8288 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8289 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8290 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8291 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8293 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8298 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8299 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);