1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, MessageRouter, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
82 use crate::prelude::*;
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
112 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
115 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
116 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
118 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
119 /// do with the HTLC.
120 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
121 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
123 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
124 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
125 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
126 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
127 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
128 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
130 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
132 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
133 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
135 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
136 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
137 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
138 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
139 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
141 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
142 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
143 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
144 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
145 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
147 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
148 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
149 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
150 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
152 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
153 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
158 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
159 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
160 requires_blinded_error: bool,
162 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
163 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
164 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
166 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
167 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
169 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
170 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
171 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
172 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
173 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
174 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
175 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
177 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
178 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
179 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
180 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
182 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
183 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
184 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
186 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
187 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
188 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
192 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
193 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
194 pub struct BlindedForward {
195 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
196 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
197 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
198 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
199 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
202 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
203 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
204 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
205 // TODO: needs update when we support forwarding blinded HTLCs as non-intro node
207 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
208 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
214 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
216 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
217 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
218 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
219 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
220 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
221 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
223 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
224 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
225 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
226 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
229 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
231 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
233 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
235 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
236 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
237 /// it along another path).
239 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
240 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
241 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
242 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
243 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
244 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
245 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
246 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
247 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
249 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
252 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
254 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
256 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
259 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
260 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
261 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
262 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
265 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
266 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
267 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
268 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
269 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
272 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
273 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
274 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
276 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
277 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
278 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
281 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
282 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
284 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
285 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
288 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
289 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
290 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
293 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
298 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
302 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
303 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
304 enum BlindedFailure {
305 FromIntroductionNode,
309 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
310 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
311 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
312 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
313 short_channel_id: u64,
314 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
316 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
317 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
318 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
320 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
321 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
326 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
328 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
329 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
330 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
332 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
333 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
336 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
337 struct ClaimableHTLC {
338 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
340 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
342 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
343 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
344 sender_intended_value: u64,
345 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
347 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
348 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
349 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
350 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
352 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
353 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
356 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
357 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
358 events::ClaimedHTLC {
359 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
360 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
361 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
362 value_msat: val.value,
363 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
368 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
369 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
371 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
372 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
373 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
376 /// Number of bytes in the id.
377 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
380 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
381 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
386 impl Readable for PaymentId {
387 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
388 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
393 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
394 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
395 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
399 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
401 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
402 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
403 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
405 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for InterceptId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
419 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
420 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
421 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
422 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
425 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
427 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
428 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
429 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
431 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
432 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
436 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
437 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
438 (0, short_channel_id, required),
439 (2, htlc_id, required),
441 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
442 (0, session_priv, required),
447 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
448 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
449 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
450 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
451 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
454 session_priv: SecretKey,
455 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
456 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
457 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
458 payment_id: PaymentId,
461 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
462 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
463 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
465 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
467 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
469 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
472 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
473 payment_id.hash(hasher);
474 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
480 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
482 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
483 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
484 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
485 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
486 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
487 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
491 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
492 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
493 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
494 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
495 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
496 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
498 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
504 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
505 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
507 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
508 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
509 pub enum FailureCode {
510 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
511 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
512 TemporaryNodeFailure,
513 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
514 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
515 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
516 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
517 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
518 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
519 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
520 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
521 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
522 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
524 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
525 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
526 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
529 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
530 fn into(self) -> u16 {
532 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
533 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
534 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
535 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
540 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
541 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
542 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
543 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
544 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
546 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
547 err: msgs::LightningError,
548 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
549 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
550 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
552 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
554 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
556 err: LightningError {
558 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
559 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
566 shutdown_finish: None,
567 channel_capacity: None,
571 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
572 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
575 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
576 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
577 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
578 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
579 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
580 // commitment upon reconnecting.
581 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
583 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
586 err: LightningError { err, action },
587 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
588 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
589 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
593 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
596 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
598 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
599 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
603 log_level: Level::Warn,
606 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
608 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
610 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
612 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
613 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
621 shutdown_finish: None,
622 channel_capacity: None,
626 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
627 self.chan_id.is_some()
631 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
632 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
633 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
634 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
635 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
637 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
638 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
639 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
640 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
641 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
642 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
643 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
645 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
649 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
650 struct ClaimingPayment {
652 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
653 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
654 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
655 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
657 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
658 (0, amount_msat, required),
659 (2, payment_purpose, required),
660 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
661 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
662 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
665 struct ClaimablePayment {
666 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
667 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
668 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
671 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
672 struct ClaimablePayments {
673 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
674 /// failed/claimed by the user.
676 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
677 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
679 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
680 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
681 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
683 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
684 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
685 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
686 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
689 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
690 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
691 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
692 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
694 enum BackgroundEvent {
695 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
696 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
697 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
698 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
700 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
701 /// are regenerated on startup.
702 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
703 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
704 /// channel to continue normal operation.
706 /// In general this should be used rather than
707 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
708 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
709 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
711 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
712 /// are regenerated on startup.
713 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
714 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
715 funding_txo: OutPoint,
716 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
718 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
719 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
721 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
722 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
723 channel_id: ChannelId,
728 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
729 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
730 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
731 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
732 /// event can be generated.
733 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
734 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
735 /// operation of another channel.
737 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
738 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
739 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
740 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
742 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
743 event: events::Event,
744 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
746 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
747 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
748 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
750 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
751 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
752 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
753 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
754 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
756 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
757 /// stored for later processing.
758 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
759 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
760 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
761 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
765 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
766 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
767 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
768 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
769 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
770 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
771 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
772 (4, blocking_action, required),
774 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
775 (0, event, upgradable_required),
776 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
777 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
778 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
779 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
780 // downgrades to prior versions.
781 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
785 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
786 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
787 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
788 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
789 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
792 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
793 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
794 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
799 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
800 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
801 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
802 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
803 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
804 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
806 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
807 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
808 channel_id: ChannelId,
809 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
814 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
815 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
816 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
817 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
818 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
823 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
824 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
828 /// State we hold per-peer.
829 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
830 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
832 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
833 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
834 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
836 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
837 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
838 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
839 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
840 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
841 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
842 latest_features: InitFeatures,
843 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
844 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
845 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
846 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
847 /// user but which have not yet completed.
849 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
850 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
851 /// for a missing channel.
852 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
853 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
854 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
856 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
857 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
858 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
859 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
861 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
862 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
863 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
864 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
865 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
866 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
867 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
868 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
869 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
870 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
871 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
872 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
873 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
874 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
875 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
879 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
880 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
881 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
882 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
883 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
884 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
887 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
888 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
889 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
892 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
893 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
894 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
897 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
898 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
899 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
900 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
904 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
905 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
906 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
907 /// The original OpenChannel message.
908 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
909 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
910 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
913 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
914 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
915 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
917 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
918 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
920 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
923 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
924 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
925 struct PendingInboundPayment {
926 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
927 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
928 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
929 /// this payment being removed.
931 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
932 user_payment_id: u64,
933 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
934 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
935 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
938 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
939 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
940 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
941 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
942 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
943 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
944 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
945 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
947 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
948 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
949 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
957 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
959 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
960 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
961 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
966 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
967 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
968 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
969 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
970 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
971 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
972 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
973 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
974 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
976 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
977 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
978 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
987 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
989 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
990 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
991 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
996 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
998 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1000 pub trait AChannelManager {
1001 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1002 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1003 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1004 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1005 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1006 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1007 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1008 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1009 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1010 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1011 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1012 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1013 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1014 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1015 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1016 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1017 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1018 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1019 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1020 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1021 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1022 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1023 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1024 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1025 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1026 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1027 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1028 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1029 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1030 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1031 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1032 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1033 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1034 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1035 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1036 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1039 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1040 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1042 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1043 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1044 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1045 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1046 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1047 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1051 type Watch = M::Target;
1053 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1055 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1057 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1059 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1060 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1062 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1064 type Router = R::Target;
1066 type Logger = L::Target;
1068 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1071 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1072 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1074 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1075 /// to individual Channels.
1077 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1078 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1079 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1080 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1082 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1083 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1084 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1085 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1086 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1087 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1088 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1089 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1090 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1092 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1093 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1094 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1096 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1097 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1098 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1099 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1100 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1102 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1103 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1104 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1105 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1107 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1108 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1109 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1111 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1112 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1113 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1114 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1115 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1117 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1118 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1119 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1120 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1121 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1122 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1123 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1124 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1127 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1128 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1129 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1130 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1131 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1135 // `pending_offers_messages`
1137 // `total_consistency_lock`
1139 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1141 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1143 // |__`per_peer_state`
1145 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1147 // |__`claimable_payments`
1149 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1153 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1155 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1157 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1161 // |__`pending_events`
1163 // |__`pending_background_events`
1165 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1167 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1168 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1169 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1170 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1171 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1172 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1176 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1177 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1178 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1184 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1186 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1188 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1189 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1191 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1192 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1193 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1194 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1196 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1197 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1199 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1200 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1201 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1202 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1203 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1204 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1205 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1206 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1208 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1210 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1211 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1213 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1215 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1216 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1217 /// and via the classic SCID.
1219 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1220 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1222 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1224 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1226 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1227 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1228 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1230 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1231 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1233 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1234 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1236 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1237 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1239 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1240 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1241 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1242 /// active channel list on load.
1244 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1245 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1247 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1249 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1250 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1251 /// the handling of the events.
1253 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1254 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1257 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1258 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1259 /// would break backwards compatability.
1260 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1261 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1262 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1264 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1266 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1268 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1270 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1272 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1273 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1274 /// confirmation depth.
1276 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1277 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1278 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1280 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1282 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1284 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1286 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1288 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1290 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1291 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1292 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1294 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1295 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1297 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1298 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1299 /// keeping additional state.
1300 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1302 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1303 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1304 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1305 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1307 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1308 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1310 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1311 /// are currently open with that peer.
1313 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1314 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1317 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1319 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1320 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1321 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1322 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1323 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1325 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1326 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1327 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1328 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1329 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1331 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1332 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1334 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1335 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1336 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1337 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1338 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1340 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1341 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1343 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1344 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1345 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1346 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1347 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1349 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1351 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1353 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1354 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1355 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1356 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1357 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1358 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1359 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1360 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1361 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1362 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1363 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1365 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1366 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1367 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1369 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1371 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1372 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1374 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1378 signer_provider: SP,
1383 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1385 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1386 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1387 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1388 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1389 pub struct ChainParameters {
1390 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1391 pub network: Network,
1393 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1395 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1396 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1399 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1403 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1404 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1407 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1408 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1409 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1410 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1411 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1412 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1414 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1415 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1416 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1417 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1418 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1419 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1421 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1422 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1425 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1426 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1427 /// events to handle.
1429 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1430 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1432 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1433 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1436 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1437 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1438 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1439 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1441 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1442 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1443 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1444 should_persist: move || {
1445 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1446 // processing and return that.
1447 let notify = persist_check();
1448 match (notify, force_notify) {
1449 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1450 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1451 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1452 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1453 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1456 _read_guard: read_guard,
1460 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1461 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1462 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1463 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1464 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1465 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1467 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1468 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1469 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1470 should_persist: persist_check,
1471 _read_guard: read_guard,
1476 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1477 fn drop(&mut self) {
1478 match (self.should_persist)() {
1479 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1480 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1481 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1483 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1484 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1485 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1490 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1491 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1493 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1495 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1496 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1497 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1498 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1499 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1501 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1502 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1504 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1506 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1507 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1508 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1509 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1510 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1511 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1512 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1513 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1514 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1515 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1516 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1517 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1518 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1520 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1521 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1523 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1524 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1525 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1526 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1528 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1529 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1530 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1531 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1532 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1533 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1535 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1537 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1538 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1540 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1542 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1543 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1545 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1546 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1547 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1549 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1550 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1551 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1553 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1554 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1555 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1556 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1558 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1559 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1560 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1562 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1563 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1564 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1566 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1567 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1568 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1569 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1570 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1571 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1572 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1573 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1574 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1575 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1576 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1579 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1580 /// to better separate parameters.
1581 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1582 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1583 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1584 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1585 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1586 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1587 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1588 pub features: InitFeatures,
1589 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1590 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1591 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1593 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1595 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1596 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1597 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1598 /// payments to us through this channel.
1599 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1600 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1601 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1602 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1603 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1604 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1605 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1608 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1609 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1610 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1611 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1612 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1613 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1614 /// lifetime of the channel.
1615 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1616 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1617 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1618 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1619 /// our counterparty already.
1621 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1622 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1623 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1624 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1626 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1627 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1628 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1629 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1631 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1632 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1634 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1635 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1637 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1638 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1639 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1640 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1641 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1642 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1643 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1644 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1645 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1648 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1650 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1651 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1652 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1653 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1654 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1655 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1656 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1658 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1659 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1661 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1662 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1663 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1664 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1665 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1666 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1667 /// this value on chain.
1669 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1671 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1673 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1674 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1675 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1676 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1677 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1678 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1679 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1681 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1682 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1683 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1684 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1685 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1686 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1688 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1689 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1690 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1691 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1692 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1694 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1695 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1696 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1697 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1699 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1700 pub balance_msat: u64,
1701 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1702 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1703 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1704 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1706 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1708 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1709 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1710 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1711 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1712 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1713 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1714 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1715 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1717 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1718 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1719 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1720 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1721 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1722 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1723 /// route which is valid.
1724 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1725 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1726 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1727 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1728 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1729 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1731 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1732 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1733 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1734 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1735 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1736 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1737 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1738 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1739 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1741 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1743 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1744 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1745 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1746 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1747 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1749 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1750 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1751 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1752 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1753 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1754 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1755 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1757 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1758 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1759 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1760 pub is_outbound: bool,
1761 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1762 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1763 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1764 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1765 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1767 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1768 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1769 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1770 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1771 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1772 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1773 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1775 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1776 pub is_usable: bool,
1777 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1778 pub is_public: bool,
1779 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1780 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1781 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1782 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1783 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1784 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1786 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1787 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1790 impl ChannelDetails {
1791 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1792 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1793 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1795 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1796 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1797 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1798 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1801 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1802 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1803 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1805 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1806 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1807 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1808 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1811 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1812 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1813 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1816 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1817 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1819 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1820 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1821 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1823 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1824 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1825 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1826 features: latest_features,
1827 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1828 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1829 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1830 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1831 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1832 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1833 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1834 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1835 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1836 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1838 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1839 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1840 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1841 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1842 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1843 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1844 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1845 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1846 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1847 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1848 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1849 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1850 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1851 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1852 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1853 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1854 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1855 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1856 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1857 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1858 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1859 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1860 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1861 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1862 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1863 config: Some(context.config()),
1864 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1869 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1870 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1871 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1872 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1873 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1874 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1875 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1876 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1877 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1879 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1881 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1882 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1884 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1885 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1886 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1887 /// to drop the channel.
1891 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1892 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1893 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1894 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1895 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1897 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1898 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1899 payment_id: PaymentId,
1901 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1903 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1904 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1905 payment_id: PaymentId,
1906 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1908 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1909 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1910 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1913 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1914 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1915 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1917 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1918 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1919 payment_id: PaymentId,
1920 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1921 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1922 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1924 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1925 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1926 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1928 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1929 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1930 payment_id: PaymentId,
1931 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1932 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1936 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1938 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1940 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1941 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1942 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1943 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1945 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1946 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1947 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1950 macro_rules! handle_error {
1951 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1952 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1953 // entering the macro.
1954 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1955 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1959 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1960 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1962 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1963 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1964 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1965 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1971 let logger = WithContext::from(
1972 &$self.logger, Some($counterparty_node_id), chan_id.map(|(chan_id, _)| chan_id)
1974 log_error!(logger, "{}", err.err);
1975 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1977 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1978 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1979 action: err.action.clone()
1983 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1984 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1985 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1986 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1987 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1991 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1998 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1999 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2000 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2001 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2003 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2004 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2005 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2007 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2008 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2009 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2010 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2011 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2013 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2014 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2016 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2020 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2021 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2022 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2024 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2025 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2027 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2028 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2030 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2031 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2032 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2033 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2034 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2035 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2036 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
2037 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
2039 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
2040 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
2044 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2045 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2047 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2048 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2050 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2051 match $channel_phase {
2052 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2053 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2055 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2056 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2058 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2059 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2065 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2066 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2070 let key = *$entry.key();
2071 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2073 $entry.remove_entry();
2081 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2082 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2086 let key = *$entry.key();
2087 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2089 $entry.remove_entry();
2097 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2098 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2100 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2101 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2107 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2108 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2109 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2110 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2111 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2113 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2114 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2115 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2116 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2117 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2118 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2119 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2120 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2121 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2122 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2127 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2128 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2129 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2130 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2131 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2132 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2133 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2134 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2135 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2137 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2142 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2143 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2144 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2145 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2146 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2147 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2148 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2149 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2150 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2152 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2157 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2158 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2159 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2160 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2161 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2162 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2163 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2164 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2165 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2166 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2167 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2168 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2170 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2171 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2172 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2178 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2179 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2181 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2182 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2183 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2184 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2185 updates.announcement_sigs);
2186 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2187 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2190 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2191 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2192 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2193 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2195 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2196 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2197 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2198 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2199 let mut batch_completed = false;
2200 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2201 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2202 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2203 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2205 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2206 channel_state.2 = true;
2208 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2210 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2212 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2215 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2216 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2217 if batch_completed {
2218 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2219 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2220 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2221 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2222 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2223 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2224 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2225 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2226 chan.set_batch_ready();
2227 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2228 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2232 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2233 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2234 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2239 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2241 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2242 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2244 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2245 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2246 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2247 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2252 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2253 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2254 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2255 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2257 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2258 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2259 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2260 panic!("{}", err_str);
2262 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2263 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2264 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2267 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2273 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2274 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2275 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2277 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2278 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2279 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2280 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2281 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2282 // filter for uniqueness here.
2283 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2284 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2285 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2286 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2288 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2289 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2291 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2292 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2293 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2299 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2300 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2301 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2302 while !processed_all_events {
2303 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2310 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2311 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2312 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2314 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2315 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2316 result = $self.process_background_events();
2318 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2319 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2320 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2321 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2325 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2326 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2327 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2328 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2331 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2333 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2334 $event_to_handle = event;
2336 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2337 post_event_actions.push(action);
2342 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2343 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2344 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2345 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2346 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2347 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2350 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2351 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2352 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2353 processed_all_events = false;
2357 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2358 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2359 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2361 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2362 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2363 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2369 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2371 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2372 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2373 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2374 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2375 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2376 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2380 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2382 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2384 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2385 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2387 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2389 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2390 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2391 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2394 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2395 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2396 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2398 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2399 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2400 current_timestamp: u32,
2402 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2403 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2404 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2405 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2407 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2408 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2409 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2414 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2416 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2417 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2418 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2419 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2420 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2421 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2422 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2423 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2425 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2428 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2429 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2431 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2433 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2435 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2437 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2438 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2439 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2440 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2441 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2442 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2443 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2444 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2446 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2456 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2457 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2458 &self.default_configuration
2461 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2462 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2463 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2466 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2467 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2469 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2471 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2475 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2480 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2482 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2483 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2484 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2485 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2486 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2488 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2489 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2491 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2492 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2493 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2495 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2496 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2497 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2499 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2500 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2502 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2503 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2504 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2505 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2506 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2507 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2509 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2510 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2511 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2512 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2513 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2514 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2517 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2518 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2519 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2521 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2523 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2524 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2526 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2528 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2529 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2530 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2535 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2536 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2537 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2538 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2539 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2540 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2544 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2549 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2551 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2552 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2553 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2555 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2557 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2563 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2564 node_id: their_network_key,
2567 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2570 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2571 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2572 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2573 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2574 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2575 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2576 // the same channel.
2577 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2579 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2580 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2581 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2582 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2583 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2584 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2585 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2586 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2587 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2591 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2592 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2593 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2601 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2602 /// more information.
2603 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2604 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2605 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2606 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2607 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2608 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2609 // the same channel.
2610 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2612 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2613 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2614 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2615 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2616 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2617 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2618 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2619 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2627 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2628 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2630 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2631 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2633 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2634 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2635 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2636 // really wanted anyway.
2637 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2640 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2641 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2642 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2643 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2645 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2646 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2647 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2648 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2649 let context_to_details = |context| {
2650 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2652 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2654 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2655 .map(context_to_details)
2661 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2662 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2664 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2665 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2666 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2668 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2669 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2670 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2671 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2672 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2673 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2675 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2676 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2677 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2679 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2680 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2681 payment_id: *payment_id,
2682 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2683 total_msat: *total_msat,
2686 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2687 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2689 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2690 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2692 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2697 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2698 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2700 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2701 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2704 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2706 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2707 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2709 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2710 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2712 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2713 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2714 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2715 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2716 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2717 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2718 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2719 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2721 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2722 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2723 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2724 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2725 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2729 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2730 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2732 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2733 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2734 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2735 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2738 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2739 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2743 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2745 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2746 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2753 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2754 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2755 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2756 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2759 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2760 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2766 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2767 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2768 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2770 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2771 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2773 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2774 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2775 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2776 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2778 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2780 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2781 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2782 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2785 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2786 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2787 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2788 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2789 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2790 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2793 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2794 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2795 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2797 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2798 /// the channel being closed or not:
2799 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2800 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2801 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2802 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2803 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2804 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2805 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2807 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2808 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2809 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2810 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2812 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2814 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2815 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2816 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2819 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2820 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2821 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2822 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2823 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2826 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2827 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2828 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2829 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2830 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2833 let logger = WithContext::from(
2834 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2837 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2838 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2839 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2840 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2841 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2842 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2844 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2845 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2846 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2847 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2848 // ignore the result here.
2849 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2851 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2852 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2853 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2854 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2856 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2857 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2858 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2859 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2860 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2861 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2862 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2865 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2868 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2869 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2874 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2875 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2876 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2877 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2878 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2879 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2880 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2883 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2884 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2885 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2889 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2890 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2894 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2895 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2896 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2897 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2898 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2899 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2900 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2901 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2902 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2903 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2904 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2906 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2908 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2909 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2910 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2911 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2912 mem::drop(peer_state);
2913 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2915 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2916 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2917 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2919 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2920 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2921 // Unfunded channel has no update
2922 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2925 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2926 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2927 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2928 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2930 (None, *peer_node_id)
2932 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2935 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2936 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2937 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2938 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2939 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2940 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2941 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2942 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2943 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2949 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2952 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2954 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2955 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2957 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2958 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2959 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2960 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2961 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2962 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2963 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2974 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2975 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2976 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2978 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2979 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2980 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2983 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2984 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2985 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2987 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2988 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2989 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2990 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2991 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2994 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2995 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2996 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2997 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2998 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3002 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3003 /// local transaction(s).
3004 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3005 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3006 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3010 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3011 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3013 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3015 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3016 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3019 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3020 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3021 // TODO: update this when we support blinded forwarding as non-intro node
3022 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
3027 macro_rules! return_err {
3028 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3031 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3032 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3034 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3035 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3036 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3037 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3038 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3039 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3040 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3044 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3045 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3046 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3047 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3048 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3049 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3050 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3051 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3057 let NextPacketDetails {
3058 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3059 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3060 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3061 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3062 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3065 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3066 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3067 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3068 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3069 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3070 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3071 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3072 // phantom or an intercept.
3073 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3074 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3075 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3079 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3082 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3084 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3085 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3086 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3087 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3088 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3090 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3091 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3092 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3093 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3096 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3097 // have no consistency guarantees.
3098 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3102 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3103 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3104 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3105 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3106 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3108 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3109 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3110 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3111 // we don't have the channel here.
3112 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3114 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3116 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3117 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3118 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3119 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3120 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3121 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3122 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3123 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3124 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3125 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3126 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3128 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3131 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3132 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3134 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3135 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3142 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3144 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3145 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3147 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3148 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3149 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3150 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3151 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3153 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3154 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3160 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3161 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3162 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3163 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3165 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3166 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3168 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3169 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3170 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3172 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3173 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3174 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3175 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3176 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3177 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3178 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3182 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3184 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3187 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3188 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3189 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3190 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3191 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3192 macro_rules! return_err {
3193 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3195 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3196 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3197 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3198 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3199 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3200 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3201 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3202 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3203 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3207 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3208 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3209 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3210 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3211 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3217 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3219 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3220 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3221 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3222 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3225 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3226 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3227 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3228 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3229 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3231 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3234 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3235 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3236 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3237 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3238 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3244 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3245 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3246 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3248 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3249 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3250 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3252 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3253 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3254 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3255 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3256 return Err(LightningError {
3257 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3258 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3261 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3262 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3264 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3265 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3266 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3269 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3270 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3271 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3272 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3274 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3275 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3276 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3278 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3279 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3280 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3281 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3282 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3283 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3284 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3288 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3291 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3292 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3293 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3294 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3296 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3297 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3298 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3299 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3300 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3303 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3304 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3306 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3307 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3308 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3309 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3310 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3311 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3312 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3313 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3315 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3316 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3317 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3319 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3321 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3328 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3329 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3330 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3331 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3336 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3337 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3338 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3341 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3342 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3343 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3344 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3346 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3347 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3348 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3350 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3351 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3355 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3356 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3358 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3359 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3360 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3362 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3365 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3367 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3368 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3370 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3371 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3372 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3373 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3374 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3375 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3376 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3377 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3378 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3379 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3381 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3382 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3383 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3384 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3386 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3387 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3389 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3390 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3391 Some(monitor_update) => {
3392 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3394 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3395 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3396 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3397 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3398 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3399 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3400 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3408 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3411 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3412 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3413 // `channel_by_id` map.
3414 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3415 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3419 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3420 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3422 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3427 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3429 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3430 /// fields for more info.
3432 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3433 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3435 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3437 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3438 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3439 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3440 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3441 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3443 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3444 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3445 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3446 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3447 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3449 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3450 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3451 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3452 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3454 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3456 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3457 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3458 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3460 /// In general, a path may raise:
3461 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3462 /// node public key) is specified.
3463 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3464 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3465 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3466 /// relevant updates.
3468 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3469 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3470 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3472 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3473 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3474 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3475 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3476 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3477 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3478 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3479 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3481 self.pending_outbound_payments
3482 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3483 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3484 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3487 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3488 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3489 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3490 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3491 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3492 self.pending_outbound_payments
3493 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3494 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3495 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3496 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3500 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3501 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3502 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3503 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3504 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3505 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3509 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3510 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3511 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3515 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3516 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3519 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3520 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3521 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3522 self.pending_outbound_payments
3523 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3524 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3525 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3526 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3527 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3531 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3532 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3533 /// retries are exhausted.
3535 /// # Event Generation
3537 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3538 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3540 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3541 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3542 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3544 /// # Requested Invoices
3546 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3547 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3548 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3549 /// once the invoice has been received.
3551 /// # Restart Behavior
3553 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3554 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3555 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3557 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3558 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3559 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3560 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3563 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3564 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3565 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3566 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3567 /// never reach the recipient.
3569 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3570 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3572 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3573 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3575 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3576 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3577 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3579 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3580 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3581 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3584 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3585 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3587 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3590 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3591 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3592 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3593 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3594 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3595 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3596 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3597 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3600 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3601 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3602 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3603 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3604 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3606 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3607 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3608 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3611 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3614 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3615 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3618 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3619 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3621 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3622 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3623 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3624 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3625 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3626 let payment_params =
3627 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3629 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3631 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3634 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3635 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3637 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3638 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3639 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3640 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3642 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3643 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3644 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3645 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3646 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3647 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3648 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3649 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3650 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3651 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3653 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3654 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3655 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3656 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3660 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3662 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3663 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3666 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3668 let mut res = Vec::new();
3670 for mut path in route.paths {
3671 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3672 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3673 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3674 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3675 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3678 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3681 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3682 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3684 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3686 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3687 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3692 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3695 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3700 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3701 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3702 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3704 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3705 let used_liquidity =
3706 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3708 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3709 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3711 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3714 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3719 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3720 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3721 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3728 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3729 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3730 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3731 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3732 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3733 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3734 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3735 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3736 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3738 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3739 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3741 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3742 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3743 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3745 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3746 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3747 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3748 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3749 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3750 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3751 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3752 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3753 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3754 } else { unreachable!(); });
3756 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3757 Err((chan, err)) => {
3758 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3759 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3760 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3761 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3762 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3768 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3769 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3771 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3772 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3775 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3776 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3777 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3781 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3782 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3783 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3787 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3788 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3789 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3791 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3792 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3793 if outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3794 panic!("outpoint_to_peer map already contained funding outpoint, which shouldn't be possible");
3796 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3803 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3804 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3805 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3809 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3811 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3812 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3814 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3815 /// across the p2p network.
3817 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3818 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3820 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3821 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3822 /// keys per-channel).
3824 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3825 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3826 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3828 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3829 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3830 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3832 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3833 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3834 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3835 /// for more details.
3837 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3838 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3839 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3840 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3843 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3845 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3846 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3848 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3849 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3850 /// signature for each channel.
3852 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3853 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3854 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3855 let mut result = Ok(());
3857 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3858 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3859 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3860 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3861 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3866 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3867 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3868 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3872 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3873 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3874 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3875 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3876 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3877 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3878 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3879 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3881 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3882 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3887 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3888 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3889 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3890 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3894 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3895 match states.entry(txid) {
3896 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3897 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3898 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3902 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3905 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3906 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3907 temporary_channel_id,
3908 counterparty_node_id,
3909 funding_transaction.clone(),
3912 let mut output_index = None;
3913 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3914 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3915 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3916 if output_index.is_some() {
3917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3918 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3921 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3924 if output_index.is_none() {
3925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3926 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3929 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3930 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3931 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3937 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3938 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3939 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3940 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3941 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3942 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3943 .into_iter().flatten()
3944 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3946 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3947 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3949 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3951 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3952 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3953 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3954 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3955 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3957 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3958 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
3959 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3963 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3964 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3970 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3972 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3973 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3974 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3975 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3977 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3978 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3980 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3981 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3983 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3985 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3986 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3987 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3988 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3989 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3990 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3991 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3992 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3993 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3994 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3995 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3996 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3997 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4001 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4002 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4003 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4004 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4005 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4006 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4007 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4008 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4009 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4010 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4014 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4015 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4016 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4017 config.apply(config_update);
4018 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4021 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4022 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4023 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4024 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4025 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4026 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4033 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4034 debug_assert!(false);
4035 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4037 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4038 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4045 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4047 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4048 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4049 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4050 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4052 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4053 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4055 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4056 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4058 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4060 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4061 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4062 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4063 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4064 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4065 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4066 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4067 pub fn update_channel_config(
4068 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4069 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4070 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4073 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4074 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4076 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4077 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4079 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4080 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4081 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4082 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4083 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4085 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4086 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4087 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4090 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4093 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4094 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4095 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4096 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4097 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4098 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4101 let next_hop_scid = {
4102 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4103 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4104 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4105 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4106 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4107 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4108 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4109 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4110 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4111 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4114 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4116 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4117 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4118 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4121 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4122 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4123 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4124 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4125 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4132 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4133 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4134 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4137 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4138 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4139 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4140 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4143 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4145 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4146 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4147 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4148 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4149 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4152 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4153 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4154 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4155 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4156 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4158 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4162 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4163 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4165 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4168 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4169 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4172 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4173 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4174 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4177 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4178 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4179 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4180 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4181 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4182 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4183 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4184 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4185 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4188 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4189 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4190 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4191 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4196 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4198 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4199 /// Will likely generate further events.
4200 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4201 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4203 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4204 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4205 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4207 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4208 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4210 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4211 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4212 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4213 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4215 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4216 match forward_info {
4217 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4218 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4219 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4220 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4221 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4224 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4225 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4226 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4227 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4229 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4230 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4231 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4232 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4233 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4234 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4235 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4236 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4239 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4240 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4242 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4245 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4246 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4252 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4253 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4255 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4259 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4260 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4262 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4266 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4267 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4268 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4269 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4270 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4271 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4272 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4275 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4276 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4277 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4278 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4279 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4281 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4283 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4284 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4288 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4289 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4290 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4291 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4292 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4293 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4295 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4296 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4302 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4305 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4308 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4309 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4310 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4311 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4312 // problem, not ours.
4318 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4319 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4320 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4322 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4326 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4327 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4328 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4329 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4330 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4333 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4334 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4335 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4336 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4337 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4338 match forward_info {
4339 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4340 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4341 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4342 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4343 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4344 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4345 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4348 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4349 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4350 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4351 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4352 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4353 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4354 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4355 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4356 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4357 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4359 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4360 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4361 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4362 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4363 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4364 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4367 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4368 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4369 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4372 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4373 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4375 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4377 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4378 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4379 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4380 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4385 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4386 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4388 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4389 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4390 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4391 htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger
4393 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4394 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4396 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4398 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4399 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4400 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4404 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4406 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &self.logger) {
4407 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4408 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4410 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_malformed_htlc() were not met");
4412 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4413 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4414 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4421 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4425 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4426 match forward_info {
4427 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4428 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4429 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4430 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4431 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4434 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4435 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4436 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4437 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4438 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4440 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4441 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4442 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4443 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4444 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4446 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4447 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4448 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4452 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4453 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4456 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4459 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4460 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4461 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4462 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4463 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4464 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4465 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4466 phantom_shared_secret,
4469 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4470 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4471 // if routing nodes overpay
4472 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4473 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4475 total_value_received: None,
4476 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4479 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4482 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4484 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4485 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4486 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4487 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4488 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4489 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4491 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4492 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4493 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4494 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4495 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4496 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4497 phantom_shared_secret,
4500 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4501 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4503 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4506 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4507 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4508 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4509 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4510 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4513 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4514 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4515 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4516 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4517 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4518 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4520 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4521 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4522 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4524 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4525 .entry(payment_hash)
4526 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4527 .or_insert_with(|| {
4528 committed_to_claimable = true;
4530 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4533 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4534 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4535 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4536 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4538 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4539 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4540 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4542 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4543 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4544 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4547 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4549 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4550 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4551 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4552 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4553 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4554 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4555 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4556 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4557 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4558 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4560 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4562 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4563 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4564 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4565 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4566 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4567 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4569 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4570 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4571 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4572 committed_to_claimable = true;
4574 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4575 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4576 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4577 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4578 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4579 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4580 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4581 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4582 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4583 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4587 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4588 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4589 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4590 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4591 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4593 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4595 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4596 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4598 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4599 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4600 committed_to_claimable = true;
4603 payment_claimable_generated
4607 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4608 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4609 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4610 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4611 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4612 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4613 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4614 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4616 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4617 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4618 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4619 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4620 Ok(result) => result,
4622 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4623 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4626 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4627 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4628 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4629 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4630 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4631 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4634 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4635 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4636 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4638 check_total_value!(purpose);
4640 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4641 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4642 check_total_value!(purpose);
4646 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4647 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4648 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4649 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4651 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4652 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4653 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4654 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4655 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4656 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4657 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4658 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4660 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4661 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4662 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4664 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4665 if payment_claimable_generated {
4666 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4672 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4673 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4681 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4682 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4683 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4684 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4686 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4687 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4689 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4691 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4692 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4693 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4695 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4697 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4698 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4699 events.append(&mut new_events);
4702 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4704 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4705 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4706 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4708 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4710 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4711 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4712 if background_events.is_empty() {
4713 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4716 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4718 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4719 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4720 // monitor updating completing.
4721 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4723 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4724 let mut updated_chan = false;
4726 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4727 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4728 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4729 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4730 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4731 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4732 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4733 updated_chan = true;
4734 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4735 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4737 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4745 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4746 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4749 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4751 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4752 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4753 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4754 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4755 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4757 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4758 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4759 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4760 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4761 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4767 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4770 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4771 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4772 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4773 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4774 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4777 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4778 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4780 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4782 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4783 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4784 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4785 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4786 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4788 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4790 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4791 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4792 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4793 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4795 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4796 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4798 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4799 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4803 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4804 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4805 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4806 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4807 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4808 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4809 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4811 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4812 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4814 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4815 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4816 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4817 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4818 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4819 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4821 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4826 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4827 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4835 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4837 /// This currently includes:
4838 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4839 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4840 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4842 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4843 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4844 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4845 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4846 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4847 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4848 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4849 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4851 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4852 /// estimate fetches.
4854 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4855 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4856 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4857 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4858 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4860 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4861 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4863 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4864 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4865 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4866 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4868 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4869 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4870 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4871 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4872 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4873 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4875 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4876 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4877 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4879 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4880 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4881 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4882 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4883 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4884 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4885 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4886 channel_id: *chan_id,
4887 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4898 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4899 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4900 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4901 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4902 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4903 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4904 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4906 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4907 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4912 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4913 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4915 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4916 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4917 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4918 if needs_close { return false; }
4921 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4922 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4923 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4924 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4925 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4926 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4927 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4928 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4930 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4931 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4932 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4933 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4937 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4939 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4942 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4944 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4945 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4946 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4947 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4951 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4953 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4959 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4961 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4962 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4963 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4964 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4965 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4966 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4967 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4968 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4969 channel_id: *chan_id,
4970 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4978 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4979 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4980 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4982 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4983 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4984 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4989 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4990 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4991 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
4992 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4993 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4994 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4995 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4996 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4997 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5003 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5005 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5006 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5011 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5012 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5013 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5014 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5015 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5016 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5017 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5018 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5019 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5020 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5021 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5023 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5024 // have no channels to the peer.
5025 let remove_entry = {
5026 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5027 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5030 entry.remove_entry();
5033 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5038 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5039 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5040 // This should be unreachable
5041 debug_assert!(false);
5044 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5045 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5046 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5047 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5048 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5049 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5050 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5053 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5054 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5055 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5057 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5058 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5065 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5066 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5067 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5068 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5069 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5072 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5073 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5076 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5077 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5080 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5081 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5082 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5083 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5084 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5085 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5086 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5089 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5090 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5093 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5094 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5095 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5096 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5097 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5104 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5105 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5106 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5108 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5109 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5110 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5111 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5113 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5114 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5115 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5116 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5117 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5118 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5121 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5122 /// reason for the failure.
5124 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5125 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5128 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5129 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5130 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5131 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5132 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5133 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5134 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5139 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5140 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5141 match failure_code {
5142 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5143 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5144 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5145 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5146 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5147 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5149 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5150 let fail_data = match data {
5151 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5154 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5159 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5160 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5162 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5164 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5165 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5166 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5167 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5168 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5169 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5170 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5172 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5174 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5175 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5177 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5182 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5183 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5184 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5185 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5186 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5187 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5188 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5189 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5190 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5191 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5193 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5194 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5195 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5196 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5198 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5199 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5200 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5201 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5202 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5206 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5207 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5208 // be surfaced to the user.
5209 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5210 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5211 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5213 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5214 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5215 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5216 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5217 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5218 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5219 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5220 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5221 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5223 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5224 debug_assert!(false);
5225 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5230 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5233 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5234 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5235 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5236 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5240 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5241 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5242 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5243 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5244 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5245 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5246 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5247 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5248 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5249 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5252 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5253 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5254 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5257 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5258 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5259 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5262 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5263 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5264 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5265 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5267 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5268 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5269 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5272 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5273 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5274 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5276 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5277 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5278 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5279 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5280 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5282 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5284 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5285 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5287 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5288 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5292 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5293 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5295 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5299 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5300 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5301 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5302 push_forward_ev = true;
5304 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5305 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5306 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5309 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5312 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5313 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5314 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5315 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5316 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5317 failed_next_destination: destination,
5323 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5324 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5326 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5327 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5328 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5329 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5331 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5332 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5333 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5334 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5336 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5337 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5338 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5340 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5341 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5342 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5343 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5344 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5345 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5346 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5347 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5348 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5351 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5352 /// even type numbers.
5356 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5357 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5359 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5360 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5361 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5364 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5365 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5367 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5370 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5371 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5372 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5373 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5374 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5375 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5376 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5377 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5382 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5383 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5384 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5385 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5386 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5388 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5389 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5390 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5394 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5395 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5396 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5397 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5398 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5399 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5400 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5401 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5402 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5403 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5404 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5413 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5415 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5416 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5417 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5418 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5419 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5420 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5421 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5422 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5423 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5424 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5425 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5426 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5427 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5428 debug_assert!(false);
5432 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5434 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5435 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5436 debug_assert!(false);
5440 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5441 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5443 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5444 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5445 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5446 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5449 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5450 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5451 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5452 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5456 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5457 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5458 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5459 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5460 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5461 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5462 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5465 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5466 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5467 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5468 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5469 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5470 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5475 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5476 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5477 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5478 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5479 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5480 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5481 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5483 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5486 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5487 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5488 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5489 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5493 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5494 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5495 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5496 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5498 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5499 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5500 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5501 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5503 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5504 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5505 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5506 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5509 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5510 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5511 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5512 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5516 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5517 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5518 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5521 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5522 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5523 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5524 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5525 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5526 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5527 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5528 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5531 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5532 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5533 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5535 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5538 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5539 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5541 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5542 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5543 // monitor update as a background event.
5544 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5545 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5546 counterparty_node_id,
5547 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5548 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5552 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5553 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5558 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5560 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5562 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5563 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5564 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5565 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5566 blocking_action: blocker,
5568 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5570 debug_assert!(false,
5571 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5574 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5575 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5576 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5577 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5578 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5580 let mut found_blocker = false;
5581 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5582 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5583 // which case we need to only remove the one
5584 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5585 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5586 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5587 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5589 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5592 debug_assert!(false);
5601 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5602 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5603 counterparty_node_id: None,
5604 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5610 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5611 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5612 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5613 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5614 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5615 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5616 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5617 // again on restart.
5618 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5619 payment_preimage, update_res);
5622 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5623 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5625 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5626 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5627 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5628 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5629 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5630 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5631 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5632 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5633 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5634 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5637 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5638 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5639 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5640 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5641 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5642 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5646 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5647 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5650 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5651 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5652 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5655 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5656 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5657 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5658 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5659 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5661 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5662 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5663 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5665 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5666 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5669 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5670 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5671 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5672 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5673 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5674 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5675 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5676 let chan_to_release =
5677 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5678 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5680 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5681 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5682 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5683 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5688 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5689 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5690 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5691 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5692 // in the background.
5693 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5694 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5695 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5696 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5698 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5699 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5700 funding_txo, update, ..
5702 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5703 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5704 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5705 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5707 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5713 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5714 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5715 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5717 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5718 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5720 monitor_update.updates[0],
5721 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5726 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5727 // immediately once we get going.
5728 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5731 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5733 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5736 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5737 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5738 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5739 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5740 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5741 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5745 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5746 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5747 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5750 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5751 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5753 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5754 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5755 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5756 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5758 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5762 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5763 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5764 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5770 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5771 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5772 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5775 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5776 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5777 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5778 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5780 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5782 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5783 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5784 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5786 payment_purpose: purpose,
5789 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5791 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5795 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5797 sender_intended_total_msat,
5801 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5802 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5804 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5805 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5806 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5809 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5810 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5812 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5813 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5814 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5815 Some(blocking_action),
5822 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5823 /// update completion.
5824 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5825 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5826 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5827 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5828 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5829 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5830 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5831 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5832 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5833 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5834 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5835 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5836 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5837 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5839 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5841 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5842 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5843 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5844 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5847 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5848 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5850 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5851 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5852 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5857 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5858 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5859 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5860 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5865 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5866 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5867 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5868 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5869 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5874 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5878 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5884 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5885 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5886 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5890 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5891 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5892 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5898 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5899 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5901 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5902 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5904 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5905 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5906 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5907 match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
5908 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5913 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5914 let mut peer_state_lock;
5915 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5916 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5917 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5918 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5920 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5923 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5924 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5925 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5926 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5927 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5930 let remaining_in_flight =
5931 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5932 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5935 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5936 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5937 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5938 remaining_in_flight);
5939 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5942 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5945 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5947 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5948 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5951 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5952 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5953 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5955 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5956 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5957 /// used to accept such channels.
5959 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5960 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5961 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5962 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5965 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5966 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5968 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5969 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5970 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5972 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5973 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5975 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5976 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5978 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5979 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5981 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5982 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5983 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5984 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5987 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5988 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5990 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5991 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5992 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5993 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5994 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5995 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5996 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5997 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5999 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6000 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6001 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6003 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6004 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6005 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6006 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6007 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6008 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6009 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
6011 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
6015 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6016 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6017 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6018 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6019 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6020 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6021 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6024 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6025 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
6027 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6028 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6029 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6030 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6031 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6032 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6033 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6034 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6037 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6038 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
6042 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6043 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6044 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6046 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6047 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6048 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6051 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6056 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6057 /// or 0-conf channels.
6059 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6060 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6061 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6062 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6063 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6064 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6066 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6067 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6068 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6069 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6070 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6071 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6072 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6076 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6079 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6080 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6082 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6083 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6085 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6086 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6087 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6088 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6089 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6091 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6094 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6095 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6096 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6099 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6100 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6105 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6108 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6109 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6110 // likely to be lost on restart!
6111 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6112 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6115 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6119 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6120 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6121 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6122 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6123 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6125 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6126 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6128 debug_assert!(false);
6129 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6131 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6132 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6134 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6135 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6136 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6137 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6138 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6139 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6141 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6142 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6143 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6146 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6147 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6148 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6149 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6150 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6153 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6154 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6156 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6159 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6160 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6161 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6162 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6163 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6164 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6165 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6166 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6167 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6169 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6170 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6171 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6176 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6177 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6178 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6179 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6180 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6181 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6182 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6185 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6190 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6191 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6192 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6194 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6195 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6198 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6199 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6201 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6202 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6203 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6205 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6209 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6210 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6211 // likely to be lost on restart!
6212 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6213 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6214 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6216 debug_assert!(false);
6217 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6219 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6220 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6221 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6222 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6223 match phase.get_mut() {
6224 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6225 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6226 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6229 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6233 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6236 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6237 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6238 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6239 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6240 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6242 user_channel_id: user_id,
6247 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6248 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6250 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6251 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6253 debug_assert!(false);
6254 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6257 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6259 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6260 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6261 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6262 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6263 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6265 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6266 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6267 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6268 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6269 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6270 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6271 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6272 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6273 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6277 Some(mut phase) => {
6278 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6279 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6280 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6282 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6285 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6287 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6288 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6289 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6290 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6291 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6292 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6294 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6295 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6296 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6299 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6300 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6301 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6303 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6304 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6305 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6306 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6307 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6309 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6310 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6311 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6312 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6313 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6315 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6316 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6317 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6318 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6319 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6320 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6321 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6326 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6327 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6328 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6330 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6334 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6335 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6336 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6344 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6345 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6346 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6347 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6349 debug_assert!(false);
6350 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6353 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6354 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6355 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6356 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6357 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6358 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6359 let logger = WithContext::from(
6361 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6362 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6365 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6367 Ok((chan, monitor)) => {
6368 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6369 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6370 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6371 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6372 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6373 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6374 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6375 } else { unreachable!(); }
6378 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6379 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6383 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6384 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6385 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6386 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6387 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6388 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6392 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6395 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6399 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6400 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6401 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6402 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6403 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6405 debug_assert!(false);
6406 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6408 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6409 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6410 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6411 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6412 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6413 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6414 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6415 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6416 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6417 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6418 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6419 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6420 msg: announcement_sigs,
6422 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6423 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6424 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6425 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6426 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6427 // announcement_signatures.
6428 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6429 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6430 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6431 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6438 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6439 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6444 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6445 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6449 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6454 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6455 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6456 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6458 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6459 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6461 debug_assert!(false);
6462 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6464 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6465 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6466 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6467 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6469 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6470 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6471 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6472 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6474 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6477 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6478 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6479 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6480 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6482 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6483 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6484 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6485 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6486 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6487 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6491 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6492 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6493 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6494 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6497 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6498 let context = phase.context_mut();
6499 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6500 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6501 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6502 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6506 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6509 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6510 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6511 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6512 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6514 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6515 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6521 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6522 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6523 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6525 debug_assert!(false);
6526 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6528 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6529 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6530 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6531 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6532 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6533 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6534 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6535 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6536 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6537 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6538 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6543 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6544 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6545 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6546 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6547 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6548 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6549 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6551 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6552 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6555 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6558 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6559 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6560 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6561 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6563 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6564 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6565 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6566 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6567 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6572 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6573 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6574 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6579 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6580 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6581 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6582 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6584 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6585 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6586 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6587 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6589 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6590 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6592 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6593 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6594 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6596 debug_assert!(false);
6597 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6599 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6600 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6601 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6602 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6603 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6604 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6605 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6606 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6607 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6608 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6610 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6612 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6613 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6614 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6615 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6616 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6617 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6618 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6619 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6623 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6624 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6625 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6626 match pending_forward_info {
6627 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6628 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6630 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6631 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6632 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6633 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6634 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6636 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6637 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6638 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6639 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6640 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6643 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6645 _ => pending_forward_info
6648 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6649 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6651 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6652 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6660 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6662 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6663 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6664 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6666 debug_assert!(false);
6667 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6669 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6670 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6671 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6672 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6673 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6674 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6675 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6676 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6678 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6680 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6681 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6682 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6684 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6685 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6686 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6687 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6688 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6689 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6690 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6693 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6694 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6697 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6700 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6704 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6705 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6706 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6707 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6708 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6710 debug_assert!(false);
6711 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6713 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6714 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6715 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6716 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6717 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6718 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6720 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6721 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6729 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6730 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6731 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6732 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6733 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6735 debug_assert!(false);
6736 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6738 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6739 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6740 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6741 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6742 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6743 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6744 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6746 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6747 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6749 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6750 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6754 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6758 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6759 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6760 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6762 debug_assert!(false);
6763 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6765 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6766 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6767 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6768 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6769 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6770 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6771 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6772 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6773 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6774 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6775 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6779 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6780 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6783 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6788 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6789 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6790 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6791 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6792 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6793 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6794 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6795 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6796 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6797 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6798 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6800 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6801 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6803 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6804 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6805 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6806 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6807 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6808 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6810 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6811 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6812 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6814 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6815 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6816 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6817 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6818 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6819 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6820 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6821 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6822 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6825 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6826 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6829 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6830 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6831 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6832 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6833 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6834 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6835 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6836 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6837 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6838 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6841 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6842 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6843 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6848 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6849 // payments are being processed.
6850 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6851 push_forward_event = true;
6853 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6854 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6861 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6862 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6865 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6866 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6867 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6869 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6873 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6874 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6875 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6876 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6877 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6879 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6880 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6881 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6882 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6883 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6884 // real by taking more time.
6885 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6886 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6887 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6892 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6893 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6894 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6895 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6896 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6897 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6898 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6900 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6901 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6902 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6903 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6904 channel_funding_outpoint,
6905 counterparty_node_id,
6910 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6911 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6912 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6914 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6915 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6916 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6917 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6919 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6920 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6921 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6927 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6928 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6929 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6930 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6932 debug_assert!(false);
6933 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6934 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6935 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6936 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6937 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6938 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6939 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6940 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6941 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6942 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6943 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6944 *counterparty_node_id)
6946 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6947 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6948 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6949 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6950 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6951 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6952 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6956 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6957 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6960 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6963 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6967 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6968 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6969 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6971 debug_assert!(false);
6972 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6974 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6975 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6976 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6977 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6978 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6979 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6980 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6982 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6983 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6986 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6991 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6992 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6993 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6995 debug_assert!(false);
6996 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6998 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6999 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7000 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7001 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7002 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7003 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7004 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7007 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7008 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7009 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7010 msg, &self.default_configuration
7011 ), chan_phase_entry),
7012 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7013 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7014 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7017 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7018 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7021 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7026 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7027 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7028 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7029 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7031 // It's not a local channel
7032 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7035 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7036 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7037 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7038 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7040 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7041 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7042 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7043 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7044 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7045 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7046 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7047 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7048 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7049 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7050 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7052 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7054 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7055 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7056 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7057 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7059 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7060 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7061 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7062 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7065 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7069 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7070 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7073 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7075 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7078 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7080 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7081 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7083 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7085 debug_assert!(false);
7086 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7087 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7091 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7092 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7093 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7094 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7095 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7096 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7097 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7098 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7099 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7100 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7101 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7102 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7103 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7104 let mut channel_update = None;
7105 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7106 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7107 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7110 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7111 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7112 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7113 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7114 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7115 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7116 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7121 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7122 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7123 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7124 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7125 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7126 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7130 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7131 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7134 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7135 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7137 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7138 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7139 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7140 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7141 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7142 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7144 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7145 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7146 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7147 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7148 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7149 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7150 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7151 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7152 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7153 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7154 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7155 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7156 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7157 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7158 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7159 next_funding_txid: None,
7162 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7163 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7164 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7170 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7171 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7172 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7173 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7176 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7177 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7182 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7183 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7184 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7186 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7187 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7188 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7189 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7190 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7191 match monitor_event {
7192 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7193 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7194 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7195 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7196 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7198 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7199 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7200 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7201 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7204 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7205 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7206 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7208 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7209 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7210 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7211 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7214 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7215 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7216 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7217 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7218 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7219 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7220 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7221 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7222 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7223 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7224 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7228 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7229 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7230 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7231 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7239 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7240 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7246 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7247 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7250 has_pending_monitor_events
7253 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7254 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7255 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7257 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7258 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7259 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7262 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7263 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7264 /// update was applied.
7265 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7266 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7267 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7269 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7270 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7271 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7272 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7274 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7275 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7277 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7278 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7279 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7280 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7282 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7283 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7284 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7285 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7286 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7287 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7289 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7290 has_monitor_update = true;
7292 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7293 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7294 continue 'peer_loop;
7303 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7304 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7305 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7311 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7312 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7314 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7315 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7317 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7318 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7319 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7320 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7322 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7323 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7325 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7326 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7327 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7328 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7333 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7334 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7339 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7340 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7343 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7344 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7345 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7351 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7355 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7356 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7357 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7358 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7359 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7360 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7361 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7365 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7366 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7367 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7368 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7369 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7375 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7376 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7377 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7378 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7379 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7380 let mut has_update = false;
7381 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7383 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7385 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7386 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7387 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7388 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7389 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7391 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7392 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7393 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7394 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7395 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7397 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7398 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7401 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7402 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7403 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7405 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7406 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7407 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7408 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7409 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7414 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7415 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7416 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7422 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7423 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7428 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7434 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7435 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7438 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7439 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7445 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7446 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7448 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7449 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7450 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7451 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7452 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7453 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7454 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7455 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7456 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7457 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7458 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7459 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7460 assert!(should_broadcast);
7461 } else { unreachable!(); }
7462 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7463 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7464 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7467 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7471 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7472 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7473 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7477 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7478 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7479 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7480 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7481 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7483 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7487 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7492 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7494 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7496 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7497 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7498 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7499 &self, description: String
7500 ) -> Result<OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7501 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7502 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7503 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7504 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7506 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7507 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7508 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7510 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7516 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7517 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7521 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7522 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7524 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7525 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7526 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7529 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7530 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7531 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7533 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7534 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7538 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7539 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7540 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7541 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7542 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7544 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7548 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7549 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7554 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7555 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7556 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7558 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7560 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7561 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7562 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7563 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7564 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7565 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7566 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7567 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7568 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7569 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7570 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7571 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7573 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7574 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7575 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7577 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7578 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7581 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7582 self.pending_outbound_payments
7583 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7584 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7586 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7591 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7592 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7593 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7595 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7596 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7597 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7598 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7599 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7600 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7601 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7603 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7604 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7608 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7609 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7612 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7613 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7614 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7618 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7619 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7620 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7621 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7625 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7626 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7627 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7632 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7633 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7634 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7637 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7638 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7639 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7640 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7641 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7642 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7643 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7644 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7645 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7646 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7647 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7648 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7649 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7650 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7651 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7654 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7655 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7656 let builder = match quantity {
7658 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7660 let builder = match amount_msats {
7662 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7664 let builder = match payer_note {
7666 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7668 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7669 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7671 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7672 self.pending_outbound_payments
7673 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7674 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7676 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7678 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7679 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7680 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7681 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7682 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7685 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7687 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7688 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7689 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7690 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7691 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7692 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7693 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7694 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7695 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7697 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7704 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7707 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7708 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7709 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7713 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7714 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7715 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7716 /// received and no retries will be made.
7720 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7721 /// path for the invoice.
7723 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7724 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7725 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7726 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7727 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7729 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7730 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7732 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7733 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7734 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7735 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7737 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7738 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7739 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7741 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7742 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7743 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7745 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7746 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7747 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7749 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7750 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7751 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7753 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7754 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7755 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7756 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7757 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7760 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7762 for path in refund.paths() {
7763 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7764 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7765 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7766 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7768 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7774 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7778 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7781 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7782 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7784 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7785 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7786 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7787 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7789 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7791 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7792 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7796 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7797 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7799 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7801 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7802 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7804 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7805 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7806 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7807 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7808 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7809 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7810 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7811 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7812 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7813 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7814 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7817 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7818 /// stored external to LDK.
7820 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7821 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7822 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7824 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7825 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7828 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7829 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7830 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7831 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7833 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7834 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7835 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7836 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7837 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7839 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7840 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7841 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7842 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7843 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7845 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7846 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7848 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7849 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7853 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7854 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7856 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7858 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7859 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7861 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7862 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7863 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7864 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7865 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7866 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7867 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7870 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7871 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7873 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7874 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7875 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7878 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7880 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7881 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7882 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7883 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7884 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7886 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
7888 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
7889 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
7890 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
7893 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, entropy_source, secp_ctx)
7894 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
7897 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
7898 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
7899 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
7900 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7901 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
7902 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7903 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7905 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
7906 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7907 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
7908 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7909 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7911 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7913 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7916 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
7917 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7921 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7922 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7924 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7925 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7926 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7927 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7929 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7930 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7931 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7932 Some(_) => continue,
7933 None => return scid_candidate
7938 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7940 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7941 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7943 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7944 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7945 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7949 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7950 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7951 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7953 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7954 /// times to get a unique scid.
7955 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7956 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7957 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7959 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7960 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7961 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7962 return scid_candidate
7966 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7967 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7968 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7969 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7971 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7972 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7973 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7974 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7975 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7976 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7978 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7979 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7980 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7989 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7990 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7991 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7992 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7993 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7997 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7998 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7999 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8000 events.push_back((event, None));
8004 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8005 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8006 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8010 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8011 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8015 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8016 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8019 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8020 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8021 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8022 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8023 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8024 let logger = WithContext::from(
8025 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8029 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8030 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8032 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8033 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8034 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8035 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8037 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8041 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8042 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
8043 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8044 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8045 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8046 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8047 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8051 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
8052 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8053 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8054 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8055 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8056 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8057 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8058 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8059 if further_update_exists {
8060 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8065 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8066 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8072 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8073 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8079 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8080 for action in actions {
8082 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8083 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
8085 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
8091 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8092 /// using the given event handler.
8094 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8095 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8099 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8103 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8105 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8106 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8107 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8108 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8109 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8110 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8114 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8115 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8116 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8117 /// is always placed next to each other.
8119 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8120 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8121 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8122 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8124 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8125 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8126 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8127 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8128 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8129 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8130 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8132 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8133 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8134 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8135 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8138 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8139 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8141 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8142 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8145 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8146 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8147 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8148 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8149 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8150 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8151 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8155 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8156 events.replace(pending_events);
8165 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8167 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8168 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8169 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8170 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8171 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8172 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8176 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8178 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8179 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8180 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8182 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8186 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8188 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8189 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8190 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8191 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8192 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8193 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8197 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8199 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8200 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8201 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8202 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8203 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8206 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8207 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8210 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8211 let _persistence_guard =
8212 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8213 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8214 let new_height = height - 1;
8216 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8217 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8218 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8219 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8220 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8221 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8224 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8228 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8230 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8231 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8232 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8233 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8234 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8235 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8239 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8240 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8241 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8242 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8244 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8245 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8247 let _persistence_guard =
8248 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8249 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8250 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8251 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8253 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8254 if height < last_best_block_height {
8255 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8256 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8260 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8261 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8262 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8263 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8265 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8266 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8268 let _persistence_guard =
8269 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8270 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8271 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8273 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8275 macro_rules! max_time {
8276 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8278 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8279 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8280 // having an explicit local time source.
8281 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8282 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8283 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8284 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8285 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8291 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8292 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8293 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8294 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8298 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8299 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8300 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8301 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8302 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8303 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8304 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8305 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8306 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8307 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8308 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8315 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8316 let _persistence_guard =
8317 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8318 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8319 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8320 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8321 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8322 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8323 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8324 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8329 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8331 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8332 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8333 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8334 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8335 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8336 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8340 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8341 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8343 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8344 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8345 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8346 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8347 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8349 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8350 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8352 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8353 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8354 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8355 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8356 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8357 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8359 // Retain unfunded channels.
8360 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8361 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8362 let res = f(channel);
8363 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8364 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8365 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8366 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8367 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8369 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8370 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8371 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8372 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8373 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8374 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8375 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8376 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8381 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8386 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8387 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8390 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8391 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8392 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8393 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8394 msg: announcement_sigs,
8396 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8397 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8398 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8400 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8401 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8402 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8407 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8408 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8409 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8410 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8411 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8412 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8413 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8414 // is always consistent.
8415 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8416 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8417 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8418 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8419 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8422 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8423 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8424 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8425 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8426 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8427 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8428 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8429 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8433 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8434 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8435 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8436 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8437 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8438 data: reason_message,
8451 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8452 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8453 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8454 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8455 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8456 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8457 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8458 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8459 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8460 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8462 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8463 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8464 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8468 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8471 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8472 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8473 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8474 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8475 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8476 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8477 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8478 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8479 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8480 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8481 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8484 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8485 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8486 _ => unreachable!(),
8488 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8489 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8490 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8491 let logger = WithContext::from(
8492 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8494 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8500 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8502 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8503 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8507 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8508 /// may have events that need processing.
8510 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8511 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8513 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8514 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8515 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8516 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8519 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8520 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8521 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8524 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8525 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8526 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8529 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8530 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8531 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8532 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8535 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8536 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8537 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8538 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8541 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8542 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8544 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8545 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8546 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8547 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8548 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8551 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8552 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8553 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8554 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8557 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8558 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8559 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8560 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8563 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8564 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8565 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8566 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8569 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8570 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8571 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8572 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8576 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8577 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8579 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8580 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8581 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8582 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8583 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8584 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8588 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8589 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8590 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8591 // change to the contents.
8592 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8593 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8594 let persist = match &res {
8595 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8596 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8597 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8599 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8601 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8606 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8607 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8608 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8609 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8612 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8613 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8614 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8615 // change to the contents.
8616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8617 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8618 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8622 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8623 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8624 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8625 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8628 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8629 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8630 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8633 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8634 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8635 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8638 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8639 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8640 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8641 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8642 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8644 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8645 let persist = match &res {
8646 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8647 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8649 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8654 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8655 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8656 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8657 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8660 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8661 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8662 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8663 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8666 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8667 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8668 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8669 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8672 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8673 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8674 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8675 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8678 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8680 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8683 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8684 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8685 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8688 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8689 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8690 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8691 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8692 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8693 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8694 let persist = match &res {
8695 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8696 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8697 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8699 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8704 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8705 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8706 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8709 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8710 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8711 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8712 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8713 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8714 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8715 let persist = match &res {
8716 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8717 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8718 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8720 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8725 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8726 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8727 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8728 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8729 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8730 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8731 let persist = match &res {
8732 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8733 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8734 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8736 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8741 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8742 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8743 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8746 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8748 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8751 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8752 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8753 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8754 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8755 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8756 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8757 let persist = match &res {
8758 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8759 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8760 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8762 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8767 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8769 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8772 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8773 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8774 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8777 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8782 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8783 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8784 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8785 let persist = match &res {
8786 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8787 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8788 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8790 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8795 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8796 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8797 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8798 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8799 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8802 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8803 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8804 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8806 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8807 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8808 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8809 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8810 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8811 let context = match phase {
8812 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8813 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8814 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8815 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8820 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8821 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8824 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8828 // Clean up for removal.
8829 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8830 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
8833 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8834 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8835 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8836 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8838 // V1 Channel Establishment
8839 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8840 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8841 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8842 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8843 // V2 Channel Establishment
8844 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8845 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8846 // Common Channel Establishment
8847 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8848 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8850 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8852 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8853 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8854 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8855 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8856 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8857 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8858 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8859 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8860 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8861 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8862 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8863 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8864 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8865 // Channel Operations
8866 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8867 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8868 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8869 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8870 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8871 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8873 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8874 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8875 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8876 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8877 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8878 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8879 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8880 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8881 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8884 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8885 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8886 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8887 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8890 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8892 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8894 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8895 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8899 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8900 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8901 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8902 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8906 let mut res = Ok(());
8908 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8909 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8910 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8911 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8912 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8913 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8914 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8917 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8918 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8919 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8920 if inbound_peer_limited {
8922 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8924 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8925 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8926 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8927 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8928 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8929 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8930 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8931 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8935 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8936 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8937 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8939 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8940 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8941 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8942 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8945 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8948 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8949 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8954 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8957 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8960 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8962 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8963 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8964 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8965 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8966 // worry about closing and removing them.
8967 debug_assert!(false);
8971 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8972 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8973 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8974 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
8979 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8980 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8985 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8986 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8988 match &msg.data as &str {
8989 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8990 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8992 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8993 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8994 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8995 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8996 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8997 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8998 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8999 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9000 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9001 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9002 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9003 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9004 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9005 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9006 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9007 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9011 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9012 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9013 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9014 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9015 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9016 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9018 log_level: Level::Trace,
9028 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9029 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9030 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9031 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9032 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9033 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9034 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9035 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9036 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9037 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9038 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9040 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9041 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9042 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9046 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9047 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9048 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9049 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9050 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9051 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9052 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9053 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9055 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9063 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9064 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9068 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9069 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9072 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9073 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9076 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9077 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9080 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9081 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9082 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9083 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9086 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9087 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9088 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9089 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9092 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9093 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9094 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9095 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9098 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9099 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9100 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9101 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9104 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9105 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9106 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9107 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9110 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9111 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9112 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9113 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9116 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9117 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9118 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9119 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9122 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9123 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9124 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9125 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9128 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9129 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9130 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9131 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9135 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9136 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9138 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9139 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9140 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9141 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9142 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9143 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9147 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9148 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9149 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9152 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9153 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9156 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9157 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9159 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9160 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9162 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9163 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9167 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9168 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9169 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9171 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9173 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9174 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9178 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9179 amount_msats, payment_secret
9181 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9183 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9184 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9188 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9189 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9190 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9193 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9194 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9195 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9196 payment_paths, payment_hash
9198 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9199 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9200 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9202 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9203 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9204 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9207 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9208 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9209 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9210 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9211 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9213 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9214 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9216 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9217 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9218 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9219 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9221 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9222 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9226 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9227 Err(error) => Some(error),
9231 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9232 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9234 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9236 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9237 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9240 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9241 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9242 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9249 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9250 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9256 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9257 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9261 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9262 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9263 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9264 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9265 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9269 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9270 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9272 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9273 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9274 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9275 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9276 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9279 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9280 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9281 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9282 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9285 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9286 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9287 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9288 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9291 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9292 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9293 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9294 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9297 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9298 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9299 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9300 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9301 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9302 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9303 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9304 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9305 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9306 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9307 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9308 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9309 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9310 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9311 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9312 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9313 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9314 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9315 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9316 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9321 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9322 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9324 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9325 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9326 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9327 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9330 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9331 (2, node_id, required),
9332 (4, features, required),
9333 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9334 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9335 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9336 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9339 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9340 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9341 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9342 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9343 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9344 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9345 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9346 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9347 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9348 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9349 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9350 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9351 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9352 (7, self.config, option),
9353 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9354 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9355 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9356 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9357 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9358 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9359 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9360 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9361 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9362 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9363 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9364 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9365 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9366 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9367 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9368 (32, self.is_public, required),
9369 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9370 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9371 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9372 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9373 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9379 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9380 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9381 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9382 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9383 (2, channel_id, required),
9384 (3, channel_type, option),
9385 (4, counterparty, required),
9386 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9387 (6, funding_txo, option),
9388 (7, config, option),
9389 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9390 (9, confirmations, option),
9391 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9392 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9393 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9394 (16, balance_msat, required),
9395 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9396 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9397 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9398 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9399 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9400 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9401 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9402 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9403 (26, is_outbound, required),
9404 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9405 (30, is_usable, required),
9406 (32, is_public, required),
9407 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9408 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9409 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9410 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9411 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9414 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9415 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9416 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9417 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9418 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9422 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9424 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9425 outbound_scid_alias,
9429 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9430 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9432 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9433 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9434 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9435 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9436 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9437 confirmations_required,
9439 force_close_spend_delay,
9440 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9441 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9442 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9443 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9444 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9445 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9446 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9447 channel_shutdown_state,
9452 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9453 (2, channels, required_vec),
9454 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9455 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9458 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9459 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9462 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9464 (0, onion_packet, required),
9465 (1, blinded, option),
9466 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9469 (0, payment_data, required),
9470 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9471 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9472 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9473 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9474 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9476 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9477 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9478 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9479 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9480 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9481 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9485 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9486 (0, routing, required),
9487 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9488 (4, payment_hash, required),
9489 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9490 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9491 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9492 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9496 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9497 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9499 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9501 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9502 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9503 reason.write(writer)?;
9505 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9506 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9509 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9510 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9511 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9512 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9519 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9520 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9521 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9524 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9525 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9526 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9527 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9531 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9532 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9533 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9534 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9535 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9538 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9539 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9540 // messages contained in the variants.
9541 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9542 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9543 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9545 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9546 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9547 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9548 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9549 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9552 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9553 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9554 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9555 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9556 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9558 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9563 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9568 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9569 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9570 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9573 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9574 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9575 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9576 (2, outpoint, required),
9577 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9578 (4, htlc_id, required),
9579 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9580 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9583 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9584 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9585 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9586 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9587 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9589 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9590 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9591 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9592 (2, self.value, required),
9593 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9594 (4, payment_data, option),
9595 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9596 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9597 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9598 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9604 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9605 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9606 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9607 (0, prev_hop, required),
9608 (1, total_msat, option),
9609 (2, value_ser, required),
9610 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9611 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9612 (5, total_value_received, option),
9613 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9614 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9615 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9617 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9618 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9619 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9621 if payment_data.is_some() {
9622 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9624 if total_msat.is_none() {
9625 total_msat = Some(value);
9627 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9630 if total_msat.is_none() {
9631 if payment_data.is_none() {
9632 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9634 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9636 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9640 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9643 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9644 total_value_received,
9645 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9647 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9648 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9653 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9654 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9655 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9658 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9659 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9660 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9661 let mut payment_id = None;
9662 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9663 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9664 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9665 (0, session_priv, required),
9666 (1, payment_id, option),
9667 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9668 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9669 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9670 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9672 if payment_id.is_none() {
9673 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9675 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9677 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9678 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9679 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9681 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9682 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9683 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9684 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9688 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9689 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9690 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9692 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9695 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9696 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9701 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9702 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9704 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9706 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9707 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9708 (0, session_priv, required),
9709 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9710 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9711 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9712 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9713 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9714 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9717 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9719 field.write(writer)?;
9726 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9727 (0, forward_info, required),
9728 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9729 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9730 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9731 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9734 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9735 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9736 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9738 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9742 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9743 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9744 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9745 (0, htlc_id, required),
9746 (2, err_packet, required),
9749 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9750 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9751 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9752 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9753 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9754 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9755 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9756 (0, htlc_id, required),
9757 (1, failure_code, required),
9758 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9759 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9767 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9768 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9769 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9771 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9773 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9774 (0, htlc_id, required),
9775 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9776 (2, err_packet, required),
9777 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9779 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9780 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9781 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9783 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9787 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9788 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9792 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9797 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9798 (0, payment_secret, required),
9799 (2, expiry_time, required),
9800 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9801 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9802 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9805 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9807 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9808 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9809 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9810 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9811 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9812 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9816 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9817 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9819 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9821 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9823 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9824 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9825 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9828 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9830 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9831 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9832 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9833 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9835 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9836 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9839 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9840 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9844 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9846 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9847 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9848 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9849 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9850 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9851 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9854 channel.write(writer)?;
9860 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9861 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9862 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9863 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9864 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9865 for forward in pending_forwards {
9866 forward.write(writer)?;
9871 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9873 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9874 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9875 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9877 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9878 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9879 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9880 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9881 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9882 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9883 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9884 htlc.write(writer)?;
9886 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9887 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9890 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9891 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9892 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9893 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9894 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9895 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9896 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9899 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9900 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9901 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9902 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9903 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9905 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9906 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9907 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9908 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9909 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9910 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9911 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9916 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9917 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9918 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9919 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9920 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9921 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9922 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9923 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9924 0u64.write(writer)?;
9926 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9927 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9928 event.write(writer)?;
9932 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9933 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9934 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9935 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9936 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9937 0u64.write(writer)?;
9939 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9940 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9941 // likely to be identical.
9942 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9943 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9945 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9946 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9947 hash.write(writer)?;
9948 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9951 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9952 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9953 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9954 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9955 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9958 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9959 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9961 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9962 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9963 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9964 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9967 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9968 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9969 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9970 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9974 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9975 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9976 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9978 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9979 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9980 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9986 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9987 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9988 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9989 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9992 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9993 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9994 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9995 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9996 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9999 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10000 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10001 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10002 if !updates.is_empty() {
10003 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
10004 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10009 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10010 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10011 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10012 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10013 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10014 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10015 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10016 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10017 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10018 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10019 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10020 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10021 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10028 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10029 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10030 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10031 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10034 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10035 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10036 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10037 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10038 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10039 // check that the event is sane here.
10040 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10041 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10042 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10043 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10049 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10050 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10051 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10052 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10053 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10054 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10057 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10058 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10059 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10060 events.push_back((ev, action));
10061 } else if action.is_some() {
10062 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10069 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10070 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10071 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10072 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10073 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10074 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10077 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10079 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10081 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10082 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10083 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10084 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10085 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10086 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10087 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10088 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10089 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10090 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10091 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10092 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10093 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10095 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10096 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10098 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10099 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10101 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10102 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10103 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10104 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10105 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10106 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10108 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10109 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10111 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10112 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10113 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10114 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10115 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10116 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10120 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10121 pub entropy_source: ES,
10123 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10124 pub node_signer: NS,
10126 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10127 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10129 pub signer_provider: SP,
10131 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10133 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10134 pub fee_estimator: F,
10135 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10137 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10138 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10139 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10140 pub chain_monitor: M,
10142 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10143 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10144 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10145 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10146 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10147 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10149 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10151 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10152 /// deserialization.
10154 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10155 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10156 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10158 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10159 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10161 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10162 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10163 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10164 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10166 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10169 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10170 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10173 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10174 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10176 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10177 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10178 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10179 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10180 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10181 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10185 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10186 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10187 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10188 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10189 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10191 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10192 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10197 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10198 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10199 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10200 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10202 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10203 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10204 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10205 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10206 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10207 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10211 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10212 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10213 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10217 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10218 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10220 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10221 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10222 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10223 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10224 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10225 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10229 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10230 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10232 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10233 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10234 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10236 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10238 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10239 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10240 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10241 let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10242 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10243 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10244 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10245 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10246 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10247 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10249 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10250 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10251 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10252 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10253 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10254 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10255 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10256 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10257 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10258 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10259 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10260 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10261 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10262 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10264 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10265 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10266 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10268 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10269 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10270 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10272 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10273 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10274 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10276 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10277 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10278 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10280 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10281 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10282 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10285 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10286 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10287 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10288 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10289 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10290 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10291 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10293 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10294 let mut found_htlc = false;
10295 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10296 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10299 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10300 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10301 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10302 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10303 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10304 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10305 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10307 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10308 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10309 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10313 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10314 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10315 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10316 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10317 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10319 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10320 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10322 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10324 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10325 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10327 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10328 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10329 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10330 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10334 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10335 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10336 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10337 // safely discard the channel.
10338 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10339 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10340 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10341 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10342 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10343 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10344 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10347 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10348 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10349 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10350 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10351 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10352 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10356 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10357 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10358 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10359 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10360 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10361 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10362 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10363 counterparty_node_id: None,
10364 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10366 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10370 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10371 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10372 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10373 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10374 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10375 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10376 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10377 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10378 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10380 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10383 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10384 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10385 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10386 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10387 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10388 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10389 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10390 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10392 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10395 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10398 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10399 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10400 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10401 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10402 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10403 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10404 is_connected: false,
10408 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10409 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10410 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10411 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10412 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10413 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10414 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10415 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10418 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10419 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10420 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10421 for _ in 0..event_count {
10422 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10423 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10428 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10429 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10430 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10432 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10433 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10434 // on-startup monitor updates.
10435 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10436 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10438 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10442 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10443 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10445 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10446 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10447 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10448 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10449 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10453 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10454 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10455 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10456 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10457 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10458 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10459 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10461 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10462 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10466 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10467 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10468 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10469 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10470 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10471 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10472 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10473 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10474 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10475 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10476 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10477 let mut events_override = None;
10478 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10479 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10480 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10481 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10482 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10483 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10484 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10485 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10486 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10487 (8, events_override, option),
10488 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10489 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10490 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10491 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10493 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10494 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10497 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10498 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10501 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10502 pending_events_read = events;
10505 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10506 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10509 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10510 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10511 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10512 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10513 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10514 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10516 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10518 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10519 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10520 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10523 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10524 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10525 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10526 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10527 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10529 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10530 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10531 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10533 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10534 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10535 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10536 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10537 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10539 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10540 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10541 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10542 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10543 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10544 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10545 pending_background_events.push(
10546 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10547 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10548 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10549 update: update.clone(),
10552 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10553 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10554 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10555 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10556 pending_background_events.push(
10557 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10558 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10559 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10562 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10563 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10564 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10566 max_in_flight_update_id
10570 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10571 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10572 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10573 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10574 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10575 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10577 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10579 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10580 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10581 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10582 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10583 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10584 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10585 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10586 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10587 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10590 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10591 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10592 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10593 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10594 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10595 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10596 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10597 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10598 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10599 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10600 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10603 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10604 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10605 debug_assert!(false);
10606 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10611 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10612 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10613 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10614 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10615 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10616 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10617 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10618 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10619 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10621 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10622 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10623 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10625 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10626 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10627 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10628 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10629 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10630 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10631 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10632 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10637 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10638 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10640 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10641 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10642 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10643 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10646 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10647 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10648 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10649 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10650 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10651 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10652 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10654 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10655 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10656 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10657 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10658 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10659 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10660 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10661 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10662 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10665 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10666 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10667 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10668 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10670 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10671 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10672 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10674 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10675 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10676 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10677 retry_strategy: None,
10678 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10679 payment_params: None,
10680 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10681 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10682 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10683 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10684 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10685 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10686 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10687 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10688 total_msat: path_amt,
10689 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10690 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10692 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10693 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10698 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10699 match htlc_source {
10700 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10701 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10702 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10703 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10705 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10706 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10707 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10708 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10709 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10710 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10711 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10712 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10713 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10714 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10715 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10720 !forwards.is_empty()
10722 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10723 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10724 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10725 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10726 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10727 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10728 intercepted_id != ev_id
10735 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10736 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10737 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10738 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10739 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10740 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10741 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10742 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10743 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10744 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10745 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10747 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10748 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10749 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10751 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10752 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10753 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10760 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10761 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10763 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10765 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10766 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10767 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10768 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10769 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10770 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10771 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10772 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10773 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10774 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10777 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10778 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10779 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10780 // channel still live case here.
10784 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10785 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10790 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10791 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10792 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10793 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10794 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10795 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10796 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10797 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10801 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10802 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10804 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10805 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10806 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10807 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10809 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10810 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10811 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10813 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10814 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10816 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10817 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10819 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10822 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10823 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10824 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10826 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10830 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10831 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10832 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10833 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10834 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10836 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10837 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10838 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10839 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10840 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10841 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10842 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10843 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10845 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10846 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10850 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10852 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10854 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10855 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10857 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10858 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10863 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10864 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10866 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10868 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10870 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10871 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10872 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10873 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10877 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10878 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10879 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10880 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10881 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10882 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10883 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10884 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10885 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10887 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10888 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10889 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10891 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10892 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10893 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10894 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10895 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10896 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10898 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10899 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10900 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10901 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10902 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10903 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10907 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10908 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10909 debug_assert!(false);
10910 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10915 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10917 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10918 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10919 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10920 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10921 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10922 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10923 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10924 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10925 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10926 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10927 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10929 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10930 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10932 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10933 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10934 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10935 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10937 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10938 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10939 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10940 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10942 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10943 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10944 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10945 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10947 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10948 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10949 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10950 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10951 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10952 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10953 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10954 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
10957 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10958 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10961 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10964 purpose: payment.purpose,
10965 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10966 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10967 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10973 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10974 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10975 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10976 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
10977 for action in actions.iter() {
10978 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10979 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10980 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10982 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10984 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10985 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10986 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10987 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10988 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10990 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10991 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10992 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10993 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10997 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10998 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11002 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11004 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11005 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11009 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11011 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11012 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11013 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11014 router: args.router,
11016 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11018 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11019 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11020 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11021 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11023 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11024 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11025 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11026 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11027 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11028 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11030 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11032 our_network_pubkey,
11035 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11037 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11039 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11040 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11041 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11042 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11043 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11045 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11046 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11048 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11050 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11052 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11053 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11054 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11056 logger: args.logger,
11057 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11060 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11061 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11062 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11063 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11064 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11067 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11068 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11069 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11070 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11071 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11072 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11075 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11076 //connection or two.
11078 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11084 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11085 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11086 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11087 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11088 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11089 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11090 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11091 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11092 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11093 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11094 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11095 use crate::prelude::*;
11096 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11097 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11098 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11099 use crate::util::test_utils;
11100 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11101 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11104 fn test_notify_limits() {
11105 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11106 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11107 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11108 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11109 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11110 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11112 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11113 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11114 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11115 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11116 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11118 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11120 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11121 // to connect messages with new values
11122 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11123 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11124 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11125 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11126 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11127 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11129 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11130 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11131 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11132 // ... but the last node should not.
11133 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11134 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11135 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11136 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11138 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11139 // about the channel.
11140 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11141 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11142 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11144 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11146 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11147 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11148 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11149 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11150 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11151 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11153 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11154 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11155 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11157 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11158 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11159 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11160 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11161 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11162 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11164 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11165 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11166 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11167 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11168 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11169 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11170 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11171 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11173 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11174 // the channel info has updated.
11175 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11176 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11177 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11178 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11179 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11180 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11184 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11185 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11187 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11188 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11189 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11190 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11191 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11193 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11194 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11195 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11196 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11198 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11199 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11200 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11201 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11202 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11203 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11204 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11205 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11207 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11208 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11209 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11211 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11212 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11213 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11215 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11216 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11217 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11218 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11219 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11221 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11222 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11223 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11225 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11226 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11227 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11228 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11229 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11230 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11231 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11232 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11233 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11235 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11236 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11237 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11239 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11241 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11243 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11244 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11245 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11246 // lightning messages manually.
11247 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11248 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11251 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11252 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11253 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11254 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11256 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11257 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11259 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11260 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11262 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11263 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11264 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11266 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11267 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11268 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11270 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11272 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11274 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11275 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11278 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11279 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11280 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11281 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11283 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11284 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11285 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11286 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11291 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11292 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11293 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11294 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11296 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11301 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11302 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11303 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11306 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11307 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11308 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11309 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11310 // fails as expected.
11311 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11312 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11313 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11314 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11315 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11316 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11317 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11318 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11319 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11320 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11321 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11322 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11323 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11324 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11325 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11327 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11328 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11329 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11331 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11332 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11333 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11334 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11335 let route = find_route(
11336 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11337 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11339 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11340 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11342 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11343 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11344 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11345 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11346 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11348 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11349 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11350 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11351 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11352 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11354 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11355 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11356 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11357 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11358 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11359 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11360 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11361 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11362 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11364 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11365 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11367 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11368 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11369 let route = find_route(
11370 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11371 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11373 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11374 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11376 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11377 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11378 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11379 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11380 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11382 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11383 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11384 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11385 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11387 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11388 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11389 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11390 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11391 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11393 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11394 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11395 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11397 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11398 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11399 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11400 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11401 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11402 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11403 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11404 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11405 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11407 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11408 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11410 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11411 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11412 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11413 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11415 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11416 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11417 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11418 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11419 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11421 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11422 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11423 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11426 let route = find_route(
11427 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11428 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11430 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11431 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11432 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11434 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11435 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11436 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11437 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11438 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11440 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11441 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11442 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11444 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11445 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11446 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11447 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11448 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11449 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11450 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11451 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11452 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11454 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11455 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11459 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11460 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11461 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11462 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11463 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11464 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11465 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11467 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11468 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11470 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11471 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11472 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11473 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11474 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11475 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11476 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11477 let route = find_route(
11478 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11479 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11482 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11483 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11484 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11485 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11486 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11487 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11490 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11491 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11492 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11493 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11494 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11495 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11496 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11498 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11502 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11503 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11504 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11505 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11506 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11507 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11508 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11509 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11510 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11512 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11513 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11515 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11516 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11517 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11518 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11519 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11520 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11521 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11522 let route = find_route(
11523 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11524 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11527 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11528 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11529 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11530 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11531 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11532 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11533 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11534 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11537 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11538 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11539 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11540 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11541 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11542 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11543 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11545 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11549 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11550 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11551 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11552 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11553 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11555 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11556 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11557 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11558 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11560 // Marshall an MPP route.
11561 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11562 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11563 route.paths.push(path);
11564 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11565 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11566 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11567 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11568 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11569 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11571 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11572 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11574 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11575 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11577 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11582 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11588 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11590 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11591 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11593 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11594 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11596 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11599 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11600 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11601 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11602 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11603 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11604 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11607 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11610 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11611 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11616 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11617 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11618 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11619 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11620 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11621 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11623 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11624 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11626 total_msat: 100_000,
11629 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11630 // payment verification fails as expected.
11631 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11632 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11633 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11634 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11636 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11640 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11641 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11645 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11646 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11647 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11648 // the channel is successfully closed.
11649 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11650 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11651 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11652 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11654 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11655 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11656 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11657 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11658 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11660 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11661 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11663 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11664 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11665 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11666 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11669 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11671 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11672 // as it has the funding transaction.
11673 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11674 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11675 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11678 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11680 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11682 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11684 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11685 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11686 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11688 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11691 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11692 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11693 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11694 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11695 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11698 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11699 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11701 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11702 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11703 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11704 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11706 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11707 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11708 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11709 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11711 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11712 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11714 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11715 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11716 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11717 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11718 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11719 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11720 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11724 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11725 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11726 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11727 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11728 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11729 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11730 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11733 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11735 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11736 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11737 // closing transaction).
11738 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11739 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11740 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11742 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11743 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11744 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11745 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11746 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11749 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11751 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11753 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11754 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11755 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11757 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11759 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11760 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11763 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11764 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11765 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11768 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11769 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11770 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11773 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11774 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11775 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11778 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11779 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11780 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11783 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11785 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11786 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11788 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11789 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11791 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11792 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11797 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11798 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11799 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11800 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11801 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11802 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11803 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11804 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11807 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11808 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11809 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11811 // Test the API functions.
11812 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11814 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11816 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11818 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11820 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11822 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11824 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11828 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11829 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11830 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11831 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11832 // the given `channel_id`.
11833 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11834 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11835 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11836 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11838 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11841 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11843 // Test the API functions.
11844 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11846 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11848 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11850 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11852 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11854 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11858 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11859 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11860 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11861 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11862 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11863 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11865 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11867 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11868 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11870 let mut funding_tx = None;
11871 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11872 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11873 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11876 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11877 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11878 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11879 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11880 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11882 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11884 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11886 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11888 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11890 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11892 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11895 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11896 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11897 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11898 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11899 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11901 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11902 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11904 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11905 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11906 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11907 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11908 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11909 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11910 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11913 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11914 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11915 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11916 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11917 }, true).unwrap_err();
11919 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11920 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11921 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11922 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11923 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11924 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11925 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11927 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11928 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11930 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11931 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11932 }, true).unwrap_err();
11934 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11935 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11936 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11937 }, false).unwrap();
11938 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11940 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11941 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11943 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11944 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11945 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11946 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11947 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11949 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11950 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11951 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11953 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11954 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11955 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11957 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11958 // "protected" and can connect again.
11959 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11960 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11961 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11963 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11965 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11967 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11968 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11972 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11973 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11976 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11977 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11979 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11981 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11982 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11984 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11985 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11986 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11987 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11990 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11992 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11993 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11994 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11996 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11997 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11998 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12000 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12001 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12002 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12003 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12007 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12008 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12009 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12010 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12011 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12012 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12013 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12014 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12015 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12017 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12019 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12020 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12022 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12023 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12024 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12025 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12026 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12027 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12030 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12031 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12033 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12034 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12036 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12038 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12039 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12042 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12043 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12044 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12045 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12046 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12048 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12049 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12051 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12052 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12053 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12054 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12060 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12061 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12063 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12064 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12065 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12067 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12068 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12072 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12076 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12077 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12078 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12079 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12080 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12081 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12082 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12083 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12085 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12086 payment_metadata: None,
12087 keysend_preimage: None,
12088 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12089 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12091 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12093 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12094 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12095 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12096 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
12097 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12098 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12099 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12101 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12102 } else { panic!(); }
12104 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12105 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12107 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12108 payment_metadata: None,
12109 keysend_preimage: None,
12110 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12111 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12113 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12115 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12116 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12117 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12118 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12122 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12123 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12124 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12125 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12126 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12128 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12129 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12131 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
12132 payment_metadata: None,
12133 keysend_preimage: None,
12134 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12135 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12137 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12138 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12139 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12141 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12142 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12143 // is not satisfied.
12144 assert!(result.is_ok());
12148 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12149 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12150 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12151 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12152 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12154 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12155 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12157 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12158 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12159 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12160 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12161 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12163 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12164 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12166 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12167 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12168 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12169 match &msg_events[0] {
12170 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12171 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12173 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12174 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12175 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12181 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12182 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12184 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12185 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12186 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12188 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12192 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12193 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12194 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12195 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12196 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12197 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12198 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12199 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12200 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12201 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12202 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12204 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12205 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12206 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12208 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12209 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12211 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12212 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12214 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12217 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12218 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12220 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12221 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12223 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12224 // not have generated any events.
12225 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12229 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12230 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12231 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12232 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12233 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12234 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12235 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12236 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12238 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12239 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12242 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12243 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12244 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12245 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12246 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12248 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12249 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12252 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12253 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12254 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12256 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12257 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12258 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12259 ..Default::default()
12261 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12262 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12263 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12265 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12266 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12269 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12270 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12271 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12272 ..Default::default()
12274 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12275 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12276 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12277 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12279 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12280 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12283 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12284 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12285 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12286 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12287 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12290 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12291 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12292 ..Default::default()
12294 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12297 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12298 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12299 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12300 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12304 fn test_payment_display() {
12305 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12306 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12307 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12308 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12309 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12310 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12314 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12315 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12316 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12317 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12318 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12319 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12321 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12322 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12323 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12324 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12325 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12326 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12327 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12328 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12330 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12331 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12332 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12335 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12336 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12338 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12339 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12341 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12342 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12343 }, false).unwrap();
12344 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12345 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12346 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12348 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12350 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12351 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12352 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12353 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12354 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12355 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12356 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12357 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12358 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12359 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12360 } else { panic!() };
12361 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12362 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12363 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12364 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12366 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12368 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12369 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12370 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12375 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12376 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12377 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12378 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12381 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12382 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12383 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12385 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12386 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12388 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12389 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12392 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12393 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12394 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12396 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12400 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12401 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12402 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12404 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12409 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12410 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
12411 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12412 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12414 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12415 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12416 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12418 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12420 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12421 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12422 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12423 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12425 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12426 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12428 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12434 use crate::chain::Listen;
12435 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12436 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12437 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12438 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12439 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12440 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12441 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12442 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12443 use crate::util::test_utils;
12444 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12446 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12447 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12448 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12449 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12451 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12453 use criterion::Criterion;
12455 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12456 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12457 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12458 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12459 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12460 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12461 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12463 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12464 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12466 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12467 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12469 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12471 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12474 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12475 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12478 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12479 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12480 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12482 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12483 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12485 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12486 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12487 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12488 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12489 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12491 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12492 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12493 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12495 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12496 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12497 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12498 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12500 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12501 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12502 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12504 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12505 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12506 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12507 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12508 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12510 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12511 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12512 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12514 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12515 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12517 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12518 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12519 }, false).unwrap();
12520 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12521 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12522 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12525 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12526 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12527 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12529 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12530 } else { panic!(); }
12532 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12533 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12534 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12535 match events_b[0] {
12536 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12537 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12539 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12542 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12543 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12544 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12545 match events_a[0] {
12546 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12547 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12549 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12552 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12554 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12555 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12556 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12558 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12559 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12560 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12561 match msg_events[0] {
12562 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12563 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12564 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12568 match msg_events[1] {
12569 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12573 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12574 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12575 match events_a[0] {
12576 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12577 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12579 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12582 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12583 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12584 match events_b[0] {
12585 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12586 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12588 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12591 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12592 macro_rules! send_payment {
12593 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12594 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12595 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12596 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12597 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12598 payment_count += 1;
12599 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12600 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12602 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12603 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12604 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12605 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12606 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12607 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12608 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12609 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12610 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12611 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12612 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12614 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12615 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12616 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12617 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12619 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12620 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12621 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12622 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12623 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12625 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12628 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12629 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12630 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12631 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12633 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12637 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12638 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12639 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);