1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
26 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
46 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
49 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
52 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
53 use util::config::UserConfig;
54 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
55 use util::{byte_utils, events};
56 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
57 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
58 use util::logger::Logger;
59 use util::errors::APIError;
62 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
63 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
64 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
65 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
66 use std::time::Duration;
67 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
68 use std::time::Instant;
69 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
71 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
73 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
75 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
76 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
77 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
79 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
80 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
81 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
82 // before we forward it.
84 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
85 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
86 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
87 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
88 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
90 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
91 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
93 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
94 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
97 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
98 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
103 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
104 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
105 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
106 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
107 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
108 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
111 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
112 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
113 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
114 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
117 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
120 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
121 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
124 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
126 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
128 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
129 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
130 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
132 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
134 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
138 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
142 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
143 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
144 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
145 short_channel_id: u64,
147 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
149 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
150 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
154 struct ClaimableHTLC {
155 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
157 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
158 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
159 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
160 /// are part of the same payment.
161 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
167 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
168 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
171 session_priv: SecretKey,
172 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
173 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
174 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
179 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
180 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
182 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
183 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
188 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
189 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
191 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
199 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
200 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
201 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
202 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
203 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
204 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
205 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
206 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
207 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
208 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
209 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
210 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
212 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
214 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
215 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
216 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
217 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
218 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
220 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
221 err: msgs::LightningError,
222 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
224 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
226 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
228 err: LightningError {
230 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
231 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
237 shutdown_finish: None,
241 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
243 err: LightningError {
245 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
247 shutdown_finish: None,
251 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
252 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
255 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
257 err: LightningError {
259 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
260 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
266 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
270 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
273 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
275 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
277 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
279 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
280 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
286 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
288 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
289 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
296 shutdown_finish: None,
301 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
302 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
303 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
304 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
305 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
307 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
308 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
309 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
310 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
311 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
312 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
313 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
315 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
319 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
320 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
321 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
322 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
323 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
324 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
325 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
326 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
327 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
328 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
329 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
330 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
331 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
333 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
334 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
335 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
336 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
339 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
340 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_chan_freshness_every_min, so may be processed with
341 /// quite some time lag.
342 enum BackgroundEvent {
343 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
344 /// commitment transaction.
345 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
348 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
349 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
351 latest_features: InitFeatures,
354 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
355 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
357 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
358 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
359 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
360 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
361 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
362 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
363 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
364 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
366 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
367 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
368 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
369 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
370 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
371 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
372 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
373 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
374 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
376 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
377 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
379 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
380 /// to individual Channels.
382 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
383 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
384 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
385 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
387 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
388 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
389 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
390 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
391 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
392 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
393 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
395 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
396 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
397 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
398 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
401 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
402 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
403 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
404 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
405 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
407 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
408 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
409 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
410 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
411 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
412 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
413 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
414 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
415 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
416 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
419 default_configuration: UserConfig,
420 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
426 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
428 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
429 last_block_hash: RwLock<BlockHash>,
430 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
432 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
433 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
434 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
435 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
436 our_network_key: SecretKey,
437 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
439 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
440 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
441 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
443 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
444 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
445 /// are currently open with that peer.
446 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
447 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
449 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
451 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
452 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
453 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
454 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
455 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
456 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
457 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
458 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
459 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
461 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
468 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
470 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
471 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
472 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
473 pub struct ChainParameters {
474 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
475 pub network: Network,
477 /// The hash of the latest block successfully connected.
478 pub latest_hash: BlockHash,
480 /// The height of the latest block successfully connected.
482 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
483 pub latest_height: usize,
486 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
487 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
488 /// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
489 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
490 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
491 /// updates are ready for persistence).
492 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
493 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
494 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
495 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
498 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
499 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
500 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
503 persistence_notifier: notifier,
504 _read_guard: read_guard,
509 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
511 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
515 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
516 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
518 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
520 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
521 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
522 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
523 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
524 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
526 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
527 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
529 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
531 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
532 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
533 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
534 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
535 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
536 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
537 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
539 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
540 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
541 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
542 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
543 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
544 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
547 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
549 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
550 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
553 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
555 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
557 pub struct ChannelDetails {
558 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
559 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
560 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
561 /// lifetime of the channel.
562 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
563 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
564 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
565 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
566 /// The node_id of our counterparty
567 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
568 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
569 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
570 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
571 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
572 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
573 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
574 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
576 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
577 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
578 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
579 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
580 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
581 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
582 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
583 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
584 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
585 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
586 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
587 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
588 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
591 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
592 /// payments to us through this channel.
593 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
596 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
597 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
599 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
600 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
601 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
602 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
603 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
604 ParameterError(APIError),
605 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
606 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
607 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
610 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
612 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
613 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
614 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
615 /// paths than the ones selected).
616 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
617 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
618 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
619 /// in over-/re-payment.
621 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
622 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
623 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
625 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
626 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
627 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
628 /// with the latest update_id.
629 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
632 macro_rules! handle_error {
633 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
636 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
637 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
639 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
640 // entering the macro.
641 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
644 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
646 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
647 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
648 if let Some(update) = update_option {
649 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
655 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
656 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
658 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
659 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
660 action: err.action.clone()
664 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
665 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
668 // Return error in case higher-API need one
675 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
676 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
679 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
680 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
682 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
683 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
684 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
685 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
686 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
688 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
690 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
695 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
696 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
699 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
700 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
702 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
703 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
704 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
705 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
706 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
708 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
710 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
711 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
712 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
713 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
714 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
716 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
717 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
723 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
724 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
725 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
727 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
729 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
730 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
731 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
732 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
733 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
735 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
736 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
737 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
738 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
739 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
740 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
741 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
742 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
743 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
744 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
747 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
748 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
749 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
750 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
752 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
753 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
755 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
756 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
758 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
759 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
760 if !$resend_commitment {
761 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
764 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
766 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
767 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
773 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
774 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
775 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
777 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
778 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
782 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
783 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
784 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
785 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
786 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
789 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
794 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
795 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
796 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
797 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
798 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
801 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
803 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
804 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
806 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
808 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
810 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
811 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
812 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
813 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
814 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
815 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
818 default_configuration: config.clone(),
819 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
820 fee_estimator: fee_est,
824 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(params.latest_height),
825 last_block_hash: RwLock::new(params.latest_hash),
827 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
828 by_id: HashMap::new(),
829 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
830 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
831 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
832 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
834 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
835 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
838 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
840 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
842 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
843 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
844 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
845 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
853 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
855 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
856 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
857 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
858 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
860 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
861 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
863 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
864 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
865 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
866 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
867 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
870 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
871 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
872 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
874 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
875 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
876 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
878 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
879 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
881 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
882 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
884 panic!("RNG is bad???");
887 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
889 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
890 node_id: their_network_key,
896 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
897 let mut res = Vec::new();
899 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
900 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
901 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
902 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
903 res.push(ChannelDetails {
904 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
905 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
906 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
907 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
908 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
909 inbound_capacity_msat,
910 outbound_capacity_msat,
911 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
912 is_live: channel.is_live(),
913 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
917 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
918 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
919 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
920 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
926 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
927 /// more information.
928 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
929 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
932 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
933 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
935 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
936 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
937 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
938 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
939 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
940 // really wanted anyway.
941 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
944 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
945 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
946 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
948 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
949 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
950 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
952 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
953 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
954 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
955 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
957 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
958 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
959 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
962 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
963 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
964 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
966 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
967 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
972 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
973 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
975 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
976 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
981 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
982 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
983 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
992 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
993 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
994 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
995 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
996 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
998 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
999 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1000 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1001 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1002 // ignore the result here.
1003 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1007 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1009 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1010 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1011 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1012 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1013 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1014 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1017 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1018 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1020 chan.remove_entry().1
1022 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1025 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1026 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1027 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1028 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1029 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1034 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1037 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1038 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1039 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1040 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1041 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1042 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1043 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1044 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1045 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1046 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1047 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1057 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1058 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1059 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1060 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1061 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1065 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1066 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1067 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1069 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1070 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1071 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1072 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1073 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1074 failure_code: $err_code,
1075 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1080 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1081 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1084 let shared_secret = {
1085 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1086 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1089 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1091 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1092 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1093 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1094 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1095 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1096 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1097 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1098 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1101 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1102 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1103 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1104 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1105 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1108 let mut channel_state = None;
1109 macro_rules! return_err {
1110 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1112 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1113 if channel_state.is_none() {
1114 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1116 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1117 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1118 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1119 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1120 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1125 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1126 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1127 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1128 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1130 let error_code = match err {
1131 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1132 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1133 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1134 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1135 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1137 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1140 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1141 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1142 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1149 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1152 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1153 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1154 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1155 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1156 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1157 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1158 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1159 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1160 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1161 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1162 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1163 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1167 // final_expiry_too_soon
1168 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1169 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1170 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1171 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1172 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1173 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1175 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1176 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1177 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1179 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1180 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1181 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1184 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1185 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1186 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1187 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1190 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1191 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1192 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1193 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1195 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1196 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1198 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1200 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1201 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1202 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1203 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1206 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1207 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1208 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1210 // Check two things:
1211 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1212 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1213 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1215 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1217 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1218 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1219 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1221 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1223 let blinding_factor = {
1224 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1225 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1226 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1227 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1230 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1232 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1234 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1237 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1238 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1241 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1242 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1243 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1244 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1245 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1249 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1250 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1251 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1254 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1255 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1256 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1257 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1261 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1262 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1263 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1264 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1265 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1266 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1267 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1268 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1269 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1270 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1272 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1274 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1275 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1277 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1278 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1279 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1280 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1281 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1282 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1283 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1285 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1286 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1288 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1289 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1290 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1292 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1293 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1295 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1296 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1297 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1298 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1299 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1301 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1302 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1304 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1305 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1306 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1307 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1313 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1314 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1315 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1316 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1318 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1319 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1321 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1322 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1323 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1325 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1327 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1332 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1335 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1336 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1337 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1338 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1339 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1343 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1345 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1346 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1348 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1349 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1350 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1351 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1352 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1353 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1354 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1355 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1358 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1359 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1361 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1367 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1368 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1370 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1371 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1373 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1374 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1375 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1376 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1377 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1379 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1381 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1383 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1384 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1385 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1386 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1387 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1390 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1391 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1393 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1394 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1396 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1397 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1399 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1401 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1402 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1403 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1405 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1406 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1407 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1408 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1409 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1410 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1411 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1412 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1413 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1416 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1417 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1418 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1419 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1420 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1421 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1422 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1430 } else { unreachable!(); }
1434 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1435 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1437 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1442 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1444 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1445 /// fields for more info.
1447 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1448 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1449 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1450 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1451 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1452 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1454 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1456 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1457 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1458 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1460 /// In general, a path may raise:
1461 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1462 /// node public key) is specified.
1463 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1464 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1466 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1467 /// relevant updates.
1469 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1470 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1471 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1473 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1474 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1475 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1476 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1478 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1479 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1480 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1481 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1482 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1483 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1485 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1486 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1487 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1488 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1489 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1491 let mut total_value = 0;
1492 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1493 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1494 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1495 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1496 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1497 continue 'path_check;
1499 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1500 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1501 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1502 continue 'path_check;
1505 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1506 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1508 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1509 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1512 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1513 let mut results = Vec::new();
1514 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1515 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1517 let mut has_ok = false;
1518 let mut has_err = false;
1519 for res in results.iter() {
1520 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1521 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1522 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1523 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1530 if has_err && has_ok {
1531 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1533 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1539 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1541 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1542 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1544 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1546 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1547 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1548 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1552 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1554 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1555 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1556 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1557 } else { unreachable!(); })
1562 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1563 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1566 Err(_) => { return; }
1570 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1571 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1572 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1575 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1576 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1577 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1585 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1586 if !chan.should_announce() {
1587 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1591 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1593 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1595 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1596 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1598 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1599 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1600 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1601 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1602 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1607 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1608 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1609 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1611 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1614 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1615 // smaller than 500:
1616 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1618 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1619 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1620 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1622 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1623 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1625 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1626 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1627 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1628 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1630 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1631 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1632 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1634 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1635 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1638 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1639 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1640 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1641 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1642 rgb, alias, addresses,
1643 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1644 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1646 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1648 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1649 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1650 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1651 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1652 contents: announcement
1657 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1659 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1660 /// Will likely generate further events.
1661 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1664 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1665 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1666 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1668 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1669 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1671 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1672 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1673 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1674 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1676 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1677 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1678 match forward_info {
1679 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1680 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1681 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1682 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1683 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1684 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1685 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1687 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1688 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1691 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1692 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1693 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1694 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1695 // problem, not ours.
1702 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1703 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1704 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1705 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1706 match forward_info {
1707 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1708 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1710 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1711 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1712 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1713 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1714 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1715 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1716 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1717 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1719 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1721 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1722 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1724 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1726 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1727 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1728 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1734 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1736 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1737 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1738 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1739 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1740 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1741 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1742 // this channel currently :/.
1748 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1749 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1751 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1752 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1753 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1755 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1756 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1758 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1760 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1761 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1762 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1765 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1767 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1768 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1769 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1770 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1771 // messages when we can.
1772 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1773 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1774 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1781 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1782 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1785 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1786 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1787 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1788 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1789 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1790 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1792 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1793 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1794 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1795 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1796 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1798 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1800 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1802 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1806 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1807 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1810 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1811 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1812 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1813 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1814 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1815 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1816 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1818 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1826 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1827 match forward_info {
1828 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1829 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1830 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1831 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1832 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1833 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1834 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1835 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1836 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1839 let mut total_value = 0;
1840 let payment_secret_opt =
1841 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1842 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1843 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1844 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1846 value: amt_to_forward,
1847 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1848 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1850 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1851 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1852 total_value += htlc.value;
1853 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1854 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1856 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1858 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1859 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1860 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1861 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1862 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1863 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1867 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1868 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1869 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1870 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1871 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1873 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1876 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1877 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1879 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1884 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1886 payment_secret: None,
1887 amt: amt_to_forward,
1891 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1892 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1894 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1895 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1903 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1904 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1907 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1908 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1911 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1912 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1913 events.append(&mut new_events);
1916 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
1918 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
1919 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
1921 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
1922 fn process_background_events(&self) {
1923 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
1924 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
1925 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
1927 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
1928 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
1929 // monitor updating completing.
1930 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
1936 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1937 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
1938 self.process_background_events();
1941 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1942 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1943 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1945 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1947 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
1948 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1949 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1950 self.process_background_events();
1952 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1953 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1954 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1955 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1956 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1957 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1962 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1964 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1965 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1970 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1971 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1972 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1973 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1974 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1975 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1976 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1978 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1979 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1980 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1981 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1982 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1983 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1984 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1985 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1987 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1988 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1989 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1995 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
1996 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
1997 // be surfaced to the user.
1998 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
1999 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2001 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2002 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2003 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2005 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2006 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2008 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2011 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2013 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2014 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2015 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2017 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2018 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2019 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2021 rejected_by_dest: false,
2033 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2034 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2035 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2036 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2037 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2038 /// still-available channels.
2039 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2040 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2041 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2042 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2045 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2046 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2047 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2049 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2050 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2051 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2052 match &onion_error {
2053 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2055 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2057 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2058 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2059 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2060 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2061 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2062 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2063 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2068 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2069 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2070 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2071 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2073 error_code: onion_error_code,
2075 error_data: onion_error_data
2079 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2085 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2086 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2087 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2088 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2090 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2091 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2092 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2093 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2094 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2095 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2097 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2099 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2105 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2106 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2107 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2108 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2109 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2110 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2112 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2113 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2114 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2118 let mut forward_event = None;
2119 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2120 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2122 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2123 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2124 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2126 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2127 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2130 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2131 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2132 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2133 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2134 time_forwardable: time
2141 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2142 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2143 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2145 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2146 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2147 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2148 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2149 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2150 /// motivated attackers.
2152 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2153 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2155 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2156 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2157 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2159 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2161 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2162 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2163 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2164 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2166 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2167 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2168 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2169 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2171 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2172 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2173 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2174 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2175 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2178 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2179 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2180 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2182 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2186 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2187 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2188 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2193 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2194 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2195 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2196 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2197 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2198 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2199 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2200 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2202 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2203 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2204 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2206 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2208 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2209 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2210 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2211 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2212 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2213 } else { errs.push(e); }
2215 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2217 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2219 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2224 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2225 // which were generated.
2226 channel_state.take();
2228 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2229 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2230 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2237 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2238 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2239 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2240 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2241 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2247 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2248 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2249 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2250 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2251 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2252 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2253 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2254 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2256 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2260 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2261 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2262 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2263 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2264 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2265 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2266 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2267 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2276 // TODO: Do something with e?
2277 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2278 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2279 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2280 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2281 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2282 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2283 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2287 } else { unreachable!(); }
2290 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2292 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2293 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2294 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2295 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2299 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2300 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2301 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2304 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2305 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2306 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2307 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2310 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2311 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2312 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2313 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2314 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2315 payment_preimage, e);
2319 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2321 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2322 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2323 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2329 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2330 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2331 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2334 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2335 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2338 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2339 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2341 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2342 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2343 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2344 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2346 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2347 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2348 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2349 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2350 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2351 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2352 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2353 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2354 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2357 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2358 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2359 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2360 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2363 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2364 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2365 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2366 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2367 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2371 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2375 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2376 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2377 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2379 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2381 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2382 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2383 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2384 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2389 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2390 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2391 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2392 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2393 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2398 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2402 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2407 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2408 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2409 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2410 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2413 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2414 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2415 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2418 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2419 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2420 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2421 msg: announcement_sigs,
2424 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2428 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2430 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2431 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2433 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2435 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2436 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2440 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2441 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2442 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2445 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2446 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2447 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2448 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2449 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2450 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2451 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2452 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2453 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2454 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2456 entry.insert(channel);
2462 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2463 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2464 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2465 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2466 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2467 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2468 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2469 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2471 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2472 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2474 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2477 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2478 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2479 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2480 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2482 user_channel_id: user_id,
2487 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2488 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2489 let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
2490 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2491 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2492 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2493 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2494 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2495 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2497 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2499 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2502 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2503 // lock before watch_channel
2504 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2506 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2507 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2508 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2509 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2510 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2511 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2512 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2513 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2514 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2515 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2516 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2518 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2519 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2520 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2521 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2522 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2523 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2527 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2528 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2529 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2530 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2531 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2533 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2534 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2535 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2544 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2545 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2546 let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
2547 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2548 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2549 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2551 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2552 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2554 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger) {
2555 Ok(update) => update,
2556 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2558 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2559 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2561 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2566 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2567 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2569 user_channel_id: user_id,
2574 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2575 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2576 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2577 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2579 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2580 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2582 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2583 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2584 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2585 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2586 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2587 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2588 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2589 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2590 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2591 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2592 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2593 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2594 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2595 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2596 msg: announcement_sigs,
2601 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2605 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2606 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2607 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2608 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2610 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2611 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2612 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2613 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2615 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2616 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2617 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2618 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2622 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2623 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2624 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2628 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2629 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2630 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2632 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2633 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2638 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2639 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2641 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2642 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2643 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2644 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2652 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2653 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2654 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2655 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2656 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2657 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2658 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2659 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2661 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2662 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2663 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2664 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2669 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2670 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2671 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2672 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2673 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2674 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2675 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2677 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2678 } else { (tx, None) }
2680 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2683 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2684 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2685 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2687 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2688 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2689 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2690 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2698 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2699 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2700 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2701 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2703 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2704 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2705 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2706 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2708 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2709 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2711 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2712 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2713 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2714 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2717 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2718 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2719 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2720 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2721 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2722 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2723 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2724 match pending_forward_info {
2725 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2726 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2727 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2728 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2729 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2730 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2731 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2735 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2736 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2737 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2738 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2739 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2740 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2741 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2742 // no problem just calling this
2743 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2744 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2746 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2747 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2748 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2751 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2753 _ => pending_forward_info
2756 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2763 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2764 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2766 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2767 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2768 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2769 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2770 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2772 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2777 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2781 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2782 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2783 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2784 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2785 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2786 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2787 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2789 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2791 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2796 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2797 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2798 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2799 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2801 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2802 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2804 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2805 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2806 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2808 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2811 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2815 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2816 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2817 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2818 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2819 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2820 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2821 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2823 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2824 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2825 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2826 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2827 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2828 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2829 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2834 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2835 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2836 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2838 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2839 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2840 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2842 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2843 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2844 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2845 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2846 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2847 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2848 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2849 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2851 commitment_signed: msg,
2855 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2856 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2857 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2863 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2868 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2869 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2870 let mut forward_event = None;
2871 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2872 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2873 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2874 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2876 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2877 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2878 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2879 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2881 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2882 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2883 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2885 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2886 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2887 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2892 match forward_event {
2894 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2895 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2896 time_forwardable: time
2904 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2905 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2907 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2908 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2909 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2911 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2912 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2914 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2915 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2916 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2917 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2918 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2919 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2920 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2921 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2923 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2925 } else { unreachable!(); }
2928 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2929 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2930 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2934 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2935 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2936 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2940 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
2942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2945 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
2947 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
2948 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2949 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2951 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
2958 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2959 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2960 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2961 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2962 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2963 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2964 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2966 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2968 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2973 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2974 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2975 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2977 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2978 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2979 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2980 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2982 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2983 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2986 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2987 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2988 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2990 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2991 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2993 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
2994 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
2995 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
2996 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
2998 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
2999 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3002 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
3003 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3009 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3011 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3012 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3013 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
3014 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
3015 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
3016 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3017 contents: announcement,
3019 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3027 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3028 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3029 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3030 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3031 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3033 // It's not a local channel
3037 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3038 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3039 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3040 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3041 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3043 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3045 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3050 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3051 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3052 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3054 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3055 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3056 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3057 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3059 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3060 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3061 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3062 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3063 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3064 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3065 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3066 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3067 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3068 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3069 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3070 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3071 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3073 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3074 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3076 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3077 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3080 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3081 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3082 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3086 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3087 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3088 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3089 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3094 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3095 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3096 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3097 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3103 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3107 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3112 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3113 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3114 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3124 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3125 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3126 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3127 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3128 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3130 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3131 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3132 let counterparty_node_id;
3133 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3134 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3135 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3137 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3138 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3139 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3140 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3141 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3143 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3144 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3146 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3147 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3149 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3150 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3151 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3153 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3156 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3157 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3158 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3159 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3160 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3161 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3162 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3163 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3173 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3174 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3175 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3179 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3180 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3181 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3183 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3184 match monitor_event {
3185 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3186 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3187 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3188 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3190 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3191 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3194 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3195 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3196 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3197 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3198 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3199 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3200 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3201 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3202 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3204 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3205 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3206 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3210 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3211 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3212 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3213 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3222 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3223 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3227 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3228 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3230 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3231 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3232 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3233 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3234 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3235 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3236 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3237 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3238 // timer_chan_freshness_every_min, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3239 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3240 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3241 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3242 assert!(should_broadcast);
3243 } else { unreachable!(); }
3244 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3246 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3251 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3252 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3253 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3254 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3255 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3258 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3259 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3260 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3261 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3263 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3264 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3265 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3270 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3271 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3272 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3273 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3274 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3277 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3278 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3279 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3280 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3282 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3283 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3284 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3289 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3291 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3292 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3293 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3294 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3297 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3298 assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3299 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3300 assert_eq!(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, height as u64 - 1,
3301 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3302 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3303 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, height, &txdata);
3304 self.update_best_block(&block.header, height);
3307 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3308 assert_eq!(*self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap(), header.block_hash(),
3309 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3311 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3312 let new_height = self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32 - 1;
3313 assert_eq!(new_height, height - 1,
3314 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3315 *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = header.prev_blockhash;
3317 self.do_chain_event(new_height, |channel| channel.update_best_block(new_height, header.time));
3321 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3322 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3323 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3324 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3325 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3328 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3329 (&self, height: u32, f: FN) {
3330 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3331 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3332 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3334 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3335 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3337 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3338 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3339 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3340 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3341 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3342 let res = f(channel);
3343 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3344 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3345 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3346 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3347 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3351 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3352 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3353 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3354 msg: funding_locked,
3356 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3358 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3359 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3360 msg: announcement_sigs,
3363 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3365 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3367 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3368 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3369 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3371 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3372 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3373 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3374 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3375 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3379 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3380 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3388 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3389 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3390 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3391 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3392 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3393 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3394 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3395 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3396 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3397 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3398 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3399 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3404 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3408 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3410 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3411 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3415 /// Updates channel state to take note of transactions which were confirmed in the given block
3416 /// at the given height.
3418 /// Note that you must still call (or have called) [`update_best_block`] with the block
3419 /// information which is included here.
3421 /// This method may be called before or after [`update_best_block`] for a given block's
3422 /// transaction data and may be called multiple times with additional transaction data for a
3425 /// This method may be called for a previous block after an [`update_best_block`] call has
3426 /// been made for a later block, however it must *not* be called with transaction data from a
3427 /// block which is no longer in the best chain (ie where [`update_best_block`] has already
3428 /// been informed about a blockchain reorganization which no longer includes the block which
3429 /// corresponds to `header`).
3431 /// [`update_best_block`]: `Self::update_best_block`
3432 pub fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData) {
3433 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3434 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3435 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3437 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3438 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3440 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3441 self.do_chain_event(height, |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3444 /// Updates channel state with the current best blockchain tip. You should attempt to call this
3445 /// quickly after a new block becomes available, however if multiple new blocks become
3446 /// available at the same time, only a single `update_best_block()` call needs to be made.
3448 /// This method should also be called immediately after any block disconnections, once at the
3449 /// reorganization fork point, and once with the new chain tip. Calling this method at the
3450 /// blockchain reorganization fork point ensures we learn when a funding transaction which was
3451 /// previously confirmed is reorganized out of the blockchain, ensuring we do not continue to
3452 /// accept payments which cannot be enforced on-chain.
3454 /// In both the block-connection and block-disconnection case, this method may be called either
3455 /// once per block connected or disconnected, or simply at the fork point and new tip(s),
3456 /// skipping any intermediary blocks.
3457 pub fn update_best_block(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3458 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3459 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3460 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3462 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3463 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3465 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3467 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3468 *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = block_hash;
3470 self.do_chain_event(height, |channel| channel.update_best_block(height, header.time));
3473 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3474 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3475 // having an explicit local time source.
3476 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3477 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3478 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3479 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3480 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3486 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3487 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3488 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3490 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3491 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3492 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3493 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3496 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3497 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3499 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3500 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3503 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3504 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3505 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3506 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3507 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3512 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3513 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3514 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3515 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3516 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3517 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3520 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3521 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3522 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3525 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3526 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3527 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3530 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3531 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3532 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3535 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3536 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3537 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3540 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3541 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3542 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3545 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3546 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3547 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3550 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3551 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3552 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3555 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3556 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3557 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3560 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3562 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3565 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3566 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3567 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3570 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3571 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3572 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3575 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3576 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3577 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3580 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3581 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3582 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3585 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3587 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3590 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3591 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3592 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3595 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3596 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3597 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3600 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3601 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3602 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3605 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3606 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3607 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3608 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3609 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3611 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3612 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3613 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3614 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3615 if no_connection_possible {
3616 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3617 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3618 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3619 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3620 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3622 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3623 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3624 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3634 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3635 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3636 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3637 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3638 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3639 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3640 // reestablish logic.
3641 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3642 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3643 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3644 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3645 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3647 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3648 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3649 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3653 no_channels_remain = false;
3659 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3661 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3662 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3663 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3664 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3665 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3666 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3667 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3668 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3669 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3670 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3671 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3672 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3673 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3674 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3675 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3676 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3677 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3678 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3679 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
3683 if no_channels_remain {
3684 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3687 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3688 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3690 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3691 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3692 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3697 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3698 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3700 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3703 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3704 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3706 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3707 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3710 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3711 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3716 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3717 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3718 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3719 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3720 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3721 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3722 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3723 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3724 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3728 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3729 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3730 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3736 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3739 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3742 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3743 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3744 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3745 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3746 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3750 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3751 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3756 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
3757 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
3758 struct PersistenceNotifier {
3759 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
3760 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
3761 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
3764 impl PersistenceNotifier {
3767 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
3773 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3774 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3775 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
3776 let result = *guard;
3784 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3785 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3786 let current_time = Instant::now();
3788 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3789 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3790 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
3791 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
3792 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
3793 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
3794 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
3796 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
3797 let result = *guard;
3798 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
3802 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
3803 None => return result,
3809 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
3811 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
3812 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
3813 *persistence_lock = true;
3814 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
3819 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3820 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3822 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3823 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3824 match &self.routing {
3825 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3827 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3828 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3830 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3832 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3833 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3836 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3837 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3838 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3839 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3844 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3845 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3846 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3847 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3848 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3849 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3850 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3852 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3853 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3854 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3856 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3858 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3859 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3860 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3861 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3866 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3867 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3869 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3871 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3873 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3875 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3882 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3883 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3884 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3885 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3886 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3887 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3892 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3893 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3895 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3897 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3899 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3901 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3908 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3909 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3910 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3911 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3912 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3913 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3918 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3922 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3925 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3932 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3933 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3935 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3937 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3939 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3941 path.write(writer)?;
3942 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3943 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3950 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3951 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3952 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3953 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3954 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3955 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3956 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3957 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3959 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3964 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3965 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3967 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3971 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3973 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3974 data.write(writer)?;
3981 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3982 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3983 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3984 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3985 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3986 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3987 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3989 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3994 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3995 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3997 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3999 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4000 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
4001 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4002 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4004 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4006 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4007 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4014 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4015 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
4016 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4017 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
4018 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4019 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
4020 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4021 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
4023 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4024 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4025 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4027 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4032 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4033 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4034 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4035 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4036 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4039 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4040 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4042 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4043 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4045 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4046 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4047 self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap().write(writer)?;
4049 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4050 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4051 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4052 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4053 unfunded_channels += 1;
4056 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4057 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4058 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4059 channel.write(writer)?;
4063 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4064 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4065 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4066 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4067 for forward in pending_forwards {
4068 forward.write(writer)?;
4072 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4073 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4074 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4075 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4076 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4077 htlc.write(writer)?;
4081 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4082 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4083 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4084 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4085 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4086 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4089 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4090 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4091 for event in events.iter() {
4092 event.write(writer)?;
4095 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4096 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4097 for event in background_events.iter() {
4099 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4101 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4102 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4107 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4113 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4115 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4117 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4118 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4119 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4120 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4121 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4122 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4123 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4124 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4125 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4126 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4127 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4129 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4130 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4132 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4133 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4134 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4135 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4136 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4137 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4138 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4139 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4140 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4141 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4142 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4145 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4146 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4148 pub keys_manager: K,
4150 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4152 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4153 pub fee_estimator: F,
4154 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4156 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4157 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4158 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4159 pub chain_monitor: M,
4161 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4162 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4163 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4164 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4165 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4166 /// deserialization.
4168 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4169 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4170 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4172 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4173 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4175 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4176 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4177 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4178 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4180 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4183 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4184 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4187 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4188 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4189 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4190 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4191 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4192 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4195 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4196 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4197 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4198 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4199 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4201 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4202 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4207 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4208 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4209 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4210 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4211 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4212 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4213 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4214 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4217 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4218 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4219 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4223 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4224 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4225 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4226 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4227 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4228 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4231 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4232 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4233 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4234 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4235 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4238 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4239 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4240 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4242 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4244 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4245 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4246 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4247 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4248 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4249 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4250 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4251 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4252 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4253 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4254 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4255 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4256 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4257 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4258 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4259 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4260 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4261 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4262 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4263 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4264 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4265 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4266 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4268 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4269 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4271 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4274 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4278 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4279 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4280 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4284 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4285 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4286 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4287 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4288 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4289 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4290 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4291 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4292 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4294 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4297 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4298 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4299 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4300 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4301 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4302 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4303 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4304 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4306 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4309 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4310 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4311 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4312 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4313 let peer_state = PeerState {
4314 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4316 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4319 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4320 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4321 for _ in 0..event_count {
4322 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4323 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4328 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4329 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4330 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4331 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4332 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4333 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4337 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4339 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4340 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4342 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4344 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4345 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4346 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4348 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
4349 last_block_hash: RwLock::new(last_block_hash),
4351 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4356 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4358 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4359 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4362 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4364 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4366 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4367 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4368 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4369 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4371 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4372 logger: args.logger,
4373 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4376 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4377 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4380 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4381 //connection or two.
4383 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4389 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4391 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4393 use std::time::Duration;
4396 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4397 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4398 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4400 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4401 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4402 thread::spawn(move || {
4404 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4405 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4406 *persistence_lock = true;
4409 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4415 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4416 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4418 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4421 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4426 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4428 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4431 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4438 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4441 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4442 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4443 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4444 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4445 use ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4446 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4447 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4448 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4449 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4450 use routing::router::get_route;
4451 use util::test_utils;
4452 use util::config::UserConfig;
4453 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4455 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4456 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4457 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4459 use std::sync::Mutex;
4463 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4464 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4465 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4466 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4467 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4468 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4469 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4474 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4475 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4478 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4479 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4480 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4482 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4483 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4485 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
4486 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4488 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4489 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4491 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4492 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4493 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4494 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4495 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4497 latest_hash: genesis_hash,
4500 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4502 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4503 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4504 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4505 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4506 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4508 latest_hash: genesis_hash,
4511 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4513 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4514 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4515 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4518 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4519 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4520 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4522 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4523 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_outpoint);
4524 } else { panic!(); }
4526 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4527 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4529 get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingBroadcastSafe);
4532 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4535 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4536 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4538 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4539 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4541 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4543 macro_rules! send_payment {
4544 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4545 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4546 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), None, Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4548 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4549 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4551 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap();
4552 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
4553 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4554 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
4555 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4556 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4557 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4558 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4560 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
4561 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
4562 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &None, 10_000));
4564 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
4565 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
4566 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4567 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4568 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
4570 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
4573 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
4574 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4575 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4576 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4578 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
4583 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
4584 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);