1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
82 use crate::prelude::*;
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
112 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
115 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
117 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
118 /// do with the HTLC.
119 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
120 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
122 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
123 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
124 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
125 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
126 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
127 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
129 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
131 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
132 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
134 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
135 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
136 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
137 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
138 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
140 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
141 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
142 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
143 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
144 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
146 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
147 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
148 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
149 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
151 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
152 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
154 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
155 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
156 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
157 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
159 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
160 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
161 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
163 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
164 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
166 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
167 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
168 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
169 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
170 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
171 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
172 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
174 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
175 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
176 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
177 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
179 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
180 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
181 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
183 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
184 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
185 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
189 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
190 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
191 pub struct BlindedForward {
192 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
193 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
194 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
195 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
196 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
199 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
200 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
201 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
202 // TODO: needs update when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
203 if let Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } = self {
204 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)
211 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
213 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
214 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
215 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
216 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
217 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
219 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
220 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
221 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
222 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
225 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
227 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
228 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
229 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
231 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
232 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
233 /// it along another path).
235 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
236 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
237 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
238 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
239 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
240 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
241 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
242 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
243 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
245 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
248 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
250 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
252 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
255 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
256 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
257 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
258 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
261 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
262 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
263 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
264 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
265 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
268 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
269 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
271 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
272 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
273 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
276 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
277 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
279 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
280 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
283 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
284 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
287 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
291 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
292 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
293 enum BlindedFailure {
294 FromIntroductionNode,
298 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
299 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
300 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
301 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
302 short_channel_id: u64,
303 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
305 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
306 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
307 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
309 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
310 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
315 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
317 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
318 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
319 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
321 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
322 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
325 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
326 struct ClaimableHTLC {
327 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
329 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
331 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
332 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
333 sender_intended_value: u64,
334 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
336 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
337 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
338 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
339 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
341 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
342 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
345 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
346 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
347 events::ClaimedHTLC {
348 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
349 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
350 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
351 value_msat: val.value,
352 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
357 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
358 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
360 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
361 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
362 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
365 /// Number of bytes in the id.
366 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
369 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
370 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
375 impl Readable for PaymentId {
376 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
377 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
382 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
383 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
384 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
388 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
390 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
391 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
392 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
394 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
395 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
400 impl Readable for InterceptId {
401 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
402 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
407 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
408 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
409 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
410 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
411 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
414 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
416 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
417 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
418 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
420 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
421 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
425 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
426 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
427 (0, short_channel_id, required),
428 (2, htlc_id, required),
430 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
431 (0, session_priv, required),
436 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
437 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
438 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
439 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
440 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
443 session_priv: SecretKey,
444 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
445 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
446 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
447 payment_id: PaymentId,
450 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
451 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
452 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
454 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
456 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
458 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
461 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
462 payment_id.hash(hasher);
463 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
469 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
471 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
472 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
473 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
474 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
475 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
476 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
480 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
481 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
482 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
483 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
484 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
485 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
487 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
493 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
494 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
496 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
497 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
498 pub enum FailureCode {
499 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
500 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
501 TemporaryNodeFailure,
502 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
503 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
504 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
505 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
506 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
507 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
508 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
509 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
510 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
511 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
513 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
514 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
515 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
518 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
519 fn into(self) -> u16 {
521 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
522 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
523 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
524 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
529 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
530 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
531 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
532 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
533 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
535 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
536 err: msgs::LightningError,
537 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
538 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
539 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
541 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
543 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
545 err: LightningError {
547 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
548 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
555 shutdown_finish: None,
556 channel_capacity: None,
560 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
561 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
564 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
565 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
566 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
567 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
568 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
569 // commitment upon reconnecting.
570 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
572 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
575 err: LightningError { err, action },
576 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
577 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
578 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
582 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
585 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
587 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
588 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
592 log_level: Level::Warn,
595 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
597 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
599 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
601 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
602 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
610 shutdown_finish: None,
611 channel_capacity: None,
615 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
616 self.chan_id.is_some()
620 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
621 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
622 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
623 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
624 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
626 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
627 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
628 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
629 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
630 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
631 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
632 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
634 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
638 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
639 struct ClaimingPayment {
641 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
642 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
643 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
644 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
646 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
647 (0, amount_msat, required),
648 (2, payment_purpose, required),
649 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
650 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
651 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
654 struct ClaimablePayment {
655 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
656 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
657 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
660 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
661 struct ClaimablePayments {
662 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
663 /// failed/claimed by the user.
665 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
666 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
668 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
669 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
670 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
672 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
673 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
674 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
675 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
678 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
679 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
680 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
681 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
683 enum BackgroundEvent {
684 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
685 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
686 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
687 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
689 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
690 /// are regenerated on startup.
691 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
692 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
693 /// channel to continue normal operation.
695 /// In general this should be used rather than
696 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
697 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
698 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
700 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
701 /// are regenerated on startup.
702 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
703 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
704 funding_txo: OutPoint,
705 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
707 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
708 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
710 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
711 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
712 channel_id: ChannelId,
717 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
718 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
719 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
720 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
721 /// event can be generated.
722 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
723 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
724 /// operation of another channel.
726 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
727 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
728 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
729 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
731 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
732 event: events::Event,
733 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
735 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
736 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
737 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
739 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
740 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
741 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
742 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
743 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
745 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
746 /// stored for later processing.
747 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
748 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
749 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
750 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
754 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
755 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
756 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
757 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
758 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
759 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
760 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
761 (4, blocking_action, required),
763 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
764 (0, event, upgradable_required),
765 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
766 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
767 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
768 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
769 // downgrades to prior versions.
770 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
774 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
775 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
776 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
777 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
778 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
781 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
782 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
783 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
784 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
788 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
789 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
790 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
791 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
792 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
793 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
795 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
796 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
797 channel_id: ChannelId,
798 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
803 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
804 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
805 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
806 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
807 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
812 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
813 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
817 /// State we hold per-peer.
818 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
819 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
821 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
822 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
823 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
825 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
826 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
827 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
828 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
829 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
830 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
831 latest_features: InitFeatures,
832 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
833 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
834 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
835 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
836 /// user but which have not yet completed.
838 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
839 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
840 /// for a missing channel.
841 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
842 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
843 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
845 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
846 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
847 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
848 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
850 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
851 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
852 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
853 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
854 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
855 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
856 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
857 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
858 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
859 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
860 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
861 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
862 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
863 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
864 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
868 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
869 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
870 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
871 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
872 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
873 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
876 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
877 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
878 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
881 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
882 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
883 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
886 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
887 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
888 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
889 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
893 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
894 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
895 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
896 /// The original OpenChannel message.
897 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
898 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
899 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
902 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
903 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
904 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
906 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
907 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
909 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
912 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
913 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
914 struct PendingInboundPayment {
915 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
916 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
917 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
918 /// this payment being removed.
920 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
921 user_payment_id: u64,
922 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
923 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
924 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
927 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
928 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
929 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
930 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
931 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
932 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
933 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
934 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
936 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
937 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
938 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
946 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
948 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
949 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
950 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
955 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
956 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
957 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
958 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
959 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
960 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
961 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
962 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
963 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
965 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
966 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
967 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
976 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
978 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
979 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
980 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
985 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
987 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
989 pub trait AChannelManager {
990 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
991 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
992 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
993 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
994 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
995 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
996 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
997 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
998 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
999 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1000 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1001 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1002 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1003 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1004 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1005 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1006 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1007 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1008 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1009 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1010 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1011 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1012 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1013 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1014 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1015 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1016 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1017 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1018 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1019 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1020 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1021 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1022 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1023 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1024 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1025 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1028 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1029 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1031 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1032 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1033 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1034 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1035 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1036 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1040 type Watch = M::Target;
1042 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1044 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1046 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1048 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1049 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1051 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1053 type Router = R::Target;
1055 type Logger = L::Target;
1057 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1060 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1061 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1063 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1064 /// to individual Channels.
1066 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1067 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1068 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1069 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1071 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1072 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1073 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1074 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1075 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1076 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1077 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1078 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1079 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1081 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1082 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1083 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1085 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1086 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1087 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1088 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1089 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1091 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1092 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1093 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1094 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1096 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1097 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1098 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1100 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1101 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1102 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1103 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1104 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1106 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1107 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1108 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1109 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1110 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1111 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1112 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1113 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1116 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1117 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1118 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1119 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1120 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1124 // `pending_offers_messages`
1126 // `total_consistency_lock`
1128 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1130 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1132 // |__`per_peer_state`
1134 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1136 // |__`claimable_payments`
1138 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1144 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1146 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1150 // |__`pending_events`
1152 // |__`pending_background_events`
1154 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1156 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1157 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1158 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1159 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1160 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1161 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1165 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1166 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1167 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1173 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1175 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1177 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1178 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1180 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1181 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1182 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1183 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1185 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1186 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1188 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1189 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1190 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1191 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1192 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1193 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1194 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1195 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1197 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1199 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1200 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1202 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1204 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1205 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1206 /// and via the classic SCID.
1208 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1209 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1211 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1213 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1215 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1216 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1217 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1219 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1220 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1222 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1223 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1225 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1226 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1228 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1229 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1230 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1231 /// active channel list on load.
1233 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1234 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1236 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1238 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1239 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1240 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1242 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1243 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1244 /// the handling of the events.
1246 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1247 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1250 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1251 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1252 /// would break backwards compatability.
1253 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1254 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1255 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1257 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1258 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1260 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1262 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1263 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1264 /// confirmation depth.
1266 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1267 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1268 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1270 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1272 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1274 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1276 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1278 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1280 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1281 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1282 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1284 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1285 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1287 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1288 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1289 /// keeping additional state.
1290 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1292 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1293 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1294 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1295 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1297 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1298 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1300 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1301 /// are currently open with that peer.
1303 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1304 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1307 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1309 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1310 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1311 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1312 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1313 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1315 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1316 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1317 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1318 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1319 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1321 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1322 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1324 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1325 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1326 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1327 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1328 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1330 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1331 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1333 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1334 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1335 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1336 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1337 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1339 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1341 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1343 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1344 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1345 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1346 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1347 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1348 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1349 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1350 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1351 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1352 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1353 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1355 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1356 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1357 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1359 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1361 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1362 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1364 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1368 signer_provider: SP,
1373 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1375 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1376 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1377 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1378 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1379 pub struct ChainParameters {
1380 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1381 pub network: Network,
1383 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1385 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1386 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1389 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1393 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1394 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1397 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1398 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1399 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1400 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1401 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1402 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1404 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1405 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1406 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1407 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1408 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1409 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1411 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1412 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1415 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1416 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1417 /// events to handle.
1419 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1420 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1422 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1423 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1426 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1427 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1428 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1429 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1431 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1432 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1433 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1434 should_persist: move || {
1435 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1436 // processing and return that.
1437 let notify = persist_check();
1438 match (notify, force_notify) {
1439 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1440 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1441 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1442 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1443 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1446 _read_guard: read_guard,
1450 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1451 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1452 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1453 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1454 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1455 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1457 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1458 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1459 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1460 should_persist: persist_check,
1461 _read_guard: read_guard,
1466 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1467 fn drop(&mut self) {
1468 match (self.should_persist)() {
1469 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1470 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1471 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1473 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1474 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1475 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1480 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1481 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1483 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1485 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1486 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1487 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1488 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1489 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1491 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1492 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1494 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1496 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1497 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1498 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1499 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1500 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1501 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1502 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1503 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1504 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1505 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1506 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1507 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1508 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1510 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1511 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1513 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1514 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1515 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1516 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1518 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1519 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1520 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1521 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1522 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1523 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1526 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1528 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1529 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1532 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1534 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1535 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1537 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1538 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1539 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1541 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1542 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1543 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1545 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1546 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1547 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1548 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1550 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1551 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1552 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1554 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1555 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1556 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1558 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1559 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1560 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1561 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1562 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1563 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1564 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1565 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1566 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1567 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1568 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1571 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1572 /// to better separate parameters.
1573 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1574 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1575 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1576 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1577 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1578 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1579 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1580 pub features: InitFeatures,
1581 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1582 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1583 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1585 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1587 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1588 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1589 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1590 /// payments to us through this channel.
1591 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1592 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1593 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1594 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1595 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1596 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1597 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1600 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1601 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1602 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1603 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1604 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1605 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1606 /// lifetime of the channel.
1607 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1608 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1609 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1610 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1611 /// our counterparty already.
1613 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1614 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1615 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1616 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1618 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1619 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1620 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1621 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1623 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1624 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1626 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1627 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1629 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1630 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1631 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1632 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1633 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1634 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1635 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1636 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1637 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1640 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1642 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1643 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1644 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1645 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1646 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1647 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1648 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1650 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1651 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1653 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1654 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1655 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1656 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1657 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1658 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1659 /// this value on chain.
1661 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1663 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1665 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1666 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1667 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1668 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1669 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1670 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1671 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1673 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1674 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1675 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1676 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1677 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1678 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1680 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1681 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1682 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1683 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1684 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1686 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1687 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1688 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1689 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1691 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1692 pub balance_msat: u64,
1693 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1694 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1695 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1696 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1698 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1700 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1701 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1702 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1703 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1704 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1705 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1706 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1707 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1709 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1710 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1711 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1712 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1713 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1714 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1715 /// route which is valid.
1716 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1717 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1718 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1719 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1720 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1721 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1723 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1724 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1725 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1726 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1727 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1728 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1729 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1730 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1731 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1733 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1735 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1736 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1737 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1738 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1739 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1741 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1742 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1743 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1744 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1745 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1746 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1747 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1749 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1750 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1751 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1752 pub is_outbound: bool,
1753 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1754 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1755 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1756 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1757 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1759 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1760 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1761 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1762 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1763 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1764 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1765 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1767 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1768 pub is_usable: bool,
1769 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1770 pub is_public: bool,
1771 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1772 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1773 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1774 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1775 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1776 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1778 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1779 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1782 impl ChannelDetails {
1783 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1784 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1785 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1787 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1788 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1789 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1790 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1793 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1794 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1795 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1797 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1798 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1799 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1800 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1803 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1804 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1805 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1808 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1809 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1811 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1812 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1813 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1815 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1816 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1817 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1818 features: latest_features,
1819 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1820 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1821 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1822 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1823 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1824 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1825 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1826 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1827 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1828 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1830 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1831 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1832 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1833 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1834 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1835 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1836 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1837 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1838 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1839 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1840 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1841 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1842 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1843 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1844 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1845 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1846 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1847 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1848 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1849 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1850 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1851 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1852 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1853 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1854 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1855 config: Some(context.config()),
1856 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1861 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1862 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1863 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1864 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1865 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1866 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1867 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1868 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1869 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1871 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1873 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1874 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1876 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1877 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1878 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1879 /// to drop the channel.
1883 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1884 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1885 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1886 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1887 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1889 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1890 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1891 payment_id: PaymentId,
1893 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1895 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1896 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1897 payment_id: PaymentId,
1898 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1900 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1901 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1902 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1905 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1906 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1907 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1909 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1910 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1911 payment_id: PaymentId,
1912 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1913 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1914 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1916 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1917 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1918 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1920 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1921 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1922 payment_id: PaymentId,
1923 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1924 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1928 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1930 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1932 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1933 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1934 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1935 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1937 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1938 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1939 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1942 macro_rules! handle_error {
1943 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1944 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1945 // entering the macro.
1946 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1947 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1951 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1952 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1954 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1955 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1956 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1957 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1961 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1962 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1963 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1964 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1965 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1966 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1971 let logger = WithContext::from(
1972 &$self.logger, Some($counterparty_node_id), chan_id.map(|(chan_id, _)| chan_id)
1974 log_error!(logger, "{}", err.err);
1975 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1977 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1978 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1979 action: err.action.clone()
1983 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1984 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1985 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1986 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1987 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1991 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1998 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1999 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2000 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
2001 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2002 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2003 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2005 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2006 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2007 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2008 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2009 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2011 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2012 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2014 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2018 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2019 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2020 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2022 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2023 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2025 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2026 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2028 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2029 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2030 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2031 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2032 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
2033 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
2034 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
2036 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
2037 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
2041 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2042 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2044 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2045 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2047 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2048 match $channel_phase {
2049 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2050 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2052 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2053 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2055 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2056 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2062 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2063 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2067 let key = *$entry.key();
2068 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2070 $entry.remove_entry();
2078 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2079 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2083 let key = *$entry.key();
2084 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2086 $entry.remove_entry();
2094 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2095 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2097 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2098 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2104 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2105 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2106 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2107 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2108 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2110 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2111 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2112 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2113 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2114 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2115 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2116 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2117 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2118 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2119 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2124 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2125 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2126 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2127 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2128 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2129 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2130 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2131 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2132 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2134 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2139 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2140 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2141 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2142 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2143 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2144 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2145 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2146 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2147 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2149 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2154 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2155 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2156 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2157 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2158 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2159 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2160 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2161 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2162 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2163 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2164 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2165 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2167 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2168 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2169 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2175 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2176 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2178 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2179 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2180 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2181 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2182 updates.announcement_sigs);
2183 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2184 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2187 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2188 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2189 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2190 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2192 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2193 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2194 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2195 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2196 let mut batch_completed = false;
2197 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2198 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2199 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2200 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2202 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2203 channel_state.2 = true;
2205 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2207 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2209 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2212 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2213 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2214 if batch_completed {
2215 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2216 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2217 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2218 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2219 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2220 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2221 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2222 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2223 chan.set_batch_ready();
2224 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2225 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2229 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2230 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2231 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2236 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2238 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2239 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2241 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2242 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2243 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2244 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2249 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2250 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2251 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2252 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2254 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2255 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2256 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2257 panic!("{}", err_str);
2259 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2260 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2261 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2264 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2270 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2271 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2272 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2274 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2275 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2276 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2277 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2278 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2279 // filter for uniqueness here.
2280 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2281 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2282 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2283 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2285 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2286 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2288 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2289 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2290 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2296 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2297 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2298 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2299 while !processed_all_events {
2300 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2307 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2308 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2309 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2311 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2312 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2313 result = $self.process_background_events();
2315 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2316 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2317 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2318 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2322 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2323 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2324 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2325 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2328 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2330 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2331 $event_to_handle = event;
2333 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2334 post_event_actions.push(action);
2339 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2340 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2341 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2342 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2343 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2344 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2347 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2348 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2349 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2350 processed_all_events = false;
2354 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2355 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2356 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2358 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2359 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2360 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2366 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2368 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2369 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2370 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2371 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2372 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2373 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2377 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2379 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2381 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2382 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2384 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2386 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2387 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2388 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2391 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2392 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2393 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2395 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2396 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2397 current_timestamp: u32,
2399 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2400 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2401 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2402 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2404 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2405 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2406 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2411 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2413 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2414 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2415 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2416 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2417 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2418 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2419 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2420 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2422 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2425 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2426 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2428 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2430 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2432 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2434 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2435 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2436 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2437 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2438 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2439 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2440 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2441 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2443 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2453 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2454 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2455 &self.default_configuration
2458 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2459 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2460 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2463 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2464 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2466 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2468 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2472 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2477 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2479 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2480 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2481 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2482 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2483 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2485 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2486 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2488 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2489 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2490 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2492 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2493 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2494 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2496 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2497 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2499 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2500 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2501 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2502 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2503 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2504 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2506 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2507 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2508 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2509 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2510 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2511 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2515 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2516 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2518 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2520 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2521 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2523 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2525 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2526 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2527 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2532 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2533 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2534 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2535 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2536 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2537 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2541 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2546 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2548 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2549 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2552 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2554 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2560 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2561 node_id: their_network_key,
2564 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2567 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2568 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2569 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2570 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2571 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2572 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2573 // the same channel.
2574 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2576 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2577 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2578 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2579 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2580 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2581 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2582 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2583 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2584 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2588 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2589 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2590 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2598 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2599 /// more information.
2600 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2601 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2602 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2603 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2604 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2605 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2606 // the same channel.
2607 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2609 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2610 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2611 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2612 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2613 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2614 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2615 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2616 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2624 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2625 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2627 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2628 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2630 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2631 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2632 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2633 // really wanted anyway.
2634 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2637 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2638 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2639 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2640 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2642 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2643 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2644 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2645 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2646 let context_to_details = |context| {
2647 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2649 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2651 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2652 .map(context_to_details)
2658 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2659 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2661 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2662 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2663 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2665 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2666 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2667 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2668 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2669 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2670 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2672 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2673 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2674 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2676 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2677 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2678 payment_id: *payment_id,
2679 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2680 total_msat: *total_msat,
2683 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2684 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2686 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2687 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2689 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2694 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2695 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2696 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2697 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2698 Some(transaction) => {
2699 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2700 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2705 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2706 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2707 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2708 reason: closure_reason,
2709 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2710 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2714 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2717 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2718 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2721 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2723 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2724 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2726 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2727 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2729 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2731 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2732 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2733 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2734 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2735 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2736 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2738 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2739 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2740 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2741 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2742 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2746 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2747 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2749 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2750 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2751 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2752 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2755 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan_phase_entry.get().context(), ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2756 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2757 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2760 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2761 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2763 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2764 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2771 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2772 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2773 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2774 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2777 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2778 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2784 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2785 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2786 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2788 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2789 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2791 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2792 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2793 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2794 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2796 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2798 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2799 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2800 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2803 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2804 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2805 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2806 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2807 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2808 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2811 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2812 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2813 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2815 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2816 /// the channel being closed or not:
2817 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2818 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2819 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2820 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2821 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2822 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2823 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2825 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2826 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2827 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2828 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2830 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2832 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2833 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2834 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2837 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2838 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2839 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2840 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2841 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2844 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2845 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2846 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2847 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2848 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2851 let logger = WithContext::from(
2852 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2854 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2855 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2856 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2857 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2858 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2859 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2861 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2862 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2863 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2864 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2865 // ignore the result here.
2866 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2868 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2869 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2870 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2871 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2873 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2874 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2875 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2876 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2877 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2878 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2879 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2880 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2883 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2886 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2887 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2890 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2891 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2895 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2896 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2897 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2898 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2899 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2900 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2901 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2902 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2903 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2904 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2905 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2907 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2909 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2910 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2911 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2912 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2913 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2914 mem::drop(peer_state);
2915 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2917 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2918 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2919 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2921 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2922 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2923 // Unfunded channel has no update
2924 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2927 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2928 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2929 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2930 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2932 (None, *peer_node_id)
2934 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2937 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2938 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2939 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2940 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2941 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2942 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2943 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2944 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2945 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2951 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2954 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2955 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2956 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2957 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2958 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2959 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2960 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2961 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2962 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2963 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2964 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2965 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2976 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2977 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2978 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2980 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2981 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2982 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2985 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2986 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2987 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2989 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2990 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2991 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2992 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2993 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2996 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2997 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2998 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2999 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3000 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3004 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3005 /// local transaction(s).
3006 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3007 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3008 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3012 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3013 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3015 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3017 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3018 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3021 let is_blinded = match next_hop {
3022 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3023 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
3025 _ => false, // TODO: update this when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
3028 macro_rules! return_err {
3029 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3032 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3033 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3035 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_blinded {
3036 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3037 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3038 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3039 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3040 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3041 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3042 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3048 let NextPacketDetails {
3049 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3050 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3051 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3052 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3053 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3056 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3057 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3058 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3059 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3060 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3061 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3062 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3063 // phantom or an intercept.
3064 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3065 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3066 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3070 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3073 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3075 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3076 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3077 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3078 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3079 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3081 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3082 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3083 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3084 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3087 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3088 // have no consistency guarantees.
3089 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3093 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3094 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3095 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3096 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3097 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3099 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3100 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3101 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3102 // we don't have the channel here.
3103 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3105 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3107 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3108 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3109 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3110 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3111 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3112 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3113 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3114 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3115 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3116 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3117 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3119 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3122 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3123 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3125 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3126 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3133 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3135 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3136 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3138 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3139 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3140 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3141 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3142 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3144 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3145 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3151 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3152 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3153 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3154 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3156 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3157 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3159 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3160 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3161 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3163 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3164 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3165 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3166 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3167 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3168 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3169 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3173 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3175 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3178 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3179 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3180 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3181 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3182 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3183 macro_rules! return_err {
3184 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3186 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3187 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3188 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3189 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3190 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3191 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3192 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3198 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3200 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3201 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3202 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3203 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3206 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3207 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3208 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3209 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3210 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3212 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3215 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3216 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3217 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3218 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3219 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3225 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3226 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3227 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3229 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3230 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3231 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3233 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3234 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3235 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3236 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3237 return Err(LightningError {
3238 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3239 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3242 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3243 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3245 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3246 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3247 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3250 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3251 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3252 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3253 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3255 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3256 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3257 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3259 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3260 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3261 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3262 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3263 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3264 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3265 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3269 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3272 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3273 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3274 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3275 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3277 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3278 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3279 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3280 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3281 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3284 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3285 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3287 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3288 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3289 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3290 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3291 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3292 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3293 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3294 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3296 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3297 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3298 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3300 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3302 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3309 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3310 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3311 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3312 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3317 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3318 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3319 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3322 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3323 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3324 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3325 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3327 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3328 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3329 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3331 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3332 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3336 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3337 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3339 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3340 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3341 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3343 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3346 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3348 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3349 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3351 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3352 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3353 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3354 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3355 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3356 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3357 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3358 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3359 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3360 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3362 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3363 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3364 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3365 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3367 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3368 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3370 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3371 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3372 Some(monitor_update) => {
3373 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3375 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3376 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3377 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3378 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3379 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3380 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3381 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3389 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3392 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3393 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3394 // `channel_by_id` map.
3395 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3396 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3400 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3401 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3403 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3408 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3410 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3411 /// fields for more info.
3413 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3414 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3416 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3418 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3419 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3420 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3421 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3422 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3424 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3425 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3426 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3427 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3428 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3430 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3431 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3432 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3433 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3435 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3437 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3438 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3439 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3441 /// In general, a path may raise:
3442 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3443 /// node public key) is specified.
3444 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3445 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3446 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3447 /// relevant updates.
3449 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3450 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3451 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3453 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3454 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3455 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3456 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3457 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3458 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3459 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3460 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3461 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3462 self.pending_outbound_payments
3463 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3464 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3465 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3468 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3469 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3470 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3471 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3472 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3473 self.pending_outbound_payments
3474 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3475 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3476 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3477 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3481 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3482 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3483 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3484 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3485 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3486 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3490 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3491 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3492 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3496 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3497 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3500 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3501 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3502 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3503 self.pending_outbound_payments
3504 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3505 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3506 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3507 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3508 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3512 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3513 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3514 /// retries are exhausted.
3516 /// # Event Generation
3518 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3519 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3521 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3522 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3523 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3525 /// # Requested Invoices
3527 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3528 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3529 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3530 /// once the invoice has been received.
3532 /// # Restart Behavior
3534 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3535 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3536 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3538 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3539 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3541 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3544 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3545 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3546 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3547 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3548 /// never reach the recipient.
3550 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3551 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3553 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3554 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3556 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3557 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3558 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3559 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3560 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3561 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3562 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3565 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3566 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3568 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3571 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3572 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3573 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3574 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3575 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3576 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3577 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3578 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3581 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3582 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3583 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3584 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3585 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3587 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3588 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3589 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3592 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3595 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3596 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3599 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3600 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3602 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3603 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3604 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3605 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3606 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3607 let payment_params =
3608 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3610 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3612 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3615 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3616 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3618 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3619 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3620 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3621 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3623 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3624 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3625 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3626 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3627 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3628 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3629 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3630 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3631 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3632 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3634 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3635 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3636 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3637 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3641 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3643 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3644 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3647 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3649 let mut res = Vec::new();
3651 for mut path in route.paths {
3652 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3653 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3654 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3655 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3656 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3659 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3662 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3663 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3665 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3667 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3668 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3673 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3676 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3681 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3682 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3683 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3685 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3686 let used_liquidity =
3687 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3689 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3690 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3692 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3695 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3700 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3701 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3702 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3709 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3710 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3711 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3712 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3713 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3714 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3715 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3716 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3717 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3719 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3720 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3721 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3722 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3723 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3725 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3726 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3727 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3728 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3729 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3730 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3731 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3732 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3733 } else { unreachable!(); });
3735 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3736 Err((chan, err)) => {
3737 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3738 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3739 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3740 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3741 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3747 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3748 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3750 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3751 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3754 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3755 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3756 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3760 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3761 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3762 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3766 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3768 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3770 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3771 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3772 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3773 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3775 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3782 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3783 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3784 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3788 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3790 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3791 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3793 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3794 /// across the p2p network.
3796 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3797 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3799 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3800 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3801 /// keys per-channel).
3803 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3804 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3805 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3807 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3808 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3809 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3811 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3812 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3813 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3814 /// for more details.
3816 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3817 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3818 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3819 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3822 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3824 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3825 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3827 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3828 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3829 /// signature for each channel.
3831 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3832 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3833 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3834 let mut result = Ok(());
3836 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3837 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3838 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3839 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3840 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3845 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3846 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3847 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3851 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3852 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3853 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3854 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3855 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3856 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3857 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3858 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3860 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3861 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3866 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3867 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3868 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3869 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3873 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3874 match states.entry(txid) {
3875 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3876 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3877 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3881 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3884 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3885 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3886 temporary_channel_id,
3887 counterparty_node_id,
3888 funding_transaction.clone(),
3891 let mut output_index = None;
3892 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3893 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3894 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3895 if output_index.is_some() {
3896 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3897 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3900 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3903 if output_index.is_none() {
3904 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3905 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3908 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3909 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3910 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3916 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3917 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3918 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3919 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3920 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3921 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3922 .into_iter().flatten()
3923 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3925 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3926 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3928 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3930 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3931 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3932 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3933 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3934 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3936 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3937 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3938 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3942 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3943 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3949 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3951 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3952 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3953 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3954 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3956 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3957 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3959 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3960 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3962 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3964 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3965 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3966 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3967 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3968 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3969 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3970 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3971 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3972 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3973 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3974 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3975 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3976 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3980 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3981 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3982 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3983 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3984 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3985 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3986 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3987 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3988 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3989 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3993 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3994 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3995 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3996 config.apply(config_update);
3997 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4000 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4001 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4002 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4003 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4004 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4005 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4012 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4013 debug_assert!(false);
4014 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4016 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4017 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4024 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4026 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4027 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4028 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4029 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4031 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4032 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4034 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4035 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4037 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4039 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4040 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4041 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4042 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4043 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4044 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4045 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4046 pub fn update_channel_config(
4047 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4048 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4049 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4052 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4053 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4055 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4056 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4058 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4059 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4060 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4061 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4062 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4064 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4065 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4066 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4069 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4072 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4073 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4074 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4075 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4076 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4077 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4078 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4080 let next_hop_scid = {
4081 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4082 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4083 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4084 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4085 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4086 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4087 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4088 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4089 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4090 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4093 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4095 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4096 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4097 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4100 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4101 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4102 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4103 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4104 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4111 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4112 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4113 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4116 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4117 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4118 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4119 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4122 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4124 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4125 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4126 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4127 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4128 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4131 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4132 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4133 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4134 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4135 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4137 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4141 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4142 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4144 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4147 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4148 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4149 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4151 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4152 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4153 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4156 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4157 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4158 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4159 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4160 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4161 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4163 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4164 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4167 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4168 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4169 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4170 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4175 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4177 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4178 /// Will likely generate further events.
4179 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4180 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4182 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4183 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4184 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4186 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4187 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4189 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4190 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4191 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4192 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4194 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4195 match forward_info {
4196 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4197 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4198 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4199 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4200 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4203 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4204 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4205 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4206 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4208 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4209 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4210 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4211 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4212 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4213 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4214 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4215 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4218 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4219 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4221 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4224 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4225 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4231 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4232 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4234 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4238 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4239 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4241 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4245 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4246 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4247 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4248 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4249 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4250 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4251 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4254 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4255 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4256 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4257 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4258 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4260 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4262 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4263 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4267 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4268 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4269 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4270 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4271 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4272 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4274 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4275 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4281 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4284 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4287 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4288 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4289 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4290 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4291 // problem, not ours.
4297 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4298 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4299 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4301 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4305 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4306 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4307 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4308 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4309 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4312 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4313 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4314 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4315 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4316 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4317 match forward_info {
4318 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4319 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4320 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4321 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4322 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4323 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4324 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4327 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4328 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4329 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4330 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4331 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4332 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4333 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4334 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4335 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4336 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4338 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4339 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4340 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4341 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4342 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4343 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4346 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4347 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4348 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4351 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4352 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4354 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4356 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4357 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4358 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4359 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4364 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4365 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4367 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4368 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4369 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4370 htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger
4372 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4373 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4375 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4377 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4378 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4379 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4386 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4390 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4391 match forward_info {
4392 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4393 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4394 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4395 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4396 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4399 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4400 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4401 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4402 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4403 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4404 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4405 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4406 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4408 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4409 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4410 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4414 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4415 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4418 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4421 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4422 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4423 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4424 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4425 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4426 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4427 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4428 phantom_shared_secret,
4431 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4432 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4433 // if routing nodes overpay
4434 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4435 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4437 total_value_received: None,
4438 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4441 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4444 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4446 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4447 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4448 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4449 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4450 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4451 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4453 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4454 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4455 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4456 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4457 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4458 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4459 phantom_shared_secret,
4460 blinded_failure: None,
4462 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4463 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4465 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4468 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4469 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4470 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4471 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4472 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4475 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4476 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4477 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4478 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4479 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4480 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4482 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4483 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4484 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4486 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4487 .entry(payment_hash)
4488 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4489 .or_insert_with(|| {
4490 committed_to_claimable = true;
4492 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4495 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4496 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4497 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4498 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4500 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4501 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4502 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4504 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4505 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4506 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4509 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4511 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4512 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4513 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4514 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4515 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4516 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4517 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4518 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4519 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4520 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4522 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4524 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4525 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4526 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4527 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4528 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4529 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4531 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4532 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4533 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4534 committed_to_claimable = true;
4536 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4537 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4538 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4539 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4540 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4541 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4542 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4543 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4544 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4545 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4549 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4550 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4551 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4552 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4553 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4555 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4557 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4558 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4560 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4561 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4562 committed_to_claimable = true;
4565 payment_claimable_generated
4569 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4570 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4571 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4572 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4573 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4574 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4575 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4576 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4578 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4579 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4580 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4581 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4582 Ok(result) => result,
4584 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4585 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4588 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4589 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4590 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4591 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4592 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4593 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4596 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4597 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4598 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4600 check_total_value!(purpose);
4602 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4603 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4604 check_total_value!(purpose);
4608 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4609 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4610 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4611 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4613 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4614 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4615 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4616 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4617 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4618 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4619 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4620 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4622 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4623 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4624 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4626 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4627 if payment_claimable_generated {
4628 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4634 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4635 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4643 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4644 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4645 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4646 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4648 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4649 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4651 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4653 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4654 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4655 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4657 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4659 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4660 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4661 events.append(&mut new_events);
4664 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4666 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4667 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4668 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4670 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4672 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4673 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4674 if background_events.is_empty() {
4675 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4678 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4680 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4681 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4682 // monitor updating completing.
4683 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4685 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4686 let mut updated_chan = false;
4688 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4689 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4690 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4691 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4692 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4693 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4694 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4695 updated_chan = true;
4696 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4697 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4699 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4707 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4708 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4711 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4712 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4713 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4714 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4715 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4716 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4717 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4719 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4720 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4721 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4722 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4723 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4729 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4732 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4733 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4734 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4735 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4736 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4739 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4740 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4742 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4744 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4745 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4746 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4747 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4748 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4750 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4752 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4753 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4754 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4755 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4757 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4758 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4760 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4761 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4765 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4766 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4767 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4768 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4769 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4770 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4771 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4773 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4774 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4776 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4777 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4778 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4779 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4780 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4781 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4783 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4788 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4789 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4797 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4799 /// This currently includes:
4800 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4801 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4802 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4804 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4805 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4806 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4807 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4808 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4809 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4810 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4811 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4813 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4814 /// estimate fetches.
4816 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4817 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4818 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4819 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4820 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4822 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4823 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4825 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4826 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4827 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4828 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4830 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4831 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4832 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4833 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4834 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4835 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4837 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4838 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4839 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4841 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4842 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4843 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4844 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4845 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4846 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4847 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4848 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4849 channel_id: *chan_id,
4850 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4861 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4862 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4863 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4864 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4865 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4866 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4867 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4869 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4870 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4875 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4876 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4878 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4879 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4880 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4881 if needs_close { return false; }
4884 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4885 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4886 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4887 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4888 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4889 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4890 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4891 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4893 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4894 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4895 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4896 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4900 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4902 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4905 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4907 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4908 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4909 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4910 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4914 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4916 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4922 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4924 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4925 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4926 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4927 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4928 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4929 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4930 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4931 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4932 channel_id: *chan_id,
4933 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4941 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4942 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4943 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4945 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4946 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4947 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4952 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4953 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4954 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
4955 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4956 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4957 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4958 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4959 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4960 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4966 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4968 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4969 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4974 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4975 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4976 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4977 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4978 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4979 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4980 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4981 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4982 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4983 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4984 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4985 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4986 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4987 // have no channels to the peer.
4988 let remove_entry = {
4989 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4990 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4993 entry.remove_entry();
4996 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5001 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5002 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5003 // This should be unreachable
5004 debug_assert!(false);
5007 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5008 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5009 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5010 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5011 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5012 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5013 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5016 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5017 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5018 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5020 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5021 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5028 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5029 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5030 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5031 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5032 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5035 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5036 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5039 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5040 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5043 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5044 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5045 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5046 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5047 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5048 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5049 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5052 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5053 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5056 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5057 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5058 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5059 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5060 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5067 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5068 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5069 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5071 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5072 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5073 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5074 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5076 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5077 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5078 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5079 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5080 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5081 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5084 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5085 /// reason for the failure.
5087 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5088 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5089 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5091 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5092 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5093 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5094 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5095 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5096 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5097 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5102 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5103 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5104 match failure_code {
5105 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5106 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5107 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5108 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5109 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5110 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5112 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5113 let fail_data = match data {
5114 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5117 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5122 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5123 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5125 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5127 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5128 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5129 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5130 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5131 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5132 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5133 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5135 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5137 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5138 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5140 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5145 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5146 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5147 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5148 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5149 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5150 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5151 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5152 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5153 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5154 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5156 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5157 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5158 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5159 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5161 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5162 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5163 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5164 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5165 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5169 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5170 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5171 // be surfaced to the user.
5172 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5173 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5174 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5176 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5177 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5178 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5179 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5180 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5181 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5182 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5183 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5184 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5186 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5187 debug_assert!(false);
5188 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5191 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5193 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5196 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5197 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5198 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5199 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5203 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5204 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5205 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5206 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5207 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5208 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5209 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5210 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5211 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5212 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5215 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5216 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5217 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5220 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5221 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5222 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5224 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5225 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5226 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5227 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5228 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5230 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5231 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5232 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5235 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5236 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5237 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5239 let err_packet = match blinded_failure {
5240 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5241 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5242 blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5243 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5246 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => todo!(),
5248 onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret)
5252 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5253 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5254 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5255 push_forward_ev = true;
5257 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5258 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5259 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5261 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5262 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5265 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5266 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5267 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5268 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5269 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5270 failed_next_destination: destination,
5276 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5277 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5279 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5280 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5281 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5282 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5284 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5285 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5286 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5287 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5289 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5290 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5291 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5293 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5294 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5295 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5296 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5297 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5298 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5299 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5300 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5301 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5304 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5305 /// even type numbers.
5309 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5310 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5312 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5313 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5314 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5317 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5318 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5320 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5323 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5324 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5325 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5326 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5327 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5328 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5329 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5330 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5335 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5336 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5337 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5338 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5339 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5341 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5342 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5343 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5347 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5348 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5349 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5350 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5351 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5352 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5353 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5354 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5355 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5356 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5357 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5366 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5368 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5369 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5370 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5371 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5372 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5373 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5374 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5375 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5376 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5377 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5378 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5379 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5380 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5381 debug_assert!(false);
5385 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5387 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5388 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5389 debug_assert!(false);
5393 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5394 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5396 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5397 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5398 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5399 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5402 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5403 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5404 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5405 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5409 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5410 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5411 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5412 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5413 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5414 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5415 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5418 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5419 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5420 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5421 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5422 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5423 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5428 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5429 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5430 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5431 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5432 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5433 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5434 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5436 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5439 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5440 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5441 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5442 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5446 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5447 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5448 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5449 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5451 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5452 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5453 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5454 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5456 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5457 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5458 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5459 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5462 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5463 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5464 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5465 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5469 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5470 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5471 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5474 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5475 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5476 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5477 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5478 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5479 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5480 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5481 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5484 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5485 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5486 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5488 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5491 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5492 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5494 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5495 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5496 // monitor update as a background event.
5497 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5498 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5499 counterparty_node_id,
5500 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5501 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5505 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5506 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5511 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5513 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5515 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5516 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5517 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5518 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5519 blocking_action: blocker,
5521 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5523 debug_assert!(false,
5524 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5527 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5528 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5529 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5530 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5531 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5533 let mut found_blocker = false;
5534 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5535 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5536 // which case we need to only remove the one
5537 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5538 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5539 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5540 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5542 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5545 debug_assert!(false);
5554 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5555 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5556 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5562 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5563 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5564 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5565 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5566 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5567 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5568 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5569 // again on restart.
5570 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5571 payment_preimage, update_res);
5574 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5575 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5577 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5578 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5579 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5580 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5581 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5582 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5583 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5584 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5585 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5586 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5589 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5590 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5591 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5592 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5593 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5594 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5598 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5599 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5602 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5603 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5604 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5607 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5608 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5609 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5610 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5611 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5613 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5614 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5615 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5617 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5618 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5621 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5622 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5623 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5624 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5625 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5626 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5627 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5628 let chan_to_release =
5629 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5630 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5632 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5633 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5634 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5635 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5640 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5641 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5642 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5643 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5644 // in the background.
5645 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5646 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5647 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5648 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5650 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5651 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5652 funding_txo, update, ..
5654 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5655 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5656 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5657 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5659 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5665 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5666 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5667 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5669 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5670 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5672 monitor_update.updates[0],
5673 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5678 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5679 // immediately once we get going.
5680 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5683 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5685 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5688 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5689 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5690 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5691 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5692 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5693 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5697 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5698 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5699 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5702 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5703 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5705 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5706 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5707 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5708 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5710 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5714 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5715 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5716 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5722 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5723 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5724 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5727 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5728 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5729 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5730 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5732 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5734 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5735 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5736 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5738 payment_purpose: purpose,
5741 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5743 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5747 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5749 sender_intended_total_msat,
5753 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5754 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5756 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5757 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5758 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5761 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5762 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5764 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5765 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5766 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5767 Some(blocking_action),
5774 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5775 /// update completion.
5776 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5777 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5778 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5779 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5780 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5781 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5782 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5783 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5784 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5785 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5786 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5787 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5788 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5789 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5791 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5793 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5794 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5795 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5796 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5799 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5800 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5802 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5803 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5804 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5809 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5810 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5811 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5812 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5817 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5818 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5819 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5820 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5821 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5826 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5830 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5836 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5837 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5838 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5842 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5843 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5844 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5850 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5851 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5853 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5854 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5856 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5857 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5858 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5859 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5860 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5865 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5866 let mut peer_state_lock;
5867 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5868 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5869 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5870 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5872 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5875 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5876 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5877 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5878 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5879 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5882 let remaining_in_flight =
5883 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5884 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5887 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5888 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5889 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5890 remaining_in_flight);
5891 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5894 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5897 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5899 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5900 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5903 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5904 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5905 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5907 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5908 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5909 /// used to accept such channels.
5911 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5912 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5913 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5914 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5917 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5918 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5920 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5921 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5922 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5924 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5925 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5927 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5928 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5930 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5931 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5933 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5934 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5935 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5936 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5939 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5942 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5943 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5944 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5945 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5946 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5947 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5948 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5949 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5951 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5952 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5953 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5955 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5956 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5957 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5958 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5959 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5960 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5961 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5963 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5967 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5968 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5969 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5970 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5971 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5972 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5973 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5976 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5977 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5979 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5980 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5981 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5982 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5983 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5984 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5985 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5986 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5989 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5990 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5994 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5995 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5996 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5998 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5999 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6000 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6003 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6008 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6009 /// or 0-conf channels.
6011 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6012 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6013 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6014 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6015 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6016 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6018 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6019 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6020 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6021 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6022 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6023 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6024 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6028 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6031 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6032 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6034 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6035 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6037 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6038 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6039 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6040 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6041 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6043 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6046 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6047 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6048 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6051 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6052 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6057 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6060 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6061 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6062 // likely to be lost on restart!
6063 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6064 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6067 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6068 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6071 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6072 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6073 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6074 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6075 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6077 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6078 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6080 debug_assert!(false);
6081 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6083 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6084 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6086 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6087 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6088 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6089 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6090 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6091 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6093 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6094 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6095 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6098 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6099 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6100 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6101 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6102 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6105 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6106 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6108 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6111 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6112 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6113 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6114 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6115 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6116 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6117 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6118 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6119 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6121 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6122 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6123 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6128 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6129 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6130 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6131 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6132 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6133 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6134 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6137 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6142 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6143 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6144 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6146 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6147 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6150 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6151 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6153 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6154 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6155 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6157 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6161 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6162 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6163 // likely to be lost on restart!
6164 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6165 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6166 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6168 debug_assert!(false);
6169 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6171 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6172 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6173 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6175 match phase.get_mut() {
6176 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6177 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6178 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6181 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6188 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6189 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6190 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6191 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6192 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6194 user_channel_id: user_id,
6199 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6200 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6202 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6203 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6205 debug_assert!(false);
6206 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6209 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6210 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6211 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6212 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6213 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6214 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6215 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6217 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6218 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6219 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6220 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6221 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6222 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6223 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6224 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6225 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6229 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6230 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6232 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6235 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6236 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6237 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6238 "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6239 chan.context.channel_id()
6242 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6243 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6244 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6245 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6246 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6247 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6248 chan.context.channel_id()))
6250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6251 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6252 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6253 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6254 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6256 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6257 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6258 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6259 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6260 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6261 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6262 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6267 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6268 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6269 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6271 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6275 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6276 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6277 let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6278 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6279 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6281 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6282 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6291 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6292 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6293 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6294 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6296 debug_assert!(false);
6297 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6300 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6301 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6302 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6303 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6304 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6305 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6306 let logger = WithContext::from(
6308 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6309 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6312 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6314 Ok((chan, monitor)) => {
6315 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6316 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6317 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6318 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6319 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6320 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6321 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6322 } else { unreachable!(); }
6325 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6326 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6330 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6331 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6332 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6333 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6334 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6335 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6339 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6342 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6346 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6347 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6348 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6349 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6350 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6352 debug_assert!(false);
6353 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6355 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6356 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6357 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6358 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6359 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6360 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6361 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6362 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6363 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6364 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6365 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6366 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6367 msg: announcement_sigs,
6369 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6370 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6371 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6372 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6373 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6374 // announcement_signatures.
6375 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6376 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6377 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6378 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6385 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6386 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6391 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6392 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6395 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6396 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6401 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6402 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6403 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6405 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6406 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6408 debug_assert!(false);
6409 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6411 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6412 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6413 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6414 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6416 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6417 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6418 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6419 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6421 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6424 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6425 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6426 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6427 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6429 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6430 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6431 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6432 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6433 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6434 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6438 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6439 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6440 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6441 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6444 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6445 let context = phase.context_mut();
6446 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6447 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6448 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6449 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6450 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6454 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6457 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6458 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6459 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6460 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6462 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6463 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6469 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6470 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6471 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6473 debug_assert!(false);
6474 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6476 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6477 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6478 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6479 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6480 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6481 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6482 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6483 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6484 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6485 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6486 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6491 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6492 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6493 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6494 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6495 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6496 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6497 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6499 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6500 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6503 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6506 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6507 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6508 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6509 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6511 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6512 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6513 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6514 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6515 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6519 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6521 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6522 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6523 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6528 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6529 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6530 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6531 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6533 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6534 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6535 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6536 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6538 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6539 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6541 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6542 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6543 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6545 debug_assert!(false);
6546 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6548 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6549 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6550 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6551 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6552 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6553 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6554 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6555 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6556 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6557 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6559 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6561 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6562 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6563 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6564 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6565 match pending_forward_info {
6566 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6567 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6569 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6570 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6571 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6572 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6573 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6575 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6576 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6577 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6578 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6579 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6582 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6584 _ => pending_forward_info
6587 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6588 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6590 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6591 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6594 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6599 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6601 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6602 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6603 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6605 debug_assert!(false);
6606 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6610 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6611 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6612 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6613 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6614 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6615 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6617 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6619 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6620 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6621 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6623 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6624 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6625 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6626 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6627 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6628 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6629 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6632 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6633 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6636 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6639 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6643 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6644 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6645 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6646 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6647 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6649 debug_assert!(false);
6650 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6652 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6653 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6654 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6655 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6656 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6657 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6659 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6660 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6663 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6668 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6669 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6670 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6671 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6672 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6674 debug_assert!(false);
6675 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6677 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6678 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6679 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6680 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6681 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6682 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6683 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6685 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6686 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6688 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6689 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6693 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6697 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6698 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6699 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6701 debug_assert!(false);
6702 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6704 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6705 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6706 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6708 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6709 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6710 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6711 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6712 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6713 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6714 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6718 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6719 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6727 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6728 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6729 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6730 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6731 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6732 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6733 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6734 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6735 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6736 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6737 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6739 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6740 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6742 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6743 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6744 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6746 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6747 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6749 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6750 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6751 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6753 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6754 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6755 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6757 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6758 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6759 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6760 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6761 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6764 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6765 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6768 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6769 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6770 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6771 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6772 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6773 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6774 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6775 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6776 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6777 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6780 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6781 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6782 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6787 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6788 // payments are being processed.
6789 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6790 push_forward_event = true;
6792 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6793 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6800 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6801 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6804 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6805 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6806 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6808 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6812 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6813 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6814 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6815 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6816 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6818 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6819 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6820 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6821 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6822 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6823 // real by taking more time.
6824 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6825 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6826 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6831 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6832 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6833 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6834 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6835 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6836 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6837 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6839 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6840 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6841 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6842 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6843 channel_funding_outpoint,
6844 counterparty_node_id,
6849 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6850 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6851 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6853 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6854 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6855 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6856 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6858 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6859 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6860 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6866 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6867 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6868 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6869 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6871 debug_assert!(false);
6872 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6873 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6874 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6875 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6876 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6877 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6878 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6879 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6880 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6881 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6882 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6883 *counterparty_node_id)
6885 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6886 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6887 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6888 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6889 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6890 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6891 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6895 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6896 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6902 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6906 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6907 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6908 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6910 debug_assert!(false);
6911 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6913 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6914 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6915 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6917 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6918 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6919 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6921 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6922 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6925 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6930 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6931 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6932 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6934 debug_assert!(false);
6935 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6937 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6938 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6939 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6940 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6941 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6942 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6943 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6946 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6947 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6948 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6949 msg, &self.default_configuration
6950 ), chan_phase_entry),
6951 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6952 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6953 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6956 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6957 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6960 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6965 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6966 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6967 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6968 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6970 // It's not a local channel
6971 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6974 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6975 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6976 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6977 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6979 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6980 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6981 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6982 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6983 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6984 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6985 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6986 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6987 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6988 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6989 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6991 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6993 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6994 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6995 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6996 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6998 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6999 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7000 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7001 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7004 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7008 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7009 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7014 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7017 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7019 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7020 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7022 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7024 debug_assert!(false);
7025 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7026 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7030 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7031 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7032 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7033 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7034 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7035 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7036 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7037 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7038 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7039 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7040 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7041 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7042 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7043 let mut channel_update = None;
7044 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7045 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7046 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7049 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7050 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7051 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7052 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7053 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7054 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7055 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7060 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7061 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7062 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7063 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7064 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7065 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7069 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7070 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7073 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7074 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7076 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7077 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7078 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7079 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7080 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7081 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7083 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7084 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7085 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7086 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7087 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7088 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7089 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7090 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7091 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7092 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7093 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7094 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7095 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7096 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7097 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7098 next_funding_txid: None,
7101 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7102 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7103 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7109 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7110 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7111 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7112 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7115 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7116 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7121 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7122 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7123 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7125 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7126 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7127 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7128 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7129 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7130 match monitor_event {
7131 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7132 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7133 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7134 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7135 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7137 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7138 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7139 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7140 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7143 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7144 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7145 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7147 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7148 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7149 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7150 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7153 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7154 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7155 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7156 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7157 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7158 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7159 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7160 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7161 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7162 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7163 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7167 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7168 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7169 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7170 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7171 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7179 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7180 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7186 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7187 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7190 has_pending_monitor_events
7193 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7194 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7195 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7197 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7198 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7199 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7202 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7203 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7204 /// update was applied.
7205 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7206 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7207 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7209 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7210 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7211 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7212 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7214 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7215 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7217 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7218 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7219 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7220 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7222 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7223 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7224 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7225 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7226 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7227 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7229 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7230 has_monitor_update = true;
7232 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7233 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7234 continue 'peer_loop;
7243 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7244 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7245 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7251 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7252 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7254 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7255 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7257 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7258 #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7259 // actually finish implementing it fully.
7260 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7261 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7263 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7264 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7266 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7267 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7268 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7269 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7274 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7275 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7280 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7281 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7284 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7285 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7286 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7292 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7296 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7297 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7298 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7299 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7300 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7301 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7302 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7306 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7307 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7308 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7309 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7310 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7316 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7317 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7318 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7319 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7320 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7321 let mut has_update = false;
7322 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7324 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7326 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7327 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7328 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7329 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7330 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7332 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7333 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7334 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7335 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7336 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7338 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7339 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7342 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7343 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7344 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7346 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7347 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7348 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7349 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7350 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7355 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7357 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7358 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7359 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7365 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7366 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7371 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7377 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7378 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7381 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7382 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7388 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7389 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7391 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7392 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7393 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7394 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7395 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7396 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7397 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7398 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7399 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7400 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7401 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7402 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7403 assert!(should_broadcast);
7404 } else { unreachable!(); }
7405 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7406 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7407 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7410 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7414 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7415 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7416 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7420 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7421 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7422 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7423 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7427 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7430 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7432 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7433 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7434 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7435 &self, description: String
7436 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7437 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7438 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7439 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7440 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7441 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7443 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7444 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7448 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7449 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7453 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7454 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7456 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7457 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7458 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7461 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7462 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7463 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7465 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7466 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7470 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7471 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7472 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7473 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7477 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7478 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7482 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7483 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7485 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7487 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7488 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7489 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7490 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7491 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7492 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7493 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7494 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7495 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7496 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7497 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7498 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7500 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7501 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7503 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7504 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7507 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7508 self.pending_outbound_payments
7509 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7510 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7512 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7517 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7518 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7519 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7521 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7522 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7523 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7524 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7525 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7526 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7527 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7529 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7530 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7534 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7535 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7538 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7539 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7540 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7544 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7545 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7546 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7547 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7551 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7552 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7553 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7557 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7558 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7560 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7561 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7562 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7563 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7564 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7565 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7566 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7567 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7568 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7569 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7570 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7571 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7572 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7573 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7574 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7577 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7578 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7579 let builder = match quantity {
7581 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7583 let builder = match amount_msats {
7585 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7587 let builder = match payer_note {
7589 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7592 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7593 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7595 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7596 self.pending_outbound_payments
7597 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7598 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7600 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7602 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7603 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7604 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7605 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7606 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7609 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7611 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7612 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7613 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7614 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7615 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7616 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7617 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7618 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7619 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7621 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7628 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7631 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7632 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7633 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7637 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7638 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7639 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7640 /// received and no retries will be made.
7642 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7643 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7644 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7645 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7646 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7648 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7649 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7651 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7652 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7653 let payment_paths = vec![
7654 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7656 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7657 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7658 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7660 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7661 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7662 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7664 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7665 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7666 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7668 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7669 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7671 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7672 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7673 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7674 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7675 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7678 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7680 for path in refund.paths() {
7681 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7682 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7683 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7684 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7686 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7692 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7696 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7699 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7700 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7702 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7703 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7704 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7705 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7707 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7709 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7710 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7714 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7715 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7717 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7719 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7720 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7722 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7723 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7724 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7725 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7726 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7727 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7728 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7729 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7730 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7731 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7732 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7735 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7736 /// stored external to LDK.
7738 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7739 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7740 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7742 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7743 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7746 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7747 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7748 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7749 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7751 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7752 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7753 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7754 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7755 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7757 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7758 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7759 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7760 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7761 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7763 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7764 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7766 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7767 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7771 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7772 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7774 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7776 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7777 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7779 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7780 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7781 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7782 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7783 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7784 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7785 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7788 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7789 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7791 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7792 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7793 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7796 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7798 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7799 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7800 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7801 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7804 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7806 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7807 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7808 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7809 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7810 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7812 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7813 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7814 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7816 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7818 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7821 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7822 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7823 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7827 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7828 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7830 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7831 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7832 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7833 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7835 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7836 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7837 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7838 Some(_) => continue,
7839 None => return scid_candidate
7844 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7846 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7847 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7849 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7850 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7851 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7855 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7856 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7857 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7859 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7860 /// times to get a unique scid.
7861 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7862 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7863 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7865 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7866 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7867 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7868 return scid_candidate
7872 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7873 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7874 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7875 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7877 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7878 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7879 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7880 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7881 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7882 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7884 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7885 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7886 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7895 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7896 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7897 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7898 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7899 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7903 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7904 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7905 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7906 events.push_back((event, None));
7910 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7911 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7912 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7916 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7917 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7921 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7922 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7925 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7926 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7927 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7928 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7929 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7930 let logger = WithContext::from(
7931 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7935 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7936 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7937 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7938 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7939 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7940 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7941 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7943 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7947 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7948 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7949 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7950 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7951 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7952 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7953 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7957 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7958 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7959 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7960 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7961 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7962 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7963 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7964 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7965 if further_update_exists {
7966 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7971 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7972 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7978 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7979 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7985 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7986 for action in actions {
7988 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7989 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7991 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7997 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7998 /// using the given event handler.
8000 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8001 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8005 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8009 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8011 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8012 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8013 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8014 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8015 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8016 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8020 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8021 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8022 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8023 /// is always placed next to each other.
8025 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8026 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8027 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8028 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8030 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8031 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8032 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8033 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8034 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8035 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8036 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8038 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8039 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8040 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8041 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8044 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8045 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8047 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8048 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8051 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8052 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8053 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8054 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8055 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8056 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8057 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8061 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8062 events.replace(pending_events);
8071 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8073 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8074 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8075 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8076 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8077 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8078 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8082 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8084 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8085 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8086 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8088 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8092 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8094 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8095 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8096 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8097 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8098 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8099 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8103 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8105 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8106 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8107 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8108 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8109 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8112 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8113 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8116 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8117 let _persistence_guard =
8118 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8119 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8120 let new_height = height - 1;
8122 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8123 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8124 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8125 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8126 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8127 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8130 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8134 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8136 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8137 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8138 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8139 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8140 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8141 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8145 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8146 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8147 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8148 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8150 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8151 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8153 let _persistence_guard =
8154 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8155 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8156 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8157 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8159 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8160 if height < last_best_block_height {
8161 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8162 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8166 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8167 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8168 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8169 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8171 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8172 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8174 let _persistence_guard =
8175 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8176 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8177 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8179 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8181 macro_rules! max_time {
8182 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8184 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8185 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8186 // having an explicit local time source.
8187 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8188 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8189 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8190 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8191 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8197 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8198 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8199 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8200 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8204 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8205 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8206 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8207 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8208 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8209 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8210 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8211 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8212 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8213 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8214 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8221 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8222 let _persistence_guard =
8223 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8224 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8225 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8226 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8227 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8228 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8229 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8230 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8235 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8237 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8238 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8239 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8240 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8241 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8242 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8246 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8247 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8249 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8250 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8251 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8252 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8253 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8255 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8256 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8258 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8259 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8260 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8261 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8262 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8263 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8265 // Retain unfunded channels.
8266 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8267 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8268 let res = f(channel);
8269 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8270 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8271 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8272 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8273 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8275 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8276 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8277 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8278 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8279 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8280 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8281 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8282 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8287 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8292 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8293 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8296 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8297 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8298 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8299 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8300 msg: announcement_sigs,
8302 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8303 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8304 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8306 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8307 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8308 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8313 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8314 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8315 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8316 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8317 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8318 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8319 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8320 // is always consistent.
8321 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8322 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8323 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8324 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8325 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8328 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8329 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8330 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8331 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8332 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8333 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8334 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8338 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8339 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8340 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8341 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8342 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8343 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8344 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8345 data: reason_message,
8358 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8359 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8360 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8361 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8362 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8363 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8364 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8365 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8366 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8367 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8369 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8370 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8371 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8375 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8378 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8379 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8380 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8381 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8382 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8383 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8384 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8385 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8386 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8387 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8388 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8391 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8392 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8393 _ => unreachable!(),
8395 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8396 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8397 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8398 let logger = WithContext::from(
8399 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8401 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8407 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8409 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8410 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8414 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8415 /// may have events that need processing.
8417 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8418 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8420 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8421 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8422 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8423 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8426 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8427 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8428 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8431 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8432 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8433 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8436 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8437 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8438 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8439 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8442 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8443 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8444 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8445 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8448 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8449 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8451 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8452 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8453 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8454 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8455 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8458 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8459 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8460 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8461 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8464 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8465 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8466 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8467 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8470 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8471 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8472 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8473 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8476 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8477 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8478 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8479 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8483 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8484 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8486 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8487 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8488 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8489 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8490 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8491 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8495 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8496 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8497 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8498 // change to the contents.
8499 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8500 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8501 let persist = match &res {
8502 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8503 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8504 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8506 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8508 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8513 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8514 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8515 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8516 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8519 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8520 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8521 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8522 // change to the contents.
8523 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8524 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8525 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8529 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8530 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8531 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8532 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8535 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8536 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8537 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8540 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8541 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8542 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8545 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8546 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8547 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8548 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8549 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8550 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8551 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8552 let persist = match &res {
8553 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8554 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8556 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8561 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8562 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8563 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8564 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8567 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8568 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8569 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8570 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8573 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8574 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8575 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8576 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8579 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8580 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8581 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8582 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8585 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8587 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8590 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8591 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8592 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8595 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8596 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8597 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8598 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8599 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8600 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8601 let persist = match &res {
8602 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8603 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8604 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8606 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8611 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8612 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8613 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8616 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8617 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8618 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8619 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8620 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8621 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8622 let persist = match &res {
8623 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8624 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8625 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8627 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8632 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8633 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8634 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8635 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8636 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8637 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8638 let persist = match &res {
8639 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8640 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8641 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8643 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8648 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8649 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8650 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8653 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8654 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8655 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8658 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8659 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8660 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8661 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8663 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8664 let persist = match &res {
8665 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8666 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8667 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8669 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8674 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8675 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8676 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8679 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8680 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8681 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8684 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8689 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8691 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8692 let persist = match &res {
8693 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8694 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8695 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8697 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8702 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8703 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8704 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8705 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8706 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8709 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8710 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8711 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8713 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8714 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8715 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8716 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8717 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8718 let context = match phase {
8719 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8720 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8721 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8722 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8727 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8728 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8731 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8735 // Clean up for removal.
8736 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8737 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8738 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8741 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8742 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8743 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8744 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8746 // V1 Channel Establishment
8747 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8748 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8749 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8750 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8751 // V2 Channel Establishment
8752 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8753 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8754 // Common Channel Establishment
8755 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8756 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8758 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8760 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8761 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8762 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8763 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8764 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8765 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8766 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8767 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8768 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8769 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8770 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8771 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8772 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8773 // Channel Operations
8774 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8775 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8776 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8777 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8778 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8779 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8781 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8782 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8783 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8784 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8785 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8786 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8787 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8788 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8789 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8792 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8793 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8794 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8795 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8798 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8800 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8802 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8803 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8807 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8808 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8809 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8810 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8814 let mut res = Ok(());
8816 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8817 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8818 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8819 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8820 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8821 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8822 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8825 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8826 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8827 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8828 if inbound_peer_limited {
8830 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8832 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8833 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8834 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8835 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8836 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8837 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8838 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8839 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8843 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8844 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8845 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8847 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8848 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8849 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8850 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8853 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8856 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8857 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8862 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8864 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8865 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8866 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8867 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8868 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8870 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8871 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8872 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8873 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8874 // worry about closing and removing them.
8875 debug_assert!(false);
8879 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8880 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8881 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8882 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
8887 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8888 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8893 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8894 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8896 match &msg.data as &str {
8897 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8898 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8900 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8901 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8902 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8903 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8904 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8905 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8906 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8907 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8908 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8909 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8910 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8911 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8912 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8913 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8914 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8915 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8919 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8920 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8921 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8922 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8923 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8924 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8926 log_level: Level::Trace,
8936 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8937 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8938 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8939 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8940 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8941 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8942 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8943 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8944 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8945 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8946 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8948 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8949 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8950 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8954 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8955 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8956 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8957 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8960 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8961 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8962 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8963 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8971 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8972 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8976 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8977 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8980 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8981 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8984 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8985 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8988 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8989 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8990 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8991 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8994 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8995 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8996 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8997 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9000 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9001 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9002 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9003 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9006 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9007 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9008 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9009 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9012 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9013 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9014 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9015 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9018 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9019 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9020 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9021 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9024 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9025 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9026 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9027 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9030 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9031 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9032 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9033 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9036 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9037 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9038 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9039 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9043 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9044 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9046 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9047 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9048 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9049 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9050 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9051 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9055 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9056 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9057 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9060 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9061 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9064 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
9065 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9067 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9068 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9070 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9071 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9074 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9076 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9077 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9078 let payment_paths = vec![
9079 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9081 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9082 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9083 payment_paths, payment_hash
9085 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9086 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9087 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9089 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9090 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9091 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9093 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9094 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9095 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9098 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9099 let payment_paths = vec![
9100 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9102 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9103 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9104 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9105 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9106 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9108 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9109 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9110 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9112 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9113 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9115 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9116 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9117 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9118 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9120 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9121 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9125 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9126 Err(error) => Some(error),
9130 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9134 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9135 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9137 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9139 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9140 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9143 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9144 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9145 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9152 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9153 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9159 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9160 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9164 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9165 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9166 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9167 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9168 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9172 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9173 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9175 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9176 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9177 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9178 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9179 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9182 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9183 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9184 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9185 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9188 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9189 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9190 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9191 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9194 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9195 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9196 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9197 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9200 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9201 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9202 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9203 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9204 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9205 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9206 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9207 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9208 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9209 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9210 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9211 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9212 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9213 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9214 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9215 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9216 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9217 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9218 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9219 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9224 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9225 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9227 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9228 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9229 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9230 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9233 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9234 (2, node_id, required),
9235 (4, features, required),
9236 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9237 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9238 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9239 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9242 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9243 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9244 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9245 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9246 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9247 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9248 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9249 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9250 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9251 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9252 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9253 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9254 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9255 (7, self.config, option),
9256 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9257 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9258 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9259 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9260 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9261 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9262 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9263 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9264 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9265 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9266 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9267 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9268 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9269 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9270 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9271 (32, self.is_public, required),
9272 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9273 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9274 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9275 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9276 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9282 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9283 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9284 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9285 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9286 (2, channel_id, required),
9287 (3, channel_type, option),
9288 (4, counterparty, required),
9289 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9290 (6, funding_txo, option),
9291 (7, config, option),
9292 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9293 (9, confirmations, option),
9294 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9295 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9296 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9297 (16, balance_msat, required),
9298 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9299 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9300 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9301 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9302 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9303 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9304 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9305 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9306 (26, is_outbound, required),
9307 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9308 (30, is_usable, required),
9309 (32, is_public, required),
9310 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9311 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9312 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9313 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9314 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9317 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9318 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9319 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9320 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9321 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9325 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9327 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9328 outbound_scid_alias,
9332 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9333 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9335 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9336 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9337 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9338 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9339 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9340 confirmations_required,
9342 force_close_spend_delay,
9343 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9344 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9345 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9346 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9347 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9348 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9349 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9350 channel_shutdown_state,
9355 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9356 (2, channels, required_vec),
9357 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9358 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9361 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9362 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9365 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9367 (0, onion_packet, required),
9368 (1, blinded, option),
9369 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9372 (0, payment_data, required),
9373 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9374 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9375 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9376 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9378 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9379 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9380 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9381 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9382 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9383 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9387 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9388 (0, routing, required),
9389 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9390 (4, payment_hash, required),
9391 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9392 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9393 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9394 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9398 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9399 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9401 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9403 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9404 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9405 reason.write(writer)?;
9407 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9408 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9411 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9412 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9413 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9414 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9421 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9422 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9423 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9426 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9427 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9428 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9429 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9433 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9434 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9435 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9436 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9437 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9440 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9441 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9442 // messages contained in the variants.
9443 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9444 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9445 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9447 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9448 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9449 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9450 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9451 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9454 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9455 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9456 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9457 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9458 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9460 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9465 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9470 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9471 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9472 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9475 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9476 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9477 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9478 (2, outpoint, required),
9479 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9480 (4, htlc_id, required),
9481 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9482 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9485 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9486 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9487 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9488 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9489 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9491 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9492 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9493 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9494 (2, self.value, required),
9495 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9496 (4, payment_data, option),
9497 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9498 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9499 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9500 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9506 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9507 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9508 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9509 (0, prev_hop, required),
9510 (1, total_msat, option),
9511 (2, value_ser, required),
9512 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9513 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9514 (5, total_value_received, option),
9515 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9516 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9517 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9519 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9520 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9521 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9523 if payment_data.is_some() {
9524 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9526 if total_msat.is_none() {
9527 total_msat = Some(value);
9529 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9532 if total_msat.is_none() {
9533 if payment_data.is_none() {
9534 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9536 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9538 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9542 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9545 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9546 total_value_received,
9547 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9549 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9550 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9555 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9556 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9557 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9560 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9561 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9562 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9563 let mut payment_id = None;
9564 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9565 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9566 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9567 (0, session_priv, required),
9568 (1, payment_id, option),
9569 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9570 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9571 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9572 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9574 if payment_id.is_none() {
9575 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9577 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9579 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9580 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9581 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9583 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9584 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9585 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9586 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9590 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9591 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9592 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9594 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9597 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9598 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9603 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9604 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9606 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9608 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9609 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9610 (0, session_priv, required),
9611 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9612 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9613 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9614 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9615 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9616 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9619 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9621 field.write(writer)?;
9628 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9629 (0, forward_info, required),
9630 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9631 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9632 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9633 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9636 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9638 (0, htlc_id, required),
9639 (2, err_packet, required),
9644 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9645 (0, payment_secret, required),
9646 (2, expiry_time, required),
9647 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9648 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9649 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9652 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9654 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9655 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9656 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9657 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9658 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9659 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9663 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9664 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9666 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9668 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9670 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9671 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9672 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9675 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9677 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9678 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9679 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9680 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9681 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9682 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9683 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9686 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9687 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9691 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9693 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9694 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9695 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9696 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9697 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9698 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9701 channel.write(writer)?;
9707 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9708 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9709 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9710 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9711 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9712 for forward in pending_forwards {
9713 forward.write(writer)?;
9718 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9720 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9721 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9722 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9724 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9725 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9726 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9727 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9728 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9729 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9730 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9731 htlc.write(writer)?;
9733 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9734 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9737 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9738 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9739 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9740 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9741 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9742 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9743 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9746 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9747 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9748 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9749 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9750 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9752 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9753 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9754 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9755 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9756 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9757 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9758 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9763 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9764 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9765 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9766 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9767 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9768 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9769 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9770 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9771 0u64.write(writer)?;
9773 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9774 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9775 event.write(writer)?;
9779 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9780 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9781 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9782 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9783 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9784 0u64.write(writer)?;
9786 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9787 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9788 // likely to be identical.
9789 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9790 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9792 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9793 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9794 hash.write(writer)?;
9795 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9798 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9799 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9800 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9801 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9802 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9805 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9806 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9808 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9809 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9810 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9811 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9814 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9815 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9816 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9817 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9821 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9822 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9823 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9825 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9826 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9827 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9833 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9834 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9835 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9836 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9839 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9840 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9841 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9842 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9843 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9846 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9847 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9848 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9849 if !updates.is_empty() {
9850 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9851 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9856 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9857 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9858 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9859 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9860 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9861 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9862 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9863 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9864 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9865 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9866 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9867 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9868 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9875 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9876 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9877 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9878 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9881 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9882 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9883 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9884 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9885 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9886 // check that the event is sane here.
9887 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9888 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9889 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9890 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9896 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9897 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9898 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9899 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9900 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9901 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9904 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9905 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9906 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9907 events.push_back((ev, action));
9908 } else if action.is_some() {
9909 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9916 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9917 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9918 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9919 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9920 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9921 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9924 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9926 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9928 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9929 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9930 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9931 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9932 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9933 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9934 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9935 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9936 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9937 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9938 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9939 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9940 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9942 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9943 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9945 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9946 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9948 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9949 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9950 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9951 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9952 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9953 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9955 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9956 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9958 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9959 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9960 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9961 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9962 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9963 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9967 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9968 pub entropy_source: ES,
9970 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9971 pub node_signer: NS,
9973 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9974 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9976 pub signer_provider: SP,
9978 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9980 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9981 pub fee_estimator: F,
9982 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9984 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9985 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9986 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9987 pub chain_monitor: M,
9989 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9990 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9991 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9992 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9993 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9994 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9996 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9998 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9999 /// deserialization.
10001 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10002 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10003 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10005 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10006 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10008 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10009 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10010 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10011 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10013 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10016 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10017 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10020 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10021 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10023 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10024 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10025 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10026 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10027 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10028 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10032 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10033 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10034 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10035 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10036 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10038 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10039 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10044 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10045 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10046 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10047 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10049 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10050 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10051 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10052 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10053 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10054 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10058 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10059 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10060 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10064 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10065 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10067 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10068 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10069 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10070 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10071 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10072 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10076 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10077 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10079 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10080 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10081 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10083 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10085 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10086 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10087 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10088 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10089 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10090 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10091 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10092 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10093 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10094 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10096 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10097 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10098 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10099 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10100 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10101 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10102 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10103 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10104 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10105 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10106 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10107 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10108 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10109 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10111 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10112 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10113 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10115 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10116 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10117 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10119 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10120 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10121 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10123 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10124 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10125 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10127 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10128 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10129 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10132 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10133 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10134 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10135 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10136 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10137 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10138 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10140 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10141 let mut found_htlc = false;
10142 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10143 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10146 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10147 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10148 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10149 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10150 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10151 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10152 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10154 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10155 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10156 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10160 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10161 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10162 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10163 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10164 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10166 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10167 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10169 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10171 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10172 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10174 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10175 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10176 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10177 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10181 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10182 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10183 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10184 // safely discard the channel.
10185 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10186 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10187 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10188 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10189 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10190 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10191 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10194 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10195 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10196 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10197 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10198 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10199 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10203 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10204 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10205 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10206 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10207 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10208 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10209 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10210 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10212 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10216 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10217 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10218 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10219 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10220 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10221 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10222 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10223 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10224 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10226 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10229 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10230 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10231 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10232 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10233 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10234 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10235 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10236 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10238 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10241 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10244 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10245 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10246 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10247 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10248 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10249 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10250 is_connected: false,
10254 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10255 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10256 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10257 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10258 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10259 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10260 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10261 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10264 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10265 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10266 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10267 for _ in 0..event_count {
10268 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10269 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10274 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10275 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10276 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10278 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10279 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10280 // on-startup monitor updates.
10281 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10282 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10284 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10288 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10289 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10291 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10292 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10293 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10294 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10295 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10299 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10300 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10301 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10302 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10303 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10304 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10305 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10307 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10308 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10312 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10313 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10314 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10315 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10316 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10317 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10318 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10319 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10320 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10321 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10322 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10323 let mut events_override = None;
10324 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10325 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10326 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10327 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10328 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10329 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10330 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10331 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10332 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10333 (8, events_override, option),
10334 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10335 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10336 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10337 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10339 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10340 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10343 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10344 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10347 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10348 pending_events_read = events;
10351 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10352 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10355 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10356 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10357 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10358 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10359 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10360 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10362 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10364 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10365 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10366 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10369 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10370 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10371 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10372 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10373 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10375 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10376 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10377 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10379 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10380 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10381 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10382 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10383 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10385 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10386 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10387 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10388 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10389 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10390 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10391 pending_background_events.push(
10392 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10393 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10394 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10395 update: update.clone(),
10398 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10399 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10400 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10401 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10402 pending_background_events.push(
10403 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10404 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10405 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10408 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10409 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10410 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10412 max_in_flight_update_id
10416 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10418 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10419 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10420 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10421 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10423 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10425 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10426 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10427 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10428 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10429 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10430 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10431 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10432 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10433 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10436 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10437 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10438 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10439 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10440 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10441 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10442 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10443 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10444 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10445 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10446 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10449 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10450 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10451 debug_assert!(false);
10452 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10457 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10458 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10459 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10460 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10461 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10462 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10463 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10464 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10465 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10467 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10468 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10469 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10471 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10472 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10473 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10474 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10475 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10476 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10477 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10478 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10483 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10484 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10486 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10487 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10488 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10489 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10492 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10493 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10494 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10495 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10496 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10497 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10498 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10500 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10501 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10502 let chan_id = monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id();
10503 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10504 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10505 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10506 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10507 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10508 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10509 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10512 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10513 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10514 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10515 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10516 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10517 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10518 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10519 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10521 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10522 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10523 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10524 retry_strategy: None,
10525 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10526 payment_params: None,
10527 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10528 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10529 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10530 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10531 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10532 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10533 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10534 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10535 total_msat: path_amt,
10536 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10537 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10539 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10540 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10545 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10546 match htlc_source {
10547 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10548 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10549 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10550 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10552 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10553 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10554 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10555 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10556 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10557 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10558 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10559 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10560 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10561 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10562 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10567 !forwards.is_empty()
10569 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10570 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10571 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10572 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10573 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10574 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10575 intercepted_id != ev_id
10582 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10583 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10584 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10585 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10586 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10587 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10588 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10589 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10590 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10591 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10592 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10594 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10595 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10596 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10598 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10599 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10600 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10607 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10608 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10610 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10612 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10613 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10614 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10615 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10616 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10617 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10618 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10619 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10620 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10621 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10624 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10625 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10626 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10627 // channel still live case here.
10631 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10632 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10637 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10638 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10639 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10640 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10641 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10642 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10643 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10644 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10648 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10649 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10651 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10652 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10653 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10654 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10656 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10657 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10658 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10660 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10661 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10663 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10664 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10666 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10669 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10670 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10671 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10673 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10677 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10678 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10679 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10680 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10681 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10683 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10684 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10685 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10686 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10687 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10688 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10689 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10690 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10692 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10693 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10697 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10699 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10701 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10702 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10704 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10705 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10710 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10711 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10713 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10715 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10717 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10718 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10719 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10720 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10724 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10725 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10726 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10727 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10728 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10729 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10730 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10731 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10732 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10734 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10735 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10736 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10738 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10739 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10740 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10741 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10742 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10743 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10745 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10746 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10747 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10748 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10749 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10750 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10754 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10755 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10756 debug_assert!(false);
10757 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10762 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10764 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10765 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10766 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10767 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10768 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10769 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10770 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10771 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10772 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10773 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10774 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10776 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10777 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10779 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10780 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10781 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10782 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10784 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10785 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10786 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10787 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10789 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10790 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10791 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10792 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10794 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10795 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10796 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10797 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10798 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10799 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10800 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10801 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
10804 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10805 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10808 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10811 purpose: payment.purpose,
10812 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10813 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10814 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10820 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10821 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10822 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10823 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
10824 for action in actions.iter() {
10825 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10826 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10827 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10829 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10831 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10832 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10833 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10834 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10835 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10837 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10838 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10839 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10840 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10844 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10845 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10849 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10851 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10852 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10856 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10858 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10859 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10860 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10861 router: args.router,
10863 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10865 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10866 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10867 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10868 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10870 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10871 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10872 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10873 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10874 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10875 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10877 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10879 our_network_pubkey,
10882 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10884 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10886 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10887 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10888 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10889 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10890 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10892 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10893 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10895 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10897 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10899 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10900 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10901 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10903 logger: args.logger,
10904 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10907 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10908 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10909 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10910 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10911 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10914 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10915 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10916 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10917 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10918 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10919 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10922 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10923 //connection or two.
10925 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10931 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10932 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10933 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10934 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10935 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10936 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10937 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10938 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10939 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10940 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10941 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10942 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10943 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10944 use crate::util::test_utils;
10945 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10946 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10949 fn test_notify_limits() {
10950 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10951 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10952 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10953 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10954 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10955 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10957 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10958 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10959 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10960 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10961 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10963 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10965 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10966 // to connect messages with new values
10967 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10968 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10969 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10970 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10971 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10972 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10974 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10975 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10976 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10977 // ... but the last node should not.
10978 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10979 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10980 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10981 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10983 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10984 // about the channel.
10985 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10986 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10987 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10989 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10991 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10992 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10993 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10994 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10995 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10996 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10998 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10999 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11000 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11002 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11003 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11004 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11005 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11006 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11007 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11009 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11010 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11011 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11012 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11013 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11014 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11015 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11016 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11018 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11019 // the channel info has updated.
11020 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11021 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11022 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11023 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11024 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11025 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11029 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11030 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11032 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11033 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11034 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11035 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11036 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11038 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11039 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11040 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11041 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11043 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11044 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11045 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11046 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11047 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11048 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11049 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11050 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11052 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11053 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11054 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11056 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11057 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11058 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11060 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11061 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11062 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11063 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11064 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11066 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11067 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11068 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11070 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11071 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11072 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11073 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11074 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11075 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11076 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11077 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11078 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11080 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11081 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11082 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11084 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11086 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11088 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11089 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11090 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11091 // lightning messages manually.
11092 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11093 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11096 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11097 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11098 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11099 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11101 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11102 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11104 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11105 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11107 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11108 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11109 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11111 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11112 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11113 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11115 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11117 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11119 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11120 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11123 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11124 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11125 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11128 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11129 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11130 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11131 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11133 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11136 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11137 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11138 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11139 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11141 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11146 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11147 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11148 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11151 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11152 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11153 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11154 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11155 // fails as expected.
11156 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11157 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11158 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11159 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11160 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11161 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11164 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11165 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11166 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11167 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11168 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11169 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11170 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11172 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11173 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11174 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11176 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11177 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11178 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11179 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11180 let route = find_route(
11181 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11182 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11184 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11185 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11187 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11188 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11189 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11190 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11191 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11193 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11194 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11195 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11196 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11197 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11199 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11200 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11201 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11202 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11203 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11204 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11205 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11206 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11207 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11209 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11210 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11212 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11213 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11214 let route = find_route(
11215 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11216 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11218 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11219 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11221 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11222 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11223 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11224 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11225 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11227 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11228 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11229 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11230 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11232 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11233 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11234 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11235 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11236 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11238 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11239 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11240 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11242 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11243 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11244 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11245 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11246 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11247 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11248 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11249 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11250 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11252 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11253 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11255 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11256 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11257 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11258 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11260 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11261 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11262 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11263 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11264 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11266 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11267 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11268 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11271 let route = find_route(
11272 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11273 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11275 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11276 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11277 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11279 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11280 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11281 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11282 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11283 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11285 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11286 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11287 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11289 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11290 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11291 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11292 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11293 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11294 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11295 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11296 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11297 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11299 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11300 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11304 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11305 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11306 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11307 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11308 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11309 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11310 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11312 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11313 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11315 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11316 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11317 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11318 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11319 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11320 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11321 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11322 let route = find_route(
11323 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11324 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11327 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11328 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11329 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11330 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11331 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11332 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11335 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11336 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11337 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11338 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11339 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11340 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11341 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11343 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11347 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11348 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11349 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11350 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11351 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11352 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11353 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11354 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11355 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11357 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11358 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11360 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11361 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11362 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11363 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11364 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11365 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11366 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11367 let route = find_route(
11368 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11369 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11372 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11373 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11374 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11375 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11376 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11377 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11378 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11379 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11382 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11383 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11384 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11385 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11386 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11387 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11388 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11390 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11394 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11395 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11396 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11397 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11398 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11400 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11401 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11402 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11403 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11405 // Marshall an MPP route.
11406 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11407 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11408 route.paths.push(path);
11409 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11410 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11411 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11412 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11413 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11414 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11416 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11417 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11419 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11420 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11422 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11427 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11428 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11430 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11431 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11433 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11435 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11436 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11438 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11439 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11441 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11444 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11445 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11446 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11447 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11448 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11449 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11452 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11455 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11456 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11461 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11462 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11463 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11464 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11465 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11466 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11468 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11469 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11471 total_msat: 100_000,
11474 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11475 // payment verification fails as expected.
11476 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11477 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11478 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11479 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11481 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11485 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11486 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11490 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11491 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11492 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11493 // the channel is successfully closed.
11494 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11495 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11496 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11497 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11499 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11500 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11501 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11502 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11503 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11505 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11506 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11508 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11509 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11510 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11511 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11514 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11516 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11517 // as it has the funding transaction.
11518 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11519 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11520 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11523 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11525 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11527 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11529 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11530 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11531 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11533 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11536 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11537 // as it has the funding transaction.
11538 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11539 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11540 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11543 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11544 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11546 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11547 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11548 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11549 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11551 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11552 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11553 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11554 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11556 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11557 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11559 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11560 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11561 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11562 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11563 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11564 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11565 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11569 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11570 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11571 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11572 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11573 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11574 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11575 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11578 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11580 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11581 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11582 // closing transaction).
11583 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11584 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11585 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11587 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11588 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11589 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11590 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11591 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11594 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11596 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11598 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11599 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11600 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11602 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11604 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11605 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11608 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11609 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11610 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11613 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11614 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11615 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11618 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11619 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11620 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11623 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11624 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11625 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11628 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11630 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11631 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11633 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11634 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11636 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11637 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11642 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11643 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11644 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11645 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11646 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11647 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11648 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11649 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11652 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11653 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11654 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11656 // Test the API functions.
11657 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11659 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11661 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11663 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11665 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11667 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11669 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11673 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11674 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11675 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11676 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11677 // the given `channel_id`.
11678 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11679 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11680 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11681 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11683 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11686 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11688 // Test the API functions.
11689 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11691 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11693 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11695 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11697 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11699 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11703 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11704 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11705 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11706 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11707 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11708 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11710 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11712 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11713 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11715 let mut funding_tx = None;
11716 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11717 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11718 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11721 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11722 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11723 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11724 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11725 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11727 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11729 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11731 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11733 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11735 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11737 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11740 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11741 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11742 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11743 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11744 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11746 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11747 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11749 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11750 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11751 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11752 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11753 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11754 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11755 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11758 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11759 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11760 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11761 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11762 }, true).unwrap_err();
11764 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11765 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11766 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11767 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11768 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11769 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11770 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11772 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11773 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11775 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11776 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11777 }, true).unwrap_err();
11779 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11780 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11781 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11782 }, false).unwrap();
11783 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11785 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11786 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11788 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11789 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11790 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11791 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11792 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11794 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11795 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11796 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11798 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11799 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11800 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11802 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11803 // "protected" and can connect again.
11804 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11805 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11806 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11808 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11810 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11812 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11813 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11817 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11818 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11819 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11820 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11821 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11822 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11824 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11826 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11827 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11829 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11830 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11831 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11832 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11835 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11837 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11838 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11839 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11841 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11842 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11843 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11845 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11846 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11847 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11848 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11852 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11853 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11854 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11855 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11856 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11857 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11858 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11860 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11862 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11864 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11865 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11867 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11868 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11869 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11870 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11871 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11872 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11875 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11876 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11878 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11879 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11881 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11883 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11884 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11887 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11888 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11889 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11890 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11891 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11893 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11894 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11896 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11897 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11898 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11899 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11903 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11905 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11906 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11908 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11909 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11910 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11912 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11913 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11917 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11921 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11922 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11923 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11924 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11925 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11926 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11927 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11928 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11930 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11931 payment_metadata: None,
11932 keysend_preimage: None,
11933 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11934 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11936 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11938 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11939 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11940 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11941 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11942 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11943 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11944 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
11946 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11947 } else { panic!(); }
11949 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11950 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11952 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11953 payment_metadata: None,
11954 keysend_preimage: None,
11955 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11956 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11958 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11960 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11961 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11962 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11963 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
11967 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11968 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11969 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11970 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11971 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11973 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11974 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11976 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11977 payment_metadata: None,
11978 keysend_preimage: None,
11979 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11980 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11982 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11983 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
11984 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
11986 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11987 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11988 // is not satisfied.
11989 assert!(result.is_ok());
11993 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11994 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11995 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11996 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11997 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11999 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12000 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12002 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12003 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12004 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12005 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12006 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12008 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12009 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12011 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12012 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12013 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12014 match &msg_events[0] {
12015 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12016 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12018 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12019 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12020 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12023 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12026 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12027 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12029 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12030 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12031 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12033 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12037 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12038 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12039 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12040 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12041 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12042 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12043 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12044 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12045 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12046 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12047 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12049 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12050 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12051 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12053 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12054 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12056 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12057 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12062 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12063 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12065 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12066 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12068 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12069 // not have generated any events.
12070 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12074 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12075 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12076 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12077 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12078 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12079 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12080 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12081 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12083 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12084 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12087 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12088 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12089 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12090 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12091 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12093 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12094 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12097 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12098 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12099 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12101 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12102 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12103 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12104 ..Default::default()
12106 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12107 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12108 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12110 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12111 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12114 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12115 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12116 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12117 ..Default::default()
12119 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12120 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12121 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12122 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12124 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12125 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12128 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12129 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12130 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12131 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12132 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12135 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12136 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12137 ..Default::default()
12139 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12142 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12143 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12144 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12145 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12149 fn test_payment_display() {
12150 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12151 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12152 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12153 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12154 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12155 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12159 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12160 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12161 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12162 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12163 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12164 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12166 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12167 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12168 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12169 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12170 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12171 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12172 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12173 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12175 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12176 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12177 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12180 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12181 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12183 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12184 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12186 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12187 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12188 }, false).unwrap();
12189 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12190 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12191 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12193 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12195 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12196 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12197 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12198 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12199 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12200 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12201 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12202 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12203 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12204 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12205 } else { panic!() };
12206 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12207 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12208 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12209 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12211 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12213 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12214 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12215 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12222 use crate::chain::Listen;
12223 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12224 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12225 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12226 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12227 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12228 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12229 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12230 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12231 use crate::util::test_utils;
12232 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12234 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12235 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12236 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12237 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12239 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12241 use criterion::Criterion;
12243 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12244 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12245 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12246 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12247 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12248 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12249 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12251 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12252 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12254 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12255 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12257 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12259 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12262 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12263 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12266 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12267 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12268 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12270 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12271 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12273 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12274 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12275 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12276 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12277 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12279 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12280 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12281 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12283 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12284 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12285 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12286 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12288 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12289 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12290 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12292 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12293 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12294 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12295 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12296 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12298 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12299 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12300 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12302 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12303 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12305 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12306 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12307 }, false).unwrap();
12308 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12309 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12310 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12313 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12314 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12315 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12317 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12318 } else { panic!(); }
12320 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12321 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12322 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12323 match events_b[0] {
12324 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12325 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12327 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12330 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12331 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12332 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12333 match events_a[0] {
12334 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12335 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12340 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12342 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12343 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12344 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12346 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12347 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12348 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12349 match msg_events[0] {
12350 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12351 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12352 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12356 match msg_events[1] {
12357 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12361 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12362 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12363 match events_a[0] {
12364 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12365 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12370 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12371 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12372 match events_b[0] {
12373 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12374 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12376 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12379 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12380 macro_rules! send_payment {
12381 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12382 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12383 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12384 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12385 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12386 payment_count += 1;
12387 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12388 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12390 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12391 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12392 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12393 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12394 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12395 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12396 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12397 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12398 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12399 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12400 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12402 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12403 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12404 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12405 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12407 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12408 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12409 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12410 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12411 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12413 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12416 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12417 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12418 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12419 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12421 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12425 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12426 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12427 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);