1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131 /// may overshoot this in either case)
132 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
138 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
139 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
142 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
145 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
146 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
149 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
150 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
152 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
153 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
154 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
157 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
158 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
160 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
161 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
164 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
165 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
168 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
172 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
173 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
174 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
175 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
176 short_channel_id: u64,
178 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
179 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
181 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
182 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
187 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
189 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
190 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
191 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
193 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
194 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
197 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
198 struct ClaimableHTLC {
199 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
201 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
203 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
204 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
205 sender_intended_value: u64,
206 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
208 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
209 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
210 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
211 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
215 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
217 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
218 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
219 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
221 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
222 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
227 impl Readable for PaymentId {
228 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
229 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
234 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
236 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
237 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
238 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
240 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
241 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
246 impl Readable for InterceptId {
247 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
248 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
253 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
254 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
255 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
256 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
257 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
260 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
262 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
263 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
264 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
266 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
267 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
271 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
272 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
273 (0, short_channel_id, required),
274 (2, htlc_id, required),
276 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
277 (0, session_priv, required),
282 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
283 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
284 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
285 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
286 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
289 session_priv: SecretKey,
290 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
291 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
292 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
293 payment_id: PaymentId,
296 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
297 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
298 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
300 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
302 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
304 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
307 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
308 payment_id.hash(hasher);
309 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
315 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
317 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
318 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
319 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
320 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
321 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
322 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
326 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
327 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
328 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
329 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
330 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
331 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
333 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
339 struct ReceiveError {
345 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
346 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
348 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
349 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
350 pub enum FailureCode {
351 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
352 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
353 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
354 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
355 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
356 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
357 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
358 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
359 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
360 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
361 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
364 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
366 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
367 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
368 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
369 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
370 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
372 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
373 err: msgs::LightningError,
374 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
375 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
377 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
379 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
381 err: LightningError {
383 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
384 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
391 shutdown_finish: None,
395 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
396 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
399 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
401 err: LightningError {
403 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
404 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
410 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
411 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
415 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
418 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
420 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
421 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
425 log_level: Level::Warn,
428 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
430 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
432 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
434 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
435 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
443 shutdown_finish: None,
448 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
449 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
450 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
451 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
452 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
454 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
455 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
456 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
457 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
458 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
459 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
460 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
462 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
466 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
467 struct ClaimingPayment {
469 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
470 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
472 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
473 (0, amount_msat, required),
474 (2, payment_purpose, required),
475 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
478 struct ClaimablePayment {
479 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
480 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
481 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
484 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
485 struct ClaimablePayments {
486 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
487 /// failed/claimed by the user.
489 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
490 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
492 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
493 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
494 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
496 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
497 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
498 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
499 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
502 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
503 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
504 /// quite some time lag.
505 enum BackgroundEvent {
506 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate
508 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
509 /// are regenerated on startup.
510 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
514 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
515 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
516 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
517 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
518 /// event can be generated.
519 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
520 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
521 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
524 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
525 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
526 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
529 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
530 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
531 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
532 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
533 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
536 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
537 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
538 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
539 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
543 /// State we hold per-peer.
544 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
545 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
547 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
548 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
550 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
551 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
552 latest_features: InitFeatures,
553 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
554 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
555 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
556 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
557 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
559 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
560 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
561 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
562 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
564 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
565 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
566 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
567 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
568 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
569 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
570 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
571 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
572 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
573 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
577 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
578 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
579 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
580 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
581 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
582 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
585 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
589 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
590 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
592 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
595 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
596 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
597 struct PendingInboundPayment {
598 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
599 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
600 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
601 /// this payment being removed.
603 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
604 user_payment_id: u64,
605 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
606 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
607 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
610 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
611 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
612 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
613 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
614 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
615 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
616 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
617 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
619 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
620 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
628 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
630 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
631 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
632 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
637 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
638 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
639 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
640 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
641 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
642 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
643 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
644 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
645 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
647 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
648 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
650 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
651 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
652 pub trait AChannelManager {
653 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
654 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
655 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
656 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
657 type EntropySource: EntropySource;
658 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
659 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
660 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
661 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
662 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
663 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
664 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
665 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
667 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
669 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
670 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
672 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
673 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
674 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
676 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
677 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
678 ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
679 NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
680 SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
681 F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
682 R::Target: Router + Sized,
683 L::Target: Logger + Sized,
685 type Watch = M::Target;
687 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
689 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
691 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
693 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
694 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
696 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
698 type Router = R::Target;
700 type Logger = L::Target;
702 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
705 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
706 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
708 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
709 /// to individual Channels.
711 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
712 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
713 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
714 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
716 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
717 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
718 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
719 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
720 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
721 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
722 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
724 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
725 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
726 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
728 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
729 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
730 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
731 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
732 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
734 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
735 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
736 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
737 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
739 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
740 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
741 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
743 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
744 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
745 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
746 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
747 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
749 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
750 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
751 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
752 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
753 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
754 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
755 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
756 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
759 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
760 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
761 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
762 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
763 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
767 // `total_consistency_lock`
769 // |__`forward_htlcs`
771 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
773 // |__`per_peer_state`
775 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
777 // | |__`claimable_payments`
779 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
785 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
787 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
791 // | |__`pending_events`
793 // | |__`pending_background_events`
795 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
797 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
798 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
799 ES::Target: EntropySource,
800 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
801 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
802 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
806 default_configuration: UserConfig,
807 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
808 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
814 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
816 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
818 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
819 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
821 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
822 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
823 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
824 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
826 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
827 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
829 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
830 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
831 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
832 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
833 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
834 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
835 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
836 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
838 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
840 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
841 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
843 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
845 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
846 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
847 /// and via the classic SCID.
849 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
850 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
852 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
854 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
856 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
857 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
858 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
860 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
861 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
863 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
864 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
866 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
867 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
869 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
870 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
871 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
872 /// active channel list on load.
874 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
875 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
877 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
879 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
880 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
881 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
883 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
884 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
885 /// the handling of the events.
887 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
888 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
891 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
892 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
893 /// would break backwards compatability.
894 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
895 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
896 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
898 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
899 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
901 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
903 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
904 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
905 /// confirmation depth.
907 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
908 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
909 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
911 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
913 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
915 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
917 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
919 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
921 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
922 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
923 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
925 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
926 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
928 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
929 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
930 /// keeping additional state.
931 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
933 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
934 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
935 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
936 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
938 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
939 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
941 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
942 /// are currently open with that peer.
944 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
945 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
948 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
950 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
951 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
952 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
953 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
954 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
956 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
957 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
958 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
959 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
960 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
962 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
963 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
965 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
966 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
967 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
968 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
969 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
970 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
971 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
972 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
973 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
974 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
975 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
976 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
977 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
979 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
988 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
990 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
991 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
992 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
993 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
994 pub struct ChainParameters {
995 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
996 pub network: Network,
998 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1000 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1001 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1004 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1010 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1011 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1012 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1013 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1014 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1015 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1017 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1018 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1019 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1020 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1021 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1023 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1024 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1027 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1028 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1029 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1032 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1033 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1035 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1036 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1037 should_persist: persist_check,
1038 _read_guard: read_guard,
1043 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1044 fn drop(&mut self) {
1045 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1046 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1051 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1052 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1054 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1056 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1057 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1058 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1059 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1060 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1062 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1063 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1065 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1067 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1068 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1069 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1070 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1071 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1072 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1073 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1074 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1075 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1076 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1077 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1078 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1079 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1081 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1082 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1084 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1085 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1086 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1087 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1089 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1090 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1091 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1092 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1093 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1094 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1097 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1099 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1100 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1103 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1105 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1106 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1108 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1109 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1110 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1111 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1113 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1114 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1115 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1117 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1118 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1119 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1121 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1122 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1123 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1124 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1126 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1127 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1128 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1130 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1131 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1132 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1134 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1135 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1136 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1137 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1138 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1139 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1140 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1141 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1142 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1143 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1144 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1147 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1148 /// to better separate parameters.
1149 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1150 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1151 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1152 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1153 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1154 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1155 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1156 pub features: InitFeatures,
1157 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1158 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1159 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1161 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1163 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1164 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1165 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1166 /// payments to us through this channel.
1167 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1168 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1169 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1170 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1171 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1172 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1173 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1176 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1177 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1178 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1179 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1180 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1181 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1182 /// lifetime of the channel.
1183 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1184 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1185 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1186 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1187 /// our counterparty already.
1189 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1190 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1191 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1192 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1194 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1195 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1196 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1197 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1199 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1200 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1202 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1203 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1205 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1206 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1207 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1208 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1209 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1210 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1211 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1212 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1213 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1216 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1218 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1219 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1220 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1221 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1222 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1223 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1224 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1226 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1227 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1229 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1230 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1231 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1232 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1233 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1234 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1235 /// this value on chain.
1237 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1239 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1241 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1242 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1243 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1244 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1246 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1247 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1248 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1250 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1251 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1252 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1253 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1254 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1256 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1257 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1258 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1259 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1261 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1262 pub balance_msat: u64,
1263 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1264 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1265 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1266 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1268 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1270 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1271 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1272 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1273 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1274 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1275 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1276 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1277 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1279 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1280 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1281 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1282 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1283 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1284 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1285 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1287 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1288 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1289 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1290 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1291 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1292 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1293 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1294 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1295 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1297 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1299 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1300 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1301 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1302 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1303 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1305 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1306 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1307 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1308 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1309 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1310 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1311 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1313 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1314 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1315 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1316 pub is_outbound: bool,
1317 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1318 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1319 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1320 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1321 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1323 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1324 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1325 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1326 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1328 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1329 pub is_usable: bool,
1330 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1331 pub is_public: bool,
1332 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1333 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1334 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1335 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1336 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1337 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1339 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1340 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1343 impl ChannelDetails {
1344 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1345 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1346 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1348 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1349 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1350 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1351 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1354 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1355 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1356 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1358 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1359 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1360 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1361 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1364 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1365 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1367 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1368 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1369 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1371 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1372 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1373 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1374 features: latest_features,
1375 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1376 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1377 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1378 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1379 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1380 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1381 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1382 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1383 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1384 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1386 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1387 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1388 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1389 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1390 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1391 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1392 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1393 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1394 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1395 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1396 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1397 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1398 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1399 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1400 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1401 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1402 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1403 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1404 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1405 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1406 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1407 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1408 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1409 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1410 config: Some(channel.config()),
1415 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1416 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1417 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1418 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1419 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1421 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1423 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1424 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1425 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1428 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1429 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1430 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1432 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1433 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1434 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1436 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1437 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1438 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1440 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1441 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1445 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1447 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1449 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1450 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1451 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1452 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1454 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1455 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1456 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1459 macro_rules! handle_error {
1460 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1461 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1462 // entering the macro.
1463 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1464 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1468 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1469 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1471 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1472 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1473 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1474 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1478 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1479 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1480 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1481 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1486 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1487 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1489 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1490 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1491 action: err.action.clone()
1495 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1496 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1497 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1498 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1499 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1503 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1510 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1511 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1512 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1513 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1514 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1515 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1517 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1518 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1519 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1520 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1521 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1523 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1524 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1526 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1530 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1531 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1532 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1534 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1535 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1537 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1538 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1540 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1541 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1542 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1543 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1544 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1545 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1551 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1552 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1556 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1558 $entry.remove_entry();
1566 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1567 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1571 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1573 $entry.remove_entry();
1581 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1582 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1584 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1585 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1591 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1592 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1593 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1594 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1595 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1597 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1598 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1599 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1600 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1601 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1602 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1603 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1604 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1605 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1606 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1611 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1612 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1613 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1614 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1615 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1616 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1617 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1618 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1619 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1621 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1626 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1627 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1628 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1629 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1630 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1631 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1632 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1633 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1634 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1636 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1641 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1642 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1643 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1644 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1645 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1646 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1647 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1648 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1649 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1650 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1651 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1653 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1654 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1655 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1661 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1662 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1664 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1665 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1666 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1667 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1668 updates.announcement_sigs);
1669 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1670 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1673 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1674 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1675 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1677 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1679 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1680 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1682 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1683 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1684 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1685 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1690 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1691 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1692 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1693 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1694 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1696 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1697 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1698 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1701 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1702 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1703 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1704 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1705 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1706 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1707 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1708 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1712 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1713 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1714 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1715 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1721 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1722 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1726 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1727 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1728 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1729 while !processed_all_events {
1730 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1734 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1737 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1738 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1739 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1741 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1742 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1743 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1744 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1748 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1749 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1750 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1751 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1754 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1756 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1757 $event_to_handle = event;
1759 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1760 post_event_actions.push(action);
1765 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1766 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1767 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1768 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1771 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1772 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1773 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1774 processed_all_events = false;
1777 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1778 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1784 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1786 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1787 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1788 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1789 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1790 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1791 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1795 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1797 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1798 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1800 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1802 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1803 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1804 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1807 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1808 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1809 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1810 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1811 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1812 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1813 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1814 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1816 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1817 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1818 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1823 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1825 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1826 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1827 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1828 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1829 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1830 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1831 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1832 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1834 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1837 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1838 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1840 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1842 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1844 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1846 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1847 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1848 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1849 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1850 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1860 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1861 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1862 &self.default_configuration
1865 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1866 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1867 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1870 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1871 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1873 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1875 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1879 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1884 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1886 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1887 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1888 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1889 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1890 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1892 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1893 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1895 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
1896 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
1897 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
1899 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1900 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1901 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1903 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1904 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1905 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1906 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1907 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1908 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1910 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1911 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1912 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1913 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1914 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1915 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1918 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1919 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1920 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1922 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1924 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1925 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1927 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1929 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1930 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1931 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1932 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1933 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1934 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1938 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1943 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1945 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1946 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1947 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1949 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1951 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1954 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1957 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1958 node_id: their_network_key,
1961 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1964 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1965 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1966 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1967 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1968 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1969 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1970 // the same channel.
1971 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1973 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1974 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1975 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1976 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1977 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1978 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1979 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1980 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1988 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1989 /// more information.
1990 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1991 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1994 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1995 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1997 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1998 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2000 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2001 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2002 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2003 // really wanted anyway.
2004 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
2007 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2008 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2009 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2010 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2012 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2013 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2014 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2015 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2016 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2019 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2025 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2026 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2028 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2029 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2030 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2032 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2033 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2034 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2035 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2036 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2037 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2038 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2039 total_msat: *total_msat,
2042 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2043 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2045 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2046 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2048 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2053 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2054 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2055 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2056 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2057 Some(transaction) => {
2058 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2059 channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
2064 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2065 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2066 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2067 reason: closure_reason
2071 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2072 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2074 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2075 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2076 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2078 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2079 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2081 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2082 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2083 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2084 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2085 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2086 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2087 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2088 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2089 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2091 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2092 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2093 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2094 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2095 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2099 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2100 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2101 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2102 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2103 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2106 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2107 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2108 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2109 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2113 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2117 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2121 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2122 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2123 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2124 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2127 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2131 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2132 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2133 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2135 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2136 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2138 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2139 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2140 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2141 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2143 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2145 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2146 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2147 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2150 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2151 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2152 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2153 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2154 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2155 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2158 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2159 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2160 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2162 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2163 /// the channel being closed or not:
2164 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2165 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2166 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2167 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2168 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2169 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2170 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2172 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2173 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2174 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2175 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2177 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2179 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2180 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2181 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2184 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2185 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2186 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2187 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2188 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2189 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2193 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2194 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2195 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2196 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2197 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2198 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2199 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2200 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2202 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2203 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2204 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2205 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2206 // ignore the result here.
2207 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2211 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2212 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2213 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2214 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2215 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2216 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2217 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2219 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2220 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2221 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2222 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2223 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2225 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2227 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2229 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2232 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2233 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2234 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2235 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2236 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2241 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2244 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2246 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2247 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2248 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2249 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2250 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2251 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2252 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2253 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2255 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2266 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2267 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2268 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2270 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2271 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2272 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2275 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2276 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2277 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2279 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2280 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2281 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2282 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2283 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2286 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2287 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2288 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2289 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2290 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2294 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2295 /// local transaction(s).
2296 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2297 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2298 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2302 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2303 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2305 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2306 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2307 return Err(ReceiveError {
2308 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2310 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2313 // final_expiry_too_soon
2314 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2315 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2317 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2318 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2319 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2320 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2321 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2322 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2323 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2324 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2325 return Err(ReceiveError {
2326 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2327 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2330 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2331 return Err(ReceiveError {
2333 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2334 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2338 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2339 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2340 return Err(ReceiveError {
2341 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2342 err_data: Vec::new(),
2343 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2346 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2347 if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2348 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2349 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2350 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2351 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2352 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2353 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2354 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2355 return Err(ReceiveError {
2356 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2357 err_data: Vec::new(),
2358 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2361 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2362 return Err(ReceiveError {
2363 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2364 err_data: Vec::new(),
2365 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2368 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2372 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2374 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2375 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2378 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2379 phantom_shared_secret,
2382 return Err(ReceiveError {
2383 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2384 err_data: Vec::new(),
2385 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2390 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2393 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2394 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2395 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2396 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2400 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2401 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2402 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2404 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2405 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2406 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2407 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2408 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2409 failure_code: $err_code,
2415 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2416 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2419 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2420 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2421 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2423 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2424 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2425 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2426 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2427 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2428 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2429 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2430 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2432 macro_rules! return_err {
2433 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2435 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2436 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2437 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2438 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2439 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2440 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2446 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2448 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2449 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2451 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2452 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2456 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2457 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2459 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2461 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2462 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2463 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2464 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2465 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2467 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2470 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2471 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2472 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2474 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2475 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2476 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2479 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2480 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2481 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2482 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2486 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2487 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2488 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2491 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2492 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2493 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2494 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2495 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2500 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2501 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2502 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2503 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2504 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2505 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2506 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2507 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2508 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2509 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2510 // phantom or an intercept.
2511 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2512 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2513 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2517 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2520 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2522 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2523 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2524 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2525 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2526 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2528 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2529 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2530 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2532 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2533 // have no consistency guarantees.
2534 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2538 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2539 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2540 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2541 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2542 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2544 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2545 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2546 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2547 // we don't have the channel here.
2548 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2550 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2552 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2553 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2554 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2555 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2556 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2557 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2558 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2559 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2560 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2561 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2562 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2564 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2567 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2568 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2570 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2571 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2575 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2576 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2577 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2578 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2580 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2587 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2588 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2589 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2590 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2591 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2592 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2594 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2595 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2597 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2598 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2599 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2600 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2601 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2602 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2603 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2604 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2605 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2606 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2612 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2613 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2614 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2615 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2617 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2618 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2620 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2621 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2622 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2624 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2625 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2626 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2627 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2628 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2629 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2630 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2634 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2639 pending_forward_info
2642 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2643 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2644 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2646 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2647 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2648 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2650 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2651 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2652 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2653 if !chan.should_announce() {
2654 return Err(LightningError {
2655 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2656 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2659 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2660 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2663 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2666 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2667 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2668 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2669 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2671 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2672 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2673 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2675 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2676 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2677 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2678 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2679 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2680 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2684 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2686 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2687 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2688 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2690 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2691 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2692 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2693 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2694 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2697 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2698 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2700 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2701 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2702 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2703 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2704 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2705 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2706 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2707 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2709 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2710 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2711 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2713 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2715 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2722 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2723 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2724 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2727 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2728 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2729 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2731 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2732 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2733 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2735 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2736 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2737 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2739 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
2740 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
2742 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2743 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2744 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2745 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2748 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2749 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2750 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2751 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2752 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2753 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2754 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2755 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2757 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2758 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2759 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2761 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2762 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2764 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2765 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2766 Some(monitor_update) => {
2767 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2768 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2769 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2772 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2773 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2774 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2775 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2776 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2777 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2778 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2779 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2785 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2786 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2787 // `channel_by_id` map.
2788 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2789 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2794 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2795 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2797 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2802 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2804 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2805 /// fields for more info.
2807 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2808 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2810 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2812 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2813 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2814 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2815 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2816 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2818 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2819 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2820 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2821 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2822 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2824 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2825 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2826 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2827 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2829 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2831 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2832 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2833 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2835 /// In general, a path may raise:
2836 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2837 /// node public key) is specified.
2838 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2839 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2841 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2842 /// relevant updates.
2844 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2845 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2846 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2848 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2849 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2850 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2851 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2852 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2853 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2854 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2855 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2856 self.pending_outbound_payments
2857 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2858 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2859 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2862 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2863 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2864 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2865 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2866 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2867 self.pending_outbound_payments
2868 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2869 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2870 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2871 &self.pending_events,
2872 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2873 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2877 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2878 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2879 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2880 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2881 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2882 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2886 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2887 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2888 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2892 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2893 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2897 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2898 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2899 /// retries are exhausted.
2901 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2902 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2904 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2905 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2906 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2908 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2909 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2911 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2912 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2913 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2914 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2915 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2918 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2919 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2920 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2921 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2922 /// never reach the recipient.
2924 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2925 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2927 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2928 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2930 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2931 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2932 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2933 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2934 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2935 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2936 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2937 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2938 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2941 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2942 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2944 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2947 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2948 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2949 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2950 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2951 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2952 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2953 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2954 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2955 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2956 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2959 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2960 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2961 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2962 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2963 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2964 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2965 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2966 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2967 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2970 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2973 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2974 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2977 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2978 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2979 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2980 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2981 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2982 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2983 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2984 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2986 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2987 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2988 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2990 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2992 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2993 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2994 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2995 } else { unreachable!(); });
2997 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2999 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3000 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3002 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
3003 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3004 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3010 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3012 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3013 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3018 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3019 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3022 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
3023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3024 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3026 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3027 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3028 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3029 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3038 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3039 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3040 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3044 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3046 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3047 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3049 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3050 /// across the p2p network.
3052 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3053 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3055 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3056 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3057 /// keys per-channel).
3059 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3060 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3061 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3063 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3064 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3065 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3067 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3068 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3069 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3070 /// for more details.
3072 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3073 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3074 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3075 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3077 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3078 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3079 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3080 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3085 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3086 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3087 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3088 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3089 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3090 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3091 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3092 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3096 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3097 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3098 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3099 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3103 let mut output_index = None;
3104 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3105 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3106 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3107 if output_index.is_some() {
3108 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3109 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3112 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3115 if output_index.is_none() {
3116 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3117 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3120 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3124 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3126 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3127 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3128 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3129 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3131 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3132 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3134 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3135 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3137 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3139 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3140 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3141 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3142 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3143 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3144 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3145 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3146 pub fn update_channel_config(
3147 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3148 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3149 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3150 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3151 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3155 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3156 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3158 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3159 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3160 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3161 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3162 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3163 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3164 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3165 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3166 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3170 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3171 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3172 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3175 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3176 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3177 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3178 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3179 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3187 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3188 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3190 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3191 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3193 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3194 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3195 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3196 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3197 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3199 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3200 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3202 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3205 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3206 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3207 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3208 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3209 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3210 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3212 let next_hop_scid = {
3213 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3214 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3215 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3216 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3217 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3218 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3220 if !chan.is_usable() {
3221 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3222 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3225 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3227 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3228 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3233 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3234 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3235 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3238 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3239 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3240 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3242 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3244 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3245 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3248 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3249 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3250 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3251 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3252 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3254 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3258 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3259 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3261 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3264 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3265 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3266 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3268 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3269 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3270 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3273 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3274 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3275 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3276 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3277 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3278 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3279 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3282 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3283 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3284 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3285 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3290 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3292 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3293 /// Will likely generate further events.
3294 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3297 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3298 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3299 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3301 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3302 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3304 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3305 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3306 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3308 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3309 match forward_info {
3310 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3311 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3312 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3313 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3314 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3317 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3318 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3319 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3321 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3322 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3323 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3324 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3325 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3326 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3329 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3330 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3332 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3335 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3336 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3342 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3343 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3345 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3349 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3350 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3352 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3356 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3357 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3358 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3359 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3360 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3362 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3363 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3364 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3365 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3366 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3368 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3370 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3371 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3375 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3376 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3377 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3378 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3384 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3387 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3390 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3391 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3392 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3393 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3394 // problem, not ours.
3400 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3401 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3403 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3407 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3408 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3409 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3410 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3413 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3414 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3415 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3416 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3417 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3420 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3421 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3422 match forward_info {
3423 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3424 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3425 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3426 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3427 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3430 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3431 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3432 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3433 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3434 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3435 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3436 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3437 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3439 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3440 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3441 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3443 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3444 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3446 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3448 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3449 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3450 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3451 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3456 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3457 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3459 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3460 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3461 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3462 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3464 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3465 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3467 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3469 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3470 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3471 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3480 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3481 match forward_info {
3482 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3483 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3484 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3485 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3488 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3489 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3490 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3492 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3493 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3494 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3496 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3497 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3498 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3501 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3502 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3505 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3508 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3509 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3510 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3511 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3512 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3513 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3514 phantom_shared_secret,
3516 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3517 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3518 // if routing nodes overpay
3519 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3520 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3522 total_value_received: None,
3523 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3528 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3530 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3531 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3532 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3533 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3534 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3535 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3537 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3538 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3539 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3540 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3541 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3542 phantom_shared_secret,
3544 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3545 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3547 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3550 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3551 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3552 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3553 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3554 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3557 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3558 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3559 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3561 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3562 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3563 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3566 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3567 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3568 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3570 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3571 .entry(payment_hash)
3572 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3573 .or_insert_with(|| {
3574 committed_to_claimable = true;
3576 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3579 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3580 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3581 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3584 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3586 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3587 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3588 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3589 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3590 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3593 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3594 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3595 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3596 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3597 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3598 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3599 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3600 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3601 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3602 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3603 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3605 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3607 _ => unreachable!(),
3610 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3611 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3612 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3613 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3614 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3615 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3616 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3617 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3618 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3619 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3620 committed_to_claimable = true;
3622 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3623 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3624 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3625 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3626 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3627 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3631 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3632 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3633 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3634 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3636 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3638 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3639 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3641 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3642 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3643 committed_to_claimable = true;
3646 payment_claimable_generated
3650 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3651 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3652 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3653 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3654 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3655 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3656 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3657 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3658 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3659 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3660 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3661 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3662 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3663 Ok(result) => result,
3665 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3666 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3669 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3670 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3671 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3672 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3673 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3674 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3677 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3679 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3680 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3681 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3682 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3684 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3685 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3686 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3687 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3688 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3689 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3690 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3691 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3692 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3693 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3695 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3696 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3697 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3701 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3702 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3704 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3708 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3709 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3715 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3716 if payment_data.is_none() {
3717 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3718 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3720 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3721 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3722 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3723 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3724 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3725 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3726 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3727 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3729 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3730 if payment_claimable_generated {
3731 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3737 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3738 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3746 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3747 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3748 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3749 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3750 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3751 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3753 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3754 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3756 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3758 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3759 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3760 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3762 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3764 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3765 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3766 events.append(&mut new_events);
3769 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3771 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3772 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3774 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3775 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3776 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3777 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3778 if background_events.is_empty() {
3782 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3784 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
3785 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3786 // monitor updating completing.
3787 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3794 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3795 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3796 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3797 self.process_background_events();
3800 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3801 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3802 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3803 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3804 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3805 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3806 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3808 if !chan.is_live() {
3809 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3810 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3811 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3813 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3814 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3816 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3817 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3821 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3822 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3823 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3824 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3825 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3826 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3827 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3829 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3831 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3832 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3833 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3835 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3836 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3837 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3845 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3847 /// This currently includes:
3848 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3849 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3850 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3852 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3853 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3854 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3856 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3857 /// estimate fetches.
3859 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3860 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3861 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3862 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3863 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3864 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3866 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3868 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3869 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3870 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3873 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3874 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3875 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3876 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3877 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3878 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3879 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3880 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3882 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3883 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3884 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3885 if needs_close { return false; }
3888 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3889 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
3890 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
3891 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
3892 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3893 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
3894 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3895 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
3897 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3898 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3899 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3900 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3904 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3906 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
3909 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
3911 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3912 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3913 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3914 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3918 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3920 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
3926 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3930 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3931 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3936 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3937 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3938 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3939 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3940 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3941 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3942 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3943 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3944 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3945 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3946 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3947 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3948 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3949 // have no channels to the peer.
3950 let remove_entry = {
3951 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3952 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3955 entry.remove_entry();
3958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3963 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3964 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3965 // This should be unreachable
3966 debug_assert!(false);
3969 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3970 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3971 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3972 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3973 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3974 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3975 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3978 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3979 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3980 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3982 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3983 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3990 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3991 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3992 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3993 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3994 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3997 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3998 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4001 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4003 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4004 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4005 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4006 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4007 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4014 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4015 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4016 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4018 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4019 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4020 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4021 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4023 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4024 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4025 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4026 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4027 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4028 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4031 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4032 /// reason for the failure.
4034 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4035 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4036 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4038 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4039 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4040 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4041 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4042 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4043 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4044 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4049 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4050 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4051 match failure_code {
4052 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4053 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4054 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4055 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4056 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4057 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4062 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4063 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4065 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4067 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4068 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4069 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4070 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4071 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4072 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4073 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4075 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4077 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4078 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4080 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4085 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4086 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4087 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4088 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4089 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4090 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4091 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4092 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4093 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4094 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4096 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4097 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4098 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4099 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4101 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4102 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4103 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4104 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4105 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4109 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4110 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4111 // be surfaced to the user.
4112 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4113 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4114 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4116 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4117 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4118 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4119 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4120 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4121 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4122 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4123 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4125 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4127 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4130 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4131 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4132 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4133 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4137 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4138 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4139 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4140 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4141 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4142 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4143 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4144 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4145 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4148 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4149 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4150 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4153 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4154 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4155 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4157 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4158 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4159 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4160 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4161 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4163 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4164 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4165 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4167 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4168 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4169 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4170 push_forward_ev = true;
4172 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4173 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4174 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4176 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4177 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4180 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4181 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4182 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4183 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4184 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4185 failed_next_destination: destination,
4191 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4192 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4194 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4195 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4196 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4197 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4199 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4200 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4201 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4202 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4204 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4205 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4206 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4207 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4208 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4209 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4210 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4211 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4213 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4216 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4217 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4218 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4219 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4220 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4221 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4222 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4223 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4228 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4229 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4230 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4232 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4233 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4234 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4235 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4240 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4242 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4243 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4244 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4245 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4246 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4247 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4248 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4249 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4250 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4251 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4252 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4253 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4254 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4255 debug_assert!(false);
4259 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4261 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4262 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4263 debug_assert!(false);
4267 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4269 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4270 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4271 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4272 if sources.len() != 1 {
4273 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4274 debug_assert!(false);
4280 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4282 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4283 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4284 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4285 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4288 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4289 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4290 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4291 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4295 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4296 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4297 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4298 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4300 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4301 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4302 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4303 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4304 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4309 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4310 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4311 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4312 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4313 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4314 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4315 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4317 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4320 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4321 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4322 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4323 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4327 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4328 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4329 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4330 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4333 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4334 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4335 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4336 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4340 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4341 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4342 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4345 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4346 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4347 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4348 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4349 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4350 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4352 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4353 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4354 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4355 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4356 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4358 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4359 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4360 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4361 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4362 if let Err(e) = res {
4363 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4364 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4365 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4366 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4367 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4374 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4375 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4376 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4380 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4381 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4382 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4383 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4384 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4385 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4386 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4387 // again on restart.
4388 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4389 payment_preimage, update_res);
4391 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4392 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4393 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4394 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4395 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4396 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4400 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4401 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4404 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4406 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4407 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4409 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4410 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4411 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4412 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4413 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4414 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4415 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4418 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4419 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4421 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4423 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4426 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4430 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4431 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4432 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4438 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4439 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4440 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4443 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4444 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4446 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4447 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4448 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4449 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4450 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4454 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4455 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4461 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4462 /// update completion.
4463 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4464 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4465 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4466 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4467 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4468 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4469 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4470 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4471 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4472 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4473 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4474 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4475 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4477 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4479 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4480 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4481 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4482 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4485 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4486 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4488 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4489 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4490 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4495 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4496 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4497 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4498 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4503 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4504 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4505 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4506 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4507 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4512 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4516 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4522 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4523 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4524 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4528 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4529 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4530 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4536 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4537 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4539 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4540 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4542 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4543 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4544 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4545 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4546 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4551 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4552 let mut peer_state_lock;
4553 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4554 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4555 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4556 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4558 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4559 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4563 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4564 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4565 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4568 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4571 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4573 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4574 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4577 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4578 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4579 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4581 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4582 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4583 /// used to accept such channels.
4585 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4586 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4587 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4588 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4591 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4592 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4594 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4595 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4596 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4598 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4599 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4601 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4602 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4604 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4605 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4607 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4608 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4609 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4610 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4613 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4614 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4616 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4617 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4618 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4619 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4620 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4621 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4622 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4623 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4624 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4625 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4626 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4629 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4630 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4631 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4632 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4633 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4634 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4637 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4638 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4639 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4641 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4642 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4643 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4644 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4645 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4646 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4647 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4648 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4651 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4652 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4653 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4657 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4658 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4659 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4662 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4663 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4669 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4670 /// or 0-conf channels.
4672 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4673 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4674 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4675 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4676 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4677 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4679 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4680 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4681 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4682 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4683 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4684 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4685 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4689 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4692 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4693 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4695 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4696 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4697 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4698 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4700 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4703 num_unfunded_channels
4706 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4707 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4708 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4711 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4712 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4715 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4716 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4717 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4718 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4720 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4721 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4722 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4723 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4725 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4726 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4728 debug_assert!(false);
4729 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4731 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4732 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4734 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4735 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4736 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4737 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4738 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4739 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4741 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4742 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4743 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4746 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4747 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4748 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4749 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4750 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4753 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4754 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4755 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4758 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4759 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4763 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4764 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4765 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4766 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4768 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4769 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4770 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4771 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4773 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4774 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4775 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4778 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4779 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4780 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4781 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4782 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4783 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4784 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4788 entry.insert(channel);
4794 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4795 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4796 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4797 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4799 debug_assert!(false);
4800 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4802 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4803 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4804 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4806 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4807 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4809 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4812 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4813 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4814 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4815 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4816 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4818 user_channel_id: user_id,
4823 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4824 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4826 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4827 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4829 debug_assert!(false);
4830 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4833 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4835 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4836 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4837 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4838 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4843 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4844 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4845 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4847 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4848 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4850 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4851 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4852 funding_msg.channel_id))
4854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4855 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4859 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4860 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4861 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4862 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4863 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4864 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4865 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4869 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4871 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4872 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4873 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4875 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4876 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4877 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4878 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4879 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4880 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4881 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4882 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4890 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4891 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4892 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4893 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4895 debug_assert!(false);
4896 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4899 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4900 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4901 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4902 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4903 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4904 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4905 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4906 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4907 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4908 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4909 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4910 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4911 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4912 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4917 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4921 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4922 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4923 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4925 debug_assert!(false);
4926 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4928 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4929 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4930 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4932 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4933 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4934 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4935 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4936 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4937 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4938 msg: announcement_sigs,
4940 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4941 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4942 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4943 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4944 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4945 // announcement_signatures.
4946 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4947 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4948 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4949 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4956 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4957 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4962 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4966 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4967 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4968 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4969 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4970 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4972 debug_assert!(false);
4973 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4975 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4976 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4977 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4978 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4980 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4981 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4982 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4983 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4986 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4987 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4988 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4989 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4991 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4992 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4993 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4994 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4995 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4996 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5001 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5002 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5003 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5004 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5005 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5009 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5012 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5013 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5014 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5015 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5021 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5022 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5023 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5025 debug_assert!(false);
5026 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5028 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5029 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5030 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5031 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5032 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5033 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5034 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5035 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5036 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5041 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5042 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5043 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5044 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5045 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5046 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5047 } else { (tx, None) }
5049 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5052 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5053 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5054 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5056 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5057 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5058 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5059 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5060 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5064 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5069 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5070 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5071 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5072 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5074 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5075 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5076 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5077 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5079 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5080 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5081 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5083 debug_assert!(false);
5084 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5086 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5087 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5088 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5089 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5091 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5092 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5093 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5094 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5095 match pending_forward_info {
5096 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5097 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5098 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5099 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5101 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5102 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5103 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5104 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5105 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5108 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5110 _ => pending_forward_info
5113 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5115 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5120 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5121 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5122 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5123 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5125 debug_assert!(false);
5126 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5128 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5129 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5130 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5131 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5132 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5134 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5137 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5141 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5142 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5143 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5145 debug_assert!(false);
5146 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5148 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5149 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5150 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5151 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5152 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5154 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5159 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5160 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5161 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5163 debug_assert!(false);
5164 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5166 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5167 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5168 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5170 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5171 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5172 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5174 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5177 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5181 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5182 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5183 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5185 debug_assert!(false);
5186 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5188 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5189 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5190 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5192 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5193 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5194 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5195 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5196 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5197 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5198 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5206 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5207 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5208 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5209 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5210 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5211 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5212 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5213 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5214 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5215 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5216 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5218 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5219 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5221 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5222 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5223 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5225 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5226 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5229 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5230 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5232 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5233 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5234 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5235 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5236 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5237 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5238 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5239 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5240 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5243 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5244 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5247 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5248 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5249 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5250 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5251 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5252 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5253 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5256 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5257 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5258 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5263 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5264 // payments are being processed.
5265 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5266 push_forward_event = true;
5268 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5269 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5276 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5277 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5280 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5281 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5282 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5284 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5288 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5289 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5290 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5291 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5292 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5294 if !forward_ev_exists {
5295 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5297 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5302 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5303 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5304 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5305 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5307 debug_assert!(false);
5308 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5309 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5310 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5311 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5312 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5313 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5314 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5315 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5316 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5317 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5318 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5319 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5321 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5323 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5326 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5330 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5332 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5334 debug_assert!(false);
5335 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5337 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5338 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5339 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5340 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5341 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5343 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5348 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5349 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5350 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5352 debug_assert!(false);
5353 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5355 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5356 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5357 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5358 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5359 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5360 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5363 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5364 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5365 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5366 msg, &self.default_configuration
5368 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5369 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5370 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5373 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5378 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5379 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5380 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5381 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5383 // It's not a local channel
5384 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5387 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5388 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5389 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5390 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5392 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5393 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5394 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5395 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5396 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5397 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5398 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5399 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5400 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5401 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5403 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5405 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5406 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5407 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5408 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5410 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5411 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5414 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5416 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5419 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5421 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5422 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5424 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5426 debug_assert!(false);
5427 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5429 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5430 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5431 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5432 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5433 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5434 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5435 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5436 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5437 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5438 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5439 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5440 let mut channel_update = None;
5441 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5442 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5443 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5446 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5447 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5448 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5449 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5450 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5451 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5452 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5457 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5458 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5459 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5460 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5461 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5462 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5466 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5470 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5471 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5474 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5475 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5480 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5481 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5482 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5484 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5485 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5486 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5487 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5488 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5489 match monitor_event {
5490 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5491 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5492 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5493 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5495 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5496 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5497 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5498 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5501 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5502 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5503 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5504 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5506 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5507 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5508 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5509 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5512 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5513 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5514 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5515 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5516 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5517 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5518 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5519 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5520 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5521 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5522 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5526 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5527 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5529 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5531 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5532 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5533 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5534 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5535 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5542 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5543 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5549 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5550 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5553 has_pending_monitor_events
5556 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5557 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5558 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5560 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5561 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5562 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5563 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5565 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5570 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5571 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5572 /// update was applied.
5573 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5574 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5575 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5576 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5578 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5579 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5580 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5581 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5583 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5584 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5586 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5587 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5588 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5589 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5590 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5591 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5592 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5593 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5594 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5596 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5597 has_monitor_update = true;
5599 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5600 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5601 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5602 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5603 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5604 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5605 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5607 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5609 continue 'peer_loop;
5618 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5619 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5620 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5623 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5624 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5630 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5631 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5632 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5633 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5634 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5635 let mut has_update = false;
5637 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5639 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5640 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5641 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5642 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5643 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5644 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5645 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5646 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5648 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5649 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5652 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5653 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5654 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5655 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5656 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5661 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5663 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5664 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5665 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5671 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5672 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5680 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5681 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5687 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5688 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5690 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5691 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5692 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5693 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5694 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5695 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5696 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5697 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5698 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5699 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5700 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5701 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5702 assert!(should_broadcast);
5703 } else { unreachable!(); }
5704 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)));
5706 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5710 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5711 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5713 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5714 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5717 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5719 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5720 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5721 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5723 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5724 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5725 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5726 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5727 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5728 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5729 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5730 // never fail a payment too early.
5731 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5733 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5736 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5741 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5744 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5745 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5747 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5748 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5749 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5750 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5752 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5754 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5755 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5759 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5760 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5762 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5764 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5765 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5767 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5768 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5769 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5770 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5771 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5772 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5773 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5774 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5775 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5776 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5777 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5780 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5781 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5783 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5786 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5788 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5790 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5791 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5792 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5793 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5794 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5797 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5798 /// stored external to LDK.
5800 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5801 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5802 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5804 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5805 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5808 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5809 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5810 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5811 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5813 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5814 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5815 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5816 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5817 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5819 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5820 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5821 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5822 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5823 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5825 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5826 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5828 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5829 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5833 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5834 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5836 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5838 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5839 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5841 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5842 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5843 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5844 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5845 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5846 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5847 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5850 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5851 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5853 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5856 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5858 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5860 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5861 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5864 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5865 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5867 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5868 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5869 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5872 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5873 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5875 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5876 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5877 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5878 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5880 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5881 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5882 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5883 Some(_) => continue,
5884 None => return scid_candidate
5889 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5891 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5892 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5894 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5895 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5896 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5900 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5901 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5902 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5904 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5905 /// times to get a unique scid.
5906 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5907 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5908 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5910 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5911 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5912 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5913 return scid_candidate
5917 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5918 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5919 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5920 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5922 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5923 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5924 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5925 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5926 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5927 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5928 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5929 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5938 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5939 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5940 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5941 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5942 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5946 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5947 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5948 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5949 events.push_back((event, None));
5953 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5954 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5955 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
5959 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5960 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5964 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5965 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5968 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5969 let mut errors = Vec::new();
5971 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5972 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5973 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5974 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
5975 if self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter()
5976 .any(|(_ev, action_opt)| action_opt == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5977 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
5980 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have another event
5981 // blocking any monitor updates for this channel. If we do, let those
5982 // events be the ones that ultimately release the monitor update(s).
5983 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another event is pending",
5984 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5987 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5988 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
5989 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
5990 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
5991 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5992 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
5993 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5994 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5995 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5997 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
5999 if further_update_exists {
6000 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6005 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6006 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6010 log_debug!(self.logger,
6011 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6012 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6016 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6017 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6018 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6022 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6023 for action in actions {
6025 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6026 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6028 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint);
6034 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6035 /// using the given event handler.
6037 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6038 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6042 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6046 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6048 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6049 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6050 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6051 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6052 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6053 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6057 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6058 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6059 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6060 /// is always placed next to each other.
6062 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6063 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6064 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6065 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6067 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6068 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6069 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6070 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6071 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6072 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6073 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6075 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6076 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6077 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6078 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6081 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6082 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6084 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6085 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6088 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6089 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6090 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6091 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6092 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6093 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6094 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6098 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6099 events.replace(pending_events);
6108 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6110 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6111 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6112 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6113 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6114 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6115 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6119 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6121 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6122 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6123 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6125 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6129 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6131 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6132 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6133 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6134 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6135 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6136 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6140 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6142 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6143 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6144 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6145 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6146 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6149 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6150 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6153 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6154 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6155 let new_height = height - 1;
6157 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6158 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6159 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6160 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6161 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6162 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6165 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6169 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6171 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6172 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6173 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6174 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6175 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6176 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6180 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6181 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6182 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6183 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6185 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6186 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6188 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6189 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6190 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6192 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6193 if height < last_best_block_height {
6194 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6195 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6199 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6200 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6201 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6202 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6204 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6205 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6209 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6211 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6213 macro_rules! max_time {
6214 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6216 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6217 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6218 // having an explicit local time source.
6219 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6220 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6221 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6222 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6223 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6229 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6230 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6231 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6232 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6236 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6237 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6238 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6239 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6240 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6241 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6242 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6243 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6250 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6251 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6252 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6253 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6254 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6255 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6256 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6257 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6262 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6264 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6265 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6266 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6267 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6268 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6269 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6273 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6274 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6276 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6277 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6278 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6279 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6280 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6282 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6283 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6285 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6286 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6287 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6288 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6289 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6290 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6291 let res = f(channel);
6292 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6293 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6294 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6295 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6296 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6298 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6299 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6300 if channel.is_usable() {
6301 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6302 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6303 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6304 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6309 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6314 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6315 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6318 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6320 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6321 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6322 msg: announcement_sigs,
6324 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6325 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6326 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6328 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6329 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6330 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6335 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6336 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6337 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6338 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6339 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6340 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6341 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6342 // is always consistent.
6343 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6344 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6345 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6346 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6347 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6350 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6351 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6352 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6353 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6354 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6355 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6356 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6360 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6361 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6362 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6363 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6365 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6366 data: reason_message,
6376 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6377 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6378 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6379 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6380 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6381 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6382 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6383 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6384 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6385 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6387 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6388 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6389 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6393 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6396 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6397 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6398 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6399 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6400 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6401 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6402 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6403 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6404 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6407 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6408 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6409 _ => unreachable!(),
6411 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6412 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6413 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6414 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6420 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6422 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6423 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6427 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6429 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6430 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6432 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6433 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6436 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6437 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6438 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6441 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6442 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6443 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6444 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6447 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6448 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6449 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6450 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6453 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6454 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6456 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6457 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6458 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6459 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6460 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6463 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6464 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6465 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6466 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6469 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6470 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6471 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6472 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6475 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6476 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6477 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6478 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6482 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6483 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6485 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6486 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6487 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6488 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6489 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6490 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6494 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6495 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6496 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6499 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6500 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6501 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6502 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6505 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6506 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6507 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6510 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6511 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6512 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6513 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6516 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6517 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6518 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6521 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6522 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6523 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6526 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6528 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6531 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6532 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6533 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6536 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6538 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6541 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6542 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6543 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6546 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6547 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6548 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6551 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6552 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6553 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6556 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6557 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6558 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6561 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6562 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6563 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6566 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6567 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6568 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6571 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6573 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6576 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6577 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6578 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6581 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6582 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6583 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6586 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6591 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6592 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6593 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6596 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6598 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6599 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6601 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6602 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6603 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6604 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6605 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6606 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6607 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6608 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6609 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6610 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6611 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6616 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6618 // V1 Channel Establishment
6619 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6620 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6621 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6622 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6623 // V2 Channel Establishment
6624 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6625 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6626 // Common Channel Establishment
6627 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6628 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6629 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6630 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6631 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6632 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6633 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6634 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6635 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6636 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6637 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6638 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6639 // Channel Operations
6640 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6641 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6642 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6643 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6644 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6645 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6647 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6648 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6649 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6650 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6651 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6652 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6653 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6654 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6655 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6658 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6659 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6660 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6661 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6664 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6666 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6668 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6669 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6673 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6674 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6675 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6681 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6682 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6683 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6684 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6685 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6686 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6689 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6690 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6691 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6692 if inbound_peer_limited {
6695 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6696 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6697 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6698 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6699 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6703 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6704 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6705 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6707 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6708 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6709 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6710 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6715 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6716 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6721 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6723 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6724 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6725 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6726 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6727 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6728 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6729 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6730 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6731 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6732 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6733 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6737 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6738 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6739 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6744 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6745 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6746 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6747 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6748 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6757 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6761 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6762 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6764 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6765 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6766 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6767 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6768 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6769 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6770 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6771 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6773 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6774 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6775 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6779 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6780 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6781 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6782 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6783 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6784 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6785 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6786 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6787 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6788 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6796 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6797 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6801 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6802 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6805 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6806 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6809 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
6810 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6811 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6812 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6815 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
6816 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6817 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6818 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6821 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
6822 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6823 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6824 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6827 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
6828 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6829 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6830 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6833 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
6834 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6835 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6836 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6839 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
6840 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6841 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6842 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6845 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
6846 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6847 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6848 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6851 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
6852 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6853 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6854 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6857 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
6858 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6859 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6860 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6864 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6865 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6866 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6867 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6870 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6871 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6873 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6874 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6875 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6876 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6877 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6880 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6881 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6882 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6883 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6886 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6887 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6888 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6889 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6892 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6893 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6894 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6895 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6896 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6897 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6898 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6899 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
6900 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6901 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6902 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6903 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6904 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6905 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6906 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6907 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6908 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6909 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6911 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6912 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6913 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6919 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6920 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6922 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6923 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6924 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6925 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6928 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6929 (2, node_id, required),
6930 (4, features, required),
6931 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6932 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6933 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6934 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6937 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6938 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6939 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6940 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6941 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6942 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6943 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6944 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6945 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6946 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6947 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6948 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6949 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6950 (7, self.config, option),
6951 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6952 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6953 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6954 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6955 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6956 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6957 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6958 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6959 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6960 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6961 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6962 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6963 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6964 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6965 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6966 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6967 (32, self.is_public, required),
6968 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6969 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6970 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6971 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6977 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6978 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6979 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6980 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6981 (2, channel_id, required),
6982 (3, channel_type, option),
6983 (4, counterparty, required),
6984 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6985 (6, funding_txo, option),
6986 (7, config, option),
6987 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6988 (9, confirmations, option),
6989 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6990 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6991 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6992 (16, balance_msat, required),
6993 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6994 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6995 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6996 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6997 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6998 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6999 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7000 (26, is_outbound, required),
7001 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7002 (30, is_usable, required),
7003 (32, is_public, required),
7004 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7005 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7006 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7007 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7010 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7011 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7012 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7013 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7014 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7018 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7020 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7021 outbound_scid_alias,
7025 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7026 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7028 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7029 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7030 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7031 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7032 confirmations_required,
7034 force_close_spend_delay,
7035 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7036 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7037 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7038 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7039 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7040 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7041 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7046 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7047 (2, channels, vec_type),
7048 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7049 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7052 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7054 (0, onion_packet, required),
7055 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7058 (0, payment_data, required),
7059 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7060 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7061 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7063 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7064 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7065 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7066 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7067 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7071 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7072 (0, routing, required),
7073 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7074 (4, payment_hash, required),
7075 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7076 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7077 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7081 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7082 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7084 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7086 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7087 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7088 reason.write(writer)?;
7090 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7091 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7094 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7095 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7096 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7097 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7104 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7105 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7106 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7109 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7110 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7111 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7112 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7116 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7117 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7118 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7119 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7120 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7123 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7124 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7125 // messages contained in the variants.
7126 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7127 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7128 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7130 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7131 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7132 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7133 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7134 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7137 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7138 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7139 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7140 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7141 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7143 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7148 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7153 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7154 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7155 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7156 (2, outpoint, required),
7157 (4, htlc_id, required),
7158 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7161 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7162 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7163 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7164 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7165 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7167 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7168 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7169 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7170 (2, self.value, required),
7171 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7172 (4, payment_data, option),
7173 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7174 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7175 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7181 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7182 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7183 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7185 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7186 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7187 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7188 let mut total_value_received = None;
7189 let mut total_msat = None;
7190 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7191 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7192 (0, prev_hop, required),
7193 (1, total_msat, option),
7194 (2, value, required),
7195 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7196 (4, payment_data, option),
7197 (5, total_value_received, option),
7198 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7199 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7201 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7203 if payment_data.is_some() {
7204 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7206 if total_msat.is_none() {
7207 total_msat = Some(value);
7209 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7212 if total_msat.is_none() {
7213 if payment_data.is_none() {
7214 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7216 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7218 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7222 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7225 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7226 total_value_received,
7227 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7234 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7235 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7236 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7239 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7240 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7241 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7242 let mut payment_id = None;
7243 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7244 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7245 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7246 (0, session_priv, required),
7247 (1, payment_id, option),
7248 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7249 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7250 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7251 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7253 if payment_id.is_none() {
7254 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7256 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7258 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7259 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7260 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7262 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7263 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7264 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7265 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7269 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7270 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7271 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7273 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7276 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7277 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7282 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7283 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7285 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7287 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7288 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7289 (0, session_priv, required),
7290 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7291 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7292 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7293 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7294 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7295 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7300 field.write(writer)?;
7307 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7308 (0, forward_info, required),
7309 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7310 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7311 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7312 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7315 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7317 (0, htlc_id, required),
7318 (2, err_packet, required),
7323 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7324 (0, payment_secret, required),
7325 (2, expiry_time, required),
7326 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7327 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7328 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7331 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7333 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7334 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7335 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7336 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7337 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7338 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7342 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7343 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7345 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7347 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7349 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7350 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7351 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7354 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7356 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7357 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7358 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7359 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7360 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7361 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7362 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7363 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7365 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7366 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7367 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7368 unfunded_channels += 1;
7373 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7375 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7376 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7377 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7378 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7379 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7380 channel.write(writer)?;
7387 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7388 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7389 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7390 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7391 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7392 for forward in pending_forwards {
7393 forward.write(writer)?;
7398 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7400 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7401 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7402 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7404 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7405 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7406 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7407 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7408 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7409 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7410 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7411 htlc.write(writer)?;
7413 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7414 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7417 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7418 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7419 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7420 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7421 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7422 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7423 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7426 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7427 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7428 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7429 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7430 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7432 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7433 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7434 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7435 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7436 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7437 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7438 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7443 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7444 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7445 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7446 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7447 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7448 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7449 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7450 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7451 0u64.write(writer)?;
7453 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7454 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7455 event.write(writer)?;
7459 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7460 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7461 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7462 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7463 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7464 0u64.write(writer)?;
7466 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7467 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7468 // likely to be identical.
7469 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7470 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7472 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7473 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7474 hash.write(writer)?;
7475 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7478 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7479 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7480 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7481 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7482 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7485 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7486 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7488 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7489 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7490 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7491 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7494 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7495 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7499 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7500 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7501 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7503 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7504 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7505 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7511 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7512 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7513 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7514 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7517 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7518 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7519 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7520 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7521 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7524 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7525 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7526 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7527 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7528 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7529 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7530 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7531 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7532 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7533 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7534 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7535 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7542 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7543 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7544 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7545 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7548 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7549 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7550 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7551 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7552 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7553 // check that the event is sane here.
7554 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7555 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7556 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7557 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7563 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7564 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7565 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7566 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7567 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7568 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7571 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7572 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7573 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7574 events.push_back((ev, action));
7575 } else if action.is_some() {
7576 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7583 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7585 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7587 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7588 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7589 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7590 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7591 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7592 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7593 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7594 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7595 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7596 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7597 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7598 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7599 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7601 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7602 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7604 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7605 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7607 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7608 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7609 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7610 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7611 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7612 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7614 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7615 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7617 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7618 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7619 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7620 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7621 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7622 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7626 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7627 pub entropy_source: ES,
7629 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7630 pub node_signer: NS,
7632 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7633 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7635 pub signer_provider: SP,
7637 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7639 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7640 pub fee_estimator: F,
7641 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7643 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7644 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7645 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7646 pub chain_monitor: M,
7648 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7649 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7650 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7651 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7652 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7653 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7655 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7657 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7658 /// deserialization.
7660 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7661 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7662 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7664 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7665 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7667 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7668 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7669 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7670 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7672 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7675 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7676 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7679 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7680 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7682 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7683 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7684 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7685 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7686 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7687 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7691 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7692 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7693 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7694 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7695 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7697 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7698 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7703 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7704 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7705 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7706 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7708 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7709 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7710 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7711 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7712 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7713 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7717 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7718 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7719 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7723 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7724 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7726 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7727 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7728 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7729 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7730 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7731 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7735 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7736 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7738 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7739 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7740 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7742 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7744 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7745 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7746 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7747 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7748 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7749 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7750 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7751 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7752 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7753 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7755 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7756 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7757 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7758 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7759 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7760 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7761 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7762 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7763 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7764 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7765 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7766 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7767 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7768 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7769 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7770 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7771 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7772 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7773 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7774 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7775 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7776 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7777 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7778 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7779 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(monitor_update));
7781 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7782 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7783 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7784 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7785 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7787 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7788 let mut found_htlc = false;
7789 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7790 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7793 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7794 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7795 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7796 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7797 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7798 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7799 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7800 log_info!(args.logger,
7801 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7802 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7803 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7807 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7808 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7809 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7811 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7812 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7814 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7815 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7816 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7817 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7819 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7820 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7821 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7822 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7826 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7827 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7828 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7829 // safely discard the channel.
7830 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7831 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7832 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7833 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7834 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7837 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7838 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7839 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7840 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7841 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7842 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7846 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7847 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7848 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
7849 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7850 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7851 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7852 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7854 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7858 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7859 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7860 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7861 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7862 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7863 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7864 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7865 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7866 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7868 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7871 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7872 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7873 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7874 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7875 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7876 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7877 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7878 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7880 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7883 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7884 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7885 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7886 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7887 let peer_state = PeerState {
7888 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7889 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7890 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7891 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7892 is_connected: false,
7894 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7897 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7898 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
7899 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
7900 for _ in 0..event_count {
7901 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7902 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
7907 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7908 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7909 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7911 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
7912 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
7913 // on-startup monitor updates.
7914 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
7915 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
7917 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7921 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7922 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7924 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7925 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7926 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7927 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7928 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7932 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7933 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7934 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7935 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7936 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7937 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7938 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7940 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7941 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7945 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7946 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7947 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7948 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7949 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7950 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7951 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7952 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7953 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7954 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7955 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7956 let mut events_override = None;
7957 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7958 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7959 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7960 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7961 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7962 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7963 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7964 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7965 (8, events_override, option),
7966 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7967 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7968 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7970 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7971 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7974 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7975 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7978 if let Some(events) = events_override {
7979 pending_events_read = events;
7982 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7983 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7986 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7987 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7988 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7989 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7990 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7991 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7993 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7995 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7996 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7997 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8001 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8002 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8003 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8004 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8005 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8006 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8007 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8009 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8010 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8011 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8012 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8013 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8014 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8015 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8018 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8019 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8020 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8021 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8023 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8024 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8025 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8027 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8028 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8029 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8030 retry_strategy: None,
8031 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8032 payment_params: None,
8033 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8034 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8035 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8036 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8037 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8038 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8039 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8040 total_msat: path_amt,
8041 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8043 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8044 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8049 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8051 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8052 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8053 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8054 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8056 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8057 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8058 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8059 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8060 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8061 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8062 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8063 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8064 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8065 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8066 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8071 !forwards.is_empty()
8073 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8074 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8075 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8076 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8077 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8078 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8079 intercepted_id != ev_id
8086 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8087 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8088 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8089 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8090 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8091 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8092 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8093 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8094 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8095 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8096 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8097 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8098 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8107 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8108 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8109 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8110 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8111 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8112 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8113 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8114 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8118 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8119 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8121 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8122 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8123 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8124 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8126 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8127 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8128 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8130 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8131 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8133 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8134 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8136 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8139 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8140 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8141 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8143 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8147 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8148 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8149 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8150 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8151 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8153 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8154 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8155 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8156 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8157 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8158 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8159 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8160 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8162 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8163 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8167 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8169 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8171 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8172 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8174 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8175 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8180 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8181 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8183 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8185 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8187 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8188 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8189 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8190 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8194 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8195 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8196 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8197 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8198 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8199 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8200 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8202 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8203 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8204 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8206 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8207 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8208 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8209 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8210 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8211 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8213 if chan.is_usable() {
8214 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8215 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8216 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8217 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8218 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8224 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8226 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8227 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8228 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8229 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8230 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8231 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8232 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8233 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8234 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8235 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8236 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8238 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8239 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8241 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8242 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8243 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8244 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8246 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8247 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8248 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8249 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8251 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8252 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8253 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8254 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8256 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8257 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8258 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8259 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8260 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8261 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8262 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8265 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8266 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8269 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8272 purpose: payment.purpose,
8273 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8279 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8280 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
8281 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8283 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8284 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8288 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8290 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8291 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8292 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8293 router: args.router,
8295 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8297 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8298 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8299 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8300 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8302 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8303 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8304 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8305 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8306 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8307 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8309 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8314 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8316 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8318 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8319 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8320 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8321 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8322 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8324 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8325 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8326 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8328 logger: args.logger,
8329 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8332 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8333 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8334 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8335 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8336 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8339 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8340 //connection or two.
8342 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8348 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8349 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8350 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8351 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8352 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8353 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8354 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8355 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8356 use crate::ln::msgs;
8357 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8358 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8359 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8360 use crate::util::test_utils;
8361 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8362 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8365 fn test_notify_limits() {
8366 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8367 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8368 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8369 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8370 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8371 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8373 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8374 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8375 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8376 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8377 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8379 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8381 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8382 // to connect messages with new values
8383 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8384 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8385 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8386 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8387 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8388 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8390 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8391 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8392 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8393 // ... but the last node should not.
8394 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8395 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8396 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8397 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8399 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8400 // about the channel.
8401 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8402 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8403 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8405 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8407 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8408 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8409 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8410 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8411 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8412 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8414 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8415 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8416 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8418 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8419 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8420 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8421 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8422 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8423 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8425 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8426 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8427 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8428 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8429 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8430 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8431 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8432 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8434 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8435 // the channel info has updated.
8436 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8437 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8438 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8439 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8440 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8441 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8445 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8446 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8448 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8449 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8450 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8451 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8452 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8454 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8455 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8456 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8457 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8459 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8460 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8461 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8462 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8463 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8464 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8465 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8466 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8468 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8469 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8470 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8472 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8473 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8474 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8476 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8477 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8478 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8479 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8480 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8482 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8483 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8484 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8486 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8487 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8488 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8489 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8490 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8491 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8492 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8493 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8494 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8496 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8497 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8498 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8500 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8501 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8502 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8504 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8505 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8506 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8507 // lightning messages manually.
8508 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8509 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8512 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8513 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8514 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8516 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8517 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8519 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8520 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8522 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8523 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8524 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8526 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8527 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8528 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8530 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8532 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8534 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8535 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8538 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8539 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8540 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8541 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8543 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8544 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8545 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8546 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8548 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8551 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8552 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8553 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8554 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8556 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8559 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8560 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8561 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8562 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8564 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8569 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8570 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8571 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8572 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8573 // fails as expected.
8574 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8575 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8576 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8577 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8578 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8579 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8580 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8582 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8583 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8584 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8586 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8587 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8588 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
8589 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8591 let route = find_route(
8592 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8593 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8595 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8596 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8598 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8599 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8600 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8601 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8602 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8604 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8605 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8606 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8607 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8608 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8610 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8611 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8612 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8613 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8614 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8615 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8616 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8617 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8618 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8620 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8621 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8623 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8624 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8625 let route = find_route(
8626 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8627 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8629 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8630 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8632 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8633 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8634 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8635 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8636 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8638 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8639 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8640 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8641 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8643 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8644 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8645 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8646 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8647 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8649 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8650 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8651 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8653 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8654 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8655 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8656 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8657 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8658 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8659 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8660 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8661 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8663 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8664 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8668 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8669 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8670 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8671 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8672 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8673 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8674 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8676 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8677 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8679 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8680 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8681 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
8682 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8684 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8685 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8686 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8687 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8688 let route = find_route(
8689 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8690 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8693 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8694 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8695 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8696 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8697 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8698 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8701 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8702 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8703 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8704 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8705 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8706 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8707 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8709 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8713 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8714 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
8715 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
8716 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
8717 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
8718 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8719 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8720 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
8721 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8723 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8724 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8726 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8727 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8728 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
8729 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8731 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8732 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8733 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8734 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8735 let route = find_route(
8736 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8737 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8740 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8741 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8742 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8743 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8744 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8745 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8746 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8747 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8750 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8751 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8752 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8753 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8754 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8755 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8756 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8758 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8762 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8763 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8764 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8765 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8766 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8768 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8769 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8770 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8771 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8773 // Marshall an MPP route.
8774 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8775 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8776 route.paths.push(path);
8777 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8778 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8779 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8780 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8781 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8782 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8784 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8785 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8787 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8788 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8790 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8795 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8796 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8797 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8798 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8799 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8801 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8803 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8804 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8806 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8807 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8809 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8812 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8813 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8814 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8815 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8816 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8817 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8820 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8823 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8824 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8829 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8830 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8831 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8832 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8833 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8834 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8836 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8837 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8839 total_msat: 100_000,
8842 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8843 // payment verification fails as expected.
8844 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8845 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8846 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8847 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8849 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8853 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8854 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8858 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8859 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8860 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8861 // the channel is successfully closed.
8862 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8863 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8864 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8865 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8867 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8868 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8869 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8870 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8871 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8873 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8874 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8876 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8877 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8878 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8879 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8882 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8884 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8885 // as it has the funding transaction.
8886 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8887 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8888 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8891 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8893 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8895 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8897 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8898 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8899 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8901 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8904 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8905 // as it has the funding transaction.
8906 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8907 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8908 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8911 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8912 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8914 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8915 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8916 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8917 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8919 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8920 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8921 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8922 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8924 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8925 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8927 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8928 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8929 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8930 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8931 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8932 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8933 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8937 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8938 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8939 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8940 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8941 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8942 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8943 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8946 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8948 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8949 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8950 // closing transaction).
8951 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8952 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8953 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8955 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8956 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8957 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8958 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8959 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8962 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8964 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8966 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8967 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8968 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8970 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8972 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8973 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8976 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8977 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8978 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8981 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8982 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8983 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8986 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8988 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8989 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8991 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8992 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8994 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8995 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9000 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9001 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9002 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9003 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9004 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9005 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9006 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9007 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9010 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9011 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9012 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9014 // Test the API functions.
9015 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9017 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9019 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9021 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9023 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9025 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9027 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9031 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9032 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9033 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9034 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9035 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9036 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9038 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9040 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9041 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9043 let mut funding_tx = None;
9044 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9045 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9046 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9049 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9050 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9051 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9052 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9053 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9055 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9057 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9059 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9061 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9063 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9065 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9068 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9069 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9070 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9071 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9072 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9074 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9075 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9077 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9078 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9079 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9080 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9081 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9082 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9083 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9085 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9086 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9087 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9088 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9090 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9091 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9092 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9093 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9094 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9095 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9096 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9098 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9099 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9100 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9101 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9103 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9104 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9105 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9106 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9108 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9109 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9111 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9112 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9113 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9114 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9115 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9117 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9118 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9119 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9121 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9122 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9123 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9125 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9126 // "protected" and can connect again.
9127 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9128 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9129 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9130 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9132 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9134 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9135 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9139 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9140 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9141 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9142 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9143 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9144 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9146 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9148 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9149 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9151 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9152 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9153 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9154 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9157 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9159 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9160 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9161 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9163 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9164 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9165 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9167 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9169 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9170 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9174 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9175 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9176 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9177 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9178 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9179 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9180 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9181 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9182 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9184 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9186 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9187 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9189 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9190 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9191 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9192 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9193 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9194 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9196 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9197 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9199 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9200 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9202 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9204 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9205 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9208 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9209 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9210 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9211 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9212 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9213 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9214 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9216 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9217 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9218 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9219 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9225 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9226 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9228 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9229 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9230 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9232 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9233 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9237 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9242 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9243 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9244 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9245 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9246 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9248 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9249 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9250 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9251 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9252 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9254 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9255 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9256 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9258 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9259 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9261 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9262 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9267 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9268 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9270 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9271 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9273 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9277 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
9279 use crate::chain::Listen;
9280 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9281 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9282 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9283 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9284 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9285 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9286 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9287 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9288 use crate::util::test_utils;
9289 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9291 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9292 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9293 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9295 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9299 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9300 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9301 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9302 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9303 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9304 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9305 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9307 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9308 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9310 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9311 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9313 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9315 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9320 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
9321 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9324 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9325 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9326 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9328 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9330 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9331 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9332 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9333 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9334 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9336 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9337 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9339 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9340 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9341 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9342 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9344 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9346 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9348 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9349 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9350 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9351 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9352 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9354 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9356 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9358 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9359 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9360 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9361 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9362 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9365 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9366 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9367 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9369 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9370 } else { panic!(); }
9372 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9373 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9374 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9376 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9377 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9379 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9382 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9383 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9384 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9386 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9387 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9389 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9392 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9394 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
9395 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9396 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9398 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9399 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9400 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9401 match msg_events[0] {
9402 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9403 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9404 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9408 match msg_events[1] {
9409 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9413 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9414 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9416 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9417 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9419 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9422 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9423 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9425 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9426 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9428 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9431 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9432 macro_rules! send_payment {
9433 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9434 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9435 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9436 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9437 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9439 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9440 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9442 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9443 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9444 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9445 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9446 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9447 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9448 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9449 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9450 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9451 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9452 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9454 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9455 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9456 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9457 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9459 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9460 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9461 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9462 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9463 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9465 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9468 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9469 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9470 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9471 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9473 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9478 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9479 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);