Merge pull request #1108 from TheBlueMatt/2021-10-persist-mon-blocks

[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs

// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
// history.
//
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.

//! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
//!
//! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
//! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
//! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
//!
//! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
//! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
//! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
//!

use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;

use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};

use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;

use chain;
use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
// Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
// construct one themselves.
use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
use ln::onion_utils;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
use util::{byte_utils, events};
use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
use util::errors::APIError;

use io;
use prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, mem};
use core::cell::RefCell;
use io::{Cursor, Read};
use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use core::time::Duration;
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
use std::time::Instant;
use core::ops::Deref;

// We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
//
// Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
// forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
// the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
//
// Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
// Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
// with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
// before we forward it.
//
// We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
// relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
// to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
// Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.

#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
enum PendingHTLCRouting {
        Forward {
                onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
                short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
        },
        Receive {
                payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
                incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
        },
        ReceiveKeysend {
                payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
                incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
        },
}

#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
        routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
        incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
        payment_hash: PaymentHash,
        pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
        pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
}

#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
        Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
        Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
}

/// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
        Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
        Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
}

pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
        AddHTLC {
                forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,

                // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
                // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
                // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
                // HTLCs.
                prev_short_channel_id: u64,
                prev_htlc_id: u64,
                prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
        },
        FailHTLC {
                htlc_id: u64,
                err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
        },
}

/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
        short_channel_id: u64,
        htlc_id: u64,
        incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],

        // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
        // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
        outpoint: OutPoint,
}

enum OnionPayload {
        /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
        /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
        /// are part of the same payment.
        Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
        /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
        Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
}

struct ClaimableHTLC {
        prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
        cltv_expiry: u32,
        value: u64,
        onion_payload: OnionPayload,
}

/// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);

impl Writeable for PaymentId {
        fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
                self.0.write(w)
        }
}

impl Readable for PaymentId {
        fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
                let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
                Ok(PaymentId(buf))
        }
}
/// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
        PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
        OutboundRoute {
                path: Vec<RouteHop>,
                session_priv: SecretKey,
                /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
                /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
                first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
                payment_id: PaymentId,
        },
}
#[cfg(test)]
impl HTLCSource {
        pub fn dummy() -> Self {
                HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
                        path: Vec::new(),
                        session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
                        first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
                        payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
                }
        }
}

#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
        LightningError {
                err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
        },
        Reason {
                failure_code: u16,
                data: Vec<u8>,
        }
}

/// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
        PrevHopForceClosed,
        MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
        Success(u64),
        DuplicateClaim,
}

type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);

/// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
/// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
/// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
/// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
/// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.

struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
        err: msgs::LightningError,
        chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
        shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
}
impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
        #[inline]
        fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
                Self {
                        err: LightningError {
                                err: err.clone(),
                                action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
                                        msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
                                                channel_id,
                                                data: err
                                        },
                                },
                        },
                        chan_id: None,
                        shutdown_finish: None,
                }
        }
        #[inline]
        fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
                Self {
                        err: LightningError {
                                err,
                                action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
                        },
                        chan_id: None,
                        shutdown_finish: None,
                }
        }
        #[inline]
        fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
                Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
        }
        #[inline]
        fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
                Self {
                        err: LightningError {
                                err: err.clone(),
                                action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
                                        msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
                                                channel_id,
                                                data: err
                                        },
                                },
                        },
                        chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
                        shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
                }
        }
        #[inline]
        fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
                Self {
                        err: match err {
                                ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
                                        err: msg,
                                        action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
                                },
                                ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
                                        err: msg,
                                        action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
                                },
                                ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
                                        err: msg.clone(),
                                        action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
                                                msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
                                                        channel_id,
                                                        data: msg
                                                },
                                        },
                                },
                                ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
                                        err: msg.clone(),
                                        action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
                                                msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
                                                        channel_id,
                                                        data: msg
                                                },
                                        },
                                },
                        },
                        chan_id: None,
                        shutdown_finish: None,
                }
        }
}

/// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
/// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
/// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
/// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;

/// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
/// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
/// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
/// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
        /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
        CommitmentFirst,
        /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
        RevokeAndACKFirst,
}

// Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
        pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
        pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
        /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
        /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
        /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
        /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
        pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
        /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
        /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
        /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
        /// go to read them!
        claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
        /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
        /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
        pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
}

/// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
/// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
/// quite some time lag.
enum BackgroundEvent {
        /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
        /// commitment transaction.
        ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
}

/// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
/// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
struct PeerState {
        latest_features: InitFeatures,
}

/// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
/// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
///
/// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
/// here.
struct PendingInboundPayment {
        /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
        payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
        /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
        /// this payment being removed.
        expiry_time: u64,
        /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
        user_payment_id: u64,
        // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
        payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
        min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
}

/// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
/// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
        Legacy {
                session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
        },
        Retryable {
                session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
                payment_hash: PaymentHash,
                payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
                pending_amt_msat: u64,
                /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
                total_msat: u64,
                /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
                starting_block_height: u32,
        },
}

impl PendingOutboundPayment {
        fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], part_amt_msat: u64) -> bool {
                let remove_res = match self {
                        PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
                        PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
                                session_privs.remove(session_priv)
                        }
                };
                if remove_res {
                        if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
                                *pending_amt_msat -= part_amt_msat;
                        }
                }
                remove_res
        }

        fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], part_amt_msat: u64) -> bool {
                let insert_res = match self {
                        PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
                        PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
                                session_privs.insert(session_priv)
                        }
                };
                if insert_res {
                        if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
                                *pending_amt_msat += part_amt_msat;
                        }
                }
                insert_res
        }

        fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
                match self {
                        PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
                        PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
                                session_privs.len()
                        }
                }
        }
}

/// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
/// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
/// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
/// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
/// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
/// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
/// concrete type of the KeysManager.
pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;

/// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
/// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
/// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
/// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
/// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
/// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
/// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
/// concrete type of the KeysManager.
pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;

/// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
/// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
///
/// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
/// to individual Channels.
///
/// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
/// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
/// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
/// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
///
/// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
/// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
/// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
/// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
/// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
/// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
/// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
///
/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
/// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
/// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
/// object!
///
/// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
/// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
/// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
/// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
/// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
///
/// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
/// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
/// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
/// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
/// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
        where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
        T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
        K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                                L::Target: Logger,
{
        default_configuration: UserConfig,
        genesis_hash: BlockHash,
        fee_estimator: F,
        chain_monitor: M,
        tx_broadcaster: T,

        #[cfg(test)]
        pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
        #[cfg(not(test))]
        best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
        secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,

        #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
        pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
        #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
        channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,

        /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
        /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
        /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
        /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
        /// Locked *after* channel_state.
        pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,

        /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
        /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
        /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
        /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
        /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
        /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
        /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
        /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
        ///
        /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
        ///
        /// Locked *after* channel_state.
        pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,

        our_network_key: SecretKey,
        our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,

        /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
        /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
        last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,

        /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
        /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
        /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
        highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,

        /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
        /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
        /// are currently open with that peer.
        /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
        /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
        /// new channel.
        ///
        /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
        per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,

        pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
        pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
        /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
        /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
        /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
        /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
        /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
        /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
        total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,

        persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,

        keys_manager: K,

        logger: L,
}

/// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
///
/// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
/// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
/// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
pub struct ChainParameters {
        /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
        pub network: Network,

        /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
        ///
        /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
        pub best_block: BestBlock,
}

#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
enum NotifyOption {
        DoPersist,
        SkipPersist,
}

/// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
/// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
/// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
/// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
/// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
/// updates are ready for persistence).
///
/// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
/// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
/// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
        persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
        should_persist: F,
        // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
        _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
}

impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
        fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
                PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
        }

        fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
                let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();

                PersistenceNotifierGuard {
                        persistence_notifier: notifier,
                        should_persist: persist_check,
                        _read_guard: read_guard,
                }
        }
}

impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
        fn drop(&mut self) {
                if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
                        self.persistence_notifier.notify();
                }
        }
}

/// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
/// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
///
/// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
///
/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
/// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
/// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;

/// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
/// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
///
/// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
///
/// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
// This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
// i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?

/// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
/// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
/// this value.
// Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
// any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
// a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;

// Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
// ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
// then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
// failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
// LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;

// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;

/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
        /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
        pub fee_base_msat: u32,
        /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
        pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
        /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
        /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
        /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
        pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
}

/// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
/// to better separate parameters.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
        /// The node_id of our counterparty
        pub node_id: PublicKey,
        /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
        /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
        /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
        pub features: InitFeatures,
        /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
        /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
        /// claiming at least this value on chain.
        ///
        /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
        ///
        /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
        pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
        /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
        /// payments to us through this channel.
        pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
}

/// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct ChannelDetails {
        /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
        /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
        /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
        /// lifetime of the channel.
        pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
        /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
        pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
        /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
        /// our counterparty already.
        ///
        /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
        /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
        pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
        /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
        /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
        pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
        /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
        pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
        /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
        /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
        /// this value on chain.
        ///
        /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
        ///
        /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
        ///
        /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
        pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
        /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
        pub user_channel_id: u64,
        /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
        /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
        /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
        /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
        ///
        /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
        /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
        /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
        pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
        /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
        /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
        /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
        /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
        /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
        ///
        /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
        /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
        /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
        pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
        /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
        /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
        /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
        /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
        /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
        ///
        /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
        ///
        /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
        /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
        /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
        pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
        /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
        /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
        /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
        /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
        /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
        ///
        /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
        pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
        /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
        pub is_outbound: bool,
        /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
        /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
        /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
        /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
        /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
        ///
        /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
        pub is_funding_locked: bool,
        /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
        /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
        ///
        /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
        pub is_usable: bool,
        /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
        pub is_public: bool,
}

/// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
/// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
/// states for more.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
        /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
        /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
        /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
        ParameterError(APIError),
        /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
        /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
        /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
        /// payment in full.
        ///
        /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
        /// send_payment.
        PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
        /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
        /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
        /// paths than the ones selected).
        AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
        /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
        /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
        /// in over-/re-payment.
        ///
        /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
        /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
        /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
        ///
        /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
        /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
        /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
        /// with the latest update_id.
        PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
}

macro_rules! handle_error {
        ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
                match $internal {
                        Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
                        Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
                                #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
                                {
                                        // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
                                        // entering the macro.
                                        assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
                                        assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
                                }

                                let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);

                                if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
                                        $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
                                        if let Some(update) = update_option {
                                                msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                                        msg: update
                                                });
                                        }
                                        if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
                                                $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
                                                        channel_id, user_channel_id,
                                                        reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
                                                });
                                        }
                                }

                                log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
                                if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
                                } else {
                                        msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
                                                node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
                                                action: err.action.clone()
                                        });
                                }

                                if !msg_events.is_empty() {
                                        $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
                                }

                                // Return error in case higher-API need one
                                Err(err)
                        },
                }
        }
}

/// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
        ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
                match $err {
                        ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
                                //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
                                //peer here.
                                (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
                        },
                        ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
                                (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
                        },
                        ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
                                log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
                                if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
                                        $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                }
                                let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
                                (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
                                        shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
                        },
                        ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
                                log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
                                if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
                                        $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                }
                                let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
                                (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
                                        shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
                        }
                }
        }
}

macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
        ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
                match $res {
                        Ok(res) => res,
                        Err(e) => {
                                let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
                                if drop {
                                        $entry.remove_entry();
                                }
                                break Err(res);
                        }
                }
        }
}

macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
        ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
                match $res {
                        Ok(res) => res,
                        Err(e) => {
                                let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
                                if drop {
                                        $entry.remove_entry();
                                }
                                return Err(res);
                        }
                }
        }
}

macro_rules! remove_channel {
        ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
                {
                        let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
                        if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
                                $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                        }
                        channel
                }
        }
}

macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
        ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
                handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
        };
        ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
                match $err {
                        ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
                                log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
                                if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
                                        $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                }
                                // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
                                // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
                                // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
                                // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
                                // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
                                // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
                                // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
                                // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
                                // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
                                let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
                                                $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
                                (res, true)
                        },
                        ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
                                log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
                                                log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
                                                if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
                                                                match $action_type {
                                                                        RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
                                                                        RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
                                                                }
                                                        } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
                                                        else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
                                                        else { "nothing" },
                                                (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
                                                (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
                                if !$resend_commitment {
                                        debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
                                }
                                if !$resend_raa {
                                        debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
                                }
                                $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
                                (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
                        },
                }
        };
        ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
                let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
                if drop {
                        $entry.remove_entry();
                }
                res
        } };
}

macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
        ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
                return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
        };
        ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
                return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
        }
}

// Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
        ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
                match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
                        (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
                                break e;
                        },
                        (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
                }
        }
}

macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
        ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
         $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
         $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
                let mut htlc_forwards = None;
                let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();

                let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
                let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
                let res = loop {
                        let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
                        if !forwards.is_empty() {
                                htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
                                        $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
                        }

                        if chanmon_update.is_some() {
                                // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
                                // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
                                // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
                                // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
                                // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
                                // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
                                assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
                                // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
                                // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
                                // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
                                assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
                        }

                        if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
                                // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
                                // before it should be allowed to.
                                assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
                                $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
                                        node_id: counterparty_node_id,
                                        msg,
                                });
                                if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
                                        $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
                                                node_id: counterparty_node_id,
                                                msg: announcement_sigs,
                                        });
                                }
                                $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
                        }

                        let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
                        if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
                                // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
                                // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
                                // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
                                // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
                                // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
                                assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
                                // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
                                // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
                                // have some commitment updates to send as well.
                                assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
                                if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
                                        // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
                                        // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
                                        // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
                                        let mut order = $order;
                                        if $raa.is_none() {
                                                order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
                                        }
                                        break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
                                }
                        }

                        macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
                                if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
                                        $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                node_id: counterparty_node_id,
                                                updates: update,
                                        });
                                }
                        } }
                        macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
                                if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
                                        $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
                                                node_id: counterparty_node_id,
                                                msg: revoke_and_ack,
                                        });
                                }
                        } }
                        match $order {
                                RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
                                        handle_cs!();
                                        handle_raa!();
                                },
                                RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
                                        handle_raa!();
                                        handle_cs!();
                                },
                        }
                        if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
                                log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
                                $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
                        }
                        break Ok(());
                };

                if chanmon_update_is_none {
                        // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
                        // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
                        // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
                        assert!(res.is_ok());
                }

                (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
        } }
}

macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
        ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
                let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;

                let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);

                if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
                        $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
                }
        } }
}

impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
        where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
        T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
        K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
        L::Target: Logger,
{
        /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
        ///
        /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
        /// ChannelMessageHandler.
        ///
        /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
        ///
        /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
        ///
        /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
        /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
        /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
        pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
                let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());

                ChannelManager {
                        default_configuration: config.clone(),
                        genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
                        fee_estimator: fee_est,
                        chain_monitor,
                        tx_broadcaster,

                        best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),

                        channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
                                by_id: HashMap::new(),
                                short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
                                forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
                                claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
                                pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
                        }),
                        pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
                        pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),

                        our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
                        our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
                        secp_ctx,

                        last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
                        highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),

                        per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),

                        pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
                        pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
                        total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
                        persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),

                        keys_manager,

                        logger,
                }
        }

        /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels,  as
        pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
                &self.default_configuration
        }

        /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
        ///
        /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
        /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
        /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
        /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
        /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
        /// ignored.
        ///
        /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
        /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
        ///
        /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
        /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
        /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
        ///
        /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
        /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
        /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
        /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
        /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
        /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
        ///
        /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
        /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
        /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
        pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
                if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
                        return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
                }

                let channel = {
                        let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                        match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
                                Some(peer_state) => {
                                        let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
                                        let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
                                        let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
                                        Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config)?
                                },
                                None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
                        }
                };
                let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());

                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
                debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());

                let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
                                if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
                                        return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
                                } else {
                                        panic!("RNG is bad???");
                                }
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
                }
                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
                        node_id: their_network_key,
                        msg: res,
                });
                Ok(temporary_channel_id)
        }

        fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
                let mut res = Vec::new();
                {
                        let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
                        for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
                                let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
                                let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
                                        channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
                                res.push(ChannelDetails {
                                        channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
                                        counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
                                                node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
                                                features: InitFeatures::empty(),
                                                unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
                                                forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
                                        },
                                        funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
                                        short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
                                        channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
                                        unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
                                        inbound_capacity_msat,
                                        outbound_capacity_msat,
                                        user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
                                        confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
                                        force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
                                        is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
                                        is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
                                        is_usable: channel.is_live(),
                                        is_public: channel.should_announce(),
                                });
                        }
                }
                let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                for chan in res.iter_mut() {
                        if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
                                chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
                        }
                }
                res
        }

        /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
        /// more information.
        pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
                self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
        }

        /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
        /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
        ///
        /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
        /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
        /// are.
        pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
                // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
                // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
                // really wanted anyway.
                self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
        }

        /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
        fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
                let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
                match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
                        Some(transaction) => {
                                pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
                        },
                        None => {},
                }
                pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
                        channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
                        user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
                        reason: closure_reason
                });
        }

        fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);

                let counterparty_node_id;
                let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
                let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
                                        counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
                                        let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                                        let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
                                                Some(peer_state) => {
                                                        let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
                                                        let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
                                                        chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
                                                },
                                                None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
                                        };
                                        failed_htlcs = htlcs;

                                        // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
                                        if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
                                                if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
                                                        let (result, is_permanent) =
                                                                handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
                                                        if is_permanent {
                                                                remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
                                                                break result;
                                                        }
                                                }
                                        }

                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
                                                node_id: counterparty_node_id,
                                                msg: shutdown_msg
                                        });

                                        if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
                                                let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
                                                if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
                                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                                                msg: channel_update
                                                        });
                                                }
                                                self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
                                        }
                                        break Ok(());
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
                        }
                };

                for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
                }

                let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
                Ok(())
        }

        /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
        /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
        /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
        ///
        ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
        ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
        ///    estimate.
        ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
        ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
        ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
        ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
        ///
        /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
        ///
        /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
        /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
        /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
        pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
                self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
        }

        /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
        /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
        /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
        ///
        /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
        /// the channel being closed or not:
        ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
        ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
        ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
        ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
        ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
        ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
        ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
        ///
        /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
        ///
        /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
        /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
        /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
        pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
                self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
        }

        #[inline]
        fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
                let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
                log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
                for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
                }
                if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
                        // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
                        // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
                        // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
                        // ignore the result here.
                        let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
                }
        }

        /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
        /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
        fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
                let mut chan = {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                        if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
                                if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
                                        if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
                                                return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
                                        }
                                }
                                if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
                                        channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                }
                                if peer_node_id.is_some() {
                                        if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
                                                self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
                                        }
                                } else {
                                        self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
                                }
                                chan.remove_entry().1
                        } else {
                                return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
                        }
                };
                log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
                self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
                if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
                        let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                msg: update
                        });
                }

                Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
        }

        /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
        /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
        pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
                        Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
                                self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
                                        events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
                                                node_id: counterparty_node_id,
                                                action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
                                                        msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
                                                },
                                        }
                                );
                                Ok(())
                        },
                        Err(e) => Err(e)
                }
        }

        /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
        /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
        pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
                for chan in self.list_channels() {
                        let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
                }
        }

        fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
                macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
                        ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
                                {
                                        log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
                                        return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
                                                channel_id: msg.channel_id,
                                                htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
                                                sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
                                                failure_code: $err_code,
                                        })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
                                }
                        }
                }

                if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
                        return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
                }

                let shared_secret = {
                        let mut arr = [0; 32];
                        arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
                        arr
                };
                let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);

                if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
                        //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
                        //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
                        //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
                        //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
                        //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
                        //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
                        return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
                }

                let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
                hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
                hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
                if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
                        return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
                }

                let mut channel_state = None;
                macro_rules! return_err {
                        ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
                                {
                                        log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
                                        if channel_state.is_none() {
                                                channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
                                        }
                                        return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
                                                channel_id: msg.channel_id,
                                                htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
                                                reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
                                        })), channel_state.unwrap());
                                }
                        }
                }

                let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
                let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
                let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
                        match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
                                Err(err) => {
                                        let error_code = match err {
                                                msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
                                                msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
                                                msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
                                                msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
                                                _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
                                        };
                                        return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
                                },
                                Ok(msg) => {
                                        let mut hmac = [0; 32];
                                        if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
                                                return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
                                        }
                                        (msg, hmac)
                                },
                        }
                };

                let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
                        #[cfg(test)]
                        {
                                // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
                                // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
                                // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
                                // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
                                // as-is (and were originally 0s).
                                // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
                                // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
                                let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
                                chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
                                assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
                                chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
                                assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
                        }

                        // OUR PAYMENT!
                        // final_expiry_too_soon
                        // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
                        // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
                        // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
                        // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
                        // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
                        if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
                                return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
                        }
                        // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
                        if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
                                return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
                        }
                        // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
                        if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
                                return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
                        }

                        let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
                                msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
                                msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
                                msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
                                        if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
                                                return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
                                        } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
                                                PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
                                                        payment_data: data,
                                                        incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
                                                }
                                        } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
                                                // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
                                                // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
                                                // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
                                                // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
                                                // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
                                                let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
                                                if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
                                                        return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
                                                }

                                                PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
                                                        payment_preimage,
                                                        incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
                                                }
                                        } else {
                                                return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
                                        }
                                },
                        };

                        // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
                        // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
                        // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
                        // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!

                        PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
                                routing,
                                payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
                                incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
                                amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
                                outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
                        })
                } else {
                        let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
                        let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
                        #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
                        {
                                // Check two things:
                                // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
                                //    read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
                                // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
                                let mut t = [0; 1];
                                debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
                        }
                        // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
                        // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
                        chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);

                        let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();

                        let blinding_factor = {
                                let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
                                sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
                                sha.input(&shared_secret);
                                Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
                        };

                        let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
                                Err(e)
                        } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };

                        let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
                                version: 0,
                                public_key,
                                hop_data: new_packet_data,
                                hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
                        };

                        let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
                                msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
                                msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
                                msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
                                        return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
                                },
                        };

                        PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
                                routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
                                        onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
                                        short_channel_id,
                                },
                                payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
                                incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
                                amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
                                outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
                        })
                };

                channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
                if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
                        // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
                        // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
                        // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
                        if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
                                let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
                                if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
                                        let forwarding_id = match id_option {
                                                None => { // unknown_next_peer
                                                        break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
                                                },
                                                Some(id) => id.clone(),
                                        };

                                        let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();

                                        if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
                                                // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
                                                // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
                                                // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
                                                break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
                                        }

                                        // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
                                        // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
                                        // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
                                        // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
                                        // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
                                        if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
                                                break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
                                        }
                                        if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
                                                break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
                                        }
                                        let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
                                                .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
                                                .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
                                        if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
                                                break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
                                        }
                                        if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
                                                break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
                                        }
                                        let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
                                        // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
                                        // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
                                        if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
                                                break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
                                        }
                                        if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
                                                break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
                                        }
                                        // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
                                        // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
                                        if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
                                                break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
                                        }

                                        break None;
                                }
                                {
                                        let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
                                        if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
                                                if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
                                                        res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
                                                }
                                                else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
                                                        res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
                                                }
                                                else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
                                                        // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
                                                        res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
                                                }
                                                res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
                                        }
                                        return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
                                }
                        }
                }

                (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
        }

        /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
        /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
        /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
        ///
        /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
        fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
                if !chan.should_announce() {
                        return Err(LightningError {
                                err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
                                action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
                        });
                }
                log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
                self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
        }

        /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
        /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
        /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
        /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
        /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
        fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
                log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
                let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
                        None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
                        Some(id) => id,
                };

                let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];

                let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
                        chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
                        short_channel_id,
                        timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
                        flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
                        cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
                        htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
                        htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
                        fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
                        fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
                        excess_data: Vec::new(),
                };

                let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
                let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);

                Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
                        signature: sig,
                        contents: unsigned
                })
        }

        // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
        pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
                log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
                let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
                let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
                let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");

                let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
                        .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
                let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
                if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
                        return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
                }
                let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);

                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);

                let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
                        let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
                                None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
                                Some(id) => id.clone(),
                        };

                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
                        if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
                                match {
                                        if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
                                                return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
                                        }
                                        if !chan.get().is_live() {
                                                return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
                                        }
                                        let send_res = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
                                                htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
                                                        path: path.clone(),
                                                        session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
                                                        first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
                                                        payment_id,
                                                }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
                                        channel_state, chan);

                                        let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
                                        let payment = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id).or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
                                                session_privs: HashSet::new(),
                                                pending_amt_msat: 0,
                                                payment_hash: *payment_hash,
                                                payment_secret: *payment_secret,
                                                starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
                                                total_msat: total_value,
                                        });
                                        assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat));

                                        send_res
                                } {
                                        Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
                                                if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
                                                        maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
                                                        // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
                                                        // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
                                                        // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
                                                        // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
                                                        // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
                                                        return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
                                                }

                                                log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
                                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                        node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
                                                        updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                                                                update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
                                                                update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                update_fee: None,
                                                                commitment_signed,
                                                        },
                                                });
                                        },
                                        None => {},
                                }
                        } else { unreachable!(); }
                        return Ok(());
                };

                match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
                        Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
                        Err(e) => {
                                Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
                        },
                }
        }

        /// Sends a payment along a given route.
        ///
        /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
        /// fields for more info.
        ///
        /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
        /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
        /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
        /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
        /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
        /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
        ///
        /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
        ///
        /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
        /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
        /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
        ///
        /// In general, a path may raise:
        ///  * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
        ///    node public key) is specified.
        ///  * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
        ///    (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
        ///    failure).
        ///  * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
        ///    relevant updates.
        ///
        /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
        /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
        /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
        ///
        /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
        /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
        /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
        /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
        /// payment_secret.
        /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
        /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
        /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
        pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
                self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
        }

        fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
                if route.paths.len() < 1 {
                        return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
                }
                if route.paths.len() > 10 {
                        // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
                        // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
                        // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
                        return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
                }
                if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
                        return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
                }
                let mut total_value = 0;
                let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
                let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
                let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
                'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
                        if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
                                path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
                                continue 'path_check;
                        }
                        for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
                                if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
                                        path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
                                        continue 'path_check;
                                }
                        }
                        total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
                        path_errs.push(Ok(()));
                }
                if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
                        return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
                }
                if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
                        debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
                        total_value = amt_msat;
                }

                let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
                let mut results = Vec::new();
                for path in route.paths.iter() {
                        results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
                }
                let mut has_ok = false;
                let mut has_err = false;
                for res in results.iter() {
                        if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
                        if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
                        if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
                                // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
                                // PartialFailure.
                                has_err = true;
                                has_ok = true;
                                break;
                        }
                }
                if has_err && has_ok {
                        Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
                } else if has_err {
                        Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
                } else {
                        Ok(payment_id)
                }
        }

        /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
        ///
        /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
        /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
        /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
        /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
        ///
        /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
        pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
                const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
                for path in route.paths.iter() {
                        if path.len() == 0 {
                                return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
                                        err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
                                }))
                        }
                }

                let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
                        let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
                        if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
                                match payment {
                                        PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
                                                total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
                                        } => {
                                                let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
                                                if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
                                                        return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
                                                                err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
                                                        }))
                                                }
                                                (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
                                        },
                                        PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
                                                return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
                                                        err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
                                                }))
                                        }
                                }
                        } else {
                                return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
                                        err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
                                }))
                        }
                };
                return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
        }

        /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
        /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
        /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
        /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
        /// never reach the recipient.
        ///
        /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
        ///
        /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
        /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
        ///
        /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
        ///
        /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
        pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
                let preimage = match payment_preimage {
                        Some(p) => p,
                        None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
                };
                let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
                match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
                        Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
                        Err(e) => Err(e)
                }
        }

        /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
        /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
        fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
                        (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
                let (chan, msg) = {
                        let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
                                Some(mut chan) => {
                                        let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;

                                        (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
                                                .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
                                                        MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
                                                } else { unreachable!(); })
                                        , chan)
                                },
                                None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
                        };
                        match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
                                Ok(funding_msg) => {
                                        (chan, funding_msg)
                                },
                                Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
                                        err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
                                }) },
                        }
                };

                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
                        node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
                        msg,
                });
                match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
                                panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
                                e.insert(chan);
                        }
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        #[cfg(test)]
        pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
                self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
                        Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
                })
        }

        /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
        ///
        /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
        /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
        ///
        /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
        ///
        /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
        /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
        /// keys per-channel).
        ///
        /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
        /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
        /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
        ///
        /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
        /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
        /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
        ///
        /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
        pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);

                for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
                        if inp.witness.is_empty() {
                                return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
                                        err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
                                });
                        }
                }
                self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
                        let mut output_index = None;
                        let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
                        for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
                                if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
                                        if output_index.is_some() {
                                                return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
                                                        err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
                                                });
                                        }
                                        if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
                                                return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
                                                        err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
                                                });
                                        }
                                        output_index = Some(idx as u16);
                                }
                        }
                        if output_index.is_none() {
                                return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
                                        err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
                                });
                        }
                        Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
                })
        }

        fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
                if !chan.should_announce() {
                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
                        return None
                }

                let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
                        Ok(res) => res,
                        Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
                };
                let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
                let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);

                Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
                        channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
                        short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
                        node_signature: our_node_sig,
                        bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
                })
        }

        #[allow(dead_code)]
        // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
        // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
        // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
        // message...
        const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
        #[deny(const_err)]
        #[allow(dead_code)]
        // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
        // smaller than 500:
        const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;

        /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
        /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
        /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
        /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
        /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
        /// our network addresses.
        ///
        /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
        /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
        ///
        /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
        /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
        /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
        /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
        ///
        /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
        ///
        /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
        pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);

                if addresses.len() > 500 {
                        panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
                }

                // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
                // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
                addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());

                let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
                        features: NodeFeatures::known(),
                        timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
                        node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
                        rgb, alias, addresses,
                        excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
                        excess_data: Vec::new(),
                };
                let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
                let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);

                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;

                let mut announced_chans = false;
                for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
                        if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
                                        msg,
                                        update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
                                                Ok(msg) => msg,
                                                Err(_) => continue,
                                        },
                                });
                                announced_chans = true;
                        } else {
                                // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
                                // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
                                // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
                        }
                }

                if announced_chans {
                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
                                msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
                                        signature: node_announce_sig,
                                        contents: announcement
                                },
                        });
                }
        }

        /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
        ///
        /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
        /// Will likely generate further events.
        pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);

                let mut new_events = Vec::new();
                let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
                let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
                {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;

                        for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
                                if short_chan_id != 0 {
                                        let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
                                                Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
                                                None => {
                                                        failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
                                                        for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
                                                                match forward_info {
                                                                        HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
                                                                                                   prev_funding_outpoint } => {
                                                                                let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
                                                                                        short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
                                                                                        outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
                                                                                        htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
                                                                                        incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
                                                                                });
                                                                                failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
                                                                                        HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
                                                                                ));
                                                                        },
                                                                        HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
                                                                                // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
                                                                                // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
                                                                                // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
                                                                                // problem, not ours.
                                                                        }
                                                                }
                                                        }
                                                        continue;
                                                }
                                        };
                                        if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
                                                let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
                                                let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
                                                for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
                                                        match forward_info {
                                                                HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
                                                                                routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
                                                                                        onion_packet, ..
                                                                                }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
                                                                                prev_funding_outpoint } => {
                                                                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
                                                                        let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
                                                                                short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
                                                                                outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
                                                                                htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
                                                                                incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
                                                                        });
                                                                        match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
                                                                                Err(e) => {
                                                                                        if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
                                                                                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
                                                                                        } else {
                                                                                                panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
                                                                                        }
                                                                                        let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
                                                                                        failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
                                                                                                HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
                                                                                        ));
                                                                                        continue;
                                                                                },
                                                                                Ok(update_add) => {
                                                                                        match update_add {
                                                                                                Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
                                                                                                None => {
                                                                                                        // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
                                                                                                        // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
                                                                                                        // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
                                                                                                        // commitment_signed messages when we can.
                                                                                                        // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
                                                                                                        // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
                                                                                                        // this channel currently :/.
                                                                                                }
                                                                                        }
                                                                                }
                                                                        }
                                                                },
                                                                HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
                                                                        panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
                                                                },
                                                                HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
                                                                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
                                                                        match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
                                                                                Err(e) => {
                                                                                        if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
                                                                                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
                                                                                        } else {
                                                                                                panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
                                                                                        }
                                                                                        // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
                                                                                        // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
                                                                                        // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
                                                                                        continue;
                                                                                },
                                                                                Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
                                                                                Ok(None) => {
                                                                                        // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
                                                                                        // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
                                                                                        // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
                                                                                        // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
                                                                                        // messages when we can.
                                                                                        // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
                                                                                        // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
                                                                                        // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
                                                                                }
                                                                        }
                                                                },
                                                        }
                                                }

                                                if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
                                                        let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
                                                                Ok(res) => res,
                                                                Err(e) => {
                                                                        // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
                                                                        // close channel and then send error message to peer.
                                                                        let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
                                                                        let err: Result<(), _>  = match e {
                                                                                ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
                                                                                        panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
                                                                                }
                                                                                ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
                                                                                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
                                                                                        let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
                                                                                        if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                                                                channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                                                                        }
                                                                                        // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
                                                                                        Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
                                                                                },
                                                                                ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
                                                                        };
                                                                        handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
                                                                        continue;
                                                                }
                                                        };
                                                        if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
                                                                handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
                                                                continue;
                                                        }
                                                        log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
                                                                add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
                                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                                node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
                                                                updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                                                                        update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
                                                                        update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                        update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
                                                                        update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                        update_fee: None,
                                                                        commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
                                                                },
                                                        });
                                                }
                                        } else {
                                                unreachable!();
                                        }
                                } else {
                                        for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
                                                match forward_info {
                                                        HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
                                                                        routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
                                                                        prev_funding_outpoint } => {
                                                                let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
                                                                        PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
                                                                                (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
                                                                        PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
                                                                                (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
                                                                        _ => {
                                                                                panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
                                                                        }
                                                                };
                                                                let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
                                                                        prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
                                                                                short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
                                                                                outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
                                                                                htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
                                                                                incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
                                                                        },
                                                                        value: amt_to_forward,
                                                                        cltv_expiry,
                                                                        onion_payload,
                                                                };

                                                                macro_rules! fail_htlc {
                                                                        ($htlc: expr) => {
                                                                                let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
                                                                                htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
                                                                                        &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
                                                                                );
                                                                                failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
                                                                                                short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
                                                                                                outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
                                                                                                htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
                                                                                                incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
                                                                                        }), payment_hash,
                                                                                        HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
                                                                                ));
                                                                        }
                                                                }

                                                                // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
                                                                // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
                                                                // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
                                                                // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
                                                                // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
                                                                // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
                                                                let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
                                                                match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
                                                                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
                                                                                match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
                                                                                        OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
                                                                                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
                                                                                                fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
                                                                                        },
                                                                                        OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
                                                                                                match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
                                                                                                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
                                                                                                                e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
                                                                                                                new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
                                                                                                                        payment_hash,
                                                                                                                        amt: amt_to_forward,
                                                                                                                        purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
                                                                                                                });
                                                                                                        },
                                                                                                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
                                                                                                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
                                                                                                                fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
                                                                                                        }
                                                                                                }
                                                                                        }
                                                                                }
                                                                        },
                                                                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
                                                                                let payment_data =
                                                                                        if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
                                                                                                data.clone()
                                                                                        } else {
                                                                                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
                                                                                                fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
                                                                                                continue
                                                                                        };
                                                                                if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
                                                                                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
                                                                                        fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
                                                                                } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
                                                                                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
                                                                                                log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
                                                                                        fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
                                                                                } else {
                                                                                        let mut total_value = 0;
                                                                                        let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
                                                                                                .or_insert(Vec::new());
                                                                                        if htlcs.len() == 1 {
                                                                                                if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
                                                                                                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
                                                                                                        fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
                                                                                                        continue
                                                                                                }
                                                                                        }
                                                                                        htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
                                                                                        for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
                                                                                                total_value += htlc.value;
                                                                                                match &htlc.onion_payload {
                                                                                                        OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
                                                                                                                if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
                                                                                                                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
                                                                                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
                                                                                                                        total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
                                                                                                                }
                                                                                                                if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
                                                                                                        },
                                                                                                        _ => unreachable!(),
                                                                                                }
                                                                                        }
                                                                                        if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
                                                                                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
                                                                                                        log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
                                                                                                for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
                                                                                                        fail_htlc!(htlc);
                                                                                                }
                                                                                        } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
                                                                                                new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
                                                                                                        payment_hash,
                                                                                                        purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
                                                                                                                payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
                                                                                                                payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
                                                                                                                user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
                                                                                                        },
                                                                                                        amt: total_value,
                                                                                                });
                                                                                                // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
                                                                                                // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
                                                                                                // claimed.
                                                                                                inbound_payment.remove_entry();
                                                                                        } else {
                                                                                                // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
                                                                                                // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
                                                                                                // MPP parts.
                                                                                        }
                                                                                }
                                                                        },
                                                                };
                                                        },
                                                        HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
                                                                panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
                                                        }
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }

                for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
                }

                for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
                        let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
                }

                if new_events.is_empty() { return }
                let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
                events.append(&mut new_events);
        }

        /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
        ///
        /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
        /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
        ///
        /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
        fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
                let mut background_events = Vec::new();
                mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
                if background_events.is_empty() {
                        return false;
                }

                for event in background_events.drain(..) {
                        match event {
                                BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
                                        // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
                                        // monitor updating completing.
                                        let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
                                },
                        }
                }
                true
        }

        #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
        /// Process background events, for functional testing
        pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
                self.process_background_events();
        }

        fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
                if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
                // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
                if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
                                log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
                        return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
                }
                if !chan.is_live() {
                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
                                log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
                        return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
                }
                log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
                        log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);

                let mut retain_channel = true;
                let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
                        Ok(res) => Ok(res),
                        Err(e) => {
                                let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
                                if drop { retain_channel = false; }
                                Err(res)
                        }
                };
                let ret_err = match res {
                        Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
                                if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
                                        let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
                                        if drop { retain_channel = false; }
                                        res
                                } else {
                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
                                                updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                                                        update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fee: Some(update_fee),
                                                        commitment_signed,
                                                },
                                        });
                                        Ok(())
                                }
                        },
                        Ok(None) => Ok(()),
                        Err(e) => Err(e),
                };
                (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
        }

        #[cfg(fuzzing)]
        /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
        /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
        /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
        /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
        pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
                PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
                        let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;

                        let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);

                        let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
                        {
                                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                                let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
                                let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
                                channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
                                        let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
                                        if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
                                        if err.is_err() {
                                                handle_errors.push(err);
                                        }
                                        retain_channel
                                });
                        }

                        should_persist
                });
        }

        /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
        ///
        /// This currently includes:
        ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
        ///  * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
        ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
        ///    the channel.
        ///
        /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
        /// estimate fetches.
        pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
                PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
                        let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
                        if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }

                        let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);

                        let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
                        {
                                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                                let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
                                let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
                                channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
                                        let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
                                        let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
                                        if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
                                        if err.is_err() {
                                                handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
                                        }
                                        if !retain_channel { return false; }

                                        if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
                                                let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
                                                handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
                                                if needs_close { return false; }
                                        }

                                        match chan.channel_update_status() {
                                                ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
                                                ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
                                                ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
                                                ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
                                                ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
                                                        if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
                                                                pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                                                        msg: update
                                                                });
                                                        }
                                                        should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
                                                        chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
                                                },
                                                ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
                                                        if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
                                                                pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                                                        msg: update
                                                                });
                                                        }
                                                        should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
                                                        chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
                                                },
                                                _ => {},
                                        }

                                        true
                                });
                        }

                        for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
                                let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
                        }
                        should_persist
                });
        }

        /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
        /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
        /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
        /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
        /// HTLC backwards has been started.
        pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);

                let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
                let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
                if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
                        for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
                                if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
                                let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
                                htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
                                                self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
                                self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
                                                HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
                                                HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
                        }
                        true
                } else { false }
        }

        // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
        // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
        // be surfaced to the user.
        fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
                for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
                        match htlc_src {
                                HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
                                        let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
                                                match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
                                                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
                                                                if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
                                                                        (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
                                                                } else {
                                                                        (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
                                                                }
                                                        },
                                                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
                                                };
                                        let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
                                                htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
                                },
                                HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
                                        let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
                                        session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
                                        let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
                                        if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
                                                if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat) {
                                                        self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
                                                                events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
                                                                        payment_hash,
                                                                        rejected_by_dest: false,
                                                                        network_update: None,
                                                                        all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
                                                                        path: path.clone(),
                                                                        short_channel_id: None,
                                                                        #[cfg(test)]
                                                                        error_code: None,
                                                                        #[cfg(test)]
                                                                        error_data: None,
                                                                }
                                                        );
                                                }
                                        } else {
                                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
                                        }
                                },
                        };
                }
        }

        /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
        /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
        /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
        /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
        /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
        /// still-available channels.
        fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
                //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
                //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
                //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
                //timer handling.

                // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
                // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
                // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
                match source {
                        HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, .. } => {
                                let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
                                session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
                                let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
                                let mut all_paths_failed = false;
                                if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
                                        if !sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat) {
                                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
                                                return;
                                        }
                                        if sessions.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
                                                all_paths_failed = true;
                                        }
                                } else {
                                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
                                        return;
                                }
                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
                                mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
                                match &onion_error {
                                        &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
#[cfg(test)]
                                                let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
#[cfg(not(test))]
                                                let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
                                                // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
                                                // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
                                                // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
                                                self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
                                                        events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
                                                                payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
                                                                rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
                                                                network_update,
                                                                all_paths_failed,
                                                                path: path.clone(),
                                                                short_channel_id,
#[cfg(test)]
                                                                error_code: onion_error_code,
#[cfg(test)]
                                                                error_data: onion_error_data
                                                        }
                                                );
                                        },
                                        &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
#[cfg(test)]
                                                        ref failure_code,
#[cfg(test)]
                                                        ref data,
                                                        .. } => {
                                                // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
                                                // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
                                                // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
                                                // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
                                                // ChannelDetails.
                                                // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
                                                // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
                                                self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
                                                        events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
                                                                payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
                                                                rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
                                                                network_update: None,
                                                                all_paths_failed,
                                                                path: path.clone(),
                                                                short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
#[cfg(test)]
                                                                error_code: Some(*failure_code),
#[cfg(test)]
                                                                error_data: Some(data.clone()),
                                                        }
                                                );
                                        }
                                }
                        },
                        HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
                                let err_packet = match onion_error {
                                        HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
                                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
                                                let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
                                                onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
                                        },
                                        HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
                                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
                                                onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
                                        }
                                };

                                let mut forward_event = None;
                                if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
                                        forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
                                }
                                match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
                                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
                                                entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
                                        },
                                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
                                                entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
                                        }
                                }
                                mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
                                if let Some(time) = forward_event {
                                        let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
                                        pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
                                                time_forwardable: time
                                        });
                                }
                        },
                }
        }

        /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
        /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
        /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
        ///
        /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
        /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
        /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
        /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
        ///
        /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
        ///
        /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
        /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
        pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
                let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());

                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);

                let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
                let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
                if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
                        assert!(!sources.is_empty());

                        // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
                        // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
                        // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
                        // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
                        //
                        // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
                        // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
                        // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
                        // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
                        // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
                        // it.
                        let mut valid_mpp = true;
                        for htlc in sources.iter() {
                                if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
                                        valid_mpp = false;
                                        break;
                                }
                        }

                        let mut errs = Vec::new();
                        let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
                        for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
                                if !valid_mpp {
                                        if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
                                        let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
                                        htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
                                                        self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
                                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
                                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
                                                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
                                } else {
                                        match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
                                                ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
                                                        if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
                                                                // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
                                                                // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
                                                                log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
                                                                claimed_any_htlcs = true;
                                                        } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
                                                },
                                                ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
                                                ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
                                                        // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
                                                        // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
                                                        // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
                                                        // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
                                                },
                                                ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
                                        }
                                }
                        }

                        // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
                        // which were generated.
                        channel_state.take();

                        for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
                                let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
                                let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
                        }

                        claimed_any_htlcs
                } else { false }
        }

        fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
                //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
                let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
                let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
                        Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
                        None => {
                                return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
                        }
                };

                if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
                        match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
                                Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
                                        if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
                                                if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
                                                        log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
                                                                "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
                                                                payment_preimage, e);
                                                        return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
                                                                chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
                                                                handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
                                                                Some(htlc_value_msat)
                                                        );
                                                }
                                                if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
                                                        log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
                                                                log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
                                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                                node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
                                                                updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                                                                        update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                        update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
                                                                        update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                        update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                                        update_fee: None,
                                                                        commitment_signed,
                                                                }
                                                        });
                                                }
                                                return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
                                        } else {
                                                return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
                                        }
                                },
                                Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
                                        if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
                                                log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
                                                        "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
                                                        payment_preimage, e);
                                        }
                                        let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
                                        let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
                                        if drop {
                                                chan.remove_entry();
                                        }
                                        return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
                                },
                        }
                } else { unreachable!(); }
        }

        fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
                match source {
                        HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
                                mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
                                let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
                                session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
                                let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
                                let found_payment = if let Some(mut sessions) = outbounds.remove(&payment_id) {
                                        sessions.remove(&session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat)
                                } else { false };
                                if found_payment {
                                        let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
                                        self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
                                                events::Event::PaymentSent {
                                                        payment_preimage,
                                                        payment_hash: payment_hash
                                                }
                                        );
                                } else {
                                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
                                }
                        },
                        HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
                                let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
                                let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
                                let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
                                let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
                                        ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
                                        ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
                                        _ => None,
                                };
                                if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
                                        let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
                                                update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
                                                updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
                                                        payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
                                                }],
                                        };
                                        // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
                                        // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
                                        // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
                                        if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
                                                log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
                                                                                         payment_preimage, e);
                                        }
                                        // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
                                        // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
                                        // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
                                        // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
                                        // can happen.
                                }
                                mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
                                if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
                                        let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
                                        let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
                                }

                                if claimed_htlc {
                                        if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
                                                let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
                                                        Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
                                                } else { None };

                                                let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
                                                pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
                                                        fee_earned_msat,
                                                        claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
                                                });
                                        }
                                }
                        },
                }
        }

        /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
        pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
                self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
        }

        fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);

                let chan_restoration_res;
                let mut pending_failures = {
                        let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
                        let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
                        };
                        if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
                                return;
                        }

                        let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
                        let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
                                // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
                                // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
                                // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
                                // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
                                Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
                                        node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
                                        msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
                                })
                        } else { None };
                        chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
                        if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
                        }
                        pending_failures
                };
                post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
                for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
                }
        }

        fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
                }

                let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
                        .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
                                        node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
                                        msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
                                });
                                entry.insert(channel);
                        }
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
                        let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                        if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
                                        }
                                        try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
                                        (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
                        }
                };
                let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
                pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
                        temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
                        channel_value_satoshis: value,
                        output_script,
                        user_channel_id: user_id,
                });
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
                        let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
                        let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                        if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
                                        }
                                        (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
                        }
                };
                // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
                // lock before watch_channel
                if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
                        match e {
                                ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
                                        // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
                                        // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
                                        // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
                                        // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
                                        // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
                                        // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
                                        // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
                                        let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
                                        assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
                                },
                                ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
                                        // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
                                        // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
                                        // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
                                        // until we have persisted our monitor.
                                        chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
                                },
                        }
                }
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
                                        node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
                                        msg: funding_msg,
                                });
                                e.insert(chan);
                        }
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let funding_tx = {
                        let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
                        let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                        if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
                                        }
                                        let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
                                                Ok(update) => update,
                                                Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
                                        };
                                        if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
                                                let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
                                                if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
                                                        // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
                                                        // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
                                                        // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
                                                        if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
                                                                shutdown_finish.0.take();
                                                        }
                                                }
                                                return res
                                        }
                                        funding_tx
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
                        }
                };
                log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
                self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
                                if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
                                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
                                        // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
                                        // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
                                        // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
                                        // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
                                        // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
                                        // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
                                        // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
                                        // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
                                        // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
                                                node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
                                                msg: announcement_sigs,
                                        });
                                } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
                                                node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
                                                msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
                                        });
                                }
                                Ok(())
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
                }
        }

        fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
                let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;

                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
                                        if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
                                        }

                                        if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
                                                log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
                                                        log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
                                                        if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
                                        }

                                        let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
                                        dropped_htlcs = htlcs;

                                        // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
                                        if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
                                                if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
                                                        let (result, is_permanent) =
                                                                handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
                                                        if is_permanent {
                                                                remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
                                                                break result;
                                                        }
                                                }
                                        }

                                        if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
                                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
                                                        node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
                                                        msg,
                                                });
                                        }

                                        break Ok(());
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
                        }
                };
                for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
                }

                let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let (tx, chan_option) = {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
                                        if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
                                        }
                                        let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
                                        if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
                                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
                                                        node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
                                                        msg,
                                                });
                                        }
                                        if tx.is_some() {
                                                // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
                                                // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
                                                // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
                                                // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
                                                // watch for old state broadcasts)!
                                                if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
                                                        channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                                }
                                                (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
                                        } else { (tx, None) }
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
                        }
                };
                if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
                        log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
                        self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
                }
                if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
                        if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
                                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                        msg: update
                                });
                        }
                        self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
                //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
                //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
                //
                //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
                //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
                //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
                //but we should prevent it anyway.

                let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
                let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;

                match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
                                }

                                let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
                                        // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
                                        // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
                                        // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
                                        match pending_forward_info {
                                                PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
                                                        let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
                                                                if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
                                                                        onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
                                                                                let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
                                                                                // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
                                                                                res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
                                                                                res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
                                                                                res
                                                                        }[..])
                                                                } else {
                                                                        // The only case where we'd be unable to
                                                                        // successfully get a channel update is if the
                                                                        // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
                                                                        // implying our counterparty is trying to route
                                                                        // payments over the channel back to themselves
                                                                        // (because no one else should know the short_id
                                                                        // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
                                                                        // no problem just calling this
                                                                        // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
                                                                        onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
                                                                }
                                                        } else {
                                                                onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
                                                        };
                                                        let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
                                                                channel_id: msg.channel_id,
                                                                htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
                                                                reason
                                                        };
                                                        PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
                                                },
                                                _ => pending_forward_info
                                        }
                                };
                                try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                        if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
                                        }
                                        try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
                        }
                };
                self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
                match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
                match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
                                        let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
                                        try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
                                }
                                try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
                                Ok(())
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
                }
        }

        fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
                                        match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
                                                Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
                                                Err((Some(update), e)) => {
                                                        assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
                                                        let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
                                                        try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
                                                        unreachable!();
                                                },
                                                Ok(res) => res
                                        };
                                if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
                                        return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
                                }
                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
                                        node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
                                        msg: revoke_and_ack,
                                });
                                if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
                                        channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
                                                updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
                                                        update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
                                                        update_fee: None,
                                                        commitment_signed: msg,
                                                },
                                        });
                                }
                                Ok(())
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
                }
        }

        #[inline]
        fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
                for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
                        let mut forward_event = None;
                        if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
                                let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
                                        forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
                                }
                                for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
                                        match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
                                                        PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
                                                        PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
                                                        PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
                                        }) {
                                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
                                                        entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
                                                                                                        prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
                                                },
                                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
                                                        entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
                                                                                                     prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                        match forward_event {
                                Some(time) => {
                                        let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
                                        pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
                                                time_forwardable: time
                                        });
                                }
                                None => {},
                        }
                }
        }

        fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
                let res = loop {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                        if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                                break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
                                        }
                                        let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
                                        let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
                                                break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
                                        htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
                                        if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
                                                if was_frozen_for_monitor {
                                                        assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
                                                        break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
                                                } else {
                                                        if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
                                                                break Err(e);
                                                        } else { unreachable!(); }
                                                }
                                        }
                                        if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
                                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                        node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
                                                        updates,
                                                });
                                        }
                                        break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
                        }
                };
                self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
                match res {
                        Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
                                for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
                                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
                                }
                                self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
                                Ok(())
                        },
                        Err(e) => Err(e)
                }
        }

        fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
                match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;

                match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
                                }
                                if !chan.get().is_usable() {
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
                                }

                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
                                        msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
                                        // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
                                        // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
                                        update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
                                });
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
        fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
                        Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
                        None => {
                                // It's not a local channel
                                return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
                        }
                };
                match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                        if chan.get().should_announce() {
                                                // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
                                                // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
                                                // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
                                                return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
                                        }
                                        return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
                                }
                                let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
                                let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
                                if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
                                        return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
                                } else {
                                        try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
                                }
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
                }
                Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
        }

        fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
                let chan_restoration_res;
                let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;

                        match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
                                        if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
                                                return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
                                        }
                                        // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
                                        // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
                                        // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
                                        // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
                                        let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
                                                try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
                                        let mut channel_update = None;
                                        if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
                                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
                                                        node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
                                                        msg,
                                                });
                                        } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
                                                // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
                                                // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
                                                // they have the latest channel parameters.
                                                channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
                                                        node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
                                                        msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
                                                });
                                        }
                                        let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
                                        chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
                                        if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
                                                channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
                                        }
                                        (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
                        }
                };
                post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
                self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);

                if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
                        self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
        fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
                let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
                let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
                let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
                for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
                        match monitor_event {
                                MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
                                        if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
                                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
                                                self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
                                        } else {
                                                log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
                                                self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
                                        }
                                },
                                MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
                                MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
                                        let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
                                        let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
                                        let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
                                        let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
                                        if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
                                                if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                        short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                                }
                                                failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
                                                if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
                                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                                                msg: update
                                                        });
                                                }
                                                let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
                                                        ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
                                                } else {
                                                        ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
                                                };
                                                self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
                                                pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
                                                        node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
                                                        action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
                                                                msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
                                                        },
                                                });
                                        }
                                },
                                MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
                                        self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
                                },
                        }
                }

                for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
                        self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
                }

                has_pending_monitor_events
        }

        /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
        /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
        /// update events as a separate process method here.
        #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
        pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
                self.process_pending_monitor_events();
        }

        /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
        /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
        /// update was applied.
        ///
        /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
        /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
        /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
        /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
        fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
                let mut has_monitor_update = false;
                let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
                let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
                {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                        let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
                        let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
                        let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;

                        by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
                                match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
                                        Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
                                                if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
                                                        failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
                                                }
                                                if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
                                                        if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
                                                                has_monitor_update = true;
                                                                let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
                                                                handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
                                                                if close_channel { return false; }
                                                        } else {
                                                                pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
                                                                        node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
                                                                        updates: commitment_update,
                                                                });
                                                        }
                                                }
                                                true
                                        },
                                        Err(e) => {
                                                let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
                                                handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
                                                // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
                                                !close_channel
                                        }
                                }
                        });
                }

                let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
                for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
                        self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
                }

                for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
                        let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
                }

                has_update
        }

        /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
        /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
        /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
        fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
                let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
                let mut has_update = false;
                {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                        let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
                        let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
                        let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;

                        by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
                                match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
                                        Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
                                                if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
                                                        has_update = true;
                                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
                                                                node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
                                                        });
                                                }
                                                if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
                                                        // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
                                                        // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
                                                        if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                                short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                                        }

                                                        if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
                                                                pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                                                        msg: update
                                                                });
                                                        }

                                                        self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);

                                                        log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
                                                        self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
                                                        false
                                                } else { true }
                                        },
                                        Err(e) => {
                                                has_update = true;
                                                let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
                                                handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
                                                !close_channel
                                        }
                                }
                        });
                }

                for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
                        let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
                }

                has_update
        }

        /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
        /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
        /// Channel object.
        fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
                for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
                        // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
                        // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
                        // reorganized out of the main chain.
                        // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
                        // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
                        // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
                        // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
                        if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
                                assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
                                if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
                                        assert!(should_broadcast);
                                } else { unreachable!(); }
                                self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
                        }
                        self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
                }
        }

        fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
                assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106

                let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());

                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
                match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
                        hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
                                e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
                                        payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
                                        // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
                                        // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
                                        // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
                                        // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
                                        // never fail a payment too early.
                                        // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
                                        // timestamps.
                                        expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
                                });
                        },
                        hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
                }
                Ok(payment_secret)
        }

        /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
        /// to pay us.
        ///
        /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
        /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
        ///
        /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
        /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
        /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
        ///
        /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
        ///
        /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
        /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
        /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
        /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
        pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
                let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
                let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());

                (payment_hash,
                        self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
                                .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
        }

        /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
        /// stored external to LDK.
        ///
        /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
        /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
        /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
        ///
        /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
        /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
        ///
        /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
        /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
        /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
        /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
        /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
        ///
        /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
        /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
        /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
        /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
        ///
        /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
        /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
        /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
        /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
        /// invoices when no timeout is set.
        ///
        /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
        /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
        /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
        /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
        /// [`PaymentReceived`].
        ///
        /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
        /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
        /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
        ///
        /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
        ///
        /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
        /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
        ///
        /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
        /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
        /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
        pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
                self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
        }

        #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
        pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
                let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
                let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
                self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
                events.into_inner()
        }

        #[cfg(test)]
        pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
                !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
        }
}

impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
        where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
        T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
        K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                                L::Target: Logger,
{
        fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
                let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
                PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
                        let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;

                        // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
                        // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
                        if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
                                result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
                        }

                        if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
                                result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
                        }
                        if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
                                result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
                        }

                        let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
                        let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);

                        if !pending_events.is_empty() {
                                events.replace(pending_events);
                        }

                        result
                });
                events.into_inner()
        }
}

impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
where
        M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
        T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
        K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
        L::Target: Logger,
{
        /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
        ///
        /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
        /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
        ///
        /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
        /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
        /// restarting from an old state.
        fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
                PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
                        let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;

                        // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
                        // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
                        if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
                                result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
                        }

                        let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
                        if !pending_events.is_empty() {
                                result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
                        }

                        for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
                                handler.handle_event(&event);
                        }

                        result
                });
        }
}

impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
where
        M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
        T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
        K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
        L::Target: Logger,
{
        fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
                {
                        let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
                                "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
                        assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
                                "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
                }

                let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
                self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
                self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
        }

        fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let new_height = height - 1;
                {
                        let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
                                "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
                        assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
                                "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
                        *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
                }

                self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
        }
}

impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
where
        M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
        T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
        K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
        L::Target: Logger,
{
        fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
                // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
                // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
                // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.

                let block_hash = header.block_hash();
                log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);

                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
        }

        fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
                // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
                // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
                // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.

                let block_hash = header.block_hash();
                log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);

                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);

                *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);

                self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));

                macro_rules! max_time {
                        ($timestamp: expr) => {
                                loop {
                                        // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
                                        // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
                                        // having an explicit local time source.
                                        // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
                                        // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
                                        let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
                                        if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
                                        if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
                                                break;
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }
                max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
                max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
                let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
                payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
                        inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
                });

                let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
                outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
                        const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
                        if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
                        if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
                                return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
                        }
                        true
                });
        }

        fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
                let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
                for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
                        if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
                                res.push(funding_txo.txid);
                        }
                }
                res
        }

        fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
                        if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
                                if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
                                        channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
                                } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
                        } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
                });
        }
}

impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
where
        M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
        T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
        K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
        L::Target: Logger,
{
        /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
        /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
        /// the function.
        fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
                        (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
                // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
                // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
                // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.

                let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
                let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
                {
                        let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
                        let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
                        let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
                        channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
                                let res = f(channel);
                                if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
                                        for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
                                                let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
                                                timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash,  HTLCFailReason::Reason {
                                                        failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
                                                        data: chan_update,
                                                }));
                                        }
                                        if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
                                                pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
                                                        node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
                                                        msg: funding_locked,
                                                });
                                                if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
                                                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
                                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
                                                                node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
                                                                msg: announcement_sigs,
                                                        });
                                                } else if channel.is_usable() {
                                                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
                                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
                                                                node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
                                                                msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
                                                        });
                                                } else {
                                                        log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
                                                }
                                                short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
                                        }
                                } else if let Err(e) = res {
                                        if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                        }
                                        // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
                                        // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
                                        failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
                                        if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
                                                pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                                        msg: update
                                                });
                                        }
                                        self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
                                                node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
                                                action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
                                        });
                                        return false;
                                }
                                true
                        });

                        if let Some(height) = height_opt {
                                channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
                                        htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
                                                // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
                                                // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
                                                // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
                                                // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
                                                if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
                                                        let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
                                                        htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
                                                        timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
                                                                failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
                                                                data: htlc_msat_height_data
                                                        }));
                                                        false
                                                } else { true }
                                        });
                                        !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
                                });
                        }
                }

                self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);

                for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
                        self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
                }
        }

        /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
        /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
        /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
        /// up.
        /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
        #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
        pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
                self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
        }

        /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
        /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
        /// up.
        pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
                self.persistence_notifier.wait()
        }

        #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
        pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
                let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
                let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
                let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
                *guard
        }

        /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
        /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
        pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
                self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
        }
}

impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
        ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
        where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
        T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
        K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
        L::Target: Logger,
{
        fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
                PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
                        if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
                                persist
                        } else {
                                NotifyOption::SkipPersist
                        }
                });
        }

        fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
        }

        fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
                let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
                let mut no_channels_remain = true;
                {
                        let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                        let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                        let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
                        let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
                        if no_connection_possible {
                                log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
                                channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
                                        if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
                                                if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                        short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                                }
                                                failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
                                                if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
                                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
                                                                msg: update
                                                        });
                                                }
                                                self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
                                                false
                                        } else {
                                                true
                                        }
                                });
                        } else {
                                log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
                                channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
                                        if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
                                                chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
                                                if chan.is_shutdown() {
                                                        if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                                short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
                                                        }
                                                        self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
                                                        return false;
                                                } else {
                                                        no_channels_remain = false;
                                                }
                                        }
                                        true
                                })
                        }
                        pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
                                match msg {
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
                                        &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
                                }
                        });
                }
                if no_channels_remain {
                        self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
                }

                for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
                        self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
                }
        }

        fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
                log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));

                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);

                {
                        let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
                        match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
                                hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
                                        e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
                                                latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
                                        }));
                                },
                                hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
                                        e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
                                },
                        }
                }

                let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
                let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
                channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
                        if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
                                if !chan.have_received_message() {
                                        // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
                                        // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
                                        // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
                                        // drop it.
                                        false
                                } else {
                                        pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
                                                node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
                                                msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
                                        });
                                        true
                                }
                        } else { true }
                });
                //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
        }

        fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
                let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);

                if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
                        for chan in self.list_channels() {
                                if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
                                        // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
                                        let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
                                }
                        }
                } else {
                        // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
                        let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
                }
        }
}

/// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
/// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
struct PersistenceNotifier {
        /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
        /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
        persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
}

impl PersistenceNotifier {
        fn new() -> Self {
                Self {
                        persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
                }
        }

        fn wait(&self) {
                loop {
                        let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
                        let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
                        if *guard {
                                *guard = false;
                                return;
                        }
                        guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
                        let result = *guard;
                        if result {
                                *guard = false;
                                return
                        }
                }
        }

        #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
        fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
                let current_time = Instant::now();
                loop {
                        let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
                        let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
                        if *guard {
                                *guard = false;
                                return true;
                        }
                        guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
                        // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
                        // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
                        // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
                        // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
                        // 1.42.0.
                        let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
                        let result = *guard;
                        if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
                                *guard = false;
                                return result;
                        }
                        match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
                                None => return result,
                                Some(_) => continue
                        }
                }
        }

        // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
        fn notify(&self) {
                let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
                let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
                *persistence_lock = true;
                mem::drop(persistence_lock);
                cnd.notify_all();
        }
}

const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;

impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
        (0, Forward) => {
                (0, onion_packet, required),
                (2, short_channel_id, required),
        },
        (1, Receive) => {
                (0, payment_data, required),
                (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
        },
        (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
                (0, payment_preimage, required),
                (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
        },
;);

impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
        (0, routing, required),
        (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
        (4, payment_hash, required),
        (6, amt_to_forward, required),
        (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
});


impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
        fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
                match self {
                        HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
                                0u8.write(writer)?;
                                channel_id.write(writer)?;
                                htlc_id.write(writer)?;
                                reason.write(writer)?;
                        },
                        HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
                                channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
                        }) => {
                                1u8.write(writer)?;
                                channel_id.write(writer)?;
                                htlc_id.write(writer)?;
                                sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
                                failure_code.write(writer)?;
                        },
                }
                Ok(())
        }
}

impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
        fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
                let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                match id {
                        0 => {
                                Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
                                        channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                        htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                        reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                }))
                        },
                        1 => {
                                Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
                                        channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                        htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                        sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                        failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
                                }))
                        },
                        // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
                        // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
                        // messages contained in the variants.
                        // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
                        // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
                        // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
                        2 => {
                                let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
                                let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
                                let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
                                s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
                                Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
                        },
                        3 => {
                                let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
                                let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
                                let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
                                s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
                                Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
                        },
                        _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
                }
        }
}

impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
        (0, Forward),
        (1, Fail),
);

impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
        (0, short_channel_id, required),
        (2, outpoint, required),
        (4, htlc_id, required),
        (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
});

impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
        fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
                let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
                        OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
                        _ => None,
                };
                let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
                        OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
                        OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
                };
                write_tlv_fields!
                (writer,
                 {
                   (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
                   (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
                 });
                Ok(())
        }
}

impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
        fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
                let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
                let mut value = 0;
                let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
                let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
                let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
                read_tlv_fields!
                (reader,
                 {
                   (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
                   (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
                         (8, keysend_preimage, option)
                 });
                let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
                        Some(p) => {
                                if payment_data.is_some() {
                                        return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
                                }
                                OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
                        },
                        None => {
                                if payment_data.is_none() {
                                        return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
                                }
                                OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
                        },
                };
                Ok(Self {
                        prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
                        value,
                        onion_payload,
                        cltv_expiry,
                })
        }
}

impl Readable for HTLCSource {
        fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
                let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                match id {
                        0 => {
                                let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
                                let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
                                let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
                                let mut payment_id = None;
                                read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
                                        (0, session_priv, required),
                                        (1, payment_id, option),
                                        (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
                                        (4, path, vec_type),
                                });
                                if payment_id.is_none() {
                                        // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
                                        // instead.
                                        payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
                                }
                                Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
                                        session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
                                        first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
                                        path: path.unwrap(),
                                        payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
                                })
                        }
                        1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
                        _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
                }
        }
}

impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
        fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
                match self {
                        HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
                                0u8.write(writer)?;
                                let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
                                write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
                                        (0, session_priv, required),
                                        (1, payment_id_opt, option),
                                        (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
                                        (4, path, vec_type),
                                 });
                        }
                        HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
                                1u8.write(writer)?;
                                field.write(writer)?;
                        }
                }
                Ok(())
        }
}

impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
        (0, LightningError) => {
                (0, err, required),
        },
        (1, Reason) => {
                (0, failure_code, required),
                (2, data, vec_type),
        },
;);

impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
        (0, AddHTLC) => {
                (0, forward_info, required),
                (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
                (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
                (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
        },
        (1, FailHTLC) => {
                (0, htlc_id, required),
                (2, err_packet, required),
        },
;);

impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
        (0, payment_secret, required),
        (2, expiry_time, required),
        (4, user_payment_id, required),
        (6, payment_preimage, required),
        (8, min_value_msat, required),
});

impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingOutboundPayment,
        (0, Legacy) => {
                (0, session_privs, required),
        },
        (2, Retryable) => {
                (0, session_privs, required),
                (2, payment_hash, required),
                (4, payment_secret, option),
                (6, total_msat, required),
                (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
                (10, starting_block_height, required),
        },
;);

impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
        where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
        T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
        K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
        L::Target: Logger,
{
        fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
                let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();

                write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);

                self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
                {
                        let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
                        best_block.height().write(writer)?;
                        best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
                }

                let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
                let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
                for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
                        if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
                                unfunded_channels += 1;
                        }
                }
                ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
                for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
                        if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
                                channel.write(writer)?;
                        }
                }

                (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
                        short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
                        (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                        for forward in pending_forwards {
                                forward.write(writer)?;
                        }
                }

                (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
                        payment_hash.write(writer)?;
                        (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                        for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
                                htlc.write(writer)?;
                        }
                }

                let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
                (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
                        peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
                        let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
                        peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
                }

                let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
                (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                for event in events.iter() {
                        event.write(writer)?;
                }

                let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
                (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                for event in background_events.iter() {
                        match event {
                                BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
                                        0u8.write(writer)?;
                                        funding_txo.write(writer)?;
                                        monitor_update.write(writer)?;
                                },
                        }
                }

                (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
                (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;

                let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
                (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
                        hash.write(writer)?;
                        pending_payment.write(writer)?;
                }

                let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
                // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
                let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
                for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
                        num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
                }
                num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
                for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
                        match outbound {
                                PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
                                PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
                                        for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
                                                session_priv.write(writer)?;
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }

                // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
                let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
                for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
                        match outbound {
                                PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
                                PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
                                        pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
                                }
                        }
                }
                write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
                        (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
                        (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
                });

                Ok(())
        }
}

/// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
///
/// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
/// is:
/// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
/// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
/// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
/// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
/// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
/// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
///    the next step.
/// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
///
/// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
/// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
///
/// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
/// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
/// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
/// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
/// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
/// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
///
/// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
        where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
        T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
        K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
        L::Target: Logger,
{
        /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
        /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
        /// signing data.
        pub keys_manager: K,

        /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
        ///
        /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
        pub fee_estimator: F,
        /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
        ///
        /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
        /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
        /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
        pub chain_monitor: M,

        /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
        /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
        /// force-closed during deserialization.
        pub tx_broadcaster: T,
        /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
        /// deserialization.
        pub logger: L,
        /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
        /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
        pub default_config: UserConfig,

        /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
        /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
        ///
        /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
        /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
        /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
        /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
        ///
        /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
        /// this struct.
        ///
        /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
        pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
}

impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
                ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
        where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
                T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
        /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
        /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
        /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
        pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
                        mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
                Self {
                        keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
                        channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
                }
        }
}

// Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
// SipmleArcChannelManager type:
impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
        ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
        where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
        T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
        K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
        L::Target: Logger,
{
        fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
                let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
                Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
        }
}

impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
        ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
        where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
        T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
        K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
        L::Target: Logger,
{
        fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
                let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);

                let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();

                let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
                let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
                let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
                let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
                for _ in 0..channel_count {
                        let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
                        let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
                        funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
                        if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
                                if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
                                                channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
                                                channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
                                                channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
                                        // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
                                        log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
                                        log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
                                                log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
                                        log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
                                        log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
                                        log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
                                        log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
                                        return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
                                } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
                                                channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
                                                channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
                                                channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
                                        // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
                                        log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
                                        log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
                                        log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
                                                log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
                                        let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
                                        failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
                                        monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
                                        channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
                                                channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
                                                user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
                                                reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
                                        });
                                } else {
                                        if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
                                                short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
                                        }
                                        by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
                                }
                        } else {
                                log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
                                log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
                                log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
                                log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
                                log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
                                return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
                        }
                }

                for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
                        if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
                                monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
                        }
                }

                const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
                let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
                for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
                        let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
                        let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                        let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
                        for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
                                pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
                        }
                        forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
                }

                let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
                for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
                        let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
                        let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                        let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
                        for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
                                previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
                        }
                        claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
                }

                let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
                for _ in 0..peer_count {
                        let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
                        let peer_state = PeerState {
                                latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
                        };
                        per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
                }

                let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
                for _ in 0..event_count {
                        match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
                                Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
                                None => continue,
                        }
                }
                if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
                        // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
                        // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
                        // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
                        // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
                        // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
                        pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
                                time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
                        });
                }

                let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
                for _ in 0..background_event_count {
                        match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
                                0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
                                _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
                        }
                }

                let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
                for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
                        if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
                                return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
                        }
                }

                let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
                        HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
                for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
                        let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
                        let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
                                session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
                        };
                        if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
                                return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
                        };
                }

                // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
                let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
                let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
                read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
                        (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
                        (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
                });
                if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
                        pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
                } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
                        let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
                        for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
                                outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
                        }
                        pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
                }

                let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());

                if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
                        pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
                }

                let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
                        genesis_hash,
                        fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
                        chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
                        tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,

                        best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),

                        channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
                                by_id,
                                short_to_id,
                                forward_htlcs,
                                claimable_htlcs,
                                pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
                        }),
                        pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
                        pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),

                        our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
                        our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
                        secp_ctx,

                        last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
                        highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),

                        per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),

                        pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
                        pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
                        total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
                        persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),

                        keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
                        logger: args.logger,
                        default_configuration: args.default_config,
                };

                for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
                        channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
                }

                //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
                //connection or two.

                Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
        }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
        use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
        use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
        use core::time::Duration;
        use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
        use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
        use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
        use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
        use ln::msgs;
        use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
        use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
        use routing::scorer::Scorer;
        use util::errors::APIError;
        use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
        use util::test_utils;

        #[cfg(feature = "std")]
        #[test]
        fn test_wait_timeout() {
                use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
                use sync::Arc;
                use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
                use std::thread;

                let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
                let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);

                let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
                let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
                thread::spawn(move || {
                        loop {
                                let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
                                let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
                                *persistence_lock = true;
                                cnd.notify_all();

                                if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
                                        break
                                }
                        }
                });

                // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
                let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();

                // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
                // available.
                loop {
                        if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
                                break
                        }
                }

                exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);

                // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
                // are available.
                loop {
                        if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
                                break
                        }
                }
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_notify_limits() {
                // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
                // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
                let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
                let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
                let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
                let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

                // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
                // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
                assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
                assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
                assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));

                let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());

                // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
                // to connect messages with new values
                chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
                chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
                let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
                let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();

                // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
                assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
                assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
                // ... but the last node should not.
                assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
                // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
                assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
                assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));

                // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
                // about the channel.
                nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
                nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
                assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));

                // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
                // parties.
                nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
                nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
                nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
                nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
                assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
                assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));

                // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
                assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);

                // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
                // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
                // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
                let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
                let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
                let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };

                // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
                // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
                nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
                nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
                assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
                assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
                assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);

                // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
                // the channel info has updated.
                nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
                nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
                assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
                assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
                assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
                assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
                // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
                // expected.
                let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
                let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
                let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
                let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());

                // First, send a partial MPP payment.
                let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
                let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
                // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
                // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
                let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);

                // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
                nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
                let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
                assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
                expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);

                // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);

                // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
                // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
                // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
                // lightning messages manually.
                assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
                let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
                let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
                // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
                let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                match events[0] {
                        Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash } => {
                                assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
                                assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
                // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
                //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
                // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
                //      fails as expected.
                let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
                let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
                let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
                let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
                let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
                let scorer = Scorer::new(0);

                // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
                let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
                let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);

                // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
                let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger, &scorer).unwrap();
                nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
                let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
                assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
                expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);

                // Finally, claim the original payment.
                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);

                // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
                let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
                let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger, &scorer).unwrap();
                let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                let event = events.pop().unwrap();
                let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
                pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));

                // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
                let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
                nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
                let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
                assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
                expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);

                // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
                // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
                // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
                let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
                let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
                let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
                let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

                let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
                let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
                nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
                nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });

                let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
                let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
                let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
                let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
                let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
                                  Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
                                  nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();

                let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
                let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
                let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
                assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);

                nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
                // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
                let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
                let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
                let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
                let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

                let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
                let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
                nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
                nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });

                let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
                let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
                let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
                let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
                let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
                                  Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
                                  nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();

                let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
                let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
                let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
                let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
                assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);

                nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
                let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
                let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
                let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
                let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

                let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
                let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
                let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
                let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;

                // Marshall an MPP route.
                let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
                let path = route.paths[0].clone();
                route.paths.push(path);
                route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
                route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
                route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
                route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
                route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
                route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;

                match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
                        PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
                                assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))                        },
                        _ => panic!("unexpected error")
                }
        }
}

#[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
pub mod bench {
        use chain::Listen;
        use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
        use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
        use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
        use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
        use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
        use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
        use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
        use routing::router::get_route;
        use routing::scorer::Scorer;
        use util::test_utils;
        use util::config::UserConfig;
        use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};

        use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
        use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
        use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};

        use sync::{Arc, Mutex};

        use test::Bencher;

        struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
                node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
                        &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
                                &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
                                &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
                        &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
                        &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
        }

        #[cfg(test)]
        #[bench]
        fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
                bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
        }

        pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
                // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
                // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
                // calls per node.
                let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
                let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();

                let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
                let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };

                let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
                config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;

                let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
                let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
                let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
                let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
                let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
                        network,
                        best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
                });
                let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };

                let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
                let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
                let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
                let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
                let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
                        network,
                        best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
                });
                let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };

                node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
                node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
                node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
                node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
                node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));

                let tx;
                if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
                        tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
                                value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
                        }]};
                        node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
                } else { panic!(); }

                node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
                node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));

                assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);

                let block = Block {
                        header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
                        txdata: vec![tx],
                };
                Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
                Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);

                node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
                let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
                match msg_events[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
                                node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
                                get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
                        },
                        _ => panic!(),
                }
                match msg_events[1] {
                        MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
                        _ => panic!(),
                }

                let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);

                let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
                macro_rules! send_payment {
                        ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
                                let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
                                let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
                                let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
                                        Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();

                                let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
                                payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
                                payment_count += 1;
                                let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
                                let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();

                                $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
                                let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
                                $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                                $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
                                let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
                                $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
                                $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
                                $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));

                                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
                                expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
                                assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));

                                match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
                                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
                                                assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
                                                $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
                                                $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
                                        },
                                        _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
                                }

                                let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
                                $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
                                $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
                                $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));

                                expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
                        }
                }

                bench.iter(|| {
                        send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
                        send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
                });
        }
}